Europaudvalget 2000-01
EUU Alm.del Bilag 612
Offentligt
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Modtaget via elektronisk post. Der tages forbehold for evt. fejl
Europaudvalget
(Alm. del - bilag 612)
udenrigsministerråd
(Offentligt)
_____________________________________________
ERU, Alm. del - bilag 157 (Løbenr. 8012)
MPU, Alm. del - bilag 569 (Løbenr. 8123)
FLF, Alm. del - bilag 387 (Løbenr. 8485)
URU, Alm. del - bilag 134 (Løbenr. 8512)
UPN, FT del - bilag FT 84 (Løbenr. 8517)
Medlemmerne af Folketingets Europaudvalg
og deres stedfortrædere
Bilag
1
Journalnummer
400.C.2-0
Kontor
EU-sekr.
5. januar 2001
Til underretning for Folketingets Europaudvalg vedlægges Udenrigsministeriets notat vedr. ny frihandelsrunde:
Nyt oplæg fra EU-Kommissionen.
NOTAT
Udenrigsministeriet
Nordgruppen
Til:
Folketingets Europaudvalg
Udenrigsministeriet
Ny frihandelsrunde: Nyt oplæg fra EU-
Kommissionen
J.nr.:
N.4, 97.A.40/a
i) MD 574/00
3. januar 2001
Fra:
Bilag:
Emne:
Dato:
Baggrund
Det multilaterale samarbejde for øget frihandel udvikler sig gennem en række forhandlingsforløb, de såkaldte runder.
Uruguay-Runden, der er den seneste af disse, afsluttedes i 1994 og førte bl.a. til etableringen af WTO i 1995. Det var
forventet, at en ny frihandelsrunde ville blive lanceret på WTO{{PU2}}s tredje ministerkonference i Seattle i december
1999. Dette lykkedes imidlertid ikke, og forhandlingerne om lanceringen af en ny runde måtte ved konferencens tning
suspenderes.
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Siden da har mulighederne for indledning af en ny runde været diskuteret i en lang række fora, herunder WTO, OECD, EU,
samt ved diverse internationale topmøder. Arbejdet har generelt været rettet mod at imødekomme udviklingslandenes ønsker
til en ny runde, at genopbygge tilliden til WTO samt at skabe en fælles forståelse af handelspolitiske emner.
Et af problemerne med hensyn til igangsættelse af en ny runde har bestået i en kløft mellem i- og u-lande, der er kendetegnet
ved, at udviklingslandene i høj grad afviser emner, der ikke hører til den klassiske handelspolitiske dagsorden, såsom miljø,
arbejdstagerrettigheder, forbrugerbeskyttelse samt investerings- og konkurrenceregler. Fra EU{{PU2}}s side har man på den
anden side hidtil ønsket en bred dagsorden, der også o r disse nye emner, ud fra det synspunkt, at alene inddragelsen af alle
handelspolitiske emner kan sikre vedtagelse af en samlet pakke med fordele for alle parter.
Ligeledes har der været en forskel i USA{{PU2}}s og EU{{PU2}}s ønsker om bredden af dagsordenen for en ny runde. Fra
USA{{PU2}}s side har man tilstræbt en relativt smal runde koncentreret om afvikling af landbrugssubsidier, nedsættelse af
industritoldsatser, regler for offentligt udbud, elektronisk handel og arbejdsrettigheder.
Konkret er kløften mellem i- og u-landene blevet forsøgt reduceret ved at tilbyde u-landene en såkaldt minipakke, der bl.a.
indeholder øgede midler til finansiering af faglig bistand, bedre markedsadgang og overgangsperioder for implementering af
de forpligtelser, som u-landene påtog sig som en del af Uruguay-Aftalen.
Den fjerde ministerkonference skal i henhold til WTO-aftalen afholdes senest i december 2001. Nye
frihandelsrunder er traditionelt blevet lanceret på ministerkonferencer, men der eksisterer ingen formelle krav,
hvad det angår.
Grundlaget for EU{{PU2}}s arbejde er de rådskonklusioner, der blev vedtaget den 26. oktober 1999, og som i vid
udstrækning afspejler det danske regeringsgrundlag, Folketingets vedtagelser af 11. maj 1999 (V 81) og 4. november 1999 (V
16) samt det af Folketingets Europaudvalg tiltrådte forhandlingsoplæg forud for vedtagelsen af ovennævnte
rådskonklusioner.
Oplæggets indhold
Kommissionen har i artikel 133-komitéen fremlagt et oplæg til en mere fleksibel EU-holdning i spørgsmålet om igangsættelse
af en ny multilateral forhandlingsrunde i WTO.
Hovedtanken i Kommissionens oplæg er, at det er nødvendigt for EU at imødekomme udviklingslandenes krav på en række
områder. Kommissionen finder således, at EU bør inkludere spørgsmålene om bedre markedsadgang for tekstiler og
lempeligere anti-dumping-regler i forhandlingerne.
Et andet element i Kommissionens oplæg er, at det ikke skønnes realistisk at opnå WTO-medlemslandenes opbakning til, at
der skal indledes WTO-forhandlinger om en multilateral investeringsaftale og om en WTO-aftale på konkurrenceområdet.
Kommissionen foreslår derfor, at der i WTO åbnes for forhandlinger om disse to spørgsmål, men at det til sin tid vil være op
til hvert enkelt WTO-medlemsland at afgøre, om man ønsk er at tilslutte sig en eventuel aftale eller ej. Derved vil der kunne
indgås såkaldte plurilaterale aftaler, hvor et antal WTO-medlemslande undertegner en aftale fra begyndelsen, hvorefter de
øvrige WTO-medlemslande vil kunne tilslutte sig aftalen på det tidspunkt, de måtte ønske det.
Et tredje element vedrører miljøområdet, hvor Kommissionen foreslår, at EU går bort fra tanken om, at der skal foretages
egentlige regelændringer i WTO-aftalesystemet. En sådan regelændring kunne være en omskrivning af GATT{{PU2}}s
artikel XX, der vedrører fravigelse af ikke-diskriminationsprincippet, hvis der er tale om beskyttelse af menneskers eller dyrs
liv eller sundhed (forsigtighedsprincippet).
Et fjerde element i Kommissionens oplæg er, at EU opgiver tanken om at få handel og arbejds-tagerrettigheder (under
overskriften "trade and social development") inkluderet i selve WTO-runden. Kommissionen foreslår, at der med inddragelse
af flere internationale organisationer (f.eks. ILO, UNCTAD og Verdensbanken) etableres en dialog med udviklingslandene,
men uden at et resultat af drøftelserne gøres til en forudsætning for indgåelse a f en ny WTO-aftale. Forslaget indebærer, at
handel og arbejdstagerrettigheder tages ud af konceptet om "single undertaking" (intet er vedtaget før alt er vedtaget), der har
været et hovedelement i den hidtidige EU-strategi.
Endelig ønsker Kommissionen, på samme måde som med arbejdstagerrettigheder, at spørgsmålet om reformer af WTO
{{PU2}}s funktionsmåde gøres uafhængigt af selve rundeforhandlingerne.
Formandskabet og Kommissionen sigter mod en vedtagelse af ændrede rådskonklusioner under rådsmødet
(udenrigsministre) den 26.-27. februar 2001. Forud herfor vil sagen på sædvanlig vis blive forelagt for Folketingets
Europaudvalg.
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N.4, den 3. januar 2001
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
Directorate-General for Trade
Brussels, 13 December 2000
I.D.1/JC D(2000)
Note for the Attention of the 133 Committee (Full Members)
Subject: State of Play and Strategy for the New WTO Round
Purpose:
document for discussion attached
Origin:
DG Trade
133 COMMITTEE
MD :
574/00
SOURCE :
Commission
FOR :
Discussion
DATE RECEIVED :
13/12/00
Note for the Attention of the 133 Committee
STATE OF PLAY AND STRATEGY FOR THE NEW WTO ROUND
Introduction
The next WTO Ministerial should launch the New Round of trade negotiations, on a basis which will be in the interests of all
Members, developed and developing. However, in pursuing the launch of a Round, WTO Members, including the EU, must
learn from the lessons of the failed Seattle Conference, which are still relevant. In particular, it must be recognised that
Seattle failed, not simply because of faulty preparation and bad organisation , but also because the agenda was not sufficient
to accommodate the interests of the membership as a whole {{SPA}} and in particular of developing countries. Seattle both
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confirmed the growing weight and importance of developing countries in the multilateral system, and at the same time
demonstrated that the WTO system has not, so far, adequately responded to their interests and needs {{SPA}} and in
particular those of the least developed countries.
Until and unless all WTO Members recognise this, and make efforts to make the WTO more relevant and responsive to
developing countries{{PU2}} needs {{SPA}} in particular the aims of sustainable economic growth, institutional stability
and the alleviation of poverty - the multilateral system is condemned to continue to drift, contrary to the long term interests
of all Members of the WTO.
The Community is well positioned to defend and promote the WTO{{PU2}}s system of multilateral co-operation, trade
liberalisation and rule-making. Our initiative to launch a New Round of trade negotiations is the most visible example of this
role, and our belief in the value to all Members of such a round is undiminished. However, following extensive contacts with
developing country partners over the last year, and having reflected carefully on the underlying reasons for the failure of Se
we have concluded that, if a new round is to be launched, it can only be launched - or indeed be successfully concluded - if
the interests of developing countries are more explicitly and firmly integrated in all areas and at all stages.
Although most industrialised, and some developing countries do share the thrust of our approach
towards a round, substantive difficulties came from the United States and or from a number of
developing countries, the common denominator being a certain scepticism or resistance towards
further deepening and broadening of multilateral co-operation, negotiation and rule-making. We
therefore need to rebuild developing country support for the WTO and for its further develo pment
through new negotiations, which as noted above can only be done if their interests are firmly
reflected. The remainder of this note identifies the different areas in which WTO Members, including
the EU, need to pay much greater attention to resolving problems identified by developing countries
while still safeguarding our own
substantive interests.
Current State of Play
Over the last year the EU has continued to press the case in favour of a comprehensive trade round, but with uneven
success. Although a number of developing WTO members support negotiations beyond the built in agenda, there is
opposition to what is still perceived as an excessively ambitious, or in other respects insufficient, rule-making agenda,
including that relating to investment and competition or measures taken for the protection of the environment.
Notwithstanding this reti cence over the rule-making agenda, several developing countries have nonetheless pressed for a
wide review of WTO rules under the heading of implementation, as well as for improved access to developed country
markets. As regards market access issues, while developing countries welcome our readiness to negotiate, there is
growing insistence that any further WTO negotiations should have a specific developmental focus.
Opposition to any discussion of trade and labour standards remains strong, due to the fear that this could also lead
eventually to the imposition of trade sanctions for non-observance of core labour standards.
The resistance of a number of Asian developing countries to a comprehensive Round covering some or all of the rules
issues was seen clearly at the recent APEC Summit in Brunei. Several Asian members of APEC remain adamant that a
new Round can only be launched once there is consensus on a carefully defined agenda and they reject the idea of a
comprehensive, potentially open-ended approach in which any issue, including labour, risks (in their view) being
introduced into negotiations.
The majority of African and least developed countries have also stressed, most recently in Libreville, that their priority is
implementation of existing Uruguay Round commitments, and better market access for their agricultural and other
products, together with measures to build domestic capacity and carry out structural adjustment.
Against this background, some developed and developing countries have argued for a more limited negotiation, as can be
seen in the proposals for, variously, a market access-only Round, an incremental approach (beginning with market access
and possibly trade facilitation and progressively adding any other issues on which there is agreement to negotiate), or the
division of the negotiations into different {{PU1}}phases{{PU2}}, {{PU1}}clusters{{PU2}} or {{PU1}}baskets
{{PU2}}. All of these ap im {{SPA}} to launch negotiations soon on a limited agenda (the built in agenda, market
access, possibly trade facilitation and, for some, issues like procurement transparency, a few selected TRIPS issues,
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E-commerce), while either dropping entirely or postponing to a later date any decision regarding the negotiation of any
other topics.
The risk inherent in all these approaches is the same, namely that, once negotiations begin on a limited agenda, a
consensus would never be reached to start negotiations on the other issues. This may or may not be the intention of those
countries suggesting an incremental or phased approach, but it is very likely to be the result.
There are both strong economic and systemic reasons why all Members of the WTO should welcome the introduction of
investment and competition rules in the WTO, while for equally important reasons it is essential to clarify further the
WTO{{PU2}}s rules pertaining to environment and consumer health and safety. A negotiation confined to market
access alone will also make it impossible to address developing country objectives in areas such as trade defence, TBT
and other areas. Strengthening O rules in all these areas is necessary if the WTO is to come to grips with real obstacles to
market access in a globalising economy, and to reduce the risk of friction or contradiction between trade policy and other
public policy issues.
Indeed, a multilateral agenda which includes investment, competition and the environment entails substantial benefits
both for developing countries and for the strength {{SPA}} and continued relevance {{SPA}} of the multilateral system.
This would particularly so if three conditions are met : a) new rules should be realistic and sufficiently flexible to meet
developing country needs ; b) any new rules should go together with a substantial capacity building exercise ; and c)
country market access concerns must be an integral part of any trade and environment agenda.
More broadly, public support for the WTO system is likely to be undermined if the WTO is (however wrongly) seen as
an obstacle to legitimate action on issues like environment, health and safety etc, and if governments are seen as being
incapable of working together to resolve issues. In cases where WTO rules are uncertain, it is essential that Members
themselves, rather than the dispute settlement system, take the lead to clarify and interpret the law through discussion
and negotia tion.
In sum, the multilateral system will be at risk through inaction on the part of its members. There is a real risk of the
WTO becoming sclerotic or regarded as irrelevant or, worse, an obstacle to legitimate national action in the « trade and
{{NEL}}. » areas, unless negotiations encompassing both market access and rule making can be launched soon. In the
longer term this situation will be in the interests of no-one.
The Need for a New Approach
Against this background the approach to the Round needs to be reassessed, and the interests and concerns expressed by
developing countries fully recognised and reflected in its agenda. The EU is probably the best placed to bridge the
differences between interests of the industrialised and developing countries and to build a consensus that would firmly
integrate the priorities of developing countries
{{SPA}}
within a new Round. We should now seek to do this, through a
negoti agenda that would reflect developing country interests in a substantive way, be this in relation to the built in
agenda, market access, rule making or other areas. The negotiating process in itself should also be transparent and
designed in a way that facilitates the greatest possible participation by developing countries.
As far as the specific rule making agenda is concerned, we must launch negotiations that would include investment,
competition and environment. But we need to examine, in each area that has met with significant developing country
opposition, the reasons for this and how best to accommodate these concerns. The particular circle to be squared
therefore is : how can a Round be launched that includes investment, competition and environment, but in a way that
responds to the interes ts of all Members, and in particular developing countries?
The remainder of this note seeks to identify the specific adjustments of approach that would be necessary and feasible in
order to make the development aspects of a new round more operational, both in respect of the three rules-related
questions referred to above (investment, competition, environment) and other issues.
Investment and Competition
Investment and competition have been constantly mischaracterised as issues on which the EU is demandeur and for
which, therefore, the EU should « pay » in order to have them on the agenda of a new round. The reality is different,
since the introduction of basic rules in both areas is likely to benefit developing countries at least as much as
industrialised members, whether it be in terms of attracting investment (which developing countries need), or addressing
anti-compe titive practises (on which, paradoxically, the ldc{{PU2}}s have for many years sought international
disciplines).
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Notwithstanding this misperception of investment and competition, it is clear that if we are to break the logjam and
launch a Round, we will have to adapt our approach. There are two possible ways forward. The first would be to accept a
degree of phasing within these two subjects : launching negotiations on a modest agenda and reserving for a later
consensus decision any extension of negotiations to those aspects that are currently more disputed.
The advantage of this approach is that it would bring both subjects under basic multilateral discipline. It would also, by
definition, go a long way to meet developing country concerns over an excessive agenda : negotiations covering only, for
example, a number of very insubstantial provisions would not be burdensome or, in most cases, entail any or much
domestic policy change. The major disadvantage of such an approach is inherent in its very modesty : it would condemn
t he WTO to a very low level of ambition without any guarantee that further commitments could be negotiated in the
future. The current agenda on both investment and competition is already quite modest and it is difficult to see how it
could be made even more so without making it virtually meaningless.
A second
{{SPA}}
and better
-
option would be to provide that agreements on investment and competition need not be
concluded by all WTO members {{SPA}} ie openness to plurilateral agreements. Negotiations on both subjects would
be launched and concluded at the same time as the other subjects in the Round and be open for participation by all
Members, but the negotiating mandate for a Round would state, explicitly, that countries will retain their freedom to
subscribe or not t s in these two areas at the end of the Round. The objective would of course continue to be to negotiate
agreements that would be attractive to and which can be concluded by all WTO Members. The substance of the
negotiating mandates should therefore be based on the flexible approach reflected in our current proposals.
This approach has two advantages. First, we would not have to dilute further our already modest level of ambition in
either area in order to make the negotiations acceptable to all. Second, such an approach would respond to concerns of
developing countries about entering into a negotiation that is beyond their capacity to handle. They could participate in
the negotiations and choose at the end of the process whether to join or not, based on their own assessment of the merits
of the agree ments (which they would have helped to design) , and their own domestic absorption capacity. If some
developing country resistance is also tactically motivated, it could hardly be sustained if such an approach were chosen.
Openness to a plurilateral approach however entails certain risks. The first is that one may at the end of the day not have
the necessary critical mass to make the agreements worthwhile. Our assessment is that notwithstanding this risk, in both
areas we should be able to get the key countries into both agreements. In the case of investment, countries will have an
incentive to join an agreement, since to stay away would send a negative signal to foreign investors. In the case of
competitio n, countries with a competition law (ie the great majority) should have no substantive problem in joining and
should be attracted by a basic WTO agreement of this type.
The other potential disadvantage of a plurilateral approach is that it opens the possibility of a two tier system of rules -
different levels of commitment by different Members. Some Members may then seek plurilateral approaches to other
areas of negotiation, such as environment, trade facilitation or TRIPS, or existing areas of WTO. We tend however, to
expect (for the reasons suggested above) that most Members will join in the end, and that the systemic risks can be
contained.
Overall, the plurilateral approach suggested above would show that we have learned about the need to take account of
the capacity of developing countries to negotiate and implement new rules. It would at the same time increase the
likelihood of the US being more supportive of a broad round. The suggested approach would give developing countries
the necessary guarantee that they would retain their freedom to make a judgement about the developmental benefits of
such agreements all the way u p to the point of conclusion of the new negotiations.
Trade and the Environment
Trade and environment, and related consumer health and safety questions are areas of the WTO{{PU2}}s existing rule-
book that will continue to require adjustment and fine tuning as our societies develop. Here, the Community has a
carefully defined and non-protectionist agenda, the aim of which would be to obtain a multilaterally agreed clarification
of existing GATT/WTO rules as they pertain to environment and consumer safety issues Such an approach will not
result in legitimati forms of trade restrictions, but would instead increase predictability for traders and environmental
policy makers alike, and at the same time address developing country market access concerns and capacity constraints in
the areas of TBT and SPS, which are of high priority to some developing countries.
Already the EU has begun in the WTO to present elements of its approach (starting with the relationship between WTO
and MEAs). Our belief firmly remains that developing countries have nothing to fear from a negotiation, but nonetheless
confidence levels would rise if we make it clear that a) the exercise is focused on the clarification of existing rules, rather
than the amendment of the WTO rule book; b) the agenda is sufficiently precise and self-contained (essentially seeking
to cl arify the WTO/MEA relationship, the extent to which Members may use labelling schemes, and the application of
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the precautionary principle); and c) any mandate will spell out explicitly that the negotiations should not result in any
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or to any form of disguised restriction on trade, and should address developing
country market access concerns and capacity constraints.
Other Rules Questions
Trade defence
continues to be an important issue for many developing countries who {{SPA}} as we have seen from
the discussions on WTO implementation {{SPA}} are interested in modifying the provisions of the Anti Dumping and
Subsidies Agreements, in particular to make more operational the concept of special and differential treatment. While
some concerns of developing countries may be resolved through the implementation work programme, it is likely that
most questions can only be addr egotiation as they may imply modifying the agreements. The EU is not seeking
modification of either agreement but, as noted in the October 1999 Council conclusions on the new round, we recognise
the right of developing countries to seek improvements, and we must be prepared to address this in a Round.
We should therefore in the coming months as we seek agreement on the launch of a Round indicate openness to
negotiate on anti dumping and subsidies, without prejudice of course to the outcome, and provided that core elements of
the Agreements concerned remain. The EU should seek to act as an honest broker by finding a compromise between
those countries advocating an ambitious agenda on trade defence and those who are more cautious. One way might be to
include a strengthening of the discip lines of the Agreements, in particular in the area of reviews, in addition to
addressing questions relating to the application of special and differential treatment.
Other rules areas
such as the review of the
DSU,
and the extension of the
TRIPS
agreement to cover additional
geographical indications, are also important for some developing countries. In these areas our current approach is already
largely compatible with the interests of developing countries, and we should seek agreement with them on the
negotiating agenda. We should in addition indicate openness to addressing the concerns raised by developing countries
over the rel ationship between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the question of
traditional knowledge, and the WTO-related aspects of access to medicines.
As regards
Trade Facilitation,
this is an issue of interest to both developed and developing WTO Members and one in
which all stand to benefit. However, in seeking in a Round to create a suitable framework for the simplification of trade
procedures, the capacity constraints of developing countries, as well as the needs of small and medium sized enterprises
in these countries, should be addressed in a satisfactory way. Any rules should, among other things, answer the real
needs of d eveloping country importers and exporters, and programmes of technical assistance to build capacity should
be developed in parallel with negotiations.
As regards
Government Procurement,
we continue to believe that conclusion of a multilateral agreement on
transparency is both in the interest of all Members and is feasible in the near future. The negotiating mandate for the
Round could set this aim, while leaving open the possibility thereafter of further improvements to market access in
procurement.
As regards existing measures providing Special And Differential Treatment for developing countries, proposals have
been made to review these provisions across the board in order to see if they should be made more operational. The EU
should be receptive to such a review of S&D provisions as part of a mandate to review existing WTO rules within a
Round.
Last but certainly not least, regarding
Electronic Commerce,
clarification within a Round of the applicable rules, while
certainly of interest to the US, EU and Japan, is also of interest to a number of developing countries and is clearly an
issue where there is no North/South divide but where all Members stand to gain. Future work in the context of a new
round should aim to create new opportunities for the expansion of trade and, in particular, for greater participation in int
ernational trade on the part of developing country Members and for their small and medium sized enterprises. The EU
and other Members should ensure that, in any future discussions, developing countries{{PU2}} interests in the field of
electronic commerce are addressed and that no new barriers are created to transactions carried out electronically.
Market Access Issues
In a new round industrialised countries will have to demonstrate that the market access component will benefit developing
countries. As far as
agriculture
is concerned, we must create opportunities for increased market access for developing
countries, including stability and predictability of such access, while accepting the possible need for the most fragile
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developing countries to maintain protection in order to have adequate time for adaptati on. We must also be ready to reduce
trade distorting measures that may adversely affect developing country producers and exporters, while offering greater scope
to developing countries within the rules on domestic support to meet non-trade concerns of special relevance to them, such
as poverty alleviation and food security. Finally, we must work to ensure that the interests of net food importing developing
countries are safeguarded, particularly in the context of ensuring that food aid in no way damages loc al food production and
the marketing capacity of the recipient country.
As part of the launch of a Round, any further elaboration, of the negotiating mandate for agriculture, should open such
prospects to developing countries.
Developed countries should also, while maintaining the right to maintain SPS or TBT measures at the level appropriate to
fulfil legitimate health, safety and other policy objectives, focus significant attention and resources on enabling developing
countries to meet such regulatory requirements, so that the compliance burden does not become a de facto hindrance to their
export efforts.
As regards
non-agricultural
tariffs, the EU should persuade other industrialised countries to support a comprehensive tariff
cutting approach with no exclusions, in order to address among other things tariff peaks and tariff escalation, both of which
are of great interest to developing countries. At Seattle we also supported the concept of differentiation in the tariff
negotiating mandate. These elements should all feature in any future new round mandate on industrial tariff s, and the EU
should seek to persuade other industrialised countries of the merits of doing so.
As regards
Services, industrialised countries
will similarly need to show readiness to open further their markets in respect
of those sectors and modes of interest to developing countries, and to work constructively on the areas of services{{PU2}}
rules of importance to them. Again, greater precision and commitment in these directions can be given within {{SPA}} but
only within - a more substantive GATS mandate agreed as part of the launch of a Round. Both agriculture and se iations
would, at the same time, fall under any deadline established for a Round as a whole.
Trade and Social Development
As regards
trade and social development,
it has become increasingly apparent since Seattle that our objective of a dialogue
on this issue will only be secured if the issue is not limited to core labour standards but is extended explicitly to social
development, and if it is promoted on its own merits : outside a single undertaking, on its own timeframe, and in a multi-
institutional setting involving all relevant international organisations among which the WTO would be only one. In the
coming months as we work towards the launch of a Round, this clarification will be essential to reduce suspicion.
A continued clarification of our approach on trade and social development would therefore constitute an important element
of our overall presentation and message on how we approach a Round and the further development of the WTO. The same
basic logic is also true of the {{SPA}} admittedly less sensitive {{SPA}} issue of
WTO reform,
where we seek to establish a
work programme to look at possible institutional improvements that would be of interest to all Members {{SPA}} but
which aga ed on their own merits in parallel to, rather than as an integral part of, a Round.
Conclusion
The Community should seek to build consensus around the approach described in this paper. As regards rules, this implies
pursuing a plurilateral approach for investment and competition, and giving greater precision as to our aims in trade and
environment. In other rule making areas industrialised countries should indicate openness to negotiations in areas of interest
to developing countries, while as regards the built in agenda negotiations we should be prepared, as part of a deci sion to
launch a Round, to agree upon negotiating guidelines that encompass in explicit ways the objectives of developing countries.
Any mandate to negotiate on non-agricultural tariffs should, similarly, encompass the objectives of developing countries. In
parallel to negotiations we should further develop programmes of technical cooperation to build capacity and to help
developing countries participate in negotiations. Institutional reform and the question of trade and social development
should be pursued on their own merits outside a Round.
The approach set out above is intended to ensure that the WTO can continue to be the principal forum for the management
of the international trading system in the 21
st
century, and avoid a drift {{SPA}} that may otherwise become irresistible -
towards bilateral or regional trade arrangements. This can only be accomplished if the WTO{{PU2}}s future agenda remains
sufficiently broad and ambitious to meet the interests of all Members and the various challenges of globalisa rather than
taking issues away from the agenda of a Round, we believe that industrialised countries should make adjustments to their
positions to better meet the concerns of developing countries, notably by strengthening considerably the development
dimension of future negotiations and, in the areas of investment and competition, adjusting the approach. In these ways,
without in any way sacrificing the comprehensive round, we will have clearly demonstrated our readiness to learn from
Seattle and from the experience of the past year, and to place the development agenda at the heart of a new trade round.
Ends. 13.12 .2000 ref jclarke/wto/133/Nrstrategypaper-12Dec2000final
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