Europaudvalget 2000-01
EUU Alm.del Bilag 870
Offentligt
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FINAL
FINAL REPORT
OF
THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN
ON
THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS
Brussels, 15 February 2001
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THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN
Chairman : Alexandre LAMFALUSSY
Cornelius HERKSTRÖTER
Luis Angel ROJO
Bengt RYDEN
Luigi SPAVENTA
Norbert WALTER
Nigel WICKS
Rapporteur : David WRIGHT
Secretariat : Pierre DELSAUX
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Preamble
Summary
Introduction
Chapter I
Chapter II
The reasons for change
Regulatory reform – the
Committee’s recommendations
The Committee of Wise Men’s
recommendations
1
3
7
9
19
Annex 1
ECOFIN/European Council Conclusions
43
Annex 2
Recommended timetable 2000-2004
45
Annex 3
Analysis of the comments on the initial report of
the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of
European Securities Markets
46
Annex 4
Two illustrative examples of the new regulatory
approach
52
Annex 5
The Committee’s initial report published on 7
November 2000
67
Abbreviations
115
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1
PREAMBLE
This document constitutes the Committee of Wise Men’s final report
on the Regulation of European Securities Markets in accordance with
the Committee’s terms of reference which were defined by the
European Union’s Economic and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN
) on 17
July 2000.
It is presented in the context of the ECOFIN’s Conclusions of 26/27
November 2000 (see Annex 1) which requested that the Committee’s
final report be ready by the middle of February 2001. ECOFIN
Ministers particularly emphasized that the final report should refine
the regulatory proposals in the Committee’s initial report, taking fully
into account the institutional balance in the Treaty and the role of
national regulators. Operational recommendations were requested.
These Conclusions also stated that the ECOFIN Council would
examine the Committee’s final recommendations at the beginning of
March, in order for measures to be taken at the Stockholm European
Council of Heads of State and Government on 23/24 March 2001.
The ECOFIN Council also requested that discussions should
advance with the European Parliament.
The Nice European Council in December 2000 (see Annex 1) also
gave its broad agreement to the findings in the Committee’s initial
report and confirmed the invitation to the Council of Ministers and the
European Commission to report back at the Stockholm European
Council on the basis of the Committee’s final report.
The Chairman of the Committee of Wise Men, Alexandre Lamfalussy,
and members of the Committee would like to thank once again the
French and Swedish Presidencies of the European Union; the
President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi; European
Commissioners Frits Bolkestein and Mario Monti; the Chairperson of
the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs
Committee, Christa Randzio-Plath, and the members of this
Committee; the Director General of the European Commission’s
Internal Market Directorate General, John Mogg; the Director General
of the Commission’s Legal Service, Jean-Louis Dewost; the
Jurisconsulte of the Council, Jean-Claude Piris; the Chairman of
FESCO (the Forum of European Securities Commissions), Georg
Wittich; Members of FESCO, and the Secretary General of FESCO,
Fabrice Demarigny, for their invaluable assistance and cooperation.
The Committee again thanks all those who have taken part in its
The Committee’s
final report based
on ECOFIN
mandate
ECOFIN
(26/27November
2000) requested
the Committee to
refine regulatory
proposals and
produce
operational
recommendations
for Stockholm
European Council
23/24 March 2001
Broad agreement
on Committee’s
initial findings at
Nice European
Council
Acknowledgements
A list of abbreviations can be found in Annex.
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hearings and those organizations and individuals who responded to
its original questionnaire and more recently to the initial report. The
scale of interest in the Committee’s work has enriched its reflections.
Finally, the Committee would like to thank the Rapporteur, David
Wright, and the Secretary of the Committee, Pierre Delsaux, and their
staffs, for their constructive and efficient contribution to their work.
They displayed professionalism, imagination and loyalty to the
Committee’s gradually evolving consensus view, whilst sparing no
effort to respect the very tight timetable.
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SUMMARY OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN’S RECOMMENDATIONS
Subject
CHAPTER I -
“The reasons for change”
Recommendation
(The precise wording of all the
recommendations are in the text)
Carry out research work and publish quantitative
estimates as soon as possible (new
“Cecchini”
study) and continuously benchmark progress
towards an integrated European Financial Market.
(see p. 9)
Ensure appropriate environment is developed in
the EU (see p. 10)
Action
Economic benefits of
integrated markets
European Commission,
also with Member
States and markets
Supply of equity and risk
capital for SME’s
Differences in legal
systems and taxation;
political, external trade
and cultural barriers
Priorities of the Financial
Services Action Plan
European regulatory and
supervisory structures
Clearing and settlement
Must not be ignored if full benefits of integrated
European financial methods are to be assured.
Furthermore, establish comprehensive list of
external trade barriers to be removed in the next
Trade Round (see p. 11)
Adopt by end 2003
Single prospectus for issuers
Modernize admission to listing
Home country control for all wholesale
members and definition of professional investor
Modernize investment rules for UCITS and
pension funds
Adopt International Accounting Standards
Single passport for recognized stock
markets(see p. 13)
Encourage convergence to ensure European
Securities Regulators Committee works efficiently
(see p. 15/16)
Further restructuring necessary; pursue work in
ISD review and Giovannini Group; consider
whether regulatory framework needed; examine
general systemic issues, in the context of
monetary policy and smooth functioning of
payment systems; on competition issues – careful
examination is required by the European
Commission (see p. 16/17)
Strengthen cooperation between financial market
regulators, institutions in charge of micro and
macro supervision and cross-sectoral regulators
(see p. 17)
European Commission,
European Parliament,
Council of Ministers,
Member States
European Commission,
European Parliament,
Council of Ministers,
Member States,
markets
European Commission,
European Parliament,
Council of Ministers,
Member States
Member States,
European regulators,
European Commission
European Commission,
Council of Ministers,
European Parliament,
Member States,
European Central Bank,
markets
Managing prudential
implications of integrated
markets
Resources
Improve the allocation of resources devoted to the
task of building an integrated European
securities/financial market (see p. 17/18)
Improve the deployment of best regulation and
common understanding throughout the European
Union (see p. 18)
Economic and Finance
Committee, European
Central Bank and
national central banks,
European Commission,
European Parliament,
Member States and
European regulators
European Commission,
European Parliament,
regulators
Private sector, markets,
European Commission,
regulators
Training
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CHAPTER II –
“Regulatory reform : the Committee’s recommendations”
Subject
Regulatory reform
Recommendation
Establish new 4 level regulatory approach at
European Council in Stockholm and ensure it
functions by end 2001 (see p. 20)
Future securities market legislation to be based,
case by case, on framework principles (Level 1)
and implementing principles in Level 2, within a
broad conceptual framework (see p. 22-24)
Establish new open, transparent consultation
mechanisms with:
- Strengthened and open dialogue with market
participants and end users
- Results of consultation published
- Deadlines for each stage
- Consult Member States/regulators early on
Level 1 proposals
- Inform European Parliament on an informal
basis and seek, wherever possible, early non-
binding understandings on scope of
implementing powers in Level 2 (see p. 25)
Action
European Commission,
European Parliament,
Council of Ministers,
regulators
European Commission,
Council, of Ministers
European Parliament,
regulators, markets
European Commission
with European
Parliament, regulators,
market participants
Level 1 – Framework
principles
Level 1 consultation and
transparency mechanisms
Level 2 implementing
details
Level 2 consultation
procedures and
transparency
Institutional balance
Set up 2 new committees (i)
European
Securities Committee
(ESC), (ii)
European
Securities Regulators Committee
(ESRC) and
ensure functioning by end 2001
Agree on working methods and mandates (see
p. 28-32)
Strengthened consultation process (see page
32/33)
Ensure periodic reporting and full transparency to
European Parliament at all times.
European Commission to take
“utmost account”
of
European Parliament Resolutions…(see p. 33-35)
ESRC responsibility
Objectives:
- Consistent guidelines for administrative
regulations
- Joint interpretative recommendations, common
standards
- Compare and review regulatory practices
- Carry out peer reviews (see p. 37/38)
Strengthened enforcement of Community rules
(see p. 40)
Council of Ministers,
European Commission,
European Parliament,
regulators
Regulators, European
Commission
European Commission,
European Parliament,
Council of Ministers
Regulators, Member
States, European
Commission
Level 3
Strengthened cooperation
Level 4
Enforcement
European Commission
with contributions from
Council of Ministers,
European Parliament
and market participants
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OTHER GENERAL REGULATORY RECOMMENDATIONS
Subject
Regulations and fast track
procedures
Regulatory convergence
Recommendation
Use whenever possible to speed up
interinstitutional agreements (see p. 26)
Short term:
ESRC members acting in Level 3
must be able to deliver undertakings made
Longer term:
more fundamental convergence will
be necessary (see p. 38)
Continuous process to monitor half-yearly the
effectiveness of the 4 level regulatory procedure
(see p. 40/41)
Action
European Commission,
European Parliament,
Council of Ministers
Member States,
regulators, European
Commission
Monitoring the regulatory
system
Full review 2004
Full and open review (cf. IGC in 2004) (see p. 41)
New monitoring
committee composed of
two external nominees
from Council of
Ministers, European
Commission and
European Parliament
European Commission,
European Parliament,
Council of Ministers
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THE FOUR-LEVEL APPROACH RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMITTEE
LEVEL 1
Commission
adopts formal proposal for Directive/Regulation after a full consultation process
European Parliament
Council
Reach agreement on framework principles and definition of implementing powers in Directive/Regulation
LEVEL 2
Commission,
after consulting the
European Securities Committee,
requests advice
from the European Securities Regulators Committee on technical implementing
measures
European Securities Regulators Committee
prepares advice in consultation with market
participants, end-users and consumers, and
submits it to
Commission
European
Parliament
kept fully
informed and
can adopt a
Resolution if
measures
exceed
implementing
powers
Commission
examines the advice and makes a
proposal to
European Securities Committee
European Securities Committee
votes on
proposal within a maximum of 3 months
Commission
adopts measure
LEVEL 3
European Securities Regulators Committee
works on joint interpretation
recommendations, consistent guidelines and common standards (in areas not covered
by EU legislation), peer review, and compares regulatory practice to ensure consistent
implementation and application
LEVEL 4
Commission
checks Member State compliance with EU legislation
Commission
may take legal action against Member State suspected of breach of Community
Law
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INTRODUCTION
The Committee of Wise Men has been very encouraged by the
response to its initial report. In general, there has been widespread
support for the main thrust of its initial ideas. This was confirmed by
ECOFIN Ministers and the European Council at Nice.
There is broad agreement with the Committee’s initial diagnosis of
European financial markets and of the significant benefits that the
European Union could gain from constructing an integrated financial
market in the near future. As a result of the consultation process, the
Committee believes that there is a strong consensus on the need to
deliver the European Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan as
soon as possible, including accelerating work on some priority issues.
Chapter I of this final report sums up the key findings of the first 3
chapters of the Committee’s initial report.
The Committee notes that an almost consensual view has emerged
that the European Union’s current regulatory framework is too slow,
too rigid, complex and ill-adapted to the pace of global financial
market change. Moreover, almost everyone agrees that existing
rules and regulations are implemented differently and that therefore
inconsistencies occur in the treatment of the same type of business,
which threatens to violate the pre-requisite of the competitive
neutrality of supervision.
Almost all respondents stated that they were in favour of the
Committee’s regulatory proposals, with none objecting to the four
level structure outlined on pages 23-26 of its initial report. Whilst
Member States, the European Commission, the European Central
Bank, European regulators and market participants seem broadly
supportive, the European Parliament, in particular, has sought
assurance about the institutional implications of the 4 level regulatory
structure put forward. Chapter II of this report therefore develops in
greater detail the Committee’s regulatory proposals, and how they
would work in practice. It refines the Committee’s initial ideas –
including a number of new proposals and safeguards to ensure that
there is a proper and fair inter-institutional balance, anchored to
respect for the democratic processes at both national and European
Union levels. The importance of full transparency, flanked by an
open consultation process for both market participants and
consumers is given substantially more prominence in the light of
comments received.
Committee
encouraged by
response to initial
report
Broad agreement
on:
Diagnosis of the
problem and
benefits to be
gained
Need to
accelerate
FSAP priorities
Common view
that EU’s
regulatory
framework does
not work – hence
need for reform
Committee’s initial
regulatory
recommendations
strongly
supported
European
Parliament has
sought assurance
on institutional
balance
An analysis of all the comments received on the initial report is
Analysis of
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included in Annex 3.
Change in the legislative process is of central importance. Not just to
ensure the prompt delivery of the Financial Services Action Plan but
so that in the future Europeans will be able to rely on a more
accountable and efficient regulatory structure that will be able to
match the best in the world.
Indeed, that is where the real strategic and competitive challe nge lies.
The European Union has no divine right to the benefits of an
integrated financial market. It has to capture those benefits by
building an integrated European market - in many areas starting from
a very low level.
If it does not succeed, economic growth,
employment and prosperity will be lower, and competitive advantage
will be lost to those outside the European Union. And the opportunity
to complement and strengthen the role of the euro and to deepen
European integration will be lost.
Progress will require leadership and a spirit of cooperation and
partnership to work for the wider, deeper and strategic long-term
interest of the European Union and its peoples. All actors: the
Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the European
Commission, regulators, market participants and consumers will need
to adapt their positions in order to move forward. However it is a
positive-sum game.
comments on
initial report in
Annex 3
Regulatory reform
needed now to
ensure future
competitiveness
of EU
EU has no “divine
right” to benefits
of an integrated
market – it has to
build one.
Failure means
lower growth,
lower
employment….
Leadership,
partnership and
cooperation
required from all
actors to move
forward
There is no serious alternative available. The status quo would
entrench the continuation of European financial market
fragmentation. This means lost benefits. Lost opportunities. And a
There is no
weaker European economic performance - with European savings
serious alternative
diverted to foreign market places. The Committee strongly believes
available
that the approach recommended in this report is the only way
forward. Other options are in the present circumstances impractical,
including a single European regulatory authority for the reasons
stated in the initial report.
The Committee urges European leaders to seize this opportunity to
move forward at the European Council in Stockholm on March 23/24
by adopting a resolution based on the Committee’s
recommendations, including an agreement with the European
Parliament.
Committee urges
European leaders
to seize the
opportunity to
move forward at
Stockholm
European Council
on March 23/24
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CHAPTER I
THE REASONS FOR CHANGE
1.
ECONOMIC BENEFITS
The Committee reaffirms its view that there are significant gains from
building an integrated financial market in the European Union. These
findings, confirmed by reactions to Chapter I of the initial report, are
supported by recent academic work.
An integrated European financial market will enable, subject to proper
prudential safeguards and investor protection, capital and financial
services to flow freely throughout the European Union. The barriers –
unnecessary bureaucracy, lack of trust, and sometimes downright
protectionism - will become things of the past. European businesses,
large and small, will be able to tap deep, liquid, innovative European
capital pools centred around the euro for the financing they require to
develop their business activities. Competition and choice will drive
down the cost of capital. In short, the supply of European capital
from European savings will be efficiently matched with the demand
for capital from European businesses. Consumers will be better able
to purchase financial services and securities from the best European
suppliers of investment, insurance or pension funds, with net yields
increasing as investment choice widens. Cross-border clearing and
settlement should become cheaper. These are some of the obvious
microeconomic benefits.
In macroeconomic terms, the productivity of capital and labour wi ll
increase, enhancing the potential for stronger GDP growth and job
creation.
These tangible benefits must be measured as
accurately as possible, and publicized as soon as possible by
the European Commission because they will galvanize the
political, economic and social case for reform and progress.
In
essence what is required is a financial market Cecchini report.
∗∗
The
Commission should also construct a comprehensive series of
macro and micro indicators to continuously benchmark
progress towards an integrated European Financial market.
Significant gains
to be expected
from an integrated
European capital
market
Micro benefits:
more rational
allocation of
capital; greater
liquidity will
benefit all
companies,
especially SME’s;
cost of capital will
be lower; net
yields higher for
consumers;
cheaper cross
border clearing/
settlement
Macro benefits:
increased
productivity of
capital and
labour; stronger
growth and
employment; but
need to quantify
benefits
Furthermore, the Committee believes that, provided European
All Member
financial markets are open, competitive and innovative, the benefits
States will benefit
∗∗
The capitalization of European insurance, investment (UCITS) and pension funds alone is equivalent to
10 trillion Euros – or the size of European GDP – one indicator of the importance of this sector.
The original Cecchini report calculated the cost of the non integration of Europe in the field of goods and
services.
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of integration will spread to all Member States.
The Committee
urges governments and the European institutions to pay
particular attention to ensuring that there is an appropriate
environment for the development of the supply of risk capital for
growing small and medium sized companies, given the crucial
importance of this sector for job creation.
The Committee also
believes that if its recommendations are followed – and effectively
implemented – the primary beneficiaries will be those small and
medium sized European companies.
2.
EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKET TRENDS
The Committee observes that, in some segments of financial activity,
there has been satisfactory progress towards a single market – for
instance in the non-guaranteed inter-bank market. The Euro bond
market is now also substantial, with the Euro government bond
market already 40% larger than the US Treasury market.
But the
euro corporate bond market remains well behind its dollar equivalent.
Development of
risk capital for
SME’s must be
ensured
If
recommendations
acted on, SME’s
should be primary
beneficiaries
Mixed signals on
development of
EU financial
markets
On the positive side, turnover on European stock exchanges reached
EU markets still
a record level in 2000: further evidence of an emerging European
roughly �½ US size
equity culture. However, the capitalization of European stock
exchanges remains significantly behind those of the US equivalents.
As a rough rule of thumb, taken together, European securities
markets are still only about half of the size of those in the US.
The development of European securities markets is being held up by
a plethora of interconnected factors and barriers such as:
-
the absence of clear Europe-wide regulation on a large number of
issues (e.g. prospectuses, cross border collateral, market abuse,
investment service provision) which prevents the implementation of
the mutual recognition system;
an inefficient regulatory system;
inconsistent implementation, in part due to lack of an agreed
interpretation of the rules that do exist;
a large number of transaction and clearing and settlement systems
that fragment liquidity and increase costs, especially for cross-border
clearing and settlement;
the inadequate development of funded pension schemes in most
Member States.
OTHER FACTORS SLOWING MARKET INTEGRATION
The Committee considers that a number of other factors are playing a
But there are
significant role in slowing market integration. These are not directly,
other factors
EU financial
market
development
being hindered by
a plethora of
barriers, e.g.….
Absence of clear
EU regulation, an
effective decision
making system, or
common
interpretations of
rules
-
-
-
-
3.
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nor always susceptible to be dealt with by regulatory rules and
practices. Among the most important are:
-
-
differences in legal systems (e.g. bankruptcy proceedings, effective
judicial procedures etc);
differences in taxation (e.g. withholding taxes, the imposition of stamp
duty or different taxation rates applied to equities versus government
bonds etc);
political barriers (e.g. miscellaneous and creative techniques to
protect national markets or products that favour local suppliers);
external trade barriers (e.g. EU trading screens are not authorized in
the US);
slowing down
market
integration….
Main ones are
differences in
legal systems and
taxation…
-
-
-
Political and
external trade
barriers and….
cultural barriers of which there are two types. Firstly, those that can
Cultural barriers…
be dealt with by public policy – for example the different approaches
to corporate governance; different emphases on the strength of the
role of competition policy; different approaches to market
consultation; different disclosure standards. Secondly, others which
hopefully will converge as markets integrate – such as different
entrepreneurial cultures which in many cases are slowing the supply
of new fast growing firms for the equity markets, due in part to
European venture capital still being only one third of the size of the
parallel US market.
These barriers
must be also
addressed
While putting forward proposals for the removal of these barriers is
not within the remit of the Committee’s work, the Committee
considers that it will be necessary to deal with them if the full potential
of an integrated European financial and securities market is to be
captured. It is particularly important that the European Commission,
working with the Member States, should establish a comprehensive
list of external trade barriers.
In the next Trade Round, as a matter
of priority, the EU must try to remove the most pernicious trade
barriers hampering the global expansion of the EU's securities
industry.
4.
THE NECESSARY EUROPEAN RULES ARE MISSING
The shortcomings and lack of European regulation are responsible in
a major way for preventing progress towards the cross-border
integration of financial markets in a large number of areas. This was
recognized, and indeed is at the heart of the reason for the European
Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan which was designed to
fill the lacunae (the Lisbon European Council agreed it should be
delivered by 2005 at the latest). Among the most important gaps are:
The external trade
barriers should be
removed in next
Trade Round
Lack of basic
European rules is
a major handicap
FSAP designed to
fill the gaps
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-
-
lack of commonly agreed guiding principles covering all financial
services legislation;
failure to make the mutual recognition principle work for the
wholesale market business in the context of the Investment Services
Directive (ISD); for regulated markets themselves; for the retail
sector; or for a single passport prospectus working for cross-border
capital raising;
outdated rules on listing requirements, no distinction between
admission to listing and to trading, and lack of a definition of a public
offer;
ambiguity over the scope and application of conduct of business rules
(Article 11 of the ISD) as well as on the definition of who is a
professional investor;
no appropriate rules to deal with alternative trading systems;
potential inconsistencies between the E-commerce Directive and
financial services directives;
no comprehensive market abuse regime;
no cross-border collateral arrangements;
no set of common European-wide accepted international accounting
standards;
outdated investment rules for UCITS and pension funds;
unresolved public policy issues for clearing and settlement activities;
no agreed takeover rules;
no high and equivalent levels of consumer protection and no efficient
methods for resolving cross border consumer disputes.
The list of missing
European
legislation is long
and significant
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Some of the main
ones are listed
here….
But this list is not
complete
And there are more.
Many of these gaps and deficiencies are being tackled by new
legislation. But results will take far too long at the present rate of
progress. The result is that the development of efficient securities
markets in the EU is being badly hampered. Market infrastructure
(exchanges and clearing and settlement systems) is not as efficient
as it might be and the chances of delivering the FSAP on time are
close to zero.
The Committee believes that remedying this
unsatisfactory situation should be among the Union’s top priorities.
5.
DETERMINING THE PRIORITIES – ONE WAY TO SPEED UP
PROGRESS
The Committee believes that European policy makers must make a
European
much stronger effort to determine, in the context of the Financial
Governments
must be bolder
Services Action Plan, which are the near-term priorities. Politicians
Result?
Cross border
consolidation of
markets and
exchanges being
hampered.
Delivery of FSAP
in question
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should highlight and drive forward those likely to have the biggest
impact in the shortest time towards achieving the objective of an
integrated European financial market. They should set an ambitious
deadline for their agreement and ensure these deadlines are met.
and determine the
priorities - i.e.
drive forward
those which will
have the biggest
impact in the
shortest time
European Council
should agree on a
short list of
priorities at
Stockholm
European Council
for delivery in
2003
This is not an easy exercise. The Committee urges the European
Council to give its full political agreement at Stockholm in March to a
list of priorities so that these priorities are effectively operational from
2003 at the latest. The Committee’s suggested priorities are as
follows:
THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN’S PRIORITIES TO BE ADOPTED
AND BROUGHT INTO EFFECT AT THE LATEST BY THE END OF
2003
-
-
-
A single prospectus for issuers, with a mandatory shelf registration
system.
Modernization of admission to listing requirements and introduction of
priorities
a clear distinction between admission to listing and trading.
Generalization of the home country principle (mutual recognition) for
wholesale markets, including a clear definition of the professional
investor.
Modernization and expansion of investment rules for investment
funds and pension funds.
Adoption of International Accounting Standards.
A single passport for recognized stock markets (on the basis of the
home country control principle).
The Committee’s
-
-
-
6.
THE MAJOR PROBLEM: THE CURRENT REGULATORY SYSTEM
IS NOT WORKING
Whilst part of the problem concerns the incomplete regulatory
coverage at European level, the greater part of the responsibility lies
in the way in which European Union legislation has been decided (or
left undecided) and “implemented” (or not “implemented”). The
problem is the system itself.
The major part of
the problem – the
EU legislative
process does not
work
The current system requires the European Commission to make a
Current
proposal to the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament,
procedures
who decide, by a co-decision procedure specified in Article 251 of the
Treaty. The average time taken for a co-decision procedure from the
Commission’s proposal to final agreement in co-decision across all
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domains is over two years – and in the financial services area, the
average time is longer.
The Commission, in the preparation of its proposals, has improved its
efforts to consult the regulators and markets on forthcoming
proposals, but to date there is no agreed procedure, nor obligation,
nor deadlines imposed for the consultation mechanism.
Moreover, under
“subsidiarity”
pressure from the Member States, the
Commission has generally put forward Directives rather than
Regulations. This leaves more latitude for Member States to
implement Community Law but too often leads to uneven
transposition and different interpretations. Furthermore it puts further
pressure on the Commission to check and enforce proper
implementation. Directives also require at least 18 months for
transposition.
Blockages can occur in the system at four levels:
(i)
in the
Commission
itself – over-stretched, sometimes slow off the
mark;
most notably in the
Council of Ministers
where there is far too often
The multiple
a tendency to add unnecessary levels of complexity to straightforward
possibilities of
blockage
Commission proposals (often in an attempt to try to fit 15 sets of
national legislation into one Community framework);
Insufficient
consultation and
transparency
noticeable
Plus uneven
transposition and
erratic
implementation by
Member States of
agreed
Community rules
(ii)
(iii) in the
European Parliament,
although much less than in the past;
(iv)
and finally in the
Member States
where transposition and
implementation are often late and frequently incomplete.
Therefore, taken together, the current system has a number of major
The current
regulatory system
shortcomings:
is:
-
it is too slow
(e.g. the Takeovers Directive proposal (12 years so far
too slow….
and not yet adopted); the European Company Statute (more than 30
years); Basel I (over 4 years);
it is too rigid
and cannot react speedily enough to changing market
too rigid….
Between 1 May 1999 and 31 October 2000,
in all legislative domains,
19% of dossiers were agreed at
first reading, 53% in second reading, 28% required conciliation. First readings took an average of 8
months, second readings more than 2 years, conciliation an additional 2-3 months.
-
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conditions. Every change, however small or technical, requires a full
blown Commission proposal to be negotiated by co-decision;
-
it produces too much ambiguity
(e.g. Article 11 of the Investment
producing too
Services Directive concerning conduct of business rules; public
much
ambiguity….
versus private offers in the 1980 Directive). Worse still, Directives are
often ambiguously implemented – partly due to the texts themselves,
but also due to the lack of coordination by an effective network of
European regulators;
it fails to distinguish between core, enduring, essential
framework principles and practical, day to day, implementing
rules.
The result is that Directives are too detailed and are unable to
be adjusted expeditiously.
YET THE PACE OF MARKET CHANGE IS ACCELERATING
The pace of change in financial markets, global and Europe-wide, is
accelerating – another reason why the European regulatory system
must be able to keep pace.
Globalization, instantaneous,
interconnected electronic markets, deregulation and information
technology developments are all increasing the rate of market
change.
The euro itself is making markets more transparent, liquid and
interconnected and is an additional stimulus, indeed another reason
why the European Union must aspire to faster and more flexible
regulatory procedures to remain competitive in the global financial
market.
8.
(i)
THREE FURTHER IMPORTANT PARAMETERS
Convergence of regulatory and supervisory structures
Today, there are about 40 public bodies in the European Union
(i) EU regulatory
dealing with securities markets regulation and supervision.
convergence is
required
Competences are mixed. Responsibilities are different. The result at
European level is fragmentation and often confusion.
But market
change is
accelerating –
and European
regulation is not
up to speed….
and failing to
distinguish
between core
principles and
detail….
-
7.
Damaging
competitiveness
of EU financial
markets
3 other
parameters need
attention
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More convergent regulatory and supervisory structures are vital to
ensure that the future European Securities Regulators Committee, a
key part of the Committee’s regulatory proposal, can function
effectively. This is further explained in the second part of this report.
(ii)
Clearing and settlement
The Committee is convinced that further restructuring of clearing and
settlement is necessary in the European Union.
The process of
consolidation should largely be in the hands of the private
sector.
Market forces should mainly determine the contours of
European clearing and settlement such as the extent of linkages
between post-trading bodies, (clearing, settlement, CSD’s etc), and
the possible emergence of a single European central counterparty.
This does not mean that there are no public policy issues at
stake.
In particular, public policy should focus on competition issues
and removing the kinds of obstacles and impediments that make
consolidation difficult. Among the most important public policy issues
are the excessive costs of cross-border clearing and settlement in the
EU compared to the US, due to fragmentation; competition issues
such as open and non-discriminatory access, exclusivity agreements
etc; the soundness of the technical linkages between CSD’s; the
prudential implications of one central counterparty; and whether
clearing and settlement organizations should be authorized and
supervised according to common European standards (e.g.
conditions for access to payment systems, information sharing and
cooperation). There may also be a need, perhaps, to separate
clearing system issues from settlement (an efficient clearing system
being a public good).
The Committee is of the opinion that if in due course it emerged
that the private sector was unable to deliver an efficient pan-
European clearing and settlement system for the European
Union, a clear public policy orientation would be needed to
move forward.
In the light of the consultations underway in the context of the
updating of the Investment Services Directive
(due in the second
half of 2001) and
the forthcoming work of the Giovannini Group,
the Committee urges that serious consideration be given as to
whether the EU needs to establish a regulatory framework for
clearing and settlement activities.
(ii) Clearing and
settlement
Restructuring
required – led by
the private sector
to remove
obstacles to
consolidation
Key issues:
Excessive
European costs of
cross border
clearing and
settlement
compared to US;
competition
matters;
prudential
implications
If private sector
fails to deliver an
efficient c/s
system, public
policy lead will be
needed
Is a c/s regulatory
framework
needed at EU
level?
The Giovannini Group is a group of market participants that advises the Commission
on economic and financial matters. It has recently begun to work on clearing and
settlement issues.
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Such a framework would have to take into account the vital
importance of ensuring the smooth functioning of European clearing
and settlement mechanisms as a prerequisite for the efficient
functioning of securities markets. In addition they would also have to
take into account the general systemic issues raised and the way in
which such systems are vital for the infrastructure for monetary policy
operations and the smooth functioning of payment systems.
Consideration might also need to be given to the European Central
Bank being involved in this work.
The ECOFIN Council could ask
the Economic and Finance Committee to launch discussions on
the above areas.
Finally, on competition questions,
the Committee suggests that the
European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition
should examine the situation in order to ensure that the
Community’s competition policy is being properly respected in
this crucial sector.
(iii) Managing the prudential implications
While the Committee strongly believes that large, deep, liquid and
innovative financial markets will result in substantial efficiency gains
and will therefore bring individual benefits to European citizens, it also
believes that greater efficiency does not necessarily go hand in hand
with enhanced stability.
Increased integration of securities markets entails more
interconnection between financial intermediaries on a cross-border
basis, increasing their exposure to common shocks. It is not within
the remit of this Committee to evaluate such risks, and even less to
make recommendations on how to deal with them. However, given
the growing interlinkages between all segments of the securities
markets and the full range of financial intermediaries,
the Committee
believes that there is an urgent need to strengthen cooperation
at the European level between financial market regulators and
the institutions in charge of micro and macro prudential
supervision. The ECOFIN Council should ask the Economic and
Finance Committee to report on the development of this
cooperation.
9.
RESOURCES AND TRAINING
Building an integrated European financial market, in the tight
timeframe that the European Union’s Heads of State and
Government have defined,
requires a proper allocation of
resources to the task.
This applies in particular to the European
Smooth
functioning of c/s
essential for
efficient securities
markets and for
the infrastructure
for monetary
policy
EFC could launch
work
Competition
issues:
DG Competition
should carefully
examine the
situation
Whilst benefits of
integration are
clear – enhanced
stability not
necessarily the
result….
Committee
believes urgent
need to
strengthen
cooperation at EU
level notably from
regulators and
institutions
responsible for
micro/macro
supervision
Resources must
be properly
allocated to the
task of building an
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18
Commission, the European Parliament and to national regulators as
EU integrated
well. In general there are too few experts around with the detailed
financial market
knowledge necessary to undertake this difficult work.
In general, there
are too few
The Committee is firmly of the view that insufficient staff are
being allocated to tackle the complex task of building an
integrated European financial market.
Barely a handful, for
example, in the European Commission are working on infringement
work, which is time consuming, often exceedingly complex but
nevertheless essential work. The shift from conceptualization to the
hard negotiation of the many legislative proposals in the Financial
Services Action Plan also requires further staff.
In summary the
Commission has very few staff working on financial services –
which is not logical given its economic importance for the
European Union.
Commission is
very understaffed
in this key
economic area….
The European Parliament’s Secretariat dealing with these
The EP as well
matters is also too lightly staffed and ought to be reinforced.
Finally the Committee recommends
that the private sector along
New private led
with European regulators should lead a new training drive
to
training system
necessary
improve the deployment of best practice and common understanding
among regulators and market participants throughout the European
Union.
To summarize,
the challenges facing the creation of an integrated
securities market in Europe are that the basic legislation is not in
place; that there is still insufficient prioritization; and that the present
system cannot produce quickly or flexibly enough the type of
legislation that modern financial markets require; and that
inconsistent implementation is severely handicapping the emergence
of a pan-European market.
Summary:
Basic legislation
is not in place;
there is
insufficient
prioritization; the
current regulatory
system does not
work;
implementation is
erratic
The Committee of Wise Men is therefore convinced that regulatory
reform is required if the European Union’s objectives are to be
Therefore
fulfilled, and if the Financial Services Action Plan is to be delivered on
regulatory reform
time. Sufficient resources must be available. Part Two contains
is required
recommendations on how these challenges could be met.
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CHAPTER II
REGULATORY REFORM
THE COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS
1.
INTRODUCTION
The Committee’s proposal in its initial report centred around a four
level approach.
Level 1:
Framework principles to be decided by normal EU legislative
procedures (i.e. proposal by the Commission to the Council of
Ministers/European Parliament for co-decision).
Level 2:
Establishment of two new committees – an EU Securities
The Committee’s
Committee and an EU Securities Regulators Committee (in a format
four level initial
similar to that of FESCO) to assist the European Commission in
proposal
determining how to implement the details of the Level 1 framework.
Level 3:
Enhanced cooperation and networking among EU securities
regulators to ensure consistent and equivalent transposition of Level
1 and 2 legislation (common implementing standards).
Level 4:
Strengthened enforcement, notably with more vigorous
action by the European Commission to enforce Community law,
underpinned by enhanced cooperation between the Member States,
their regulators, and the private sector.
This approach recognized two layers in the legislation related to
financial markets :
basic political choices
that can be translated into
broad but sufficiently precise framework norms (Level 1); and the
more detailed technical measures,
in full conformity with this
framework, needed to implement the objectives pursued by the
legislation (Level 2).
Level 1
=
principles
Level 2
= detailed
technical
measures
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The two layers should be efficient, in the sense of achieving the
stated objectives with the lowest cost in terms of regulatory burden;
they should aim at establishing a level playing field, by removing any
opportunity to erect regulatory barriers to competition; they should
help speedy implementation and be flexible, so that they can be
quickly adapted to the rapid pace of technical changes and product
innovation in the financial markets. As experience shows, and as the
Committee documented in Chapter III of its initial report, there is a
trade-off between these requirements and the extent to which basic
legislation (Directives and Regulations) is specific and covers the
details of technical implementation.
In the case of financial markets, the distinction between framework
legislation on the one hand, and implementing measures to be
adopted on a faster track on the other, helps to remove that trade-off,
at least in part.
The Committee believes that this distinction
should be adopted at the EU level, subject to the following
constraints: the process must be transparent; it must respect
the institutional balance; and be in conformity with the structure
of the Treaties.
This Chapter sets out in detail how the Committee believes each of
the four levels of the regulatory approach should work in practice. It
defines the key roles and requirements of the different institutions and
actors. Diagrams illustrate the decision-making process. Lastly it
responds to certain comments made about its possible workings.
Importance of
principles of
efficiency, lowest
regulatory cost,
flexibility and
competition
It is necessary
to
adopt at EU level
a distinction
between Level 1
and Level 2
subject to proper
institutional
balance and
transparency
This chapter sets
out details of the
Committee’s
regulatory
proposal….
To give one example, even the limited possibility of mutual recognition allowed by directive 80/390EEC
for share prospectuses cannot be used for the issues of covered warrants or similar financial instruments.
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THE MAIN ISSUES BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE
COMMITTEE OVER ITS 4 LEVEL REGULATORY APPROACH
1.
Members of the European Parliament have raised concerns that the 4
level approach would represent a dilution of its right of co-decision
under the Treaties. They have also suggested more use of
Regulations rather than Directives, the use of fast track procedures
and far more transparency.
Market participants and some regulators commented that they would
like also to see greatly reinforced transparency, openness, and
accountability at all levels. Early and institutionalized involvement of
market practitioners and consumers in the legislative process is
strongly recommended. Deadlines at every stage of the procedures
are widely supported.
Respondents wanted a clearer definition concerning the
“substance”
of Level 1 framework principles and of Level 2 implementing
measures.
Respondents felt that the links between the various levels should be
made clearer. In particular, the role of the Securities Regulators
Committee needed attention. How would it be established? Who
would participate in it? How would it link with the Commission?
Under what conditions?
Questions were raised about the differences between the
competences and powers of the national regulators.
These
differences could harm the effectiveness of the European Securities
Regulators Committee and cooperation in Level 3.
Some
respondents called for more convergence in the national regulatory
structures.
Some have called for overarching principles for all European financial
services legislation.
Main issues
raised on the
Committee’s 4
level regulatory
approach, derived
from the
responses to the
initial report
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Fast Track procedure involves early adoption of an act after first reading in the European Parliament – by
ensuring prior consultation and agreement with the Council of Ministers and the Commission.
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2.
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR EUROPEAN SECURITIES
LEGISLATION
The Committee believes that all European financial services and
securities legislation should be based around a conceptual framework
of overarching principles. These principles should be consistently
applied, and in the future could be either enacted in a framework
Regulation jointly agreed by the Council of Ministers and the
European Parliament or possibly in a future amendment to the Treaty
at the next Intergovernmental Conference.
Among the most
important could be:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
to maintain confidence in European securities markets;
to maintain high levels of prudential supervision;
to contribute to the efforts of macro and micro prudential supervisors
believes there is a
to ensure systemic stability;
need for all
financial services
to ensure appropriate levels of consumer protection proportionate to
and securities
the different degrees of risk involved;
legislation to be
to respect the subsidiarity and proportionality principles of the Treaty;
to promote competition and ensure that the Community’s competition
rules are fully respected;
to ensure that regulation is efficient as well as encouraging, not
discouraging, innovation;
to take account of the European, as well as the wider international
dimension of, securities markets.
THE DETAILS OF THE COMMITTEE’S PROPOSAL
LEVEL 1 – FRAMEWORK PRINCIPLES
The Committee considers that, without amending the Treaty, new
types of Directives or Regulations should be developed in the
securities field. They should contain framework principles, with
implementing powers being delegated to a second level.
based around a
conceptual
framework of
overarching
principles
The Committee
3.
-
What are Level 1 framework principles?
The framework principles are the core political principles, the
What are Level 1
essential elements of each proposal. They reflect the key political
framework
principles?
choices to be taken by the European Parliament and the Council of
Ministers on the basis of a proposal by the European Commission.
They determine the political direction and orientation, the
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fundamentals of each decision.
Directive or Regulation.
They should be specific to each
Level 1 principles should clearly specify the nature and the extent of
the technical implementing measures that should be taken at the
second level and the limits within which the resulting provisions can
be adapted and updated at that level without requiring a change of
framework legislation. This is in order for the Council of Ministers and
the European Parliament to be fully and precisely informed on the
nature of the delegations they are being requested to grant. The
European Commission, whenever possible, should indicate the type
of implementing details that could be covered in Level 2.
Consider two examples:
the forthcoming Prospectus Directive. The Level 1 framework
principles would include all the relevant Articles concerning the type
of single passport (e.g. compulsory shelf registration, with a securities
note and a summary prospectus, definition of a public offer, the role
and powers of the competent authorities; the language regime etc).
However, all the technical details and definitions of what constitutes
the detailed implementing contents of the prospectus (such as the
contents of a prospectus for each specific type of financial
instrument) would be delegated to the Level 2 procedure.
Need for precision
of what are key
principles
(Level
1)
and
implementing
measures
(Level
2)
so EU institutions
know exactly
where they
are…..
Some
examples….
the forthcoming
Prospectus
Directive….
conduct of business rules under Article 11 of the ISD. A new text
would include the basic elements of these rules (due diligence, acting
Or Article 11 of
honestly, adequate disclosure, home country conduct, the necessity
the ISD
to differentiate between professionals and retail investors). The
implementing measures would contain the detailed rules that
investment firms should apply in their relations with clients (specific
type of information to ask from the client, what should be disclosed to
the client etc).
Two specific examples of a prototype Community Directive in the new
structural format are attached to understand the form of the
Committee’s ideas (see Annex 4….).
The substantive content of what should be delegated to the Level 2
procedure would
in every case
be agreed by the Council of Ministers
and the European Parliament on the basis of the European
Commission’s Level 1 proposal.
This is a crucial point and a key
democratic safeguard.
Delegated powers
to Level 2 would
be determined
always on a case
by case basis…
-
Are there legal guidelines or rules for determining what should
be included as Level 1 framework principles?
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The EC Treaty (Article 202), the jurisprudence of the European Court
Legal context –
of Justice and some recent interinstitutional agreements give some
Article 202 of the
Treaty
broad guidance. Article 202 of the EC Treaty refers only to
“…powers for the implementation of the rules…”
as being able to be
delegated from the normal Level 1 co-decision procedure (Article 251
of the EC Treaty).
In a number of judgements,
the European Court of Justice has
ECJ case law
referred to the requirement for all
“essential elements”
to be included
in the basic legislation. This would mean them being included in the
Commission’s co-decision Level 1 proposal.
What does essential (or by implication, non-essential) mean? This
has never been defined, but the recent June 1999 Interinstitutional
Agreement
on
comitology
agreed
by
the
European
Parliament/Council/Commission has stated that the use of the
comitology process refers to
“…applying the essential provisions of
basic instruments…. as well as measures designed to adapt or
update certain non-essential provisions of a basic instrument…”.
Level 1
=
“Essential
elements”;
Level 2
=
Applying the
essential
elements of basic
instruments…
The Committee considers that technical implementing powers for
securities legislation should be delegated to the Level 2 procedure
through a Level 1 framework Directive/Regulation. The extent of the
technical implementing powers should be decided on a case by case
basis for each Directive/Regulation by co-decision on the basis of a
Commission proposal.
-
(i)
What are the advantages of the new approach?
Committee
believes technical
implementing
powers should be
delegated to a
new Level 2
procedure
Advantages of
new approach
The legislative
process would speed up
– because the key Level 1
political co-decision negotiations between the Commission, the
Speeding up,
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament would focus solely
legislation
on the essential issues and not on technical implementing details. As
the section on Level 2 shows, the process of updating technical
details would also be speeded up.
The process would be democratic and flexible
– with the range
and scope of implementing powers being defined by the Council of
Ministers and the European Parliament by co-decision on a case by
case basis for each Level 1 proposal.
Maintaining
democratic and
institutional
balance
(ii)
(iii)
The EU institutions
would be able to benefit from the technical and
For example see
ECJ, 17 December 1970, Köster, 25/70, ECR 1161, paragraph 6.
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regulatory expertise of European regulators, with the European
Ability to benefit
from expertise of
Commission fully retaining its right of initiative.
EU regulators
-
Level 1 Consultation and Transparency mechanisms
The European Commission alone has the right of initiative under the
Treaty. However the Committee recommends that in the future,
before the Commission draws up a proposal in these areas, it should
take the following steps:
1.
Consult, beforehand, in an open, transparent and systematic way
with market participants and end-users (issuers and consumers).
Deadlines should be set and made clear. Where necessary, open
hearings should be held. There should be a strengthened and open
dialogue with market participants and end-users so as to advise the
Commission on a continuous basis on Level 1 work. Use of the
Internet should be used to encourage more participation. A summary
of the consultation process undertaken should be made available
when the final proposal is made. The Committee recognizes that this
will take a little time to set up and that there are resource implications
for the Commission services.
Continue to consult Member States and their regulators on an
informal basis as early as possible on any impending Level 1
proposals.
Inform the European Parliament on an informal basis of forthcoming
proposals (including more systematic use of the
“2005”
group)
∗∗
and
seek, wherever possible, early, non-binding, understandings on the
scope of any implementing powers that might be delegated to Level
2. This will help guide the European Commission, the Regulators
and Securities Committees on the scope of the work that they should
undertake, preparing them, where possible, in advance of any formal
co-decision agreement in order to gain time.
The Commission
must put in place
a more rigorous
consultation and
transparency
mechanism for
Level 1 work
Strengthened and
open dialogue
with market
participants and
end-users is
essential
Ex-ante
consultation with
Member States
and regulators.
Commission
should seek early
informal
understandings
with European
Parliament, if
possible, on
scope of Level 2
implementing
powers
2.
3.
∗∗
See, inter alia, paragraph 9 of the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam (O.J C340, 10/11/1997 p. 0105).
The
“2005 Group”
is an informal high level group composed of the chairperson of European and
Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, the
incoming Presidency and the European Commission.
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-
More use of Regulations and fast track procedures
The Committee proposed in its initial report that in order to help
speed up the legislative process, more use should be made of
Regulations, rather than Directives. Regulations can speed up the
implementation process because they are directly applicable in the
Member States. The Committee considers that Regulations should be
used whenever possible, along with fast track procedures, although
these techniques will not be able to resolve all the problems.
The Committee believes that the choice of the approach (Regulation
versus Directive) should be made by considering the pros and cons
of each measure on a case by case basis. The guiding principles
should be those set out on pages 20 and 22-24.
Committee
supports use of
Regulations and
fast track
procedures
whenever
possible….
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LEVEL 1 – FRAMEWORK PRINCIPLES
Pre-proposal consultation process
Commission decides that legislation needed
Commission consults
with interested parties
Interested parties feed in views
to Commission
Commission formal proposal
Commission makes formal proposal
European
Parliament
Council of
Ministers
Co-decision
Agreement reached on framework
principles and definition of
implementing powers to Level 2 in
a Directive/Regulation
Level 2
(see page 28)
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LEVEL 2 – IMPLEMENTING THE DETAILS
Level 2 is composed of an actively functioning network of national
securities regulators, the European Commission and a new European
Securities Committee to define, propose and decide on the
implementing details of framework Directives and Regulations,
determined by the co-decision procedure in Level 1.
It is therefore proposed that two new Committees are formally
established – an EU Securities Committee (ESC) which will have a
primarily regulatory function and an EU Securities Regulators
Committee (ESRC) with advisory functions. The roles of these
Committees are described below. They should be established and
be functioning before the end of 2001.
The Committee emphasizes the crucial importance it attaches to
building solid triangular relations of trust and efficiency between the
European Commission and the Securities and Regulators
Committees, based on a clear understanding of their respective roles.
The European Parliament must be fully informed throughout the
process.
-
Level 2 working methods
The main tasks of the European Commission and the Securities and
Regulators Committees can be summed up in the following way:
1.
Level 2 = a
functioning
network of
regulators,
European
Commission, and
a Securities
Committee to
determine Level 2
implementing
details
Two new
Committees
needed ESC +
ESRC
Trust must be
built up…
And the European
Parliament fully
informed
Level 2 working
methods
Without prejudice to the Commission’s right of initiative, after
Commission asks
consultation with the Securities Committee (ESC) and in the light of
ESRC to work on
a subject…..
the results of the Level 1 co-decision process, the Commission would
ask the European Securities Regulators Committee (ESRC) to begin
work on the technical details of the subject and agree a timeframe for
the work to be carried out.
The ESRC, having thoroughly and openly consulted the markets and
ESRC consults
end users, according to a prescribed process, with fixed deadlines
openly and
widely…..
(see below) would forward its technical advice to the Commission in
due time.
The Commission, without prejudice to its right of initiative under the
Treaty, would then consider this technical advice.
The Commission would then forward a proposal to the Securities
Committee, taking into account the work of the ESRC. The
Commission would also ensure that the European Parliament is fully
informed of all emerging proposals – the agenda/documents etc both
ex-ante and ex-post, in line with the Interinstitutional Agreement. The
ESRC forwards
its work to the
Commission
Commission
forwards a
proposal to the
Securities
Committee
2.
3.
4.
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Securities Committee would then vote on the Commission’s proposal
according to the decision making rules for such committees. If the
Securities Committee agreed by qualified majority voting with the
Commission’s proposal the Commission could decide to enact the
legislation. (For further details see voting procedure below.)
THE SECURITIES COMMITTEE (ESC)
-
Role
The ESC will be a Committee of major importance, with 3 main roles.
Firstly,
its central role would be to act as a Regulatory Committee
under Article 202 of the Treaty – in which the Commission’s proposal
would be voted on with a fixed deadline (usually 3 months).
Secondly,
it could also act in an advisory capacity to the Commission
in particular, but not only for, Level 1 legislation (in this guise, it will
replace the existing High Level Securities Supervisors Committee).
Thirdly,
it could also advise the Commission on Level 2 mandates for
the ESRC.
-
Voting procedure
The voting procedure in the Securities Committee (in accordance
with the 1999 decision laying down the procedures for the exercise of
implementing powers conferred on the Commission) would be as
follows :
The Commission submits the draft measures to the Securities
Committee.
The Securities Committee votes on the draft measures according to a
fixed timetable.
If approved by the Securities Committee, the draft measures are
then adopted by the Commission and become binding in Community
law.
In case the Securities Committee votes against or if no opinion is
delivered, the draft measures are submitted to the Council of
Ministers as the Commission’s proposal.
The Council votes within a determined period
∗∗
to adopt or oppose
The Committee shall deliver its opinion on the draft within a time-limit which the chairman (the
representative of the Commission) may lay down according to the urgency of the matter. The Committee
votes by qualified majority in the case of decisions which the Council is required to adopt on a proposal
from the Commission. The votes of the representatives of the Member States within the Committee shall
be weighted in the manner set out in the Treaty for the votes in Council. The chairman shall not vote.
ESC has 3 roles
Key one is acting
as a Regulatory
Committee
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30
the proposal.
In case of opposition by the Council, the Commission shall re-
examine the proposal.
The Commission may then choose between three options : (1) submit
an amended proposal of implementing measures to the Council, (2)
Voting procedures
re-submit its initial proposal or (3) abandon the draft implementing
in the ESC
(continued)
measures and present a legislative proposal based on the EC Treaty
by use of its initiative powers. In that case, the draft implementing
measures are replaced by a draft legislative act, e.g. a Regulation or
a Directive.
If the Council neither approves the draft measures proposed by the
Commission nor indicates any opposition to them, the Commission
shall adopt the proposed implementing act.
Role of the European Parliament
Key supervisory
role of European
Parliament.
EP must be fully
informed at all
times of what is
going on….
If European
Parliament
considers
Commission’s
proposal exceeds
implementing
powers –
Commission shall
re-examine its
proposal and take
utmost account of
European
Parliament’s
position
-
The European Parliament must be kept informed of the Securities
Committee’s work and receive all related documents (agendas, draft
measures, results of the votes, minutes of the meeting, list of those
present).
If the European Parliament considers that draft measures submitted
by the Commission exceed the implementing powers provided for in
the basic instrument, the Commission would have to re-examine its
proposal. Taking the utmost account of the Parliament’s Resolution,
the Commission might then submit new draft measures to the
Committee, continue with the procedure, or submit a proposal under
co-decision procedure.
-
Membership of the Securities Committee
The Member States will nominate members to the ESC, which the
Commission will chair. For this reason, the ESC is not a body of the
Council of Ministers. Member State nominees should be of a high
level (e.g. at the rank of State Secretary), in which case no doubt the
European Commissioner responsible for securities matters issues
would chair.
It is essential that attendance should not be
downgraded. The Committee of Wise Men considers it particularly
important that the Securities Committee, having such a key role, must
work in a collegiate way – with members nominated for sufficiently
long periods to ensure continuity and the building of a real
“…esprit
de corps…”.
Members of the ESC should, whenever possible, be
∗∗
Committee wants
membership of
ESC to be at high
level (State
Secretary)
Collegiality and
esprit de corps
are very important
This period is laid down in the basic legislative instrument from which the Committee originates. It cannot
exceed three months from the date of referral to the Council.
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31
present when votes are taken. The ESC must also work in a
transparent and open way – and should be ready to report to the EP
on a regular basis.
-
Setting up the Securities Committee (transitional arrangements)
The Securities Committee will be legally established when the first
Modalities of
implementing powers are granted to it. However, in order to permit
setting up the
ESC quickly
the ESC to begin work as soon as possible – pending any formal
conferment of implementing powers – the Commission could formally
set it up as an Advisory Committee by a Commission Decision. The
Committee recommends this course of action.
-
The ESC acting as a Regulatory Committee:
The Committee considers the optimal approach is to delegate, case
by case, the relevant implementing powers as each Level 1 proposal
is agreed by co-decision of the Council and European Parliament.
This would allow all the three Institutions to precisely determine the
scope of implementing powers for each piece of legislation.
EU SECURITIES REGULATORS COMMITTEE (ESRC)
The ESRC should be a Committee with two hats.
In Level 2
it would
act as an advisory committee to the European Commission.
In Level
3
(see page 37) it would act alone as a fully independent committee
of national regulators to ensure more consistent implementation of
Community Law.
-
Composition
In Level 2 the ESRC should be established as an independent
advisory group to the Commission. The members of the ESRC
should be the heads of the competent authorities for securities
regulation/supervision designated by each Member State – building
on the structure already successfully established by FESCO. The
Chairman should be elected by the members of the ESRC from one
of their number. What is crucial however, is that those attending the
ESRC, at all times, are competent to advise the Commission on any
agreed subject.
It is therefore important that the secretarial
arrangements should reflect the need to keep close operational links
with the Commission for Level 2 work
ESRC to be
composed of
national
regulators and
should be an
independent
advisory
committee to the
Commission.
Close operational
links will be
necessary with
the Commission
in the
organization of
Level 2 work.
Commission
The ESRC to
have 2 roles –
one in Level 2,
the other in Level
3
Case by case
delegation of
scope of
implementing
powers
Furthermore the Commission would obviously play a key role in the
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32
Committee, informing the members of the political priorities,
would have key
role in the ESRC
discussing emerging ideas etc.
The Committee considers the European Parliament should be able to
request the ESRC to report to it periodically. The Chairman of the
ESRC should also be an observer in the Securities Committee. The
ESRC should also produce an annual report on its work and forward
this to all the European Union’s institutions.
-
Voting procedures in the ESRC
The Committee does not think that unanimity is an appropriate voting
procedure for the ESRC in Level 2, for several reasons:
(i)
(ii)
It could lead to lower common denominator agreements.
If the voting procedures of the ESRC were inconsistent with those of
the Securities Committee, there would be the potential for
incongruous, or at worst, perverse decision making in Level 2.
It is therefore recommended that the Regulators Committee should
vote in its Level 2 role by Qualified Majority Voting. Minority opinions
should be recorded and made public in the final advice sent to the
European Commission.
-
Setting up the ESRC
The ESRC should be politically endorsed at the Stockholm European
Council and be legally established as an independent advisory group
to the Commission (outside the comitology process).
ESRC should
be politically
endorsed
at the Stockholm
European Council
and then as an
independent
advisory group to
the Commission
Voting in the
ESRC should be
by qualified
majority
The European
Parliament should
be able to request
the ESRC to
report to it
periodically
-
Consultation procedures and transparency
The Committee considers that the ESRC must consult market
participants, consumers and end-users according to a fixed,
preferably mandatory set of procedural rules that should be set out in
its statutes and rules of procedure. The following principles should
apply to the consultation process:
ESRC must also
set up an open
and transparent
consultation
process
-
-
-
market practitioners must be involved…
at every level…
in a continuous process…
Principles of
consultation
process
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33
-
-
-
with particular weight given to those with knowledge and expertise on
the subject in question…
in an open process, using,
inter alia,
the Internet…
with end-users views being considered at the same time.
The Committee considered the merit of
“practitioner forums”
at
Committee looked
European level, but given the complexity of deciding who should be
at practitioner
forum idea….
members, bearing in mind that there are 15 Member States (and
soon more) as well as a wide range of interests to be covered, the
Committee prefers the alternative outlined below.
Once advice on implementing measures has been requested from
the European Commission, and with a specified timeframe agreed for
the work, the ESRC would set up the consultation process.
Four basic procedures could be envisaged:
but prefers the
following ESRC
consultation
process….
-
In the case of complex issues, the ESRC should consult first on the
basis of a
“concept release”
– outlining the problem and the options
and asking for public input on what, if any, regulatory approach would
be appropriate. The time for such a consultation should not exceed 3
months.
Once a regulatory approach had been decided, a draft proposal
would be released by the ESRC for consultation with markets and
end users (3 months maximum).
Four basic
procedures must
be followed for an
ESRC
consultation…
-
-
Where necessary the ESRC could use hearings, or roundtables, as
With hearings,
this Committee has done. Use of the Internet should be compulsory
roundtables….
for the consultation process.
A summary of the public comments should be appended to each of
Public comments
should be
the ESRC’s final recommendations.
disclosed…..
-
The Committee recommends the Commission to maintain a similar
level of transparency and openness as these proposals move to the
Securities Committee.
-
Maintaining institutional balance and involvement of the
European Parliament
The Committee is acutely aware of the importance of maintaining
Importance of
institutional balance between the European Commission, European
institutional
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34
Parliament and the Council of Ministers.
It was put to the Committee that the procedure suggested should be
accompanied by a call-back mechanism for the European Parliament:
in particular a new interinstitutional agreement should give European
Parliament (and Council of Ministers) the possibility to oppose, within
a given period, a Commission proposal for the implementing
measures. The Committee considered this possibility with interest,
but it was convinced by the argument that the introduction of a
“Parliamentary override”
is not envisaged in the Treaty.
Nevertheless the Committee believes that there are ways to ensure
that the European Parliament will maintain a significant degree of
control and have a significant impact on the implementing legislation
enacted at Level 2 and in particular on the work of the Securities
Committee.
First,
having agreed on the scope of implementing powers in Level 1,
the European Parliament (along with other interested parties) will be
fully informed at all times of the content of the ESRC’s emerging
advice and subsequently about the Commission proposals. The
Commission and the two Committees will keep in close contact with
the European Parliament, sending all the necessary documentation
and agendas in good time (these requirements are specified,
inter
alia,
in Articles 1 and 2 of the Interinstitutional Agreement). Further
assurance could be given to the Parliament if, as suggested, the
Commission published, whenever possible, at least in an indicative
form, drafts of the more important implementing measures when it
puts forward level one legislation.
Second,
before the Commission makes a proposal to the Securities
Committee and after the Securities Committee has voted on it, the
European Parliament will have sufficient time available to check that
the proposal and the decision conform with the scope of the
implementing powers defined by co-decision in Level 1.
Third,
if the European Parliament were to consider that the European
Commission’s proposal on the intended decision does not conform
with the scope of implementing powers, it would pass a resolution.
Were it to do so, the Commission would be required to re-examine its
proposal and should take the utmost account of the European
Parliament’s position. Given the importance of institutional balance, it
would be inconceivable if the Commission did not. The Commission,
on the other hand, would have already undertaken to take the utmost
account of the position of the European Parliament in its proposals.
balance
“Call-back
mechanism” for
European
Parliament
considered…
but not envisaged
in the Treaty
But can meet
European
Parliament’s
concerns in other
ways:
(i) By keeping the
European
Parliament fully
informed….
(ii) By giving the
European
Parliament time to
check the
proposal (before
ESC votes)
(iii) By ensuring
that Commission
takes utmost
account of any
European
Parliament
resolution against
proposal
Furthermore,
it is in everybody’s interest that the European
In everybody’s
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Parliament be given an adequate role in the procedure, within the
limits of the Treaty. Were Parliament not to be satisfied, the
consequences would be felt the next time co-decision legislation
(Level 1) conferring implementing powers on the Securities
Committee is proposed. This point would no doubt not be lost on the
Commission or on the Securities Committee.
The Committee therefore concluded that these considerations
properly safeguard parliamentary oversight.
To the extent that any political problems remained, they should be
dealt with by the three Institutions working together (the Commission,
the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers) as soon as
possible – in any case before the European Council in Stockholm or
in the full review in 2004 recommended later in this report (which also
coincides with the next Intergovernmental Conference).
interest to give an
adequate role to
the European
Parliament
So European
Parliament’s
interests will be
safeguarded
The EU
institutions should
work together to
sort out any
residual problems
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LEVEL 2 DECISION MAKING
Commission,
after consulting the
European
Securities Committee,
requests advice from
the
European Securities Regulators
Committee (ESRC)
on technical
implementing measures
ESRC
consults with market
participants, consumers and end-
users
European
Parliament
ESRC
forwards advice to the
Commission
- kept fully
informed in
conformity with
Interinstitutional
Agreement;
- adopts a
resolution if it feels
the draft measures
exceed the scope
of the
implementing
powers
Commission draws up its proposal,
within the framework of its implementing
powers
Commission
forwards a proposal to the
Securities Committee
Securities Committee
(ESC) votes on
proposal
European Parliament
examines the final draft
measures and has
one month
to consider whether
they would exceed the implementing powers defined
in Level 1
If the
Parliament
passes a resolution stating that
these measures are not in conformity, the
Commission shall re-examine
its proposal, taking
the utmost account of the Parliament’s position
Commission
adopts proposal
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LEVEL 3 – STRENGTHENED COOPERATION
REGULATORS TO IMPROVE IMPLEMENTATION
BETWEEN
The initial report stated that Level 3 should encompass a
“…framework of enhanced and strengthened cooperation and
networking between (national) regulators with a view to ensuring
consistent and equivalent transposition of Level 1 and Level 2
legislation…”.
National regulators were also encouraged to agree
joint protocols for improving implementation and a peer review
process to ensure consistent enforcement practice in the ESRC. The
Committee confirms this approach.
The essence of Level 3, therefore, is to greatly improve the
consistency of the day to day transposition and implementation of
Levels 1 and 2 legislation. It is the national regulators who have the
prime responsibility for this work – acting in a cooperative network. It
is the other main part of their responsibility.
-
Membership and voting
Acting in its Level 3 role, the ESRC should be composed of a
representative for each Member State designated by the national
supervisory authority, or authorities. Given the crucial importance of
common implementing rules and interpretations, the ESRC should
decide by consensus in Level 3. The Commission could attend as an
observer.
-
Definition of Level 3 ESRC work
The key objective is to greatly improve the common and uniform
implementation of Community rules. The ESRC therefore should:
produce consistent guidelines for the administrative regulations to be
adopted at the national level;
Level 3 is
strengthened
cooperation
among regulators
to improve
implementation
Objective is to
improve day to
day transposition
and
implementation
In Level 3, ESRC
is more
“independent”.
Voting by
unanimity is
necessary for
implementation
issue joint interpretative recommendations and set common
standards regarding matters not covered by EU legislation – where
The role of the
ESRC in Level 3
necessary, these could be adopted into Community Law through a
Level 2 procedure;
compare and review regulatory practices to ensure effective
enforcement throughout the Union and define best practice;
periodically conduct peer reviews of administrative regulation and
regulatory practices in Member States, reporting their results to the
Commission and to the ESC.
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The outcome of this work would be non-binding although clearly it
would carry considerable authority.
Currently FESCO is carrying out only some of those tasks. So a
political resolution will be needed to mandate regulators to carry out
all of this essential work. Market participants should be prepared to
submit examples of uneven implementation practice to the regulators,
Commission and the Member States.
-
The importance of supervisory and regulatory convergence
An important, immediate condition for the ESRC to achieve
successfully the objectives stated above is that those mandated by
the national regulatory authorities should have both the knowledge to
carry out their work and the ability to deliver from the very outset the
undertakings on which they have agreed. In the longer term, far
more fundamental convergence is necessary among European
regulatory structures in a number of areas. The main ones are to
converge
“horizontal”
structures; the degree of autonomy of
regulators; and not least the involvement of market participants in the
regulatory process. The Committee urges governments to coordinate
their efforts in this regard given the various initiatives underway.
The Committee
believes
regulatory
convergence is
necessary
ESRC members
must be able to
deliver the
undertakings they
make
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LEVEL 3
LEVEL 1 / 2 ACTS
EU Securities Regulators Committee
Translation of Level 1 / 2 Acts and other EU securities legislation into
effective and even enforcement of Community rules, using,
inter alia:
Day to day administrative guidelines;
Joint interpretation recommendations;
Common (but not binding) standards in areas not covered by EU
legislation;
Comparison of regulatory practice to improve enforcement;
Peer Reviews
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LEVEL 4 – ENFORCEMENT
The fourth level of the Committee’s proposal concerns strengthening
Level 4 = greatly
the enforcement of Community rules. All actors have a role to play
strengthened
enforcement
here, but the major responsibility falls on the European Commission,
which has the legal duty to act as guardian of the European Treaties.
The Committee however also underlines the role that Member States,
regulators and the private sector have in improving enforcement of
agreed Community law. The Commission, for example, needs
complaints, information, and strong, well-researched cases. Yet too
often the private sector is reluctant to come forward for fear of
damaging its market opportunities. Regulators should inform the
Commission immediately if they become aware of any potential
infringements.
The primary
responsibility is
with the European
Commission –but
others must help,
including….
The European Parliament as well should inform the Commission of
the European
any areas where it believes Community Law is being breached. As in
Parliament…..
the other areas, a partnership approach between the public sector
and private sector is necessary for efficiency and success.
The Commission, however, sho uld be bolder in enforcing Community
The Commission
Law and checking the accurate transposition of agreed legislation. In
should be
bolder…..
many cases the mere opening of a case by the European
Commission results in a rapid solution being agreed with the
offending Member States.
4.
MONITORING THE REGULATORY SYSTEM
The Committee underlines the particular importance that it attaches
to an efficient, continuous process to monitor the effectiveness of the
4 level regulatory procedures that it is proposing. In the initial report
the Committee suggested that
“…half yearly reports could be given to
the Council on the progress, or lack of it, being made…”.
There are two questions: precisely what should the monitoring
mechanism look at and who should the monitors be?
Assuming the Committee’s 4 level regulatory structure is endorsed,
there needs to be a strong system to report on the functioning of the
legislative and regulatory process. It should identify the bottlenecks,
and who is responsible. It should also report on whether there is real
progress towards an integrated financial market. The Committee
would expect all the institutions to pay considerable attention to its
Monitoring system
should be blunt:
where are the
bottlenecks and
who is
responsible?
The results must
An efficient half
yearly monitoring
process is
essential
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findings. The monitoring system, however, should not propose
be acted on
remedial measures.
Given the fact that the Council of Ministers, European Commission
and the European Parliament have equivalent stakes in the process,
the Committee suggests that the Monitoring Group should be
composed of two external nominees (i.e. not drawn from the
membership of the Institutions) of the Council, European Parliament,
and the European Commission.
The Monitoring Group should produce half-yearly reports.
Committee
suggests 2
external
nominees per
Institution for the
monitoring group
Half yearly
monitoring reports
are required
5.
FULL REVIEW – 2004
Assuming that the new regulato ry structure is functioning from the
beginning of 2002 onwards, the Committee considers that there is a
strong case for a full and open review of the 4 level process in 2004.
This is in part due to the convergence of a number of significant
political factors – a new Intergovernmental Conference (agreed upon
at Nice), a period when the first wave of enlargement should be
underway, and also a period when the main priorities of the Financial
Services Action Plan should have been successfully negotiated.
Full review should
take place in 2004
– coinciding with
the next IGC
But another benefit of a full review in 2004 would be to dissipate any
“No finality”
misplaced fears of institutional rigidity or permanence.
If in the light of the Monitoring Group’s half-yearly reports, it was
If no progress, full
manifestly clear well before 2004 that progress was not being made
review should
take place earlier
and that there did not appear to be any hope of progress, a full review
would need to take place earlier. As already mentioned in the initial
report, if the full review were to confirm in 2004 (or earlier as the case
may be) that the approach did not have any prospect of success, it
might be appropriate to consider a Treaty change, including the
creation of a single EU regulatory authority for financial services
generally in the Community.
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FINAL COMMENTS
The outcome will hinge on the ability and willingness of the principal actors, the
Commission, Council of Ministers, European Parliament, and national regulators to
play
“a cooperative game”,
since all these actors carry part of the responsibility for the
identified shortcomings in the current regulatory system.
What is the likelihood that the proposed framework could work?
importance that there are:
Clear mandates given to the two key Level 2 Committees.
Full transparency throughout the system, coupled with deadlines in the decision making
process.
Strong monitoring and reporting to Council, Commission and Parliament and to the public
at large.
Active, well defined involvement of market participants and consumers.
National regulatory structures reformed in a way that brings them closer to one another
over time. Without such convergence there is serious risk that neither the ESRC nor the
ESC, nor indeed their interaction, will yield results.
It will also be important that each institution can identify the benefits, both for itself, but
also for the European Union in its entirety.
What are they?
A more rational use of scarce resources. Faster decision making, more in tune with
the needs of modern financial markets. A concentration of political efforts and energy
on the key political principles. Bringing European regulators with their experts into a
much more important
“formal”
European role: advising the European Commission on
the necessary implementing details of each subject. For the Commission, the pivot of
the whole system, there will be a much better chance to deliver the ambitious FSAP on
time. For the European Parliament, far greater transparency and open consultation, no
finality due to a 2004 review, participation in the monitoring system and the ability to
determine what the scope of implementing powers are (in Level 1). Finally for the
Council of Ministers: streamlined decision making and greater efficiency.
The Committee of Wise Men urges all concerned to give this fair and balanced
approach their full hearted and active support. The benefits of success are simply too
large to be ignored.
The present system, the status quo, simply will not do.
Brussels, 15 February 2000
It is of crucial
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ANNEX 1
ECOFIN COUNCIL MEETING ON 27 NOVEMBER 2000
CONCLUSIONS
1.
The Council welcomes the initial report of the Committee of Wise Men, chaired by
Alexandre Lamfalussy, on the Regulation of European Securities Markets and the
methods the Committee has used to gather the views of interested parties.
ECOFIN shares the diagnosis of the report, namely:
The economic benefits on economic growth, employment, productivity and for
consumers, SMEs, large companies, as well as sovereign borrowers of integrating
the EU’s financial markets are considerable, which confirms the importance of the
Lisbon Economic Reform Agenda. The Financial Services and Risk Capital Action
Plans contains the right measures to be implemented as a response towards
improving the single market in financial services, but these measures require more
prioritisation.
Financial markets are changing at a very fast pace, requiring regulators to keep up
with market developments, a view strongly supported by market participants. In this
context, the present regulatory system is too slow and complex, and is producing
unnecessary levels of ambiguity and uneven implementation. Therefore urgent action
is needed to make the current European regulatory system become more efficient, so
that the goal of an integrated European financial market be delivered in the near
future.
ECOFIN requests the Committee to present a final report in mid-February 2001. This
report should focus on refining the regulatory approach proposed in its initial version,
taking into account the institutional balance resulting of existing Treaty arrangements
and the role of national regulators. This report shall propose operational
recommendations.
ECOFIN shall examine these recommendations at the beginning of March in order to
take appropriate measures at the Stockholm European Council in March. In this
perspective ECOFIN recommends that discussions should be advanced with the
European Parliament……
2.
-
-
3.
4.
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EUROPEAN COUNCIL – NICE
7-10 DECEMBER 2000
CONCLUSIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY
Regulation of financial markets
30. The European Council broadly agrees with the initial findings in the interim report by
the Committee chaired by Mr Lamfalussy on the regulation of European securities
markets and the third Commission report on the action plan for financial services. It
invites the Council and the Commission to report back to it on this subject at
Stockholm in March 2001 on the basis of the Committee's final report.
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ANNEX 2
RECOMMENDED TIMETABLE
2000 – 2004
2001
15 February
15 February –
23/24 March
23/24 March
April/May
Publication of Final Report by Wise Men
Consideration of report by Council of Ministers, European Parliament, Commission
Agreement at European Council, Stockholm on regulatory reform and FSAP priorities
(i)
Commission brings forward some first FSAP directives in new format
(ii) Commission decision on setting up European Securities Committee as an
advisory group pending formal delegation of powers via adoption of a Level 1
directive/regulation. )
(iii) Commission decision to set up European Securities Regulators Committee as
an independent advisory group (outside comitology)
(i)
New consultation procedures set up (Commission and ESRC)
(ii) Interinstitutional Monitoring Committee agreed and set up
Giovannini report on clearing/settlement
First interinstitutional monitoring report presented to all Institutions
April –
September
June/July
November
By December
2001
By end
December 2001
By end
December 2001
First provisional results from research on economic benefits of integrated European
financial markets
Review of Commission, European Parliament
requirements
New private sector training initiative launched
New Level 2 committee structure must be operational
and
regulators
staffing
2002
March
September
Second monitoring report on functioning of regulatory system
Third monitoring report on functioning of regulatory system
2003
March
September
By December
Interinstitutional agreement (and delivery) of key priorities (single prospectus; listing
requirements; home country principle for wholesale markets, including definition of
professional investor; new investment rules for investment and pension funds;
adoption of international accounting standards; a single passport for recognized
stock markets).
Fourth monitoring report
Fifth monitoring report
2004
Intergovernmental Conference
Full review of
“new”
system
FSAP review
Sixth monitoring report
March
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ANNEX 3
ANALYSIS OF THE COMMENTS ON THE INITIAL
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN ON THE
REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS
SUMMARY
Forty one replies have been received, most of them from the private
41 replies
sector.
All the respondents welcome the general thrust of the Committee’s
Full support for
initial report. They consider it as a valuable contribution to the policy
the Wise Men’s
initial report
debate. They all share the analysis of the current situation contained
in Chapters I, II and III of the initial report. They also share the view
that urgent steps must be adopted in order to remove barriers to the
integration of the European financial market.
Most of the replies focus on the possible approach for European
Replies focus on
regulatory
Regulation described in Chapter IV of the initial report.
approach
There is a general agreement that a more efficient, flexible and faster
Accelerate the
legislative process is needed. Responses nevertheless insist that
legislative
process but
faster legislation should not be at the expense of the quality of the
maintain quality
regulatory system.
Respondents also support the main lines of the proposed institutional
Full support for
and regulatory framework. However the objectives have to be
the four-level
approach
defined. The distinction between primary and secondary technical
legislation needs to be delineated clearly. Political willingness will be
necessary to achieve this objective.
Most of the respondents called for a more detailed analysis of the
regulatory approach with practical examples in the final report.
The main issues raised by the respondents:
Respondents
want more details
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1.
Guiding principles for the new regulatory framework
Most of the respondents consider that the following principles need to
be applied:
Guiding principles
-
Transparency
of the whole legislative process is seen as
fundamental. This implies early publication of preliminary thinking
Transparent
about policy, open consultation methods, the publication of agendas,
legislative
the publication of minutes and documents of meetings, the
process
establishment of forum/technical groups, organisation of conferences,
roundtables, etc. The European Institutions and the new regulatory
model should therefore adopt these working methods. Respondents
also called for the Securities and Regulators Committees to set out
these principles as a rule.
Openness.
Market practitioners and consumers should be involved
in the legislative process through early and continuous consultation.
Involvement of
market
practitioners
-
-
Accountability.
The democratic accountability of the Securities and
Regulators Committees is seen as of vital importance. Respondents
Strong democratic
stated there must be adequate accountability mechanisms to fully
safeguards
inform the European Parliament. Different variants were suggested,
necessary
such as hearings in front of the Parliament, regular reporting and the
granting of observer status to the European Parliament in the
Securities Committee.
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TABLE 1 : COMMENTS ON THE NEW APPROACH SET OUT IN THE INITIAL
REPORT
General opinion on the
initial report
Role of regulation/level of
regulation
Guiding principles
New approach of the
legislative system
à
Level 1
à
Level 2
à
Level 3
à
Level 4
Regulations/Directives
Role of national regulators
No clear positions expressed
Need for harmonization of competences
General support for increased cooperation
Transparency
Role of market participants
/ consumers
Enforcement
Needs to be set out as a guiding principle
Early and institutionalised involvement in the
legislative process
Need for increased resources for the Commission
Need for a clear distinction between primary and
secondary legislation
Full support of all respondents
Need for a balance; avoid over-regulation
Transparency,
flexibility
openness,
accountability
and
Widespread support for the concept of a four-level
system
Need for a clear definition of basic objectives
2.
Possible four-level approach
A small number of respondents argued that the adoption of a set of
principles and objectives applying to all securities legislation would be
useful for assessing future legislation.
(a)
Level 1
The adoption of Level 1 legislation is considered to be crucial to the
success of the new approach. A clear distinction must therefore be
drawn between primary and secondary legislation (principles in Level
1, implementing details in Level 2). This may vary depending on the
subject. Level 1 should contain “essential elements”: fundamental
principles which are unlikely to require amendment in the short or the
medium term.
On the type of legislation, the suggestion to move from Directives to
Regulations was also mentioned. Nevertheless, respondents did not
set out clear preferences for either.
Distinction
necessary
between primary
and secondary
legislation
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(b)
Level 2
The final report should expand on some of the key points, such as:
Key point - define
Level 2 more
clearly
-
The role, the objectives and the working procedures of both
Committees
There is a general consensus that a set of objectives should be
drafted to define the competence of both Committees. The need for
transparency and co-operation with market-practitioners should guide
their work and deliberations.
Several respondents expressed
concerns about transposing FESCO’s working methods to the EU
institutional framework. They therefore called for more details on the
working procedures of the Regulators Committee.
Role, objectives
and working
procedures of
both Committees
-
The composition of the Regulators Committee
As there is not a common template for supervision, the composition
of the Regulators Committee raises major issues, and some
concerns. For example, the Competent Authorities that should
advise the Commission in Level 2 might be current FESCO members.
The missions and competence of national regulators
vary
considerably among the Member States. Prior harmonization of the
national regulatory functions would therefore be desirable.
Composition of
the Regulators
Committee –
need for
convergence
-
The links between the Securities and the Regulators Committees and
the European Parliament (EMAC)
The respondents called for the role of the European Parliament to be
respected in order to keep the legislative process open, accountable
and democratic. Different models are proposed, such as the full
accountability to Parliament of the Securities Committee, and the
obligation to regularly report the activities of the Committees.
Strong links with
the European
Parliament
essential
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TABLE 2 : COMMENTS ON THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Securities Committee
General support for its establishment
It needs to be accessible and transparent
Regulators Committee
Role of European
Parliament
Demand for
composition
more
details
on
its
role
and
Its rights should be preserved
Accountability of the Securities Committee to it is
recommended
More details are requested
Criticism on the lack of transparency
General agreement that it would be premature to
create it for the time being
Links between both
Committees
Comments on FESCO
Single European
Supervisor
(c)
Level 3
Most respondents consider that differences in the competences and
powers of national supervisory authorities hinder the consistent
Convergence
application of EU legislation and effective international cooperation. A
between national
great majority of replies indicate that prior harmonization of the
regulators
national regulators competences is seen as necessary, as well as a
thorough revision of the division of responsibilities between
supervisory authorities and exchanges.
(d)
Level 4
The lack of enforcement by the Commission is seen as having been a
More enforcement
serious obstacle to the completion of a single market for financial
resources for the
Commission
services. Proposals for an increase in the enforcement resources and
instruments for the Commission should be considered in the final
report.
3.
Other comments
Respondents have also submitted comments on the other preliminary
conclusions of the initial report.
These are summarized in the following table:
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TABLE 3: OTHER COMMENTS ON THE PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
Economic benefits
Trade issues
Agreement on the proposal to carry out a proper
study of the benefits
Endorsement of the Wise Men’s analysis and
suggestion to address these issues more
prominently in the final report
Suggestions to exclude any
volatility from the final report
assessment
of
Other comments
Market volatility
The FSAP
General agreement to accelerate the completion
of the FSAP to 2004
The EU needs to ensure that faster legislation
does not mean lower quality legislation
Some additional comments deal
contained in the initial report.
with the main technical issues
These are summarized in the table below:
TABLE 4 : ADDITIONAL COMMENTS
Clearing and Settlement
Suggestions to remove the obstacles necessary
for the completion of a European market. Others
express some doubts concerning the initial
report’s assessment of the savings that could be
generated by an integrated clearing and
settlement system. Some raise competition
questions. Most of the respondents consider that
market forces should drive the consolidation
process.
Some replies insist on the immediate and
widespread implementation of these principles,
notably for wholesale markets
Request for the establishment of a level playing
field between the exchanges
Further regulation of the OTC markets considered
unnecessary and undesirable
Differentiation between investors
considered useful and necessary
generally
Country of origin and
mutual recognition
Alternative trading
systems
OTC market
Categorization of investors
Additional
technical issues
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ANNEX 4
Hypothetical examples of the possible role of the Securities
Committee
These examples aim to describe how Level 1 proposals could be
structured but are without prejudice to future work in the areas by the
Commission and FESCO.
(a)
Harmonization of regular reporting obligations
Note : the changes that could be made to the text in this hypothetical
example are indicated in bold characters in italics.
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE
of 15 February 1982
on information to be published on a regular basis by companies the shares
of which have been admitted to official stock-exchange listing
(82/121/EEC)
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community, and in particular Articles 54 (3) (g) and 100 thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission (1),
Having regard to the opinion of the European Parliament (2),
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee (3),
Whereas Council Directive 80/390/EEC of 17 March 1980 coordinating the
requirements for the drawing up, scrutiny and distribution of the listing
particulars to be published for the admission of securities to official stock-
exchange listing (4) seeks to ensure improved protection of investors and
a greater degree of equivalence in the protection provided, by coordinating
requirements as to the information to be published at the time of
admission;
Whereas, in the case of securities admitted to official stock-exchange
listing, the protection of investors requires that the latter be supplied with
appropriate regular information throughout the entire period during which
the securities are listed; whereas coordination of requirements for this
1
In implementing the following principles, the competent authorities shall make an appropriate distinction
between the requirements applying to the professional investors and those applying to retail investors
(retail investors are to be understood as investors acting outside their professional activities).
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regular information has similar objectives to those envisaged for the listing
particulars, namely to improve such protection and to make it more
equivalent, to facilitate the listing of these securities on more than one
stock exchange in the Community, and in so doing to contribute towards
the establishment of a genuine Community capital market by permitting a
fuller interpenetration of securities markets;
Whereas, under Council Directive 79/279/EEC of 5 March 1979
coordinating the conditions for the admission of securities to official stock-
exchange listing (5), listed companies must as soon as possible make
available to investors their annual accounts and report giving information
on the company for the whole of the financial year; whereas the fourth
Directive 78/660/EEC (6) has coordinated the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the annual
accounts of certain types of companies;
Whereas companies should also, at least once during each financial year,
make available to investors reports on their activities;
Whereas this Directive can, consequently, be confined to coordinating the
content and distribution of a single report covering the first six months of
the financial year;
Whereas, however, in the case of ordinary debentures, because of the
rights they confer on their holders, the protection of investors by means of
the publication of a report is not essential;
Whereas, by virtue of Directive 79/279/EEC, convertible or exchangeable
debentures and debentures with warrants may be admitted to official listing
only if the related shares are already listed on the same stock exchange or
on another regulated, regularly operating, recognized open market or are
so admitted simultaneously;
Whereas the Member States may derogate from this principle only if their
competent authorities are satisfied that holders have at their disposal all
the information necessary to form an opinion concerning the value of the
shares to which these debentures relate;
Whereas, consequently, regular information needs to be coordinated only
for companies whose shares are admitted to official stock-exchange listing;
Whereas the report must enable investors to make an informed appraisal
of the general development of the company's activities during the period
covered by the report;
Whereas, however, this report need contain only the essential details on
the financial position and general progress of the business of the company
in question;
Whereas, in order to take account of difficulties resulting from the current
state of laws in certain Member States, companies may be allowed a
longer period to implement the provisions of this Directive than that laid
down for the adaptation of national laws;
Whereas, so as to ensure the effective protection of investors and the
proper operation of stock exchanges, the rules relating to regular
information to be published by companies, the shares of which are
admitted to official stock-exchange listing within the Community, should
apply not only to companies from Member States, but also to companies
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from non-member countries
HAS ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
SECTION I
General provisions and scope
Article 1
1. This Directive shall apply to companies the shares of which are admitted
to official listing on a stock exchange situated or operating in a Member
State, whether the admission is of the shares themselves or of certificates
representing them and whether such admission precedes or follows the
date on which this Directive enters into force.
2. This Directive shall not, however, apply to investment companies other
than those of the closed-end type. For the purposes of this Directive
'investment companies other than those of the closed-end type' shall mean
investment companies:
- the object of which is the collective investment of capital provided by the
public, and which operate on the principle of risk spreading, and
- the shares of which are, at the holders' request, repurchased or
redeemed, directly or indirectly, out of those companies' assets. Action
taken by such companies to ensure that the stock-exchange value of their
shares does not significantly vary from their net asset value shall be
regarded as equivalent to such repurchase or redemption.
3. The Member States may exclude central banks from the scope of this
Directive.
Article 2
The Member States shall ensure that the companies publish a report
on their activities and profits and losses on a regular basis.
The report shall be published within a fixed time limit.
The report shall be sent to the competent authorities of each Member
State in which its shares are admitted to official listing, and shall be
made available to the public.
It shall contain comparative figures as well as an explanatory
statement relating to the company’s activities and profits and losses,
so as to enable investors to assess the current state and the likely
future developments of the company.
The report must be drawn up in the official language or languages or
in one of the official languages or in another language, provided that,
in the Member State concerned, such official language or languages
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or such other language are customary in the sphere of finance and
are accepted by the competent authorities.
Where the accounting information has been audited by the official
auditor of the company's accounts, that auditor's report and any
qualifications he may have shall be reproduced in full.
Article 3
The Member States may subject companies to obligations more stringent
than those provided for by this Directive or to additional obligations,
provided that they apply generally to all companies or to all companies of a
given class.
SECTION
II
Powers of the competent authorities
Article
4
1. Member States shall appoint one or more competent authorities and
shall notify the Commission of the appointment of such authorities, giving
details of any division of powers among them. Member States shall also
ensure that this Directive is applied.
2. The Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities have the
necessary powers to carry out their task.
3.
If a company governed by the law of a non-member country publishes a
report in a non-member country, the competent authorities may authorize it
to publish that report instead of the report provided for in this Directive,
provided that the information given is equivalent to that which would result
from the application of this Directive.
4.
This Directive shall not affect the competent authorities' liability, which
shall continue to be governed solely by national law.
SECTION
III
Cooperation between Member States
Article 5
1. The competent authorities shall cooperate whenever necessary for the
purpose of carrying out their duties and shall exchange any information
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required for that purpose.
2. Where a report has to be published in more than one Member State, the
competent authorities of these Member States shall, by way of derogation
from Article 3, use their best endeavours to accept as a single text the text
which meets the requirements of the Member State in which the
company's shares were admitted to official listing for the first time or the
text which most closely approximates to that text.
In cases of
simultaneous admission to official listing on two or more stock exchanges
situated or operating in different Member States, the competent authorities
of the Member States concerned shall use their best endeavours to accept
as a single text the text of the report which meets the requirements of the
Member State in which the company's head office is situated; if the
company's head office is situated in a non-member country, the competent
authorities of the Member States concerned shall use their best
endeavours to accept a single version of the report.
SECTION
IV
Securities
Committee
Article
6
1.
The Commission shall be assisted by a Committee, composed of
representatives of the Member States and chaired by the
representative of the Commission (The Securities Committee)
2. The regulatory procedure laid down in Article 5 of Decision
1999/468/EC shall apply in compliance with Article 7 and Article 8
thereof.
3. The Securities Committee shall have as its functions :
(a) to set out, for the application of Article 2 of the Directive, the
following elements :
- the period within which the report shall be published;
- the circumstances in which the competent authorities will be
permitted to extend the time limit for publication;
- where a company publishes consolidated accounts, the
circumstances in which Member States may allow the competent
authorities to require the company to publish additional information;
- the modes of publication of the report;
- the date of communication of the report by the company to the
Member States competent authorities;
- the circumstances in which the competent authorities will be
permitted to provide for adaptations to the particular requirements of
this Directive ;
- the conditions under which the competent authorities may authorise
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the omission from the report of certain information provided for in
this Directive.
(b) without prejudice to Articles 169 and 170 of the Treaty to facilitate the
harmonized implementation of this Directive through regular consultations
on any practical problems arising from its application on which exchanges
of views are deemed useful;
(c) to facilitate consultation between the Member States on the more
stringent or additional obligations which they may impose pursuant to
Article 3 with a view to the ultimate convergence of obligations imposed in
all Member States, in accordance with Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty;
(d) to advise the Commission, if necessary, on any additions or
amendments to be made to this Directive; in particular, the Committee
shall consider the possible modification of
Articles 2 and 3
in the light of
progress towards the convergence of obligations referred to in (b) above.
2. Within five years of notification of this Directive, the Commission shall,
after consulting the
Securities
Committee, submit to the Council a report
on the application of
Articles 2 and 3
and on such modifications as it
would be possible to make thereto.
SECTION
V
Final provisions
Article
7
1. Member States shall bring into force the measures necessary to comply
with this Directive not later than 30 June 1983. They shall forthwith inform
the Commission thereof.
2. Member States may postpone application of the measures referred to in
paragraph 1 until 36 months from the date on which they bring such
measures into force.
3. As from the notification of this Directive, Member States shall
communicate to the Commission the main provisions of the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions which they adopt in the field
governed by this Directive.
Article
8
This Directive is addressed to the Member States.
Done at Brussels, 15 February 1982.
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(1) OJ No C 29, 1. 2. 1979, p. 5 and OJ No C 210, 16. 8. 1980, p. 5.
(2) OJ No C 85, 8. 4. 1980, p. 69.
(3) OJ No C 53, 3. 3. 1980, p. 54.
(4) OJ No L 100, 17. 4. 1980, p. 1.
(5) OJ No L 66, 16. 3. 1979, p. 21.
(b)
Harmonization of core conduct of business rules for investor
protection
The FESCO Expert Group on Investor Protection has drafted a proposal
for the harmonisation of core conduct of business rules for investor
protection (article 11 of the Investment Service Directive (93/22/EEC)).
This note sets out a model of a possible EU approach inspired by
FESCO’s work as it relates to information to be provided to customers.
Annex A contains an hypothetical example of a directive providing for basic
principles and conferring implementing powers on the Securities
Committee.
Annex B contains implementing rules which could be adopted by the
expert committee process after the adoption of the basic directive
described in annex A.
ANNEX A
I.
Basic principles to be set out by the legislator in an EU
directive
1
Information to be provided to the customers
1.
Prior to the provision of investment services, an investment firm
must provide to customers information relating to
itself and the services it provides;
the key features of investments services and financial instruments
envisaged;
the charges relating to the services or instruments envisaged;
the risks associated with the financial instruments and transactions
-
-
-
-
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envisaged.
2.
During the performance of investment services, an investment firm
must ensure that customers are provided promptly with the essential
information concerning the progress of execution of any transaction
they undertake.
If an investment firm issues a marketing communication, the
promotional purpose of marketing communications must not be
disguised.
The information provided to the customers shall be fair, clear, and not
misleading, so as to enable them to make informed investment
decisions.
3.
4.
Customer agreements
1.
Prior to the provision of any investment service, the investment firm
must enter into a written agreement with the customer setting out the
rights and obligations of the parties, a description of the services to
be provided, and all other items of information necessary for the
proper understanding and performance of the agreement.
The customer agreement must be clear and easily understandable by
the customer.
Implementing measures to be adopted by the Securities
Committee
The Commission shall be assisted by the Committee established by
the Directive on information to be published on a regular basis by
companies the share of which have been admitted to official stock-
exchange listing (82/121/EEC) (The Securities Committee)
The regulatory procedure laid down in Article 5 of Decision
1999/468/EC shall apply in compliance with Article 7 and Article 8
thereof.
The Securities Committee shall have as its functions to set out the
following elements :
guidance as to the appropriate way to present and communicate
2.
II.
1.
2.
3.
-
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information to the customer;
-
-
-
-
where appropriate, the time-limit in which any requested information
shall be provided to the customer ;
the content of any information to be provided to the customer;
the content of any marketing communication;
the content of the customers agreements.
ANNEX B
Selection of rules set out in FESCO’s consultative paper on the
harmonization of core conduct of business rules for investor
protection
A.
(1)
INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED TO CUSTOMERS
BASIC REQUIREMENTS
RULES
The firm must ensure that information provided to customers is clear
and comprehensible. The content and purpose of the information
should be easily understood and key items should be given due
prominence. The impact of the message should not be diminished or
obscured by the use of inappropriate content or presentation.
The investment firm must take into consideration the time necessary
for a customer to absorb and react to the information provided and
must supply its customers with information on a prompt basis
according to the urgency of the situation.
If information provided contains comparisons, the requirement of
being fair, clear and not misleading means that the comparisons
must:
be based either on facts verified by the investment firm, or on
assumptions stated within the information;
be presented in a fair and balanced way;
not omit any fact that is material to the comparison.
INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED TO CUSTOMERS BEFORE
THE PROVISION OF INVESTMENT SERVICES
1.
2.
3.
a)
b)
c)
(2)
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(2.1) MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS
4.
RULES
An investment firm must be able to demonstrate that the information
provided in a marketing communication is consistent with the
information it provides to its customers before and during the
provision of the investment services.
Any marketing communication must contain at least the information
about the investment firm defined in points a) and d) of paragraph 35.
In case of a cross border marketing communication, the information
provided must in addition state that information about the firm can
also be obtained from or through the competent authority of the
Member State where the customer resides.
An investment firm must not use the name of the competent authority
to endorse its marketing communication or services.
Where a marketing communication refers to a financial instrument or
an investment service it must provide at least the information referred
to in points a) and d) of paragraph 39.
5.
6.
7.
(2.2) INFORMATION ABOUT THE INVESTMENT FIRM
8.
RULE
An investment firm must provide customers with the following
information prior to the provision of investment services:
the identity of the investment firm, its postal address and telephone
number;
the financial group to which the investment firm belongs;
the identity and status within the investment firm of employees and
other relevant agents with whom the customer has or is to have
contact;
the fact that the investment firm is authorised and/or registered and
the name of the competent authority that has authorised and/or
registered it;
the legal capacity in which the investment firm acts and the functions
that it performs so that that the customer is able to assess the scope
of the firm’s responsibilities;
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
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f)
g)
h)
details of the relevant compensation scheme;
details of any relevant out-of-court complaint and redress mechanism
and how the customer can access it;
any existing or potential conflicts of interest between the investment
firm and its customer and an outline of the firm's policies in relation to
conflicts of interest;
the languages in which the customer can communicate with the
investment firm.
INSTRUMENTS
AND
i)
(2.3) INFORMATION
ON
FINANCIAL
INVESTMENT SERVICES
RULES
An investment firm must inform potential customers of the key
features of financial instruments and investment services. This
information must consist of a description of the type of instruments
and services that must be in line with the firm’s assessment of the
customer's knowledge and experience and having regard to any
relevant facts disclosed by the customer.
9.
10. The information provided to customers must include the following:
a)
a description of the main characteristics of the instrument/service,
including the nature of the financial commitment, whether they are
traded on a regulated market or not and the risks involved;
price, including commissions, fees and other charges, of the
instrument/service;
arrangements for payment and performance;
details on any cancellation rights or rights of reflection that may apply.
b)
c)
d)
11. In order to give a fair and adequate description of the investment
service or financial instrument being promoted, an investment firm
must avoid accentuating the potential benefits of an investment service
or financial instrument without also giving a fair indication of the risks.
12. The fair and adequate description of a compound product must contain
all the relevant characteristics of the composing instruments. The
‘relevant characteristics’ of a compound product means all the different
characteristics of the product, for example the different services
involved, the duration of the product, the fact whether you borrow
money, the interest due, etc.
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13. The information on financial instruments and investment services must
not state or imply that the performance of services or of the investment
is guaranteed unless there is a legally enforceable arrangement with a
third party who undertakes to meet in full an investor’s claim under the
guarantee. Sufficient detail about the guarantor and the guarantee
must be provided to enable the investor to make a fair assessment of
the guarantee.
14. When information provided refers to a particular tax treatment the
investment firm must remind the customer that the taxation depends
on his or her personal situation and that the tax treatment is subject
to change. In any event the investment firm must recommend to the
customer to seek independent tax advice.
15. If a reference to historical performance of investment services or
financial instruments is made, it must be clearly expressed that the
figures refer to the past, and that they do not constitute reliable
guidance as to the performance of these services and instruments in
the future.
16. Any estimate, forecast or promise contained in the information on
financial instruments and investment services must be clearly
expressed, must state the assumptions on which it is based, must be
relevant and must not mislead the customer.
17. If the information refers to actual returns based on past performance:
a)
b)
the reference period must be stated and must not be less than one
year, provided that the relevant data are available;
where returns relate to more than one year, they must either be
reduced to an average annual rate or stated separately as annual
returns;
where an average annual return is presented for more than one year,
a reference period of at least five years must be used provided the
relevant data are available. If the relevant data are not available
over a reference period of at least five years (e.g. because the
financial instrument or the investment portfolio has not existed for
such a period), the returns may be measured from the issue date or
the date on which the portfolio was established;
where a benchmark is used to compare returns, it must be identified
and its reference period must be equal to that of the investment
service or financial instrument being promoted;
the information provided must, if simulated returns are used, state
that a simulation has been used;
if the return figures are not denominated in local currency, the
currency used must be stated and reference shall be made to the
currency risk for the return in local currency.
c)
d)
e)
f)
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18. The relevant provisions on actual returns shall apply mutatis
mutandis to the method of calculating and presenting the future
returns. Information on estimated future returns must state that the
estimated future returns are forecasts and that the forecasts are
supported by figures and have been subject to verification by an
independent third party.
19. A direct offer marketing which promotes a specific financial
instrument or investment service must contain a fair and adequate
description of the instrument or service, including the risks involved,
so as to enable potential customers to make an informed assessment
of such instrument or service.
20. A direct offer marketing must contain a prominent statement that, if a
customer has any doubt about the product or service which is the
subject of the marketing communication, he should contact the
investment firm for advice or contact an independent intermediary if
the investment firm does not offer advice.
Derivatives and leveraged transactions
21. If the customer envisages undertaking transactions in derivatives, the
information provided must relate to the types of instruments
concerned (e.g. futures/options/swaps), include an explanation of
their characteristics (especially the leverage effect, the duration of the
premium, the liquidity and volatility of the market) and a description of
their underlying parameter (e.g. equities/interest rates/currencies),
and indicate the method to be used to execute the customer’s
transactions (in particular, on a regulated market or not).
2.4
COMMISSIONS, CHARGES AND FEES
RULES
22. The information to be disclosed on commissions, charges and fees
must contain:
a)
the charges for each transaction, product or service, specifying
clearly the reason for the charge and detailing, where appropriate, the
percentage or rate applicable, the frequency with which it is applied,
any maximum or fixed minimum fees and, where the commission or
fee must be paid in foreign currency, the currency involved;
if various investment firms are to be involved in a transaction or
b)
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service, an indication to this effect. An investment firm may elect to
establish the full cost to the customer of the transaction or service or
the cost solely of its own intervention, stating in this case the items
involved plus an indication of the fees relating to the participation of
the other firms.
2.5
RISK WARNINGS
RULES
55. In addition to the information to be included in marketing
communications and product literature the investment firm must
provide its customers with specific risk warnings as appropriate.
Instances where the type of instrument or transaction envisaged
makes specific risk warnings necessary include:
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
financial instruments not traded on a regulated market;
financial instruments not authorised to be marketed to the public in
the country of residence of the customer;
transactions in illiquid financial instruments ;
derivatives;
financial instruments subject to high volatility;
short sales of financial instruments;
securities repurchase agreements or securities lending agreements;
foreign markets where appropriate;
transactions which involve credit or margin payments;
deposit of collateral;
foreign currency transactions.
As a minimum the investment firm must explain to the customer that
contracts in these instruments and transactions should not be entered
into unless the customer fully understands the nature and scope of
the risk and appreciates the extent of the exposure to that risk.
56. Risk warnings about derivatives must disclose that the instrument can
be subject to sudden and sharp falls in value. Where the investor
may not only lose his entire investment but may also be required to
pay more later, he must also be warned about this fact and the
possible obligation to provide extra funding. In addition the risk
warning must, where appropriate, carry information on a) clearing
house protections (e.g. that although the performance of a
transaction is sometimes ‘guaranteed’ by the exchange or clearing
house this guarantee will not necessarily protect the customer in the
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event of default by the investment firm or another counterparty); b)
suspension of trading (e.g. that under certain trading conditions it
may be impossible to liquidate a position); c) insolvency (e.g. that in
the event of default of an investment firm involved with the customer’s
transaction, positions may be liquidated automatically and actual
assets lodged as collateral may be irrecoverable.
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ANNEX 5
FINAL
7 November 2000
INITIAL REPORT
OF
THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN
ON
THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS
Brussels, 9 November, 2000
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THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN
Chairman : Alexandre LAMFALUSSY
Cornelius HERKSTRÖTER
Luis Angel ROJO
Bengt RYDEN
Luigi SPAVENTA
Norbert WALTER
Nigel WICKS
Rapporteur : David WRIGHT
Secretariat : Pierre DELSAUX
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Preamble
Introduction
Chapter I
The benefits of European financial
integration
Financial market developments in
the European Union
The main shortcomings of European
regulation today
Preliminary conclusions
The Committee of Wise Men’s terms of reference
given by the European Union’s Economic and Finance
Ministers on 17 July 2000
1
2
4
Chapter II
9
Chapter III
15
Chapter IV
Annex 1
21
29
Annex 2
Working methods of the Committee of Wise Men
32
33
Annex 3
Highlights of responses to the Committee’s on-line
questionnaire
Annex 4
Recent academic work on links between size and
growth of financial markets and the growth of output
40
Annex 5
European Union comitology procedures
42
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PREAMBLE
This document constitutes the Committee of Wise Men’s initial report on the
Regulation of European Securities Markets in conformity with the
Initial report
Committee’s terms of reference which were defined by the European Union’s
Economic and Finance Ministers on 17 July 2000 (see Annex 1). The
Committee has been requested to “…present an initial report to the ECOFIN
Council early in November 2000. This report will present the state of play and
initial approaches to solutions…”. The three main elements of the terms of
reference are :
to assess the current conditions for implementation of the regulation
The 3 main elements of
of the securities markets in the European Union;
the mandate
to assess how the mechanism for regulating the securities markets
in the European Union can best respond to developments underway
on securities markets……; and
in order to eliminate barriers and obstacles, to propose as a result
scenarios for adapting current practices in order to ensure greater
convergence and cooperation in day to day implementation, taking
into account new developments in the market.
The Committee decided that the main focus of its work should be on securities
Focus is on European
markets, primary and secondary, dealing with equities, derivatives (including
securities markets
the over the counter (OTC) market), corporate bonds, government bonds etc.
As to the type of securities markets, both regulated markets and alternative
trading systems (ATS) were taken into account.
The Chairman, Alexandre Lamfalussy, and Members of the Committee would
like to thank the French Presidency of the European Union, Members of the
European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee,
Remerciements
representatives of the Member States and the European Commission, notably
the rapporteur, the secretariat and their staffs, for their cooperation and
contributions to the Committee’s work. The Committee would also like to
thank all those who have taken part in the Committee’s hearings, often making
themselves available at very short notice, and those organizations and
individuals who have responded to the Committee’s on-line questionnaire.
The Committee would welcome a wide debate on its initial conclusions in
the short period that remains before its final report which will be released
Wide debate on initial
report findings
in mid-February 2001 in advance of the Stockholm European Council on
encouraged
23/24 March. Comments may be made to the Committee via the
following e-mail address :
[email protected]
or by fax
00.32.2.2955606.
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INTRODUCTION
The speed of change in European and global financial markets today is
breathtaking and accelerating. The velocity and complexity of the changes
underway are among the most profound in the history of financial markets.
There are many forces at work : globalization, which has created a highly
competitive environment; rapid progress in communication and information
technologies, which are reducing the costs of trading, spurring financial
product innovation, with the introduction of new products almost a daily
occurrence; and the euro, which, by removing exchange rate risk in the euro
area, is helping push European financial markets towards more integration.
This process is reshaping European securities markets, including stock
exchanges and market participants.
Changes of this magnitude are posing significant challenges for European
financial regulators, and regulation in general in the context of building an
integrated European financial market. First, the obstacles to integration
arising from unnecessary differences in the various jurisdictions of the EU,
which are a persistent cause of market segmentation should be removed.
Second, European regulation needs to keep up with the rapid pace of
technological and market change, whilst continually ensuring proper investor
protection and stability throughout the whole financial system. One of the
major challenges is to make sure that the European regulatory system can
adjust continuously, flexibly and rapidly to future developments which are
unpredictable today. Yet it needs to do this in a way which does not inhibit
legitimate market development and is neutral as regards competition between
different financial service providers.
Profound market
change : driven by
globalization,
improvements in
communications and
IT, and the euro…
Means new challenges
for securities
regulators and
regulation
An efficient European regulatory process for financial services and capital
markets is crucial for the whole of the European Union and all its citizens.
An efficient regulatory
Crucial for successful economic reform, for boosting European economic
process is crucial
growth. Crucial for helping channel the high rate of European savings
towards the corporate sector. Crucial for strengthening both the international
competitiveness of the European Union in the global economy and for
releasing its entrepreneurial potential. Crucial also for job creation and
consumer protection. There are major strategic, economic and social benefits
to reap from an integrated European capital market.
The Committee is aware of the close historical parallels between the reforms
now needed at European level to create a fully integrated financial services
and capital market and those used to build the
“1992”
internal market. The
parallelism between the European Commission’s 1992 programme and the
Financial Services Action Plan is clear. The aim in both cases is to create a
single economic space. Both require effective and timely regulation at
European level which is a
sine qua non
to ensure that European markets work
better and achieve high levels of integration. A key part of this objective is to
Reforms needed to
create an integrated
European financial
market parallel the
“1992” internal
market process
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make sure that agreed European legislation is properly implemented and
enforced.
Building an open European financial services and capital market in the next
few years - the logical and necessary complement of the euro - is the major
missing piece of the European Union’s internal market. In tandem with
building the information economy, to which there are strong links, this is the
major near-term economic challenge for the European Union – two
judgements that the Lisbon European Council confirmed in March this year.
For the European
Union, financial
services integration is
the major economic
challenge along with
building the
information economy
This initial report evaluates the current situation, and the challenges ahead,
The initial report’s
from both a market and regulatory perspective. It contains the Committee’s
scope
preliminary views on some possible solutions.
There is a need for action now. Delay means delaying the benefits, or perhaps
Time is short to
risking no benefits at all. Delay means the continuation of European financial
capture the benefits
market fragmentation, unnecessary costs and a sub-optimal European
economic performance.
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CHAPTER I – THE BENEFITS OF EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
The Committee believes that there will be significant long term benefits if the
European Union can integrate its financial and capital markets quickly. The
box below summarizes the main factors.
Expected Benefits from an Integrated European Financial Services and
Capital Market
I.
-
-
-
-
II.
-
-
-
III.
Improving the allocation of capital in the European economy :
More efficient, deeper, and broader securities markets enabling savings
to flow more efficiently to investment.
Reduced transaction costs and increased market liquidity.
More diversified and innovative financial system.
More opportunities to pool risk.
More efficient intermediation of European savings to investment :
Intensified competition between financial markets and intermediaries.
Economies of scale, scope and a reduction in inefficiency.
More economic cohesion.
A strengthening of the EU economy, resulting in it becoming a more
attractive location for inward investment
Summary of expected
benefits from an
integrated European
financial services and
capital market
These benefits, if taken together, should be widely shared by European
citizens, small and medium sized businesses, and large companies. Below are
examples of the type of benefits that could be captured :
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(i)
For European citizens
The real return on ordinary investors’ savings in securities (directly
or through funds) should be higher.
European investment funds,
pension funds, and citizens themselves would be able to invest more
freely across the EU. Funds will be better able to use modern
investment management techniques. They would also have a more
diversified investment choice of the whole European market. European
funds could grow in size – reducing administrative costs and improving
net returns for investors. On average a US investment fund is 6 times
larger than its European equivalent and overall, the capitalization of all
US investment funds is twice as large as those in the EU.
Higher investment
returns for European
citizens
Bigger EU investment
funds
Over the period 1984-1998 the average real return on pension funds was
And improved
10.5% in the US and 6.3% in those EU countries where funds faced
performance
severe investment restrictions. Integrated European markets with more
flexible investment rules, therefore, should improve the risk-return
frontier. Higher returns could also lower the cost of pension schemes,
resulting in a reduction of labour costs and an improvement in
competitiveness.
The Committee believes that it is of the utmost importance to
underline that an integrated European capital market, by raising
the real return on capital, will deliver significant direct benefits for
citizens
. The following indicative figures show why.
If a person wants to have benefits that represent 35% of their final salary
by investing in a pension scheme over a 40 year career, pension
contributions need to be :
-
-
-
5% of salary if the real rate of return of the pension plan is 6%.
10% of salary if the return is 4%.
20% of salary if the return is 2%.
As the EU’s demographic trends will lead to far more reliance on
privately funded pension schemes in the future, these benefits are
particularly important. In addition, efficient European capital markets
should improve the overall macroeconomic performance of the
economy, producing higher economic growth with positive impacts on
employment creation and productivity.
To capture all these benefits a number of conditions will have to be
fulfilled. Among the most important are :
Why this matters so
much for European
citizens – a pensions
example
Macroeconomic
performance could
improve – impacting
positively on
employment creation
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an efficient, competitive, innovative and properly regulated EU
But a number of
conditions need to be
financial services market;
fulfilled
intermediaries should exercise good professional judgement, taking into
account the different needs of professional and retail investors. They
should provide full explanations of the risk profiles attached to different
financial products along with accurate, relevant, and timely information
on savings products (including information on companies) in order to
ensure proper protection of the consumer;
rigorous monitoring and control of selling techniques, particularly in the
growing internet/e-commerce distance–selling segments of the market.
The fulfilment of these conditions will contribute greatly to the
Building public
attainment of broad public confidence in European financial
confidence is essential
markets.
(ii)
For small and medium sized compa nies (SMEs)
Integration should benefit the financing of small and medium sized
companies
– the essential employment creator and backbone of the
European economy. Today there is still an inadequate supply of risk
capital in the EU with venture capital only 1/5 of US per capita levels.
However if the European Union’s financial markets can integrate (and
develop deeper pools of interconnected liquidity, a common prospectus
for cross-border capital raising, common listing requirements together
with one set of international accounting standards etc), European venture
capital financing will be encouraged from the bottom up. This
correlated venture capital-entrepreneurial axis is absolutely vital for
creating a dynamic European economy – and developing new companies
to invest in. This means the whole financing chain - from start up
capital to Initial Public Offer to wholesale debt raising - has to work
efficiently. The overall strength of European capital market will be as
strong as its weakest link.
During the Committee’s deliberations a number of differing views were
put forward concerning the impact of an integrated European capital
market on small/medium cap liquidity. Some argued that there will be a
“herd”
tendency, (e.g. towards index-tracking instruments)
concentrating liquidity on the blue chip stocks to the detriment of the
smaller stocks and peripheral and local stock exchanges. Others said
that as European markets integrate, investors will seek a broader range
of companies to invest in – including SMEs. Indeed as interconnected
liquidity pools deepen, liquidity for SMEs could improve leading to
benefits for all companies
“rising on the integration tide”.
Investors, it
is argued, will always be on the lookout for highly profitable, even if
riskier investments. This is what happened in the US (e.g. the
NASDAQ market) where capital for new growing companies was found
because many institutional and retail investors saw opportunities in
An integrated EU
capital market can
offer a wider choice of
instruments for SMEs –
and will encourage
venture capital growth
Could financial
integration damage
small/medium cap
liquidity?
Views differ
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balancing the extra marginal risk against the higher returns that small
SMEs themselves must
and start up companies can generate. Obviously these two conflicting
demonstrate that they
are a good investment
trends could be at work simultaneously. In any event SMEs themselves
clearly have the responsibility to demonstrate they represent good value.
(iii) For large companies
For large European companies
the cost of raising capital in the EU is
higher than in the US - even for top blue chip customers. This cost is
caused by the complexity of cross-border capital raising in the EU;
different rules in each Member State impairing liquidity and efficient
pricing; unnecessary costs of establishment plus a higher cost of capital
per se.
The relative cost may well be higher the smaller the company.
At best these are unnecessary, expensive
“non-integration”
costs – at
worst they drive the business out of Europe, usually to the US, with
potentially damaging long term consequences for the European
economy. Firms with long term, innovative investment projects may be
the most affected.
For large companies, an integrated market will offer many more
possibilities to raise equity capital and to gain access to a growing euro
corporate bond market to securitize their debt.
(iv) Stimulating competition and innovation
One of the most important elements for building an integrated securities
market is to encourage competition and to ensure there is open entry and
access to
“contestable”
markets on non-discriminatory terms. In an
integrated and open European market, competition and innovation
would stimulate new financial products and financial services. They
would also reduce the costs of standard products (e.g. commercial loans,
credit card, and mortgage or private equity transactions) which can be
expected to converge over time to lower levels. In an integrated
European market, total transaction costs would also fall and the price
mechanism would work more efficiently. The experience of applying
the principles of open access to telecommunications networks and to
many other sectors of the European economy is an indication of the
positive gains to be seized for the users of financial services from the
construction of a competitive, integrated single market.
Fragmented EU capital
markets means a
higher cost of capital
for large companies
Integration benefits –
securitizing
debts/growth of
corporate bonds and
easier to raise equity
capital
Integration will
strengthen competition
and innovation –
driving down the cost
of standard financial
products
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It has been suggested to the Committee that more rational and integrated
clearing and settlement systems for cross-border European securities
trading could save around 1 billion euros annually. It is apparent that
Big clearing and
clearing and settlement systems in the EU are not cost-efficient at
settlement savings are
present and so progress towards cost reduction in Europe could have a
possible
significant beneficial effect in promoting EU cross-border investment
and market integration. This is primarily a question for the markets to
determine. However there is a public interest in ensuring that access to
clearing and settlement systems is open and fair, and that prudential
safety is ensured.
As markets integrate and competition strengthens, there will be an
inevitable
“creative destruction process”.
Rationalization and
restructuring can be expected particularly among intermediaries and in
the banking sector, as the combination of the effects of
disintermediation, concentration and conglomeration multiply. As has
proven to be the case in the opening up of telecommunications markets
in the EU, new financial markets, products, companies, and indeed job
creation should be able to offset any downside effects, with systemic
stability ensured.
(v)
The size of the benefits
It is not simple to quantify
the net sum of these benefits, but potentially
they are large. Recent evidence from cross-country data suggests that
there is a close link between the size and growth of financial markets
Magnitude of benefits
and the growth of output. Furthermore, most of this increase appears not
not precisely known –
but potentially large
to be driven by faster capital accumulation but by higher productivity.
The evidence from some recent academic studies can be found in Annex
4.
However there will be
some “creative
destruction” that
should be offset by
more innovation
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CHAPTER II – FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
The Committee has identified five overarching trends in the financial markets.
Trend 1 : Significant growth in securities business and demand for equity
The European corporate sector has traditionally been more dependent on bank
loans as a source of external finance than its US counterpart. At the start of
the 1980s, over 80% of external financing of continental European firms was
provided by banks and the European commercial paper market was non-
existent. The raising of finance through the issuance of equity and corporate
bonds has now overtaken bank loans as a source of corporate finance (see
Table 1). Nevertheless, these sources of finance are still less developed than
in the US.
The most notable growth has to date been achieved in equity, where recent
annual growth rates of volumes traded have exceeded 30% per annum over the
period 1995-1999. Similar progress has been observed in fixed income
securities particularly the issuance of asset-backed (mortgage) bonds and
securitization of loans by financial institutions. The European corporate bond
segment is also starting to increase (with 18% growth in 1998 and 58% in
1999). The size of the average corporate bond issuance also doubled in 1999,
reflecting the better absorption capacity of the markets.
European equity and
fixed income business
growing strongly
– but sizewise, still
way behind the US
New securities and new listings have been a significant component in the
growth of European stock market capitalization. In 1999, stock market
New European
capitalization of EU-15 markets reached 109% of GDP (85% for Euro-11
securities and listings
countries). This compares with cumulative total of 181% of US GDP. The
beginning to expand
number of companies listed on EU-15 exchanges has grown steadily from
6401 in 1995 to 8111 in 1999 (with the bulk of this growth occurring in the
Euro-11 markets – from 3475 to 4416).
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EUR-15 FIGURES
Table 1 : Comparative data on financial systems (euro-zone, US) (% of GDP, 1999):
Euro-zone
45.2
Bank loans to corporate sector
Fixed income securities:
98.8
166.2
US
12.4
- corporates:
- financial institutions:
- public sector
Stock market capitalization
7.4
36.4
54.9
29.0
46.8
48.4
90.2
179.8
Source: ECB monthly bulletin, July 2000.
Figure 1
% of GDP
300
272
STOCK MARKET CAPITALIZATION (end-1999)
250
206
192
174
176
155
181
200
150
105
102
75
62
62
85
100
74
64
68
72
50
16
0
DK
IRL
FIN
UK
B
D
NL
A
I
EU-11
GR
E
F
P
S
LUX
Jap
US
Source: BIS, FIBV (2000).
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The supply of new equity is matched by a greater appetite on the part of
European investors and households for securities-based investment. Whereas
this demand in some countries was traditionally mediated through the banks, it
is now being expressed through two additional channels :
Retail investors.
There are emerging signs that an equity culture is
beginning to develop in the EU. In Germany, the number of
shareholders directly owning shares climbed by 25% in 1999 to over 6
Evidence of an equity
million. In the UK, one out of every three adults owns shares. At
culture developing in
present, the participation of retail investors in securities markets is still
the EU?
routed through intermediaries. However increasingly, exchanges and
new trading systems seem interested in serving the customer directly.
Electronic brokerage has also driven down transactions costs, prompting
a rapid increase in the number of on-line brokerage accounts in some
Member States.
Institutional investors.
European institutional investors have yet to
assume the dominant role played by institutional investors in the US in
equity trading. However, steps to relax regulatory constraints on the
investment strategies of occupational retirement schemes should sustain
a greater presence by European funds in equity and investment funds
business. In the investment funds market, there is a major portfolio
switch underway towards the equity segments – a 20% increase in
proportion compared to 1994. However, in 1999 the average proportion
of equities in European investment funds was 40%, still well below the
60% figure in the US.
Institutional investors
also swinging more
towards the equity
markets
Trend 2 : Europeanization/internationalization of securities markets
The investment horizons of funds and private investors are slowly becoming
more European. The relative share of domestic equity in portfolios of unit
New pan-European
trusts is in decline. The volume and number of cross-border transactions is
investment strategies
increasing. The same investment firms constitute the membership of different
are being defined
exchanges and serve multiple national client bases. Finally, exchanges and
new types of trading platforms are competing across borders for order flow
and are increasingly dependent on consolidated clearing houses/central
counterparty facilities.
Despite these growing linkages, a strong home bias persists in primary and
But there is still a
secondary market activity in the EU markets. In part, this situation reflects
strong home country
inertia in investment patterns. However, it is also the case that cross-border
bias
issuance, trading and settlement are beset by numerous outstanding legal and
technical obstacles.
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Globalization is also impinging directly on European securities markets in
many different ways. There are now far more linkages, cross-border and
between markets and participants. While investment services have long been
marked by strong international competition, the elimination of obstacles to
international competition in trading and execution is a more recent
phenomenon. Provision of trading infrastructure services is now a business
like any other. Such services are exposed to international competition through
a number of powerful financial marketplaces in an increasingly globally
integrated 24 hour trading environment. The competition from, and incursion
of, third country trading systems on the European market is likely to develop.
The European securities industry will need to respond to remain competitive.
The European market is, rightly, open to non-EU firms. European firms,
service providers and markets should also have the opportunity to compete on
an equal footing in third country markets. This means that those entry barriers
or regulatory impediments to European financial service providers should be
removed. There are still far too many, with some of the most important ones
being in the United States.
Trend 3 : Competition and cooperation between exchanges and trading
systems
International
competition
intensifying as global
dimension of securities
markets strengthens
International trade
barriers to EU
companies must be
removed
Exchanges, organized and managed traditionally as national monopolies, are
now competing for order flow between themselves and with new competitors.
Major changes in
Technology has lowered entry costs and allows virtual marketplaces to serve
European stock
wide geographical zones. Competition between trading platforms holds out
markets underway
the prospect of efficiency benefits in the processing and execution of trades.
Some exchanges and new entrants are seeking to achieve European reach
Mergers and alliances
through organic growth. However, other exchanges are looking to far-
are accelerating
reaching alliances or fully-fledged mergers.
Technology has also facilitated the emergence of more efficient trading
Many European the
exchanges are at
systems and a new tier of trading systems functioning without a need for
technological frontier
physical trading floors.
In the US, Alternative Trading Systems ( TSs) compete head-on with the
A
large exchanges and have now captured some 30% of NASDAQ trading
volumes, and 5% of NYSE.
In Europe, ATSs provide specialized
intermediary services for professional participants which complement rather
than substitute for exchange – based trading arrangements. There are now
more than 20 ATSs operating in Europe – largely based in the UK and
Germany. ATSs have the potential to become a potent force in the European
securities landscape.
New competition in the
form of over 20
alternative trading
systems in the EU
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These new platforms are also paving the way for organized trading of fixed
income securities and some derivatives business which were previously
Now spilling over to
conducted on a bilateral/OTC basis. To the extent that these new trading
the fixed income and
arrangements are publicly accessible to a wide population of investors, they
derivatives markets
may give rise to some regulatory and supervisory challenges comparable to
those that arise in equity markets.
Trend 4 : Growing pressures for consolidation of clearing and settlement
The pressures for a more efficient securities trading infrastructure are being
brought to bear on clearing and settlement - an area where European
significantly underperforms when compared to US markets, and which
constitutes a major hindrance to efficient cross-border transactions.
According to some industry sources, settlement charges in Europe for cross-
border transactions are ten times those levied in the centralized US Depository
Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) system. When inefficiencies at the
level of clearing/central counterparty are added in, the gap is higher. The
Committee has been told that annually a maximum of up to 1 billion euros of
the current annual cross-border settlement outlay could be saved through the
creation of a single European settlement infrastructure.
Submissions to the Committee have highlighted the widespread differences as
regards the optimal configuration of European clearing and settlement
facilities.
Some market participants and some clearing and settlement leaders expressed
a strong preference for consolidation along functional lines (the horizontal
Horizontal or vertical
model). According to this view, the organization of multilateral
“netting”
integration?
through a European central clearing counterparty could minimise counterparty
risk and would provide the conditions for maximizing the efficient use of
capital and exploiting cost efficiencies.
The jury is still out as to whether full integration of Central Securities
Depositories (CSDs) is required or whether technical linkages between
existing entities will be sufficient. Technology also provides the key to the
technical inter-linkage/integration of heavily fragmented securities settlement
systems. Managing the full web of bilateral linkages (which could amount to
up to 650 bilateral links between the 26 existing settlement systems in the EU)
is generally regarded as extremely cumbersome and a source of operational,
some have said even systemic risk in itself. This is sometimes coupled with
calls for a dominant structure in the clearing or settlement area to be organized
on a
“public utility”
basis (as in the US where the DTCC is owned by the
market participants themselves). The integration of trading, clearing and
settlement in vertical
“silos”
is dominant in several Member States.
European clearing &
settlement – major
progress required to
cut costs
One European central
counterparty, like the
US, or interlinkages?
A “public utility” to
help reduce cost (and
systemic risk)?
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The importance of open and fair access to clearing and settlement systems to
stimulate competition and market integration was frequently raised in the
Committee’s work. The alternative will be financial marketplace competition
based on bundled services – with the risk of less competition at each stage of
the transaction cycle.
Trend 5 : Increased volatility of financial asset prices
The Committee has noted that, more recently, there has been a sharp increase
Recently, noticeable
in the volatility of stock prices. This has been the case worldwide, and has
increase in volatility of
been especially noticeable for prices relating to the
“new economy”
segment.
financial assets
Increased volatility can be observed in the behaviour of indices, but even more
so in that of individual prices.
These developments may turn out to be a passing phenomenon to the extent
that volatility reflects uncertainties regarding current business perspectives or
the difficulty in assessing the working of, and the prospects for, the
“new
economy”.
But they may well relate to longer lasting forces operating in our
Unclear whether this
volatility is a long or
globalized economy. While a number of firms will enter the market, others
short term phenomenon
are bound to disappear. Worldwide financial integration, combined with the
efficiency of communication and information technology, mean that asset
price changes are transmitted instantaneously across borders; and, via the OTC
derivatives markets (which may themselves be a source of instability as a
recent IMF paper has indicated
) price movements originating in one
particular market may be transmitted across the border to the whole range of
financial assets.
Summary
All these five trends are having, and will continue to have in the future, a
major impact on European securities markets because these dynamics have not
yet run their course. This is of considerable importance for European
regulators and the process of European regulation.
International capital markets :
Developments, prospects and key policy issues by an IMF staff team led by
Donald J. Mathieson and Gary J. Schinasi – September 2000.
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CHAPTER III – THE MAIN SHORTCOMINGS OF
EUROPEAN REGULATION TODAY
THE EU REGULATORY FRAMEWORK…..
The current EU legislative framework for securities markets covers mutual
recognition of listing particulars, public offer prospectus, investment firms,
investor compensation schemes, regulated markets, insider dealing,
harmonized investment rules for UCITS (investment funds), and some
company law provisions. It is based on minimum harmonization and mutual
recognition. There is no single template for supervision. Cooperation
between securities regulators for dealing with cross-border practices and
trading is only lightly covered. The investigative powers of national
authorities and sanctions are not defined at EU level.
The current approach has begun to open previously closed national markets.
For instance, figures show that a large number of investment firms have
benefited from the single passport given by the Investment Services Directive
(ISD) and the ability to provide services on a cross-border basis. (No data are
however available on the market share of these companies.) On the other
hand, a limited number of firms have so far used the freedom to establish
branches in another Member State.
…..IS NOT SUFFICIENT
The EU’s regulatory
framework for
securities today is
limited – it is based on
minimum
harmonization and
mutual recognition
The results of the hearings conducted by this Committee, as well as the
answers to the questionnaire, show that
far more needs to be done to achieve
a real single market for financial services.
A large majority of interested
participants share the feeling that transposition and implementation of EU
directives is unsatisfactory, inhibiting the development of cross-border
securities business. In the Committee’s work and in the hearings some issues
have repeatedly emerged as being particularly damaging to the construction of
a integrated market. They are :
(i)
Issuers
are still confronted with numerous practical difficulties. For
instance:
Far more needs to be
done to achieve a real
single market in
financial services
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-
The
EU passport for issuers
is still not a reality. Firms wishing to
EU passport for issuers
raise capital in other jurisdictions are obliged to comply with different
is not a reality
or additional requirements in order to gain the approval of local
Regulatory Authorities. There is not even an agreed definition of a
public offer of securities, with the result that the same operation is
analyzed as a private placement in some Member States and not in
others. The current system discourages firms from raising capital on a
European basis and therefore from real access to a large, liquid and
integrated financial market.
Rules on disclosure of price-sensitive and relevant market and
company information
differ greatly between Member States.
Accounting rules are not yet harmonized.
More information on EU
companies is often available in the US than in Europe.
For investors
several deficiencies remain, for instance:
Professional investors
are often subjected to multiple sets of conduct of
There are still multiple
rules for investors…
business rules. There is still no legally agreed definition of what
constitutes a professional investor, despite some recent progress.
Retail investors
are faced with
different sets of consumer rules
with
Different consumer
rules
varying levels of consumer protection.
There is no agreed definition of
market manipulation.
Effective functioning of cross-border clearing and settlement is still
impeded by legal differences in the
treatment of collateral.
Markets and trading systems
There is
no single passport for organized markets and trading
No single passport for
systems
(i.e. they do not have the right to provide services directly on a
organized markets
cross-border basis).
The over the counter (OTC) market
is mostly outside the scope of the
The OTC market is
EU directives – with, for example, OTC transactions having to be
outside EU Directives
declared in some jurisdictions but not in others.
And no cross-border
collateral rules
-
Disclosure rules and
other information
requirements vary
considerably
(ii)
-
-
-
-
(iii)
-
-
(iv) Investment firms
now have a European passport but are often faced
Different obligations
with different obligations in each Member State because the firms
are placed on
investment firms
providing core services, i.e. e-brokers, broker/dealers, portfolio
managers and underwriters, are subject to substantially different
supervisory regimes in different Member States.
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(v)
The
large number of Regulatory Authorities
for securities in the
On top of a
Member States creates unnecessary cost and confusion among market
multiplication of
players. In the EU there are approximately 40 regulatory organisations
regulatory authorities
– far too many for an efficient system.
A FIRST INITIATIVE : THE CREATION OF THE FORUM OF
EUROPEAN SECURITIES COMMISSIONS (FESCO)
FESCO was founded in 1997 by the Statutory Securities Commission of the
European Economic Area (EEA). It is seeking to develop standards
FESCO is helping
develop standards
complementing the legal framework created by the EU Directives.
Specialized papers prepared by FESCO on specific issues constitute a helpful
analysis of the difficulties encountered by the national regulators and can
provide some solutions.
FESCO members have also agreed on multilateral Memoranda of
exchanged
Understanding to establish a general framework for cooperation and
communication between each other. It provides for mutual assistance between
the parties.
And MOU’s are being
However useful this work is, FESCO is confronted with several drawbacks: it
But FESCO has
drawbacks…
has no official status, it works by consensus, and its recommendations are not
binding. Furthermore, the actual implementation of decisions in the different
Member States is dependent upon the regulatory powers granted internally to
each respective regulator – and these differ widely.
A SECOND INITIATIVE : THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S
FINANCIAL SERVICES ACTION PLAN (“FSAP”)
The FSAP is the Commission’s response towards improving the single market
in financial services.
Adopted in 1999 following a Commission
Communication and a consultation with all interested parties, the FSAP
contains a list of 42 measures to be implemented, grouped around 4 strategic
objectives (retail markets; wholesale; prudential rules and supervision; and
wider conditions for an optimal single financial market). Its purpose is to
serve as an inspirational programme for rapid progress towards a single
financial market. Most of the points mentioned above are covered by the
FSAP, but prioritization of the different measures is needed.
Some of the points mentioned in the FSAP are also part of the Risk Capital
Action Plan which the Lisbon European Council stated should be delivered by
2003 (e.g. prospectuses, accounting rules etc).
The European
Commission’s
Financial Services
Action Plan is a
blueprint for an
integrated financial
services and capital
market
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The FSAP was endorsed by the Lisbon European Council in March 2000
which set a deadline for its implementation of 2005 at the latest. Some of the
measures have already been adopted.
New proposals made by the
Commission are following the legislative process while others will be
submitted in the next few months. The Commission is continually monitoring
the implementation of the FSAP with half-yearly progress reports to the
ECOFIN Council.
THE MAIN DIFFICULTY : THE FUNCTIONING OF THE
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
…And it was endorsed
at the Lisbon European
Council – with a 2005
deadline set for
delivery
Markets participants share the view that the FSAP is the right answer to the
But the regulatory
problems outlined above. However, most fear that it will not be implemented
system is not working
with the required urgency. If the EU is to capture the benefits of an integrated
efficiently enough
European capital market, it must have a regulatory system that works more
efficiently and flexibly, and one which is more comprehensive in scope.
The present system as it now functions is not meeting these objectives :
-
The process to adopt legislation is often too slow.
Even when
political problems do not arise, it takes three years on average to agree a
Regulation or a Directive. Such a timescale is unacceptable when
legislation is meant to bring an appropriate response to a fast changing
The EU’s regulatory
world. For instance, the UCITS proposals are still pending more than
system is too slow
two years after being proposed by the Commission. In worst cases,
delays are much longer : more than eleven years for the Take-over
Directive which has still not been enacted. However, examples (outside
the financial services domain) show that some proposals can be adopted
and implemented quickly at European level (in some extreme cases,
adoption in less than eight months), when the political will is there.
Seeking a political consensus leads sometimes to the adoption of
ambiguous texts
or texts with a level of harmonization so minimal that
no real integration is achieved. An example is Article 11 of the
Community texts are
Investment Services Directive. It has not given sufficient clarity about
sometimes ambiguous
whose conduct of business rules should apply to wholesale business.
The same provisions are often interpreted and applied by the Member
States in a very different manner. Without legal clarity, no efficient
delivery mechanisms can subsequently guarantee equivalent
implementation.
Too many
delays also occur in the transposition process
by Member
States. However, few infringement cases have been brought against the
Member States given ambiguities in certain Community texts, a lack of
Commission resources and a low number of complaints.
-
-
Few infringements
have been brought
against the Member
States
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-
Some important issues are still not appropriately covered at EU
level
(e.g. pension funds, international accounting standards, the
Some sensitive areas
are not covered at all
European company statute…) ,whilst some texts are clearly obsolete but
remain untouched. As an illustration, more than twenty years have
elapsed since the adoption of texts on prospectuses and listing
requirements. This is explained, in part, by the acute political
sensitivities of some issues.
There is
no rapid mechanism in place to update Community
No rapid regulatory
Directives
to new market developments.
updating system exists
Existing
obligations to cooperate, procedures for notification and
Insufficient obligations
information sharing are not sufficient
and do not deliver enough
to cooperate
predictability in enforcement mechanisms (a key issue for all financial
actors).
-
-
In short, the current system, as it is now functioning, is :
Too slow
Too rigid
Containing too much ambiguity and is therefore resulting in inconsistent
implementation
Over-reliant on primary legislation for determining detailed rules
A short term solution
has to be found within
existing Treaty
arrangements
Conclusions on the
current regulatory
system
Urgent action is needed. The Committee is therefore persuaded that in the
short term any solution has to be found within the confines of existing Treaty
arrangements.
OTHER SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLES
Even if the EU Regulatory Framework in the field of securities were a
complete success, there are a range of other obstacles that would still need to
But there are a range
of other important
be tackled to achieve a completely integrated European financial services
obstacles
market. Such obstacles are not within the remit of the Committee’s terms of
reference, but the Committee wishes to underline in particular the importance
of :
-
Differences in the Member States’ legal systems
which have
Such as different
important consequences in the field of securities (e.g. bankruptcy
Member State legal
regimes, sanctions regimes or jurisdictional regimes which are all
systems
potential obstacles to cross-border trading).
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-
The patchwork of applicable legislation
in the field of securities is
creating uncertainty and increasing dramatically the costs of cross-
border services. In particular it is complicating the tasks of smaller
firms which have insufficient resources to cope with such complexity.
Patchwork of
legislation causes
uncertainty and extra
costs
-
Taxation differences
which are a major impediment leading to
Tax differences
distortions of trading flows for non-economic reasons.
Cultural differences
(such as attitudes towards corporate governance
Cultural barriers as
and investor protection) are additional complicating factors hindering
well play a role
the development of an integrated EU financial market.
-
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CHAPTER IV – PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
The Committee considers that the pace of accelerated change in financial
markets, the benefits of channelling the high level of European savings
Initial report shows
efficiently towards the corporate sector, and the requirement for the European
change required
regulatory system to reshape to meet this new challenge recognized in the
European Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan, needs a programme
of comprehensive and coordinated reform. The Committee’s preliminary
views on a number of the main issues are set out below :
ECONOMIC BENEFITS
If the European Union can integrate its capital and financial markets in the
near-term, the European economy will strengthen – improving both long-term
economic growth and job creation. To highlight this,
the Commission might
Economic benefits
undertake to construct a comprehensive series of macro and micro
indicators to continuously benchmark progress towards an integrated
European financial market, including more precise measurements of the
overall macro and micro benefits.
The results should be widely publicized.
If possible, preliminary results should be made available by summer 2001.
TRADE ISSUES
As European financial markets integrate, reciprocal and open access to the
financial markets of the EU’s major trade partners is essential to ensure a level
Removing trade
international playing field for EU financial services/companies. However,
barriers in next Trade
Round
barriers to entry are prominent in many non-EU countries including several
important ones in the United States.
The European Commission, working
with the Member States, should consider establishing a comprehensive
list of these external trade barriers which should be removed in the
forthcoming WTO trade round, if not before.
MARKET VOLATILITY
In an environment in which volatility may be increasing, regulators should pay
enhanced attention to the need for intermediaries and others promoting
investment products to provide investors – and, in particular, retail investors –
with reliable and clear information so that they can make informed investment
decisions in full knowledge of the risks.
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Increased asset price volatility may also entail risks to systemic stability. It is
not within the remit of this Committee to evaluate such risks, and even less to
make recommendations on how to deal with them. However, given the
growing interlinkages between all segments of the securities markets and the
full range of financial intermediaries, the Committee believes that there is an
urgent need for structured cooperation at the European level between financial
market regulators and those in charge of micro and macro prudential
supervision. The proper functioning of securities clearing and settlement
systems as well as that of the OTC derivatives markets should be a shared
concern.
The Council might wish to ask the Economic and Finance
Committee to look at some of these prudential issues.
THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACTION PLAN (FSAP)
Particular attention
needed to deal with
market volatility and
possible risks to
systemic stability
The European Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan is widely seen as
containing the key elements for constructing an integrated European financial
services market. This Plan was fully endorsed by Heads of State and
Delivery of FSAP
essential
Government at the Lisbon European Council in March 2000 and is widely
supported by Member States, market participants and national regulators.
Furthermore, at the Lisbon European Council a date was set for its completion
– namely 2005. This Plan must be delivered. But in the view of the
Committee, delivery by 2005 is too late.
The Committee suggests that further political efforts should be made to
complete the Plan by 2004. There could also be political commitments to
accelerate work on a small number of priorities, some by the end of 2003,
given that some of the measures form part of the EU’s Risk Capital
Action Plan – whose deadline was set at the Lisbon European Council to
be 2003. These new dates and key priorities could be endorsed, as soon
as possible, by political commitments at the highest levels.
These
commitments should filter down to all parts of the decision making process –
particularly to the negotiator level. Swift and accurate transposition and
implementation into national legislation is equally necessary.
The Committee’s priorities, all of which are contained in the FSAP, are :
But efforts should be
made to accelerate to
2004, and some
priorities even to 2003
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-
Modernizing the Investment Services Directive
[Required : Sorting out country of origin/country of destination rules for
wholesale financial transactions; defining who are professional and retail
investors and appropriate conduct of business rules; drawing up
appropriate rules for regulated/non-regulated markets (ATSs)]
-
Making cross-border capital raising as easy as domestic capital
raising
[Required : a single passport for issuers; a common definition of public
offer; modernizing listing requirements and introducing a distinction
between admission to listing and to trading]
-
Creating open, transparent European markets
[Required : Harmonizing transparency and disclosure requirements;
encouraging use of international accounting standards for all listed
companies; defining more clearly European market abuse and finally
agreeing take-over rules]
The Committee’s
priorities
-
Creating European financial products
[Required : Updating investment rules for pension and investment funds
and providing for cross-border collateral]
-
Establishing proper levels of consumer protection
[Required : Establishing high and equivalent levels of consumer
protection and efficient methods for resolving cross-border consumers
disputes]
EUROPEAN REGULATION
The present functioning of the European legislative system cannot meet the
challenge of regulating modern financial markets. For reasons that have been
developed in the previous chapter, the Committee is indeed concerned that the
present system will not be able to deliver the Financial Services Action Plan
on time.
The Committee believes that at this present stage of development of the
European Union’s market for securities, this regulatory challenge can best be
met by building on the methods and political determination which underlie the
successful creation of the single market for goods and services, while adapting
those methods to particular needs of securities.
Present regulatory
system requires some
urgent change –
otherwise FSAP will
not be delivered on
time
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The Committee has noted during its deliberations how national securities
markets regulation is often organized. In general, framework laws are passed
by national Parliaments that outline the basic principles that regulators must
follow. Legal implementing powers are then delegated to them to turn these
principles into workable day to day rules for the market. This model is used by
a number of Member States and by the United States.
Any legislative approach must provide an efficient, timely and adaptable way of
delivering the necessary European legislation to move towards the
accomplishment of a single securities market in Europe. Within the present EU
institutional arrangements, the approach should be constructed in a way which
would :
Respect democratic processes at both national and Union levels;
Some national
securities market
regulators are
organized rather
differently
maintain the present institutional balance in the European Union and be in
institutional criteria to
conformity with the present structure of the Treaties;
be fulfilled
take full account of the established agreements regarding proportionality
and subsidiarity.
Basic legal and
The details of one way which might work are set out below and are presented
here as a basis for further discussion and analysis. This approach could be
A possible approach
introduced quickly. Ideally it would require political endorsement at the highest
political level, namely by the European Council, by the Commission and by the
Member States as well as the support of the European Parliament.
A POSSIBLE APPROACH
The broad framework principles
of securities legislation could be
enacted at EU level in accordance with normal EU legislative procedures.
Level 1 :
Broad
At this political level, legislative texts should not be detailed, but
principles agreed by
normal EU procedures
concentrate on the key principles of each issue (
EVEL 1).
In other
L
words, the European Commission, having consulted widely, could make
the necessary proposals to the Council of Ministers and the European
Parliament for adoption by them using co-decision procedures. Wherever
possible, these proposals could be agreed using
“fast track”
procedures
that already exist, even if they are rarely used. Furthermore, Regulations
could also be used rather than Directives to improve the transparency,
speed and accuracy of transposition and implementation.
Regulations are legislative acts that once agreed by the Council and the European Parliament do not need
Member State transposition. Directives require Member State transposition which can take up to 18 months or
more.
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The modalities of how to implement the principles set out in the
Level 1 framework would be laid down also at EU level using
Level 2 :
A new
Securities Committee is
comitology procedures (LEVEL 2)
[for details see Annex 5]. This
needed…
would require the setting up of an EU Securities Committee. It would be
made up of the European Commission and representatives of the Member
States and would have powers to decide on the technical implementing
details of Level 1 legislation and the responsibility to update them when
required. The technical rules decided through this mechanism would,
inter alia,
provide the basis for the practical implementation of the single
market principle of mutual recognition. They would form part of
Community law and be binding on all Member States.
Most importantly, the EU Securities Committee should be supported by a
Supported by an EU
committee composed of EU regulators
, in a format similar to that of
Regulators Committee
FESCO, but with a precisely defined role and status. The Regulators
could advise the Commission on the technical implementing details of
Level 1 framework principles.
Furthermore, there should be
arrangements whereby market practitioners could systematically and
regularly provide input to this Regulators Committee and the European
Commission.
The Member States have the responsibility to implement Community
law. They should do so within
a framework of enhanced and
strengthened cooperation and networking between their regulators
with a view to ensuring consistent and equivalent transposition of the
Level 1 and 2 legislation (LEVEL 3).
National regulators should be
encouraged to agree joint protocols on certain interpretations for
implementation purposes and also a peer review process to ensure
consistent enforcement practice in the EU Regulators Committee.
Member States should also ensure that only one National Regulatory
Authority with sufficient and comparable powers is responsible for each
aspect of European financial services regulation.
Level 3 :
Enhanced
and strengthened
transposition and
implementation
There would be
strengthened enforcement of Community rules
through more vigorous action by the Commission and enhanced
Level 4 :
Reinforced
of
cooperation between the Member States and their regulators
enforcementlaw
Community
(LEVEL 4).
In particular, the Commission should act more vigorously
to enforce Community legislation and be given sufficient resources to
carry out this essential task.
The overall success of this 4 level regulatory approach will depend on the
political will of the Member States, the European Parliament and the
Commission to make it work. If agreed, the Committee believes that every
effort should be made to ensure such an approach could be functioning by
the end of 2001.
Of crucial importance also will be the readiness of national
regulators to cooperate and work closely together to help deliver the framework
of European legislation that is needed for an integrated market.
Success will depend on
the political will of all
concerned
It should start by end
2001
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The Committee considers it essential that this new approach is properly
Proper accountability
accountable to the European Parliament. Annual reports on the work of
to the European
Securities and Regulators Committees should be submitted to the Council and
Parliament is essential
Parliament. Both Committees should report regularly to the European
Parliament.
Furthermore, the Committee believes that
a continuous monitoring process
would be necessary to evaluate how the new approach is functioning, both from
a procedural stance and also by assessing how rapidly European financial
services integration is taking place. Half-yearly reports could be given to the
Council and the European Parliament on the progress, or lack of it, being made.
Continuous monitoring
with half yearly reports
to the Council and the
European Parliament
The functioning of this approach should be fully reviewed around 2004,
Full review around
though if, in the light of the half-yearly reports, it were manifestly failing to
2004
secure sufficient progress, there would be a case for a full review earlier.
It is clearly impossible to foresee the substance of a review of developments
that have yet to take place. Various scenarios are conceivable however. At one
extreme, the approach sketched out above might be succeeding in developing
the single market in securities. In that case, its essentials could be maintained
Scenarios for the future
or strengthened if that seemed necessary. At the other extreme, if the approach
did not appear to have any prospect of success, it might be appropriate to
consider a Treaty change, including the creation of a single EU regulatory
authority for financial services generally in the Community.
At this stage of the development of the EU’s securities markets, the Committee
Case for single
believes that there are good reasons for not considering the establishment of a
regulatory authority
single regulatory agency. First, the basic harmonized rules necessary for the
not yet made
appropriate functioning of an integrated market are not yet in place. Second,
speedy action is needed to correct the identified shortcomings of the present
regulatory framework; and speed requires reforms carried out within the
confines of the present Treaty. Third, some time will be needed to ascertain
whether any such reforms deliver, or fail to deliver, results.
THE ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Legislation and regulation provides the framework in which the private sector
operates. The private sector has a major role to create the single market within
that framework. In particular the private sector has an important role to reduce
European financial market inefficiency, such as the excessive costs of trading
securities in the EU notably clearing and settlement. Progress should be
benchmarked.
Private sector has
important role to play
– e.g. reducing
clearing and settlement
costs
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The private sector should also work intensively with regulators on building
…And building cross
consumer trust to enhance the cross-border retail trade of financial services
border confidence for
(e.g. networks of alternative disputes settlement using national financial
retail trade
ombudsmen; and trust marks etc). The private sector should also work with
the European Commission to remove international trade barriers, and ensure
constructive input to the Level 2 decision-making process described above.
DELIVERING THE CHANGE
Not all of these changes can be delivered quickly. But the regulatory changes
are especially urgent. The Committee suggests that the Stockholm European
Council, in March 2001, might consider a
European Council Resolution
similar in structure to that used for establishing the Growth and Stability Pact
in June 1997. In this Resolution, Heads of State or Government could agree
with the European Commission on a series of differentiated commitments –
for the Member States, the Commission and the Council to deliver the essence
of the regulatory proposals so they can begin to function from 2002 onwards.
AREAS FOR FURTHER REFLECTION
Impact of integrated securities markets on small and medium sized
companies (SMEs)
Many of the actions outlined in this chapter can benefit SMEs, particularly
those seeking to tap capital markets. However the Committee wishes to
reflect further on this issue.
Competition
The Committee believes that encouraging competition throughout EU
Key importance of
securities markets will benefit the integration process. Essential public policy
strong competition
objectives to be pursued are open access to markets and clearing and
policy
settlement systems on a non-discriminatory basis. At the same time,
competition authorities should pay particular attention to any possible
detrimental effects of concentration in European financial markets as
integration accelerates. The Committee wishes to reflect further on this issue.
Committee wishes to
reflect further on the
issue of the impacts on
SMEs
Delivering change –
importance of
Stockholm European
Council – March 2001
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Clearing and settlement
Whilst it is certain that in Europe major progress to reduce clearing and
settlement costs is required (indeed the EU must reduce cross border trading
costs towards US levels as soon as possible), there are a number of important
public policy issues that merit further attention – such as the role of
competition policy, the need to ensure systemic stability and the future
structure of clearing and settlement in the European Union.
FUTURE WORK
The Committee’s final report will be presented in mid-February 2001. The
Committee’s intention is to deepen its reflections on a number of issues,
Future work – up to
final report mid-2001
notably those mentioned above, and on the legal and political analysis of the
regulatory approach described above. The Committee will take into account
the general political and market reactions to these proposals. It may also
launch a second series of consultations.
Clearing and
settlement – major
progress required…
and further reflection
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ANNEX 1 – THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN’S TERMS
OF REFERENCE GIVEN BY THE EUROPEAN
UNION’S ECONOMIC AND FINANCE MINISTERS ON
17 JULY 2000
The introduction of the Euro and the resulting structural changes have speeded
up integration of the European financial market. To deliver the full
prospective benefits to European business and the EU economy, to compete in
the global market for financial services and to help European business to
compete in the global market for goods and services, EU capital markets need
to be dynamic, competitive and innovative. They need to embrace new
technology and new opportunities. To support this, regulation of capital
markets needs to support the Lisbon vision of a dynamic knowledge-driven
economy, with good access to capital in order for businesses to invest, grow
and create jobs.
A single market in securities must be achieved rapidly to allow :
-
-
-
more competitive financing on the markets of EU enterprises, including
SMEs
increased liquidity and
greater competitiveness between intermediaries and infrastructures, in
order to achieve better provision of services at lower cost.
However, growth and competitiveness will be hampered unless the
administrative, regulatory or other types of obstacles which in practice impede
cross-border securities transactions are eliminated.
Regulation of the markets and of financial reporting in Europe is based
primarily on European directives which have established standards for
regulation of a broad range of financial activities. This legislation, which was
drawn up in the context of fragmented national markets, may need to be
adjusted in the light of market developments. The Financial Services Action
Plan is designed to make progress in these areas and remove the most
significant barriers to the single market.
However, given the scope of the changes taking place on the market, it seems
clear that an appropriate response is also required from national regulators.
It is therefore necessary to follow up the Action Plan with discussion on the
conditions for practical implementation of the directives by the competent
national authorities so as to meet the expectations of dealers and brokers,
issuers and investors who wish to be able to deal with one another throughout
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the European Union in an effective, entirely secure and informed manner.
Taking into account the existing institutional framework, the need to respond
effectively to the challenges of integrating the financial markets makes it
necessary to set up a committee of independent persons, to be assisted by the
Commission. The Committee will therefore focus its discussion on the
practical arrangements for implementation of the Community rules concerning
the areas identified by the Action Plan and will propose various approaches to
adjusting the practice of regulation and cooperation between regulators in
response to current developments. Without prejudice to the work being done
in the framework of the Financial Services Action Plan and taking into
account the measures being undertaken by securities market regulators within
FESCO, the Committee will consider how to achieve a more effective
approach towards transposition and implementation, in particular in the
following areas of regulation : the listing of enterprises, the public offer of
securities and requirements relating to reporting by issuers, the conduct of
cross-border financial operations, the day-to-day operation of the regulated
markets, the protection of consumers and investors in the provision of
investment services, and the integrity of the market.
In this context, the Committee will have to :
1.
Assess the current conditions for implementation of the regulation of the
securities markets in the European Union.
In addition, the Council invites the Commission to identify a priority-
related critical path to achieving the relevant parts of the Lisbon target
of Financial Services Action Plan, and the implementation, by 2003, of
the Risk Capital Action Plan. The Commission will propose possible
indicators of progress in realising economic benefits. The Commission
will report to the Council on November 27th.
2.
Assess how the mechanism for regulating the securities markets in the
European Union can best respond to developments under way on the
securities markets, including the creation of markets resulting from
either the alliance of European (and non-European) stock exchanges or
from technical innovation (ATS), while still guaranteeing the effective
and dynamic operation of markets throughout the European Union to
achieve a level playing field.
In order to eliminate barriers and obstacles, propose as a result scenarios
for adapting current practices in order to ensure greater convergence and
co-operation in day-to-day implementation and take into account new
developments on the markets.
3.
It will not, however, deal with the prudential supervision.
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The Committee should be able to present an initial report to the ECOFIN
Council early in November 2000. This report will present the state of play
and initial approaches to solutions. The final report will be presented to
ECOFIN during the first six months of 2001.
The Council appointed the following members of the Committee :
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Alexandre Lamfalussy
Cornelius Herkströter
Luis Angel Rojo
Bengt Rydén
Luigi Spaventa
Norbert Walter
Nigel Wicks
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ANNEX 2 – WORKING METHODS OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE
MEN
The Committee began work on 7 August 2000, and finished the first phase on 6 November
2000 after a total of 8 meetings.
Given the broad range of issues covered by the ECOFIN Council mandate, the Committee
considered it essential, even in the short time available, to canvass opinions in an open way,
from the widest possible number of institutions, organizations and the public at large.
The Committee met President Prodi and Commissioners Bolkestein and Solbes on 5
September 2000 and Mr Lamfalussy appeared before the European Parliament EMAC
Committee (Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee) in a closed session on 11 October
2000.
The Member States were contacted in a variety of ways. Member States’ Financial
attachés/counsellors were invited to make contributions. The Chairman met Member
States’ representatives at the HLSS (High Level Securities Supervisors Committee) on 20
September 2000, and Member States’ delegates at the FSPG (Financial Services Policy
Group) meeting of 12 October 2000.
As to the organizations concerned with European securities markets (the industry itself and
regulatory authorities), the Committee invited them to submit written contributions.
Moreover, and as a key element of the consultation process, the Committee invited leading
representatives of the major constituencies of European securities markets to confidential
hearings in Brussels. The Committee had a total of 25 confidential hearings, divided into
separate sessions, covering markets and exchanges; ATSs (Alternative Trading Systems)
and news vendors; clearing and settlement organizations; issuers ; supervisors/regulators;
and institutions such as FESCO, the EU-EFC (Chairman of the Economic and Financial
Committee), and the ECB (European Central Bank). In addition, a representative of the
Trade Unions and several outstanding personalities from the financial world were also
heard. The Committee also held a video-conference with a senior official of the US-SEC
(the Securities and Exchange Commission) on 16 October 2000.
Furthermore, the Committee launched on 21 August 2000 an ad-hoc website,
*
with a
questionnaire for anyone to express their views on a series of key questions for the
Committee’s work. To date 69 contributions, from a variety of sources and countries, have
been received (see Annex 3 for a summary).
Finally, as part of the Committee’s policy for openness and transparency, the Chairman, Mr
Lamfalussy held a press conference in Brussels on 7 September 2000 in order to inform
journalists about relevant aspects of the Committee’s work such as organization, working
method and timetables.
The initial report will be presented to the Press on 9 November in Brussels.
*
Website :
http://europea.eu.int/comm/internal_market
(financial services, general matters section).
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ANNEX 3 – SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO THE
COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN’S ON-LINE
QUESTIONNAIRE
Sixty-nine responses have been received. These come from a wide range of
69 responses
market participants. Replies have come from all over the European Union and
also from third countries (the US and Switzerland).
THE MAIN OBSTACLES TO THE COMPLETION OF A SINGLE
MARKET FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES
Concerning the main obstacles standing in the way of an integrated European
securities market, a distinction between
general obstacles
and
specific
Main obstacles in an
obstacles
affecting the securities sector needs to be made. Within the general
integrated market…
obstacles, the most mentioned are different legal traditions (i.e. solvency
regulations) in 62% of the replies, tax differences (that hinder the cross border
selling of financial products) in 42% of the replies, and cultural and linguistic
problems. The most quoted specific obstacles are the lack of unified securities
legislation (51%), the inadequate implementation of European legislation, and
the differences in the powers, competencies and duties (26%) of national
supervisory bodies.
Other obstacles have also been mentioned, such as accounting differences
(preventing a real comparison of financial statements), the lack of a unified
clearing and settlement system, institutional regulatory procedures, the
imposition of host country rules and national protectionism (used by Member
States not only to protect their investors but also their national industry).
Assessment of the current transposition and implementation of European
securities legislation
Three-quarters of the respondents consider that EU securities legislation is
Transposition and
neither transposed nor implemented consistently. The same proportion
implementation – ¾
considers that current implementation is impeding the development of cross-
say is not satisfactory
border securities business.
The main reasons for these problems arise from the differing interpretations of
directives (mentioned in 59% of the replies), from the ambiguity of certain
The reasons why
provisions of some directives and from the length of the implementation
periods. Some replies also mention the absence of any EU infringement
proceedings for inadequate implementation. Others argue that powers granted
by the Directives to the Member States in the implementation process and the
unclear drafting of the Directives allow a divergent implementation of the
Directives, without infringing them.
The main areas of concern are the inadequate transposition of EU legislation
(36%), the need for convergence in the organization and competences of
national authorities (19%) and the structure of financial markets.
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Respondents particularly emphasized as barriers and major problems : the
Main market
rules, differentiation of different types of investor etc), the lack of a single
barriers…
trading calendar and a unified policy regarding best execution of customers
orders; the lack of a single market for mutual funds or private pension
schemes on their investments. The obstacles to the development of the single
passport for issuers are the main concerns for investment services providers.
Differences in national insolvency regulation and lack of a uniform standard
of regulation and supervision of central securities depositories are the main
ones mentioned by clearing and settlement institutions.
Equity, primary and bond markets, pension and investment funds are the
activities and markets which, according to the responses, are most adversely
affected. There were differing opinions as to whether wholesale markets were
affected or not; some responses claiming that they were, but with some others
stating that they tend to be less affected. It should be noted, however, that
there were relatively few responses to this question.
And the victims =
European equity, bond,
pension and investment
fund markets
There were differing views on the role of self-regulation and market
conventions. Nearly 50% of respondents consider that self-regulation should
play a major role in rapidly developing markets, but they disagree on what
exactly that role should be. Several think that self-regulation should play a
major role in some specific fields (e.g. in mutual exchanges, the adoption of
internal codes of conduct or in professional markets) but that it should play a
Self regulation and
secondary role in other fields (such as retail markets). Respondents also raised
market conventions
some concerns as to whether self-regulatory organisations are well placed to
supported
take into account wider public interest considerations and whether
competitiveness in the securities markets could raise conflicts of interest in the
case of exchanges charged with certain regulatory responsibilities. They
generally agreed on the need to check market conventions against the Single
Market goal.
Assessment of the current arrangements for cooperation
Forty-five percent of the responses state that the current arrangements for
Pan-European
cooperation and mutual assistance between national supervisors are not
regulatory cooperation
sufficient. However 40% of the respondents did not explicitly answer this
not sufficient
question and even those that consider that they are sufficient call for them to
be reinforced.
The main perceived shortcomings are differences in supervisory powers and
duties (23%), duplication of supervisory control (19%), deficient channels for
cooperation, excessive costs and lack of expertise. Lack of transparency in the
current arrangements was also mentioned.
Main developments affecting the European securities markets in the near
future
The key structural developments that will affect European securities markets
in the future, according to the replies, are the consolidation in the financial
sector (mentioned in 62% of replies), the new profile of investors, the role of
private pension schemes and the new trading platforms.
Main developments
affecting the EU’s
securities markets :
consolidation and
technology
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On the issue of the key technological developments, the Internet and e-
business (65%) and new software for market players (49%) are by far the most
frequently mentioned.
As investors become more experienced and have direct access to the markets
due to the development of the on-line trading, there could be an increase in
cross-border activities that will highlight these differences between Member
States.
Moreover, the introduction of the euro, the consequent move from national to
sectoral diversification of investments in the euro zone and the role of private
pension schemes are already affecting European securities markets.
Euro is catalyzing pan-
European investment
strategies
Many respondents highlighted the need to speed up EU legislative procedures
Level playing field
in order to follow changes in the market; to establish a level playing field
needed for stock
between regulated markets and new markets (ATS), to ensure competition in
exchanges and ATS
the markets and in the clearing and settlement procedures, avoiding
monopolies, and to reduce differences between the supervisory powers and
competences of the national authorities.
Prospectives on structural developments
In order to create an integrated European securities market, most respondents
consider that certain regulatory and supervisory arrangements are needed.
As far as regulatory arrangements are concerned, a greater level of
harmonization of legislation at European level and more emphasis on mutual
recognition was called for. However, a high number of respondents also call
for improvements in the way that EU legislation is adopted, amended and
implemented.
Directives cannot establish detailed regulation without
becoming rapidly outdated. Directives should set a framework of enduring
principles. Secondary detailed legislation could then be determined by a
European Securities Committee with enough comitology powers to revise and
update EU legislation. The great majority of respondents are satisfied with the
work of FESCO. Nevertheless they urge prompt clarification of its legal
status and role. Greater transparency and broader consultation with the
industry in the regulatory process are also called for. In any case, new EU
institutions or agencies should not lead to additional unreasonable costs.
Regarding supervisory arrangements, close cooperation between supervisors is
also necessary. Greater convergence in supervisory powers, duties and
competences would help to achieve this goal. The issue of a Single European
Regulatory Authority was referred to in roughly half of the responses. Among
those who did comment, there is clear opposition to the creation of such a
body in current circumstances. Some respondents said that it might be an
option for the medium- or long-term after further harmonization of the
regulatory framework.
More harmonization
required, but with
emphasis on mutual
recognition
Framework principles
should be set in
Directives – with
detailed legislation in a
European Securities
Committee
Single European
Regulatory Authority
not supported at this
stage
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KEY ISSUES
35
33
Prospectuses
30
Professional investors
Conduct of business rules
Collateral
25
Pension funds
Market abuse
number of replies
FSAP
20
19
17
16
15
13
13
UCITS
10
9
8
5
0
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Main obstacles standing in the way of an integrated European securities market
18
21
23
29
35
43
0
5
10
15
20
25
Number of replies
30
35
40
45
50
Legal differences
Inadequate implementation
Lack unified securities legislation
Cultural and linguistic problems
Tax differences
national supervisory differences
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Reasons for inconsistent transposition
45
41
40
Diverging interpretations of the Directives
35
Unclear Directives
30
Number of replies
Implementation periods
25
20
15
12
10
5
5
0
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Main areas of concern
30
Transposition
25
25
Organisations and competences of national authorities
Structure of financial markets
20
Number of replies
15
13
10
5
3
0
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ANNEX 4 : RECENT ACADEMIC WORK ON THE LINKS
BETWEEN SIZE AND GROWTH OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
AND THE GROWTH OF OUTPUT
There has been a large body of economic literature over the last century,
including renowned economists like Joseph A. Schumpeter, who have
consistently underlined the positive influence of the development of a country’s
financial sector on the level and rate of growth of its per capita income. Some
academics, however, have contested this conclusion on the grounds that the
direction of the causality is not proven.
In the 1990s this question has been given increasing attention and an expanding
theoretical literature has emerged. It has tended to depart from the traditional
focus on bank financing by examining the possible links between stock markets
and long-run growth. For instance, liquidity and risk based models have been
designed which show that greater international risk sharing through
internationally integrated stock markets result in accelerated productivity growth
by inducing shifts from safe, low-return portfolios, into high-return alternatives.
Until recently, however, little empirical evidence was made available to sustain
the theoretical predictions foreseen by these models. However, the findings of
three recent papers, briefly discussed below, shed light on this issue by showing,
using new methodology, the validity of the positive predictions of the theoretical
models.
Rajan and Zingales (1998),
*
in order to avoid the debate about reverse causality,
focus on the theoretical mechanism through which financial development affects
economic growth. In particular, they argue that, according to the theoretical
models, financial development should disproportionately help firms, or
industries, typically dependent on external finance for their growth. To test this
assumption they examine a large cross section of industries and countries to
verify whether industries that are more dependent on external financing grow
relatively faster in countries that, a priori, are more financially developed. Their
empirical findings suggest that
ex ante
development of financial markets
substantially facilitates the
ex-post
growth of sectors dependent on external
finance.
The results also suggest that financial development may play a particularly
beneficial role in the development of new firms. Therefore, if these firms are
disproportionately the source of ideas, financial development can enhance
innovation, and thus enhance growth in indirect ways. This finding is very
relevant for the new economy and shows the importance of having adequately
developed risk capital markets.
*
Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales.
“Financial Dependence and Growth”.
American Economic Review
Nr. 88, pp. 559-586, June 1998.
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Another consequence of the results is in the trade area. The existence of a
well-developed financial market represents a source of comparative advantage
for that country (or group of countries) in industries that are more dependent
on external finance.
Levine and Zervos (1998)
*
ask whether well-functioning stock markets
promote long-run economic growth. Their paper empirically investigates
whether measures of stock market liquidity, size, volatility and integration
with world capital markets are robustly correlated with current and future rates
of economic growth, capital accumulation, productivity improvements and
saving rates. They use data on 47 countries from 1976 to 1993.
They find no support for theories which contend that stock market liquidity,
international capital market integration, or stock return volatility may reduce
private savings rates or hinder long-run growth. On the contrary, they find
that stock market liquidity, as measured both by the value of stock trading
relative to the size of the market and by the value of trading relative to the size
of the economy, is positively and significantly correlated with current and
future rates of economic growth, capital accumulation and productivity
growth.
Moreover, the positive link between financial development and economic
growth suggest that financial factors are an integral part of the growth process.
Beck, Levine, Loayza (2000)
*
centre their research not only on the direct
impact of financial development on economic growth but also on its impact on
the sources of economic growth. In particular, they examine the impact of
financial intermediary development on savings rates, physical capital
accumulation and total factor productivity growth. They use data from 63
countries over the period 1960-1995.
Their findings do not show a robust relation between financial intermediary
development and either physical capital accumulation or private savings rates.
However, they show a robust positive link between financial intermediary
development and both real per capita GDP growth and total factor productivity
growth. In sum, their results are consistent with the Schumpeterian view that
financial intermediaries affect economic development primarily by influencing
total factor productivity growth.
*
*
Levine, Ross and Sara Zervos.
“Stock Markets, Banks and Economic Growth”.
American Economic Review
Nr. 88 pp. 537-558, June 1998.
Beck, Thorsten, Ross Levine and Norman Loayza.
“Finance and the Sources of Growth”.
Journal of
Financial Economics Nr. 58, pp. 261-300 (2000).
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ANNEX 5 – EUROPEAN UNION COMITOLOGY
PROCEDURES
Description of the procedures for the exercise of implementing
powers conferred on the Commission
WHAT IS COMITOLOGY?
“Comitology”
refers to the delegation of implementing powers by the Council
to the Commission for the execution of EU legislation. Representatives of the
Member States, acting through Committees called
“comitology committees”,
assist the Commission in the execution of the implementing powers conferred
on it.
A first Comitology Decision was adopted in 1987. The new Comitology
Decision was adopted on June 28, 1999, in execution of a Declaration adopted
by the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. It entered into force on July 18,
1999.
The objective of the new comitology decision is twofold :
-
-
To harmonize and simplify the various existing comitology procedures.
To provide the European Parliament with extended monitoring powers
on the Commission’s use of its implementing powers.
THE DIFFERENT COMITOLOGY PROCEDURES
The Council Decision lays down three different procedures – an advisory, a
management and a regulatory procedure – for the exercise of implementing
powers conferred on the Commission.
It provides criteria for the determination of the relevant procedure. These are
based on the needs comitology intends to fulfil.
According to the text of the Council Decision, the regulatory procedure shall
be used for measures of general scope designed to :
-
-
Apply essential provisions of basic instruments, and
Adapt or update non-essential provisions of basic instruments.
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DESCRIPTION OF THE REGULATORY PROCEDURE
Legal base
The Treaty provisions do not provide any direct basis for the use of
comitology. The use of comitology must be provided in a basic legislative act,
whether a regulation or a directive.
This basic legislative act must stipulate the scope of the powers granted to the
Commission.
The implementing powers delegated to the Commission must be strictly
defined. There is no possibility for an open-ended delegation of powers.
Furthermore, comitology procedures cannot be used to modify essential
provisions of the basic instruments.
How the procedure works
The basic legislative act must provide for the establishment of a comitology
Committee, composed of representatives of the Member States and chaired by
a representative of the Commission. The Parliament does not delegate
representatives or observers.
The Regulatory Committee works as follows :
The Commission submits the draft measures to the Regulatory
Committee.
The Committee votes on the draft measures in a fixed delay.
If approved by the Committee, the draft measures are then adopted by
the Commission and become binding.
In case of disapproval by the Committee, the draft measures are
submitted to the Council as the Commission’s proposal.
*
The Committee shall deliver its opinion on the draft within a time-limit which the chairman (the representative
of the Commission) may lay down according to the urgency of the matter. The Committee votes by qualified
majority in the case of decisions which the Council is required to adopt on a proposal from the Commission.
The votes of the representatives of the Member States within the Committee shall be weighted in the manner set
out in the Treaty for the votes in Council. The chairman shall not vote.
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The Council votes within a determined period
*
to adopt or oppose the
proposal.
In case of rejection by the Council, the Commission shall re-examine
the proposal.
The Commission may chose between three options : (1) submit an
amended proposal of implementing measures to the Council, (2) re-
submit its initial proposal or (3) abandon the draft implementing
measures and present a legislative proposal based on the EC Treaty by
use of its initiative powers. In that case, the draft implementing
measures are replaced by a draft legislative act, e.g. a regulation or a
directive.
If the Council neither adopts the draft measures proposed by the
Commission nor indicates any opposition to them, the Commission shall
adopt the proposed implementing act.
Role of the European Parliament
The European Parliament does not formally participate in the work of the
Regulatory Committee. It nevertheless plays an external supervising role.
The European Parliament must be kept informed of the Committee’s work and
receive all related documents (agendas, draft measures, results of the votes,
minutes of the meeting, list of presence).
If the European Parliament considers that draft measures submitted by the
Commission exceed the implementing powers provided for in the basic
instrument, the Commission shall re-examine its proposal.
The Council may, where appropriate in view of any such position, decide on
the Commission’s proposal of implementing measures. Notwithstanding the
Parliament’s opinion, the Council may adopt the proposed measures. It may
also oppose to them. The Commission shall then re-examine the draft
measures. In case the Council neither adopts the proposal nor indicates any
opposition to it, the Commission shall then adopt the draft implementing
measures.
*
This period is laid down in the basic legislative instrument from which the Committee originates. It cannot
exceed three months from the date of referral to the Council.
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ABBREVIATIONS
ATS - Alternative Trading Systems
Basel – Basel Capital Review
CSD - Central Securities Depository
ECOFIN – Economic and Finance Council
ECB – European Central Bank
ECJ – European Court of Justice
EFC - Economic and Finance Committee
EMAC - Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee
EP - European Parliament
ESRC – European Securities Regulators Committee
ESC – European Securities Committee
FESCO – Forum of European Securities Commissions
FSAP - Financial Services Action Plan
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
HLSS – High Level Securities Supervisors’ Committee
IAS - International Accounting Standards
IGC – Intergovernmental Conference
ISD - Investment Services Directive
OTC - Over The Counter
QMV – Qualified Majority Vote
SME’s – Small and Medium Sized Enterprises
UCITS – Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable
Securities