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Europaudvalget 2002-03
EUU Alm.del INFO-note I 260
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Europaudvalget

(Info-note I 260)

(Offentligt)

Folketingets Europaudvalg

Christiansborg, den 21. maj 2003

Til

udvalgets medlemmer og stedfortrædere

Rapport fra den ungarske nationalforsamling

om de europæiske parl amenter og Konventet

Vedlagt fordeles til medlemmernes orientering en rapport udarbejdet af Dr.

Katalin Szili, formand for den ungarske Nationalforsamling, med titlen ”Eu-

ropean Parliaments and the Convention on the future of Europe”.

Rapporten er udarbejdet til brug ved konferencen for Parlamentsformænd i

Athen den 23.–24. maj 2003.

Med venlig hilsen

Christian Dubois

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PRESIDENT OF THE

HUNGARIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

The European Parliaments and

the Convention on the future of Europe

Report prepared by

Dr. Katalin Szili President of the Hungarian National Assembly

for the conference of the Presidents of European Parliaments

Athens, 23-24 May 2003

Introduction

One year ago in Madrid, we reviewed the role of national parliaments in relation to the future

of Europe. The Convention had been underway only for a few months then, and two working

groups of the Convention particularly important from the aspect of the national parliaments,

namely, the Working Group on the role of national parliaments and the Working Group on the

principle of subsidiarity had just started to operate. One year has passed since our meeting in

Madrid; a year when perhaps the most thorough deliberation was devoted to the place and

tasks of national parliaments within the European institutional system in the history of Euro-

pean integration. So many ideas and proposals have never been put forward for enhancing the

efficiency of the role assumed by parliaments as in this one year. One year after Madrid, we

are now only a few weeks from the closing of the Convention on the future of Europe. The

Convention has less than a month for adopting and submitting its proposal for the EU’s new

Constitutional Treaty to the Inter-governmental Conference, in which it must also make a

proposal for the operation of the parliamentary dimension of the European Union. The hour

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has come for finally synthesizing the proposals and initiatives formulated during the work of

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the Convention.

The Laeken Declaration had formulated the questions that have oriented the work concerning

the role of national parliaments in the Convention. The Laeken Declaration reflected the con-

sensus that it was necessary to reconsider and reinforce the role of national parliaments in

order to make the European Union more democratic, more transparent, and more efficient.

Based on this consideration and following Laeken, the Convention has to furnish an answer to

the following questions:

- Should the national parliaments be represented in a new institution alongside the Council

and the European Parliament?

- Should they have a role in areas of European action in which the European Parliament has

no competence?

- Should they focus on the division of competence between Union and Member States, for

example through preliminary checking of compliance with the principle of subsidiarity?

These questions have been discussed thoroughly in the Convention last year. The Working

Groups on the role of national parliaments and the principle of subsidiarity reviewed the rele-

vant problems and proposals in detail, pointed out the issues where there is indeed a great

need for change, and reflected them also in the final reports of the working groups. The ple-

nary session of the Convention has also discussed the reports and added further useful

thoughts to the statements included in them. Based on the results of the working groups, the

Presidium of the Convention could submit to the Convention the two draft protocols concern-

ing national parliaments, and the discussion of these drafts has taken place at the meeting of

the Convention in March. The role of national parliaments is also concerned by the fact that

the debate of institutional questions has started in the Convention. Profound thinking concern-

ing the role of national parliaments has also started outside the Convention. On the one hand,

detailed discussion has started and was completed on this in individual national parliaments,

what resulted also in the adoption of official positions and resolutions in certain cases. On the

other hand, a comprehensive exchange of views on this subject has taken place among na-

tional parliaments, particularly in COSAC. Tangible results have been achieved in this latter

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forum in January in Copenhagen with the adoption of the Copenhagen Parliamentary Guide-

lines, and then with the modification of the rules of procedure of COSAC in Athens in May.

So a number of proposals have been devised in answer to the questions of Laeken last year,

what allows the Convention to come to the conclusion that it should be possible to realise the

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basic objective enjoying everyone’s support: that is, to increase the democratic legitimacy of

the Union by involving national parliaments more intensively, and to make the Union more

transparent and more understandable for our citizens.

As a result of the Convention, we may pronounce that we have explored the questions we

must answer. We know the questions we shall decide upon. For the most part, we are also

familiar with each others’ proposals and ideas. Now we are only facing the most difficult task:

for each question, we must select the resolution concept that is acceptable for all of us, and

which meets the emerging challenge.

Based on the above, in my report, I wish to sum up the proposals that we have before us, and I

wish to point out in which direction we could still move forward in my view, and how we

could arrive at specific decisions from the proposals we are considering.

But before analysing the specific points, I consider it very important to draw attention to the

fact that the Constitutional Treaty to be elaborated by the Convention and to be adopted at the

Inter-governmental Conference will be able to provide an answer for only a part of the meas-

ures to be taken concerning the role of national parliaments. The Constitutional Treaty will be

able to decide upon only a part of the tasks to be executed. In order that national parliaments

can assume a more efficient role, individual Member States shall resolve a number of ques-

tions themselves on national level in areas and in institutional and procedural questions where

the EU, and thus the Constitutional Treaty can have no competence. Here I allude basically to

the relations of national parliaments and their governments, which is a question where we

may – or even must – adopt principles on the level of EU even as part of the Constitutional

Treaty, but the development of the national models will remain a national competence.

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Does the establishment of new institutions provide a solution?

In this respect, we came to the following conclusion in the chairman’s summary adopted at

our Madrid meeting last year:

„With a view to strengthening European democracy, the Presidents deemed it important to

strengthen the participation of national Parliament, rather than by the creation of new bodies,

by means of new procedures. In spite of the fact that some of the Presidents do not totally

reject the possibility of a second Chamber in the European Parliament, most of the partici-

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pants prefer to avoid complicating the European Union institutional structure.”

Considering the debate going on in the Convention, I believe that our conclusion drawn in

Madrid has remained in effect up to this day. The majority of those who took the floor in the

Convention rejected the necessity of establishing a new institution, although some still advo-

cate the creation of a body called Congress or Congress of the Peoples of Europe (even this

standpoint is reflected also in the proposal submitted by the Presidium of the Convention) that

would consist of members of national parliaments and the European Parliament and would

convene at least once a year. However, on account of the debates held on the subject we may

as well state that according to the majority, the establishment of such a body would be no

remedy to our main problem, namely that our citizens should see the European Union as be-

ing more transparent, more democratic and having greater legitimacy. The criterion of trans-

parency cannot be ensured by a body meeting once a year, moreover, this principle would

rather be infringed by the creation of another institution; this would make the institutional

system that has not been too simple already, even more complicated. The new body would not

involve greater democracy either, since it would not be vested with decision-making compe-

tence, thus, it would not represent a greater counterpoise against the influence of institutions

not elected directly. Legitimacy would not be enhanced either, as another institution of indi-

rect constitution would be created, although the direct election of the European Parliament

was introduced almost 25 years ago with the purpose of reducing the number of such institu-

tions. Altogether, I believe that it is incorrect to think that the establishment of an institution

regrouping national parliaments would provide an answer to the problem of democratic defi-

cit. It is incorrect, because the problems of insufficient democracy and transparency do not

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emerge on Union level basically. On the level of the Union, I can see a significant problem of

transparency only at one point: in the Council, because being a legislative body, its meeting

are not public. However, this problem is easy to resolve; and the Member States have already

given evidence of their intention to make significant progress at the Seville Summit in this

respect. In my view, the Constitutional Treaty may express that in its capacity of legislative

body the Council should act in public. With this, I believe, the requirements of transparency

could be satisfied on the level of the Union, as the other legislative body, the European Par-

liament acts in public yet, and official documents are available to anyone.

In my opinion, the democratic deficit appears rather on national level, and the establishment

of new institutions does not provide an answer to that. The main challenge is that while citi-

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zens have increasing expectations towards the European Union, in the meantime their trust in

the institutions of the Union decreases, because citizens are unclear as to which decisions are

the responsibility of the European Union, which results can be attributed to Europe, and what

the responsibilities of the specific institutions are at all. Identification with the EU is impeded

by the fact that citizens are generally unclear as to the division of competence between Mem-

ber States and the institutions of the Union, what the governments of Member States regularly

use to blame Brussels for less popular decisions. The democratic deficit comes primarily from

the fact that decision-making is concentrated in the hands of Community institutions on a su-

pranational level, while political debate still takes place on national or local level (and I think

that for a good while this cannot be changed or perhaps it is not worth changing it). Decisions

are increasingly made on Community level, while communication and social debates concern-

ing the decisions take place on national level, and electors continue to turn to their local repre-

sentatives with their questions. So, the questions of power and legitimacy are separated to a

certain degree. This can be altered only by conducting the debates on European decision-

making concerning the society or its certain groups on the scene of the social debate, that is,

in the national political arena, in its primary forums, in the national parliaments. We have to

discuss on national level among others the challenges facing the Union, the political and legis-

lative programmes for the next period (e.g. the programme of the Council Presidency and the

Commission's legislative programme), we mustpay increased attention to the questions of

Community legislation concerning our citizens, we have to review the various interests, and

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we have to visualize the national and Community standpoints. This is how we can give per-

haps the best answer to resolve the issue of democratic deficit. This is proven by the positive

practices characteristic to certain Member States. The problem of democratic deficit can be

heard less often where the national debates on the main European decision-making issues are

conducted in public in the parliament. So the answer should be sought for the most part in the

national procedures. Therefore, the establishment of a new institution is not expected to re-

duce democratic deficit and reinforce legitimacy.

Moreover, a new institution created from representatives of the national parliaments would, to

a certain degree, reinforce the misconception that the European Parliament and the national

parliaments are rivals somehow. It would be a mistake to provide a breeding-ground for this

idea. We must emphasise that national parliaments and the European Parliament do not de-

velop to each other’s detriment. The reinforcem ent of the parliaments is not a zero-sum game.

The role of national parliaments in the EU diminished so far not because the European Par-

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liament gained strength by receiving authorities of co-legislator. National parliaments became

weaker versus their own governments, as the Council is the main legislative body in Commu-

nity legislation. And the Council consists of the national governments. One of the most im-

portant questions of power related to the EU membership is that the previously sovereign leg-

islating national parliaments cede some of the legislation to the Community of the Member

States where individual countries are represented by their national governments. A shift in

sovereignty takes place with the national parliaments being the institutional losers and the

governments being the winners of the change. The powers shifted away from national parlia-

ments do not end up primarily at the European Parliament. The reinforcement of the EP is

rather compensation in terms of democratic legitimacy in this regard. The reinforcement of

the powers of the European Parliament does not take any power away from national parlia-

ments or even from the national governments sitting in the Council, since by virtue of the co-

legislative role of the European Parliament, it appears as a decision-maker beside the govern-

ments of the Member States, as an institution having the right of veto, and that needs to be

consulted, but that acts as a co-decision-maker. The increasing influence of the European Par-

liament brings about the reinforcement of parliamentary type control altogether. The Euro-

pean Parliament and the national parliaments may therefore gain strength side by side, thus

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ensuring greater legitimacy to the Union. But while in the case of former amendments of the

Treaty – primarily with the introduction and roll-out of the co-decision procedure – great em-

phasis was laid on the reinforcement by the European Parliament, and less attention was given

to national parliaments. With the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty now we have an op-

portunity for reinforcing the parliamentary dimension of the EU in parallel, on the one hand

by making the co-legislator role of the EP, that is, the co-decision procedure general (which is

an extremely important step in my view), and on the other hand by introducing new proce-

dures affecting the relations of the institutions of the Union and the national parliaments, and

of the national parliaments and their governments (see under next point) ensuring that national

parliaments providing the primary grounds for national debates receive a greater opportunity

to expound and enforce their standpoints. To achieve this, national parliaments must gain

strength primarily as opposed to their governments, exercising stricter control over the posi-

tion represented by their governments in the Council.

The inclusion of national parliaments and the European Parliament in one body might disrupt

the logical unity which ensures a fine balance of interests in the European Union today, an

institutional balance between the Commission representing the Community, the Council act-

ing for the states and the European Parliament standing for the citizens. In today’s system,

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clear and separable roles have evolved based on this fundamental assumption. If we accept

that the European Union is a system

sui

generis

(and we do not want to compare it to states or

international organisations at any price), then it is easier to adopt the fact that national parlia-

ments and the European Parliament have different roles and responsibilities within this insti-

tutional balance. The responsibility of the European Parliament is to provide on the level of

the Union an opportunity for the interests of the citizens to connect directly into Community

decision-making. On the other hand, the responsibility of national parliaments is to provide

legitimacy for the national positions represented by their governments whereby the decision

of the Council is made. Therefore, the EP and the national parliaments fulfil different legiti-

macy tasks that should not be confused, as these are complementary roles reinforcing each

other. Consequently, in my opinion not a common institution, just more efficient and ongoing

consultation is required between the European Parliament and the national parliaments.

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The only benefit of establishing a Congress would be that it would create closer relations be-

tween members of the European Parliament and members of the national parliaments. How-

ever, that can be realised in a different way, namely by reforming, expanding and reinforcing

COSAC, which process has already started and is simply waiting for being accelerated and for

greater impetus. Moreover, with COSAC, a regularly meeting, much more living organisation

could be created, which would ensure a forum necessary for the exchange of views between

parliaments.

At the same time, significant need may arise in terms of the institutional involvement of na-

tional parliaments for the establishment of a single body not operating constantly, and that, in

relation to the development of the Union. The establishment of the Convention lived up to the

expectations, and allowed preparatory work related to the transformation of the Union to be

done in a much wider, more democratic framework. Therefore it seems to be wise to consider

that the "Convention model" should be included in the Constitutional Treaty. This would

mean that in the future the Constitutional Treaty could be amended only after having the pro-

posal of an ad hoc committee to be set up by the European Council and consisting of mem-

bers of national parliaments and members of the European Parliament, delegates of the gov-

ernments of the Member States and representatives of the European Commission.

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New procedures instead of new institutions

Under the previous point I intended to point out that it is probably not the establishment of

new institutions that is an answer to our main problems, but new procedures are rather re-

quired between the institutions of the Union and the national parliaments, and on the other

hand between the national parliaments and their governments. In this regard, I feel that the

work completed in the Convention brought about very significant progress, and many ques-

tions could be clarified in detail. Two Working Groups of the Convention, the Working

Group on the role of national parliaments and the Working Group on the principle of subsidi-

arity have investigated the problem thoroughly, and the proposals submitted by the Presidium

of the Convention also seek an answer to the main questions in the right direction. In the re-

maining month, we should endeavour to supplement and modify these proposals to provide an

appropriate basis in the long term for a more efficient involvement of and more intensive role

played by national parliaments. We must consider two important aspects in this regard. First,

proposals enjoying comprehensive consensus have been developed outside the Convention,

primarily in the scope of COSAC, which should be reflected in the Constitutional Treaty. On

the other hand, we must keep in mind that it is not sufficient simply to create a good frame-

work in the Constitutional Treaty; national procedures must be developed likewise, so that

they serve our common interests and are consistent with the spirit of the principles to be set

forth in the Constitutional Treaty.

On the basis of the work completed so far it can be stated that smoothly working procedural

systems must be developed in three areas whereby we can meet our objective, namely that

national parliaments should ensure improved transparency, greater legitimacy and more de-

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mocracy in the decision-making process of the Union. We need new procedures first in the

relations of the institutions of the Union and the national parliaments, second in the relations

of national parliaments and their governments, and third in inter-parliamentary cooperation. I

intend to summarise these items below.

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a) Procedures regulating the relations of the institutions of the Union and national parlia-

ments

Under this point, I will review the relations of national parliaments and the institutions of the

Union, except for the direct connections with the European Parliament which will be dealt

with under inter-parliamentary cooperation.

We are talking about two practical procedures in this regard. One of them must provide in-

formation for the national parliaments and ensure that they are supplied with the information

necessary for their more efficient participation in the decision-making process, while the other

must ensure that national parliaments be able to exercise the highest control over the en-

forcement of the principle of subsidiarity.

As regards the supply of parliaments with information, I believe that the Working Group of

the Convention on the role of national parliaments completed a very thorough work to inves-

tigate the main questions. The Draft Protocol on the role of national parliaments submitted by

the Presidium of the Convention reflected these proposals under a number of points. I think

that we can agree with all the points of the draft protocol concerning the obligation to provide

information and the operating procedures of the Council, the Commission, and the Court of

Auditor. However further specification may be required. For instance, certain proposals of

Working Group IV of the Convention have been omitted from the draft, and a number of

other amendments would be worth including in the protocol. So my opinion is that the proto-

col should be made more accurate, should be supplemented and extended with the following

points:

Council agendas and outcomes should be communicated to national parliaments upon

their establishment.

Records of Council proceedings (or official record of the legislative proceedings)

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should be sent within 10 days to the European Parliament and the national parlia-

ments, parallel to the transmission to governments.

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Council Working Groups and Coreper should not acknowledge preliminary agree-

ments on proposals covered by the six-week period, with exceptions on the grounds of

urgency as set out in the Protocol.

The Council's rules of procedure should provide for a clear week to elapse between a

legislative item being considered at Coreper and the Council.

A debate should be held simultaneously in all the national parliaments regarding the

Commission’s annual work programme.

In addition, I would consider it important to express in some section of the Constitutional

Treaty (of course, not in the protocol on national parliaments) that the Council should act in

public in all cases where it exercises its legislative functions.

Of the procedures regulating the relations of the institutions of the Union and national parlia-

ments, the other extremely important question is that of the parliamentary control of the en-

forcement of subsidiarity. In this respect, the early warning system developed by the Conven-

tion’s Working Group on the principle of subsid iarity would represent significant steps for-

ward for the national parliaments. Therefore, national parliaments shall support the Draft Pro-

tocol on the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality submitted by the

Presidium of the Convention. The draft is well-balanced and provides a good synthesis of the

positions expounded in the Convention. At the same time, there are still a few points that are

subject to debate, but a solution is being outlined for them as well. Several of these concern

national parliaments, such as the concept of national parliaments with regard to bicameral

parliaments, the threshold for early warning, and the right to turn to the European Court of

Justice.

It seems that the proposal that enjoyed the support of the majority at the plenary meeting of

the Convention in March would provide a good solution for managing the concept of national

parliaments and the problem of bicameral parliaments. Under that proposal when the thresh-

old was calculated, reasoned opinions expressed by unicameral parliaments would be given

two votes as opposed to one for opinions issued by each chamber of a bicameral parliament.

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As far as the threshold is concerned, one third is an acceptable proportion in my view, as in

fact, it can be considered a compromise, as there are some who want a higher, while others a

lower proportion. There is a further question related to the threshold whereby some suggest

that, beside the former warning called yellow card, another threshold, a kind of a red card be

introduced, which would force the Commission’s initiative to halt under a majority of two-

thirds. However, I think that it is unnecessary to determine such a threshold explicitly, since if

the Commission indeed received a negative feedback from two-thirds of the national parlia-

ments, it is guaranteed that it would modify its proposal without such a red card.

It is also an important question how national parliaments are allowed to turn to the European

Court of Justice. According to the protocol, Member States are allowed to do that where ap-

propriate at the request of their national parliaments in accordance with their respective con-

stitutional rules. Some challenge this and say that national parliaments should be allowed to

turn directly to the Court of Justice. I believe, however, that in practice this could not be ac-

complished in the case of a number of parliaments, therefore national constitutional provi-

sions should rather be clarified to specify in which form national parliaments would appear on

behalf of the Member States in such cases.

Furthermore, it is a matter of principle from the aspect of the national parliaments that the

Commission should send the annual report scrutinizing the application of Article 7(3) of the

Constitution, to be prepared by the Commission, as mentioned in point 9 of the Draft Protocol

on subsidiarity, directly to the national parliaments as well (simultaneously with sending it to

the European Council, the Council, and the European Parliament).

b) Procedures regulating the relations of national parliaments and their governments

This point covers in essence the process of scrutiny, the procedure of the national parliaments

to check and influence the standpoint and negotiating position of their respective governments

in the Council, the preliminary control of Community legislation. As a matter of course, the

elaboration of this procedure is the internal affair of each Member State. But, as I already

pointed out, since we are talking about perhaps the most important question concerning the

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reduction of the democratic deficit – what is decisive from the point of view of the operation

and legitimacy of the Union and its acceptance by the citizens – in my view it is necessary to

formulate certain minimum requirements, principles on the level of the Union. Practically,

this was accomplished with the adoption of the Copenhagen Parliamentary Guidelines, at the

same time it is worth considering that, giving greater weight to these guidelines, reference

should be made to them in the Protocol on the national parliaments to be attached to the Con-

stitutional Treaty I do not necessarily think that these guidelines should be included in the

protocol. That would not be expedient if only because we could consider them principles

which can be adapted constantly to the practice and experiences or even modified from time

to time. At the same time, it could be a solution to pronounce in the protocol – we would

thereby give greater legitimacy to the guidelines – that national parliaments would jointly

adopt a code of conduct or guidelines to regulate the relations between governments and par-

liaments regarding EU affairs.

In my opinion, the Copenhagen Guidelines adopted by the COSAC can be valued as very

important steps made towards our parliaments fulfilling an increasingly efficient and, for our

citizens, more transparent role in making Community decision-making clearer. I would find it

important to make some kind of a reference to these in the Constitutional Treaty because in

effect this would provide clearer guidance also to the governments as to the observance of the

guidelines. I have to add that the guidelines will have any worth if the commitment to apply

them exists on the national level. Of course, the models to be developed on national level

shall in any case be aligned to the national constitutional framework and the domestic prac-

tice. At the same time, it is necessary that national parliaments regularly exchange their views

(primarily on the level of COSAC and the Presidents’ Conference) on the operation and re-

sults of the various national models, thus contributing to the improvement of these models

and of the guidelines developed jointly. Therefore I suggest that we exchange our views regu-

larly in the future concerning our practices, potentially even by reviewing the national imple-

mentation of a specific guideline on each occasion, thus sharing our experiences.

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c) The issues of inter-parliamentary cooperation

As I already pointed out, the majority of those who took the floor in the Convention rejected

the necessity of establishing new institutions; I myself also adopt the standpoint that in the

current situation it is probably not the establishment of new institutions that is an answer to

our problems. I think that this is also true for inter-parliamentary cooperation. I believe that

the forms of cooperation established still have a lot of reserves for us for exchanging our

views concerning Community decision-making, discussing our experiences, and for improv-

ing coordination between our parliaments. Instead of elaborating new forms, we rather need to

use existing ones more efficiently, transform them according to our purposes, and we need to

define our objectives with realism in this respect. We have to consider structures of coopera-

tion that we will be able to operate and fill with content. Members of both the national par-

liaments and the European Parliament are busy, their travel and meeting plans can hardly be

extended, therefore we must plan our cooperation rationally, as it is impossible to increase the

number of meetings and sessions beyond a certain point. Considering the above, I will exam-

ine the following three questions in more detail in my report in connection with the coopera-

tion between parliaments: the transformation of existing institutions, relations between mem-

bers of national parliaments and of the European Parliament, and certain administrative is-

sues.

Of existing institutions, we usually speak the most about COSAC. I agree with the finding of

the Working Group IV of the Convention that it is necessary to clarify the mandate of CO-

SAC making its activity more efficient and more focused and reinforcing its inter-

parliamentary consultative mechanisms. I think that very important steps have been taken

with the modification of the rules of procedure of COSAC in Athens, thus with the adoption

of decision-making by majority and the establishment of a permanent secretariat. This will

assist the body in remaining operational even with 25 Member States. It will be possible to

ensure continuity through the permanent secretariat.

In my view, COSAC could be extended with members from parliamentary committees other

than the committees on European affairs. Some of the other specialised committees have also

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been holding meetings lately, for instance several such meetings will take place in this half-

year on the initiative of the Greek Parliament. These could be integrated into COSAC, and the

permanent secretariat could organise these meetings more easily. A priori more technical pol-

icy questions could be included in the agenda of the COSAC (e.g. CAP reform), and it would

be good if the representatives of both the responsible specialised committees and the commit-

tees on European affairs were present at these meetings. We should consider holding two

COSAC meetings each half-year (or more as required) longer than they are now (of even 3

whole days), with one of them focusing on the main policy questions of the half-year, while

the other on the major strategic issues of the half-year, and in this manner a definite number

of representatives of the specialised committees concerned would be invited to them. Of

course, ad-hoc inter-parliamentary conferences could be held on specific topics as required,

but the parallel treatment of topics could be more easily avoided in this manner. Beside spe-

cialised committees, the presidents of parliaments could also be involved in the work of CO-

SAC, so presidents of parliaments could attend meetings dealing with strategic policy ques-

tions, and in such cases, they may even preside over these meetings. Of course, in this case

there would be no need for a separate meeting for the presidents. In the context of these

changes I would also agree to changing the name of COSAC; it could be renamed for instance

to ‘Conference of National Parliaments’ expressing its more comprehensive nature, while the

name conference would still reflect its character of informal, non-institutionalized discussion

forum. Consequently, COSAC would obviously be a coordination forum of the national par-

liaments, but of course, the European Parliament would continue to take part in all aspects of

its work, with consultative rights. The reinforced role of COSAC should also be reflected in

the Protocol on National Parliaments attached to the Constitutional Treaty. In my view, this

could pronounce that the European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission shall be in-

formed of COSAC contributions and that they shall respond within three months. In addition,

the protocol should also be supplemented with a paragraph expressing that COSAC may pro-

mote exchange of information and best practice.

As far as the development of relations between members of the national parliaments and

members of the European Parliament is concerned, in my view the main task is that we should

provide an increasing amount of information for each other on our activities and ideas. To this

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end, the most important is to exploit the procedural possibilities available to us. The practice

existing in some Member States whereby Members of the European Parliament may attend

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and speak at committee meetings of the national parliaments, especially the committees on

European affairs, should be propagated widely. The European Parliament could mutually en-

sure that a definite number of representatives from each national parliament, let us say, two

representatives from each parliamentary committee, would be allowed to attend and, if re-

quired, speak at meetings of the counterpart committees of the European Parliament. We may

even introduce a system whereby two MPs (1 from the government and 1 from opposition

side) would be appointed from each parliamentary committee of every Member State, who

would be permanently in charge of liaising with the EP and between the committees. All this

would result also that integration affairs would not be dealt with exclusively by a limited

number of representatives sitting in the committees on European affairs, but – through the

involvement of the specialised committees – members of parliaments would be involved more

deeply and more widely in Community decision-making what would also improve the public-

ity of Community affairs.

From the aspect of parliamentary cooperation, it is an important technical question that it is

very difficult to find dates for the various meetings and sessions that are suitable for all par-

liaments as the system of our sessions vary greatly. We often have to face that our representa-

tives cannot attend important European meetings because of their obligations to vote at home.

Although I can see little chance of transforming our traditional order of sessions; however, I

suggest that we consider reserving fixed dates – days or weeks – every half-year for the meet-

ings of national parliaments, when we could also hold the meetings of COSAC, which could

in this way always be attended by everyone.

As far as administrative questions are concerned, there are a couple questions that have been

on the agenda for a longer while and which are particularly in the focus of attention now that

the role of national parliaments is transferred on a new basis. I would like to highlight two

points out of them. One is the question of establishing a permanent representation, and the

other is the operation of electronic exchange of information.

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Having studied the operation of a number of Member States, I think that we can affirm that it

is of great avail to the parliaments if they have an independent source of information in Brus-

sels gathering the necessary information based on the specific needs of the parliaments and

providing information for the MPs on a regular basis. Such offices allow the parliaments to

use their own channels in addition to the channels of other institutions including government

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bodies and EU institutions. The fact that the European Parliament provides premises for this

in its own building is a very good opportunity. It would therefore seem expedient if it became

a general practice among parliaments to have such an office in Brussels. In the Hungarian

National Assembly, we have decided that we intend to establish a permanent representation in

the building of the European Parliament to assist our parliament in getting first hand informa-

tion.

As regards the electronic exchange of information, I wish to point out that the hour has come

for us to establish an information network truly useful in everyday work. We have already

taken the first steps to this end, and since we could create an enormous amount of energy in

other areas by establishing fast information flow, I think that we must pay greater attention to

informing each other in this way.

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Concluding remarks

The Nice Declaration and the Laeken Declaration pointed out that it was necessary to recon-

sider and reinforce the role of national parliaments in order to make the European Union more

democratic, more transparent, and more efficient. In connection with the work of the Conven-

tion, the greatest attention ever has been paid to the role played by national parliaments in the

decision-making of the European Union. A number of proposals have been devised as a result

of the deliberation started concerning the role of parliaments, what allows the Convention to

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come a conclusion completing the objective enjoying everyone’s support: that is, to increase

the democratic legitimacy of the Union by involving national parliaments more intensively,

and to make the Union more transparent and more understandable for our citizens.

In my report, I pointed out that as a result of the discussions held in the Convention it can be

affirmed that probably not the establishment of new institutions, but the development of new

procedures and the transformation of existing procedures would offer the best solution for

reinforcing the role of national parliaments. The current balance of institutions should not be

disrupted, but needs rather to be operated more efficiently, and the current institutional system

holds significant reserves for this. It is partly the responsibility of the Convention and the In-

tergovernmental Conference to develop these procedures and insert them in the Constitutional

Treaty. The Constitutional Treaty must ensure the procedures, primarily in the context of the

relations between the EU institutions and the national parliaments, which provide the precon-

ditions for national parliaments to be able to influence and shape decisions of the Union. At

the same time, there are several issues where the solution is independent of the Constitutional

Treaty and its implementation is a question of political intention. Some of them relate to the

national models regulating the relations of national parliaments and their governments, while

others to the interparliamentary relations. At the same time, it must be underlined that the na-

ture of the national models is of key importance to reduce the democratic deficit. The problem

of democratic deficit can be heard less often where the debates on the main European deci-

sion-making issues are conducted in public in the national parliament. Therefore, we have to

keep in mind increasingly that although the framework ensuring the involvement of national

parliaments must be expected from the Constitutional Treaty, the actual role that we can se-

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cure for our parliaments by this framework depends basically on us; it is a function of a na-

tional decision. My report summarises the procedural issues and the most important proposals

and tasks formulated in connection with them so far, that we shall resolve either within or

independent of the Constitutional Treaty.

Based on the work of the Convention we may as well state that after the closing of the Con-

vention and the Intergovernmental Conference, as a consequence of the adoption of the Con-

stitutional Treaty, national parliaments will be given a greater than ever opportunity to par-

ticipate in the development of EU decisions. Not only the influence exercised over Commu-

nity legislation by national parliaments through their governments will increase, but being the

main guardians of the prevalence of the principle of subsidiarity, they will also have a direct

say in the control of this principle. It has a symbolic importance that these two roles of the

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national parliaments should appear not only in the two protocols attached, but also in the Con-

stitutional Treaty. The Constitutional Treaty should include an article on the role of national

parliaments and another on the control of the principle of subsidiarity, while the two protocols

should include the specific procedural questions related to them in detail.

The Convention is expected to complete work in June and draft the Constitutional Treaty.

Then the Intergovernmental Conference is expected to begin in the second half of the year. In

this respect, I consider it very important that the latter should start only after the referenda on

accession have been completed in the accession countries. Thus, IGC could begin in October

at the earliest. This would also ensure a reflection period when the national parliaments could

discuss the results of the Convention, thus the governments could represent their countries at

the Intergovernmental Conference knowing the refined position of their parliament. It would

be difficult to set a deadline for closing the IGC now. Naturally, it would be ideal if the Con-

vention could resolve the most possible points of issue, and few questions would remain for

the IGC. One thing is certain, however, namely that old and new Member States shall be

equal in every respect at the Intergovernmental Conference. Since all the 25 Member States

shall ratify the Constitutional Treaty to put it in force, the ten accession countries shall have

the same rights – including the voting right – as the Fifteen. An important condition of equal-

ity taken in the legal sense is that, irrespective of when we will close the Intergovernmental

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Conference (in the optimum case this may happen quickly), the Constitutional Treaty shall be

signed with the participation of all the 25 countries after 1 May 2004. Consequently, the deci-

sion on the final approval shall also be made with the participation of 25 equal states. After it

is signed, the national parliaments shall make every effort so that ratification is completed in a

short time and the Constitutional Treaty of the 25-force Union comes into force as soon as

possible.

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(Løbenr. 20357)