

For a European civil protection force: europe aid

Report by Michel Barnier



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May 2006

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former French Minister for Foreign Affairs and
former Member of the European Commission

Thanks

By jointly entrusting me with this mission José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, and Wolfgang Schäussel, President of the Council of the European Union, have given me the opportunity to propose a project which clearly has European added value and meets an urgent need. The European Parliament too has often advocated this new form of solidarity.

This mission has also enabled me to renew contact with many of those with whom I had the pleasure to work as Commissioner or as Minister. I would like to express my personal gratitude to them and to all the European civil servants whose advice and ideas were so valuable. My very special thanks go to Jean-Marc Pisani for his competent and cooperative contribution as rapporteur throughout this four-month mission, and to Isabelle Richard-Misrachi, for her commitment and efficiency.

The twelve proposals contained in this report are for the time being purely personal. I have set out to be both realistic and straight-thinking – realistic not only in order to take account of certain reservations and apprehensions but also in view of the crises and disasters which could well be on the near horizon.

The implications of these proposals are such that they would have to be seen in the context of the function of the future Union Minister for Foreign Affairs provided for by the Constitutional Treaty, a function which, one way or another, will have to become operational in the next few years. Hence my decision to opt for a four-year time-frame for implementation, which will allow the necessary gradualism and flexibility for each of the Member States – and I hope the European citizens as well – to understand the proposals and take them on board.



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Introduction

The need for Europe

“Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.”

Robert Schuman, 9 May 1950

In January 2006 Wolfgang Schässel and José Manuel Barroso, Presidents of the Council of the European Union and of the European Commission respectively, asked me to draw up a report on the EU’s response to major cross-border emergencies for the June European Council.

Since the tsunami of 26 December 2004, the EU and other players, in particular the United Nations, have been eager to improve their response to emergencies. Since January 2005 the EU has been working on the basis of an action plan. Successive EU Presidencies have since shown their resolve to boost the EU’s capacity to show solidarity at home and abroad.

As the tsunami so tragically bears out, **the price of non-Europe in crisis management** is too high. First and foremost, a series of hastily organised individual responses is no match for an EU response that has been planned, organised and tested against specific scenarios. Secondly, multiplying responses results in a lack of coordination that diminishes the EU’s impact and visibility on the ground. The EU response can only be made more cost-effective by properly organising the Member States’ civil protection capabilities and consular assistance on the basis of common scenarios, training programmes and exercises.

When drafting this outlook report, I naturally took account of the progress of the many projects under way at the Council (especially in the Permanent Representatives Committee) and the Commission. I had talks with a number of Member States, and I sounded out the Commission and the Council’s General Secretariat.

When all is said and done, I wanted to place the work under way in a **political context**.

I have therefore taken the calculated risk of framing my proposals and the associated timetable in the medium term, and more specifically with an end date of 2010, by which time, one way or another, the countries of the EU will have created **the post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, provided for in the Constitution, which they wanted and accepted unanimously in Rome**. By 2010 the Council, the Commission and the Member States will be working together more effectively on the EU’s external action. I therefore hope that the reader will make the same mental leap into the medium term. This is the only way in which we can get over the present hurdles and shortcomings. I also hope that no more disasters will be needed in the interim to set our thinking, resources and expertise on the right track.

My mission statement¹ poses the question of what the EU can do to improve its response, especially to major emergencies **outside the EU**.

1. Annex 1 – Mission statement from Mr Barroso and Mr Schässel

External emergencies differ in a number of ways from emergencies inside the EU:

- They affect **sovereign states**, which are free to decide how to respond to an emergency and whether to request assistance from abroad.
- The **EU Presidency** coordinates the response politically in close cooperation with the **United Nations, national and local authorities in the country concerned and non-governmental organisations**. We need to find ways to increase the speed and effectiveness of their collective decision-making.
- There are **many tools at the EU's disposal**. Naturally, national or regional civil protection resources can be drawn on. At any rate, we have a presence on the ground through humanitarian aid, coordinated at international level by the United Nations and channelled at EU level through ECHO². Last but not least, the EU implements reconstruction programmes. We need to work out how best to pool these resources and maximise synergies.
- Such emergencies, often in far-off places, affect more than one country and call for **capability projection**. This projection of men and resources is currently lacking.
- Lastly, such emergencies call for **consular assistance**, since EU citizens are naturally more vulnerable when they are far from their country of origin. In 2003 there were more than 30 million trips by Europeans outside Europe. The falling price of air travel will increase this number in the years ahead. In the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004 about 200 000 people died and thousands disappeared. In Thailand alone, 2500 foreign tourists, many of them EU citizens, died. At issue is whether the Member States of the EU are willing and able to work together to improve their assistance to citizens in difficulty.

Obviously, if the Member States and the EU institutions take up the proposals outlined in this report and decide to improve our civil protection response considerably, **that will apply to emergencies in far-off places as well as to disasters within the territory of the EU**. In 1999 Turkey and Greece were hit by earthquakes at the same time. In the more distant past, some 100 000 people were killed by an earthquake and tidal wave that destroyed the Sicilian city of Messina in 1908. Exactly twenty years ago the Chernobyl disaster, just across the border from the EU, affected the whole of Europe. And the bombings in Madrid and London have shown that a European September 11 is possible.

The need for Europe

Our countries' citizens **need new proof of the EU's value added**. Voters in France and the Netherlands have told us this quite bluntly.

Whether it is the earthquakes or storms of 1999, the wrecks of the *Erika* and the *Prestige* off our shores, the floods that hit Central Europe in 2002 and again this year, whether it is the tsunami or the earthquake in Pakistan, **Europe is expected to show solidarity: the EU is called on to act and the Member States asked to help**.

Obviously, a better EU response to these emergencies reflects a real duty to help as well as responding to the citizens' political expectations. It has been at the very heart of the European project for fifty years now. **Since 1950 Europe's peoples have shown solidarity towards each other but also towards the other peoples of the world**.

It is not by chance that we find this demand for solidarity in two recent initiatives:

- The **European Union Solidarity Fund** set up in 2002 at the behest of the Prodi Commission in the wake of flooding in Germany, the Czech Republic and Austria can mobilise €1 billion a year for devastated regions of the EU.
- The **draft European Constitution**, for its part, contains a **solidarity clause** (Article I-43) for EU Member States. It provides for the EU to mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including military resources, to protect democratic institutions and the civilian population in the event of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster.

The same needs are being expressed and the same proof asked for beyond our continent: international instability, new threats and environmental hazards oblige us to respond. The citizen has consistently asked for this: as recently as December 2005,³ 77% of EU citizens expressed their backing for a common foreign and security policy and 68% for a common external policy.

Javier Solana has clearly identified the five main threats facing Europe:⁴ terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states and organised crime. The governments of each and every Member State have a duty to protect themselves and to respond to these new geopolitical threats. It is also in their interest to do this together.

The Treaties and the risks being what they are, **we can and must find the will and the resources to act together more effectively now.**

But one way or another, sooner or later, we will need the solutions offered by the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, and in particular the following innovations:

- 1. a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs** with authority over all services involved in external action (external relations, development assistance and humanitarian aid); a **European External Action Service** will help the Minister fulfil his or her mandate (Article III-296);
- 2. the solidarity clause** (Article I-43) referred to above and its implementing procedures (Article III-329);
- 3. a European policy on the prevention of natural disasters and on civil protection** (Article III-284);
- 4. EU action on humanitarian aid** in the context of the principles and objectives of the EU's external action (Article III-321);
- 5. a public health policy** covering, in particular, the fight against the major health scourges (Article III-278);
- 6. enhanced cooperation** (Articles I-44 and III-416 to III-423) making it easier for those Member States that wish to take things further and faster to do so.

What the EU is already doing

Since the early 1990s the EU has been able **to respond to emergencies**.⁵ The Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) was set up in 1992. The Commission – like a number of Member States – is already a very active member of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative and of the donor support groups set up by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

In 2001 Margot Wallström, who was Environment Commissioner at the time, proposed a Community Civil Protection Mechanism, which triggers a movement of solidarity in the event of emergencies both inside and outside the EU. Depending on the circumstances, this solidarity currently involves pooling certain resources available in the Member States (transport, equipment, medical teams, etc.). It is designed to respond to the consequences of natural and man-made disasters (industrial and maritime accidents, terrorist attack, etc.).⁶

Lastly, the EU has worked **to consolidate its emergency response and provide back-up over time**.⁷ Preparing reconstruction and stabilising fragile political situations are two key areas of EU action. Just as humanitarian aid and the rapid reaction mechanism⁸ have their role to play, so do large-scale reconstruction programmes.

Moreover, since 2003, at the prompting of Javier Solana and the Council of the European Union, civilian crisis-management operations in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) have been added to this arsenal, helping respond effectively to emergencies with a common foreign and security policy dimension. Twelve such missions are currently under way in, for instance, Bosnia in the Balkans, Rafah in Palestine and Aceh in Indonesia.

3. Eurobarometer 64 – December 2005

4. European Security Strategy, proposed by Secretary-General/High Representative Javier Solana and adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the Brussels European Council on 12 December 2003

5. See pages 37 to 40 of the technical report for further details

6. Council Decision of 23 October 2001 establishing a Community civil protection mechanism


7. See pages 40 to 42 of the technical report

8. Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism

Building on and learning from this, I have worked out 12 practical, operational solutions. They address **three concerns**:

- 1. making humanitarian aid and civil protection more effective,**
- 2. providing EU citizens with greater protection and assistance,**
- 3. strengthening overall consistency.**

Diagram 1: Examples of natural and man-made disasters inside and outside the EU (1999-2006)





Twelve proposals for improving the European Union's crisis response capability

Our **twelve proposals** for improving the European Union's crisis response capability rest on the ideas developed in the second part of the report and on progress in the projects and discussions currently under way in the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Member States.

In general they call for **voluntary participation by the Member States** and they are spread over a four-year time-frame.

We propose:

- 1.** A European civil protection force: "europe aid"
- 2.** Support for the force from the seven outermost regions of the European Union
- 3.** The setting-up of a Civil Security Council and a greater role for the General Affairs and External Relations Council
- 4.** A one-stop shop for the European Union's humanitarian response
- 5.** An integrated European approach to crisis anticipation
- 6.** Six European Union delegations to specialise in crisis management
- 7.** A clear information system for European Union citizens travelling outside the Union
- 8.** The pooling of consular resources
- 9.** The creation of consular flying squads
- 10.** The setting-up of "European consulates" on an experimental basis in four geographical areas
- 11.** The establishment of a European consular code
- 12.** Laboratories specialising in bioterrorism and victim identification

1. We propose setting up a European civil protection force: “europe aid”

The Community Civil Protection Mechanism was undoubtedly a step forward: in the event of a crisis inside or outside the Union, the Member States’ civil protection forces are now better coordinated.⁹ But the mechanism still relies too heavily on the help that is forthcoming spontaneously in response to events.

More than a year after the tsunami tragedy, there are no **systematic scenarios or protocols** at European level for responding to any of seven major risks: **earthquakes and tsunamis; forest fires and other fires; floods and landslides; industrial and nuclear accidents; terrorist attacks; disasters at sea; and pandemics**. This applies both to internal crises and to external crises, where such scenarios need to incorporate considerations of humanitarian aid.

Furthermore, the EU has not pooled the **existing national resources**. The paradox is that national and regional resources do exist; the Member States have a capacity to organise relief and prepare for disasters, and among other things have set up national crisis centres; the EU also has satellite observation capacity such as the GMES system.

In the absence of **overall organisation of the European response**, with scenarios, protocols and identified resources, the cost of non-Europe is being felt in the effectiveness of the response and in economic terms. **Only preventive organisation and a pooling of existing resources can bring about the emergence of a European civil protection force.**

A. Such a European force would be governed by five principles:

1. Dual subsidiarity, in relation to the Member States and in relation to the United Nations: European crisis capacity must respect the national, regional and local organisation of each Member State. Units of this European civil protection force would be made available in line with **national and regional powers**: the European force’s resources of people and equipment would be managed and maintained by the Member States at national or regional level. There would be no centralisation of resources in Brussels.

The European civil protection force would also respect the coordinating role of the United Nations. Such a force would be a **positive response to the expectations of the UN**, which sees clear added value in a European pole with the capacity to act, as compared with a multitude of national operations working alongside one another.

2. Voluntary membership and a “bottom-up” approach: the initiative would come from the Member State wishing to take part in the force.

Following a methodology outlined in the second part of this report,¹⁰ we have **identified precise needs** which are listed in a **“menu”** corresponding to different standard civil protection scenarios. The items on this menu, taken together, represent an average of what Europe needs in terms of equipment and national teams in order to respond and to operate the European force. A **precise and gradual timetable**¹¹ would see the force move from **potential provision to effective pooling** of operational capacities or units.

An interested Member State would voluntarily choose one or more items on the menu; it would finance these items and maintain them in its own country. In this **delegated management approach**, participation would be “bottom-up”, at the voluntary request of the Member State. The way in which the Member State decided to participate would of course take account of the need for specialisation and for the coherence of the whole.

3. European solidarity: In the event of a crisis inside or outside Europe, the resources making up the force would be devoted as a matter of priority to a European response. If the crisis was in a Member State, and the resources were not needed by Europe, they would be used by the Member State that maintained them.

9. See map No 1, page 16, showing MIC operations inside and outside the EU since 2002

10. See the technical report, in the chapter The future: better needs evaluation the section Civil protection response: what is needed, pp. 43-45

11. Pp. 26-29

4. Specialisation: Member States would specialise in the handling of one or more threats, corresponding to the various civil protection scenarios (fires, floods, earthquakes etc.) that had been precisely identified and mapped to the resources needed to tackle them. Member States could join together to establish a group of countries specialised in the management of a particular threat, setting up units big enough to be operational. A recent example of specialisation of this kind is provided by five countries in the south of the EU which have joined together to fight the danger of fires. In the future the coastal countries of the EU might also pool their resources to set up a European coastguard.

5. Openness: The European force would be open to the non-EU countries that already participate in the European Civil Protection Mechanism – Bulgaria, Romania, Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland – and to the Union’s other neighbours, such as Switzerland, Russia or Turkey.

B. The European force would call on the **existing resources of the Member States**. It should also be able to acquire additional resources, which would be **entrusted to volunteering Member States to manage on a delegated basis**.

Recent European history has seen recurrent oil spills (the *Erika*, the *Prestige*). But Europe still lacks ships able to pump oil on the high seas in stormy weather. Nor are there enough heavy-duty pumps for use in fighting floods. When crises arise outside Europe, we still hire large aircraft on each occasion, rather than making the initial investment needed to buy a few. Helicopters may or may not be available to carry aid to the scene of the disaster. The same applies to fire-fighting helicopters and aeroplanes. And lastly, rapid action must be taken to develop the interoperability of communications equipment between civil protection forces.

The European Union must itself **acquire** equipment of this kind under a multiannual programme – in particular field hospitals, heavy-duty pumps, transport planes and medical material – and these would be **entrusted to the interested Member States on a delegated management basis**.

The question of **transport planes** is crucial for long-distance transport to disaster areas outside the EU. The systems already in place (UN, NATO) have to be considered, and so, too, does the European profile that the EU’s external action ought to have in the eyes of the EU’s own citizens and of the rest of the world.

In particular, the scenarios and protocols drawn up need to make a systematic analysis of the **complementary role of military resources**, in order to achieve maximum integration and to limit the cost of emergency deployments. In an emergency, it has first to be considered whether European resources will be enough, or whether there are other needs that justify NATO involvement, especially if our US and Canadian partners are making a major contribution to the aid effort.

The European resources must in any event be upgraded: to support humanitarian aid, four or five Airbus A 400Ms (replacing the Hercules C-130s) and some Casa aircraft should be bought. These would be deployed at one or more multimodal bases. There would have to be close collaboration between the Member States, the General Secretariat of the Council, the future Operations Centre and the European Defence Agency.

C. The European force would be set up by the following **procedure**:

1. The European Council would approve the principle that such a European civil protection force should be set up. The European Commission would propose the setting up of a European civil protection force under Article 308 of the EC Treaty, which in the absence of a Constitution is the only legal basis. The proposal would include the establishment of an **Operations Centre**, or upgraded MIC, to **take over from the MIC**, and of a **Joint Training Institute**. If unanimity could not be achieved within a year of the proposal, enhanced cooperation would allow eight countries to go ahead with the plan.

12. Report of the European Parliament's Committee on Regional Development, rapporteur Mr Rolf Berend, on the European Union Solidarity Fund

2. To ensure that the national resources made available fitted together coherently, and were appropriate to requirements, Member States' proposals for participation would require the technical approval of the new **Operations Centre**. Member States would continue to be responsible for the conduct of operations carried out using their own resources.

3. Setting up the Operations Centre would not require a transfer of powers. The Centre would be made up of the present MIC teams, with the addition of seconded national experts, who could give it the benefit of their own specialised knowledge.

D. The focal points of the European force would be an **Operations Centre and a **Training Institute for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid**:**

1. The **Operations Centre** would draw up the scenarios and protocols in close cooperation with the crisis centres in the Member States, and with the Civil-Military Cell, in order to take account of the strategic transport facilities that might be available to provide logistical support for the civil protection force and for humanitarian aid. One department of the Operations Centre would be responsible for the monitoring and use of satellite capacity in three areas: navigation, communication and observation.

In line with the "**bottom-up**" approach, the Operations Centre would delegate or subcontract all or part of the drafting of scenarios to specialised bodies: the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control in Stockholm could draw up the scenario for handling pandemics, in collaboration with the Member States and the Commission's Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection; some Member States, such as Italy, which has acquired special expertise – as shown by the operation of the crisis rooms at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its civil protection arrangements – could also share their experience and draw up scenarios for particular threats. In the same way, the Operations Centre would examine the studies and proposals for preparedness and prevention drawn up by the Council, and more especially by the European Counter-terrorism Coordinator. It would organise joint exercises and practices in close collaboration with the Member States.

2. A **Training Institute for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid** would be set up. Its location would be chosen by the Council. It would provide training for staff and for the national and regional teams making up the European force and for the evaluation experts working for the EU. It would train the single reconnaissance teams (proposal 5). The Institute would also be open to NGOs, and on certain conditions to volunteers from among the public who possessed expertise that would be useful in assistance and rescue operations.

E. The European force would be financed as follows:

1. An **annual transfer of 10% from the EU Solidarity Fund**, which currently has a budget of €1 billion a year, in the spirit of the Berend Report.¹² The **resources and equipment** of the Operations Centre and the Training Centre could then be bought under a multi-annual programme.

2. In order to **supplement the efforts of the Member States, and with a view to cohesion between the 25 Member States of the Union**, some of the equipment of the force, over and above the capacities bought directly by the Member States, could also be financed out of this transfer of 10% of the Solidarity Fund. **This equipment would be entrusted to the Member States on a delegated management basis.**

3. If financing from the Solidarity Fund was not sufficient to cover the external aspect of civil protection, the drawing together of civil protection and humanitarian aid (proposal 4) would allow it to be financed out of ECHO's budget.

4. If a crisis arose inside the EU, unless the Council specifically decided otherwise, the Member States requesting European assistance would bear the costs occasioned by the provision of resources by the other Member States.

F. A proper legal basis for the European force inside the Union would be provided by a Council regulation on covering the risks associated with civil protection operations in the European Union. Unlike operations outside the Union, these are not covered by an agreement of the kind that applies to missions outside the Union.

G. Last, the profile of the force would be raised by choosing a logo that would be clear to the EU public.

It seems to me that if the European response is to become more visible, outside communication regarding emergency action taken by the Union has to be simplified.

The logo “EuropeAid” is already being used by the EU, but the implications of the visibility of EU emergency response are such that the existing terminology needs to be extended to allow the logo to be used for emergency action both inside and outside the Union.

This logo would be easily recognised by European citizens, especially if it was worn by the staff of the European civil protection force and displayed on its aircraft carrying humanitarian aid.

We propose a common uniform for all staff of the European civil protection force


It is essential that the staff carrying out operations on the ground should be visible. It will be remembered that one of the controversies that arose during the tsunami crisis concerned the allegation that the European profile was too low, and did not do justice to the very big overall effort made by the Europeans.¹³

A single uniform for all staff acting as part of the European force would help the intervention teams to feel that they were part of the European effort. The design of the uniform could draw on the best already existing in the Member States.

It would include the European flag followed by the logo “europe aid” and the flag of the country of the wearer:



13. See Annex 3, on rehabilitation and reconstruction aid for countries hit by the tsunami.



2. We propose that the force be supported from the seven outermost regions of the European Union

Geography is an important asset for the EU when it comes to crisis response.

Thanks to its seven outermost regions, the EU has a territorial and human presence off the African coast (Canaries and Madeira), in the Indian Ocean (Reunion Island), at the heart of Latin America (French Guiana), close to Central and North America (Guadeloupe and Martinique) and in the middle of the Atlantic (Azores), not to mention the overseas territories in the Pacific.

These outermost European regions, though not exclusively, can provide support bases to allow the pre-positioning of basic products and logistical backup. This would facilitate the deployment of European human resources and equipment in cases of emergency humanitarian assistance outside the EU.

Close cooperation between the Member States and the operations centre should enable us to identify the best possible positions for the backup sites. The French Red Cross has set up emergency humanitarian response teams on this pattern. They are specialised (primary health care, emergency hospital, water and sanitation, telecommunications, logistics and distribution), ready-formed and can be mobilised on demand. The Red Cross can thus deploy rapidly via a regional rapid intervention platform for the Indian Ocean (*Plateforme Régionale d'Intervention Rapide pour l'Océan Indien* or PIROI), which has basic equipment (cholera kits and water, tents, medicines, etc.) and can send out emergency teams in the area within 24 hours. A similar structure exists in the Caribbean and another is planned for the Pacific.

The EU should organise its support structure along the same lines.

3. We propose setting up a Civil Security Council and giving the General Affairs and External Relations Council a greater role

These proposals relate to **the most serious internal and external cross-border crises** that could affect the European Union (tsunami, terrorist attacks, pandemics). They take account of ongoing work in the Council and the Commission.

- 1.** The Civil Security Council will be set up on the basis of existing coordination arrangements and the Crisis Steering Group by the Heads of State and Government at the European Council. It will be composed of the President of the Council, the President of the Commission, the Secretary-General/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Member State(s) affected and the Chief of Staff of the European Union, who may appoint representatives. The President of the Commission may be represented by the future Commissioner responsible for civil protection and emergency humanitarian assistance.
- 2.** The Civil Security Council will meet immediately at the request of the Presidency-in-office of the Council of the European Union. It will report to the General Affairs and External Relations Council or to the Permanent Representatives Committee if delegated for this purpose by the Council.
- 3.** The Civil Security Council will meet only when a crisis arises in order to ensure that operational procedures are properly applied and to keep the Member States informed.
- 4.** The Civil Security Council will have a dual role:
 - a.** It will establish that a crisis exists and launch the procedures drawn up by the operations centre for each scenario. Each institution will then manage operational implementation in accordance with its responsibilities. To avoid any delay in deploying the assistance, a **clause on the immediate departure** of national teams is envisaged in case the Civil Security Council does not meet rapidly.
 - b.** It will keep the Member States regularly informed through the Permanent Representatives Committee.

At a political level, the **General Affairs and External Relations Council** will alone be responsible for the political handling of the crisis. It will meet in the event of a cross-sectoral crisis inside or outside the EU. It will inform the **Permanent Representatives Committee** of its meeting and will delegate to it the authority to take rapid action with respect to any decision coming under its responsibility for the duration of the crisis.

Once a year the General Affairs and External Relations Council will hear a report from the Civil Security Council and will discuss EU action in the fields of humanitarian assistance and civil protection and assess the action taken. The same presentation and debate will take place at the European Parliament.

4. We propose a one-stop-shop for the European Union's humanitarian response

In order to perform its various funding, political and operational roles successfully, the Commission must ensure a consistent humanitarian response. The tsunami, followed a few months later by the earthquake in Pakistan, highlighted a number of limitations of humanitarian action as it is currently organised. One of the lessons to be drawn from these disasters is that we need to boost our capacity to assess needs and provide a rapid response. We also need to improve our ability to deliver humanitarian assistance. These two key aspects require cooperation between civil protection and humanitarian assistance departments.

The fact that there are two contact points within the Commission, one purely humanitarian and one covering the civil protection field but also elements of humanitarian assistance, complicates preparatory work. It also adds to a real risk of confusion among our external partners, primarily the United Nations. The coordination mechanism for civil protection should therefore gradually be attached to DG ECHO in order to create a **one stop shop for the EU's humanitarian response**.

This would perform two functions:

1. Make the EU's emergency response more consistent and efficient, and in particular ensure better preparation, organise single assessments and carry out coordinated deployments. On the latter point, when an external crisis arises, it is vital that the civil protection and humanitarian assistance responses be closely coordinated. The one-stop-shop would also provide a single contact point with the United Nations.


We must give immediate attention to improving our emergency response to external crises: several members of the MIC staff should be seconded to ECHO to prepare joint scenarios and assessments for an external response. As things stand at present, until other arrangements are made, the RELEX **crisis platform** set up by the President of the Commission immediately after the tsunami must be the interface between ECHO, the MIC and the General Secretariat of the Council on the political aspects of the EU's emergency response.

It is hoped that before the next Commission takes up office the Heads of State and Government find some means of creating the post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs as proposed in the draft Constitutional Treaty. **The President of the European Commission could then give sole responsibility for humanitarian assistance and civil protection to a single Commissioner working with the Minister for Foreign Affairs/Vice-President of the Commission.**

2. Improve external communication on our emergency response. A single spokesperson working with the future European Commissioner responsible for humanitarian assistance and civil protection will handle communication on our emergency response. The same person could also act as spokesperson for the future Civil Security Council. In this case, the Commission and Council would need a single set-up for external communication on behalf of the European Union.

5. We propose an integrated European approach to crisis anticipation

We need to devise a more consistent integrated European approach to crisis response at all stages of the crisis cycle,¹⁴ in particular as regards **assessing situations, training and pooling experts.**



1. There is **no prevention without observation.** We should therefore systematically use the GMES system¹⁵, which supports the development of European policy on the environment and security and helps to monitor its implementation at local, regional, Community and world level. The GMES programme will largely meet the EU's civil protection needs. Given the strategic importance of earth observation in the environmental and security fields, we should keep to the deadlines set by the Göteborg Council of June 2001 and develop **an independent and operational European global monitoring capacity by 2008 at the latest.**

2. We need to ensure, as of now, that there is a **single, "integrated" assessment of situations** by setting up single, multi-disciplinary teams, **both for the emergency humanitarian response and for long-term follow-up and to prepare for the transition to the reconstruction phase.**

→ **A single needs assessment for the emergency humanitarian response** should be provided as swiftly as possible, though without, of course, encroaching on the coordination role assigned to the United Nations. At present several evaluations are made in parallel. Coordinating different teams with differing chains of command on the ground proves costly in terms of human resources, coordination, and effectiveness. Depending on the situation and without prejudice to the neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian operations, these teams could also include military personnel to analyse the advantage of additional logistical back-up.

→ **A single assessment of situations** for the "consolidation" phase should be carried out by the Council and the Commission. Following a systematic joint assessment of the political and reconstruction requirements, the instruments available to the EU to respond to the crisis would be identified. Each institution would then set in motion its own operational procedures. The Council and Commission would coordinate their responses on the spot. And the Commission would have to take account of the link between the emergency response and longer-term Community programmes.

→ **These single assessments should result in the pooling of the available expertise using two databases**, one covering the humanitarian aid and civil protection requirements and the other the requirements for the consolidation phase. For that phase the Council's Secretariat General and the Commission would work in tandem. The Member States would also support this approach by making available experts from their national cooperation agencies.

14. See Diagram 2 on the "crisis cycle"

15. Announced in the European Commission's Communication to the Council and Parliament, 10.11.2005 – COM (2005) 565 final

3. A single training régime should be set up for the European personnel deployed in the event of humanitarian emergencies (including the health aspects) and for the consolidation phase, centred around a “common core” and specialisation modules for each of the phases.

The **European Institute for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid** could run this training. This would help generate a common sense of identity and common working methods. The teams trained would take part in exercises such as those held in 2005 in Sicily, which involved Sweden, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Greece and Spain plus more than 30 observer countries, or in 2004 with the “top” five countries in fire protection.

6. We propose that six European Union regional delegations specialise in crisis management

We should take advantage of the geographical coverage of these delegations to turn them into an effective crisis response instrument.

1. We need to set up six regional delegations specialising in crisis management by drawing on ECHO’s¹⁶ experience. ECHO has 90 field experts and 150 local experts in six regional offices – Amman, Bangkok, Dakar, Managua, Nairobi and New Delhi.

2. The regional delegations are identified in Africa, Asia and Latin America by the Directorate-General for External Relations in cooperation with ECHO and in consultation with the General Secretariat of the Council. These six regional delegations must be provided with means of communication enabling them to transmit the necessary information to Brussels.


Each **regional delegation** be provided with a civil protection officer, a specialist in political crisis management, a reconstruction expert, a logistics expert, a governance specialist and a programme manager. The civil protection officer will liaise with the Operational Centre and the local civil protection, early warning and coordination services. He will be given training for that purpose funded from the Operational Centre’s budget and report directly to the Head of Delegation. The civil protection officer will be responsible for the safety of the premises and for implementing the staff evacuation plan. Together with the ECHO office head, he will be the contact for the teams deployed in the event of a major crisis and will coordinate institutional support actions and training. The training provided to civil protection officers at the relevant regional delegations will be open to staff posted to the embassies of the Member States in the area.

During the first year, these **new organisational arrangements** will be gradually tested in **three pilot delegations** in Africa, Asia and Latin America to enable the system to be fine-tuned. After one year an evaluation will be carried out and the system will be extended to all pre-identified areas on the basis of its recommendations.

3. Lastly, the head of delegation will have additional coordination powers. The ECHO offices and their staff will be placed under the authority of the head of delegation. The ECHO office head will advise the head of delegation on how to manage humanitarian crisis situations. The head of delegation and the delegation’s head of operations will be given specific training for crisis situations. In crisis areas which have been identified as a top priority, a secure communication system will be set up as a matter of urgency. It will be linked to the ARGUS system and will be operational even in a major crisis within a protected enclosure on the delegation’s premises.

16. See map No 2 – ECHO interventions and regional offices in 2005

Map No 2: ECHO interventions and regional offices 2005



7. We propose establishing a clear information system for European Union citizens travelling outside the Union

As a preventive measure, **we propose establishing a clear information system** for European Union citizens travelling outside the Union.

1. First, the following will be reproduced on all EU passports:

→ **Article 20 of the Treaty establishing the European Community:** *"Every citizen of the Union shall, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which he is a national is not represented, be entitled to protection by the diplomatic or consular authorities of any Member State, on the same conditions as the nationals of that State. Member States shall establish the necessary rules among themselves and start the international negotiations required to secure this protection."*

→ **Useful telephone numbers for persons requiring assistance**, and in particular the number of the crisis centre in each Member State.

2. Second, a **targeted information campaign** will be organised, particularly at airports.


8. We propose pooling consular resources

When the Asian tsunami occurred it became apparent that consular networks needed to develop an adequate crisis response. With more and more people travelling abroad, we need to take structural action now to evaluate and pool capacity, with due allowance for the resources of European Commission and, in future, European Union delegations abroad. The proposed responses respect the subsidiarity principle.

1. We propose evaluating existing capacity:

→ **the existing consular resources of the Member States** should be evaluated in order to anticipate requirements in the event of a crisis. A country-by-country inventory of representative offices (consulates, embassies, honorary consulates) is a first step to identifying resources and needs in terms of diplomatic and consular representations worldwide.

→ **a map showing Commission delegations** abroad and the relative presence of the Member States¹⁷ suggests that the delegations should be included in a more general discussion of capacity evaluation, especially in countries where few of the Member States are represented.



→ **this evaluation should also comprise an exchange of best practice** between national consulates abroad in the fields of assistance and evacuation.

The Council General Secretariat could make an early start on coordinating this exercise, in close cooperation with the Commission.

2. We propose stepping up cooperation between the Member States' representations, Commission delegations and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union.

Under the existing Treaties, delegations must be in a position to **help pool available resources** in order to facilitate cooperation on the ground, in response to a growing demand on the part of the Member States. This responsibility of the delegations, quite apart from the practical and logistic aspects referred to in the second part of the report,¹⁸ should be reflected:

17. See map No 3 – Presence of the European Commission delegations worldwide and relative presence of the Member States

18. See the technical report, in the chapter "The future: better needs evaluation" the section assistance for European citizens, p. 49

→ in an **appropriate administrative framework** which gives the head of delegation the necessary flexibility to mobilise his staff in the event of a crisis. Some staff members can be mobilised because their technical skills are useful (civil engineers, water purification specialists, health specialists, energy project managers, etc.). If necessary, acting under the leadership of the head of delegation, assisted by the civil protection consultant and the head of the ECHO office, they can reinforce **the teams responsible for making an initial assessment of the situation in the event of a major disaster**.

→ in the setting-up of an **emergency financial reserve** enabling heads of delegation to take any necessary support measures without delay. These measures should essentially cover logistical and material assistance. The reserve could be used within the framework of the budget of the future stability instrument, on condition that its legal basis allows the funding of emergency measures for EU nationals.

3. We propose joint funding of the most costly evacuation operations

Evacuation operations for EU citizens will involve nationals of several Member States. The Member States will work together on evacuation plans abroad. When evacuations take place, they often entail significant costs. It should therefore be possible to refund **the cost of these evacuation operations** over a given threshold using the CFSP budget; this could function along similar lines to the **solidarity fund internally**. The Commission and Council should look into this option in the near future.

9. We propose the creation of consular flying squads

The tsunami tragedy showed the need for rapid reaction and mutual support, given that some States with citizens in the area had no representation and bearing in mind the scale of the disaster for the States that did have a representation.

Consular “flying squads” are a response to this need.

Made up of diplomats from various Member States, they would be ready to fly out in the event of a disaster.

They would receive joint training in emergency management. This would enable them to form a sense of common identity and formulate common procedures for action on behalf of European citizens abroad in the event of a crisis.

Deployed immediately to assist European nationals, they would help people deal with the formalities if there were no consulate on the spot. The Commission delegations, where well placed to provide added value, could accommodate these squads and provide them with the necessary logistical support (contacts, communication).

The Member States would undertake to train their diplomats for such special consular cooperation. Joint exercises and training would be organised by geographical region or at European level under the authority of the future Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. The idea of creating a **Joint Consular Academy**, as proposed by the European Parliament in 2000, ought to be considered.

In the medium and long term, the best response in order to help European citizens would be to set up “European consulates”, especially for the countries that are part of the Schengen area. Member States could start pooling of their consular resources at once on a voluntary basis applying a “bottom-up” approach. The Commission could be asked to contribute to the financing of joint training.

10. We propose setting up “European consulates” on an experimental basis in four regions

The creation of joint consular services was explicitly proposed by the Hague Programme, point 1.7.3: *“Common visa offices should be established in the long term, taking into account discussions on the establishment of a European External Action Service.”* Besides issuing visas, these services would be transformed into a genuine common consular corps that could act to assist any EU citizen in distress.

We propose **four experimental regions** – the **Caribbean, the Balkans, the Indian Ocean and West Africa** – to develop these first “European consulates”. These regions have been identified on the basis of the following three criteria: the presence of Commission delegations, the number of European tourists, and the relative representativeness of the Member States.

A European consulate would be created in each of these regions around the existing Commission delegations. With the creation of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs and a European External Action Service in prospect, this scheme could become the general rule after proper evaluation and could then be embodied in a European consular code (see next proposal).

To implement this pilot proposal, the Commission will have to make a swift assessment of the feasibility of submitting a proposal along these lines on the basis of Articles 20 and 22 of the Treaty establishing the European Community.

Under Article 22 the Commission can present a proposal to extend the existing rights of citizenship to the Council, which has to adopt it unanimously after consulting the European Parliament. The Constitutional Treaty also provides for a similar mechanism: a European law of the Council to establish the measures necessary to facilitate such protection. The Council would act after consulting the European Parliament (Article III-12).

Failing this, this common consular service would be formed around enhanced cooperation between Member States that volunteer under the “bottom-up” approach.

11. We propose the establishment of a European consular code

A **European consular code** should be established to underpin cooperation between Member States’ diplomatic missions and the delegations of the European Union, without altering the fact that consular protection is for the citizen.

→ Any proposal would have to concern itself with the **human dimension** of the situation facing citizens in distress and **the help to be provided** (administrative assistance, repatriation, identification of a family member’s body, loss of travel documents, etc.).

→ The Code would also allow **an automatic stand-in system to be established between consulates**, depending on the effective capacity of each over a given geographical area. There are some regions of the world where several Member States have no embassy or consulate.

It is therefore important to draw up a Code clearly defining the stand-in arrangements in each country (for example Member State X would represent Member States Y and Z in India) in order to enhance consular synergies. A “stand-in” system of this kind would be an application of the principle of subsidiarity. In the absence of unanimity, automatic stand-in arrangements could already be established through enhanced cooperation between the Member States that wish to go ahead.

→ Besides stand-in arrangements, the Code would also have to define **the operating rules for a future common consular corps** that could intervene to help any citizen of the European Union.

The **European consular code** proposed by the Commission on the basis of Articles 20 and 22 would have to **spell out the assistance to be given to citizens, the stand-in system and the operating rules.**

12. We propose the creation or specialisation of laboratories to deal with bioterrorism and victim identification

The tsunami tragedy highlighted the need to specialise, designate and reinforce existing national resources, given the great difficulty of identifying victims after a disaster. And future crises will doubtless bring other shortcomings to light.

We therefore need to devise reference scenarios, so as to anticipate the requirements in terms of scientific analysis, and to set up a network of national specialist skills that could serve all Europeans if necessary.

Designating a few European reference laboratories will facilitate the work of the Member States after a disaster. Designation will entitle laboratories to European research budget funding to boost their capacities.

Taking account of the skills identified in the Member States and the expertise gained in Bosnia, **one or two laboratories to serve Europeans in identifying victims** would be set up, designated or would specialise after a feasibility study.

Besides identifying victims, this approach of designating laboratories or having them specialise could be taken further, for example to build up scientific capacity **on bioterrorism.**

This pooling of resources in support of the European civil protection force would follow the principles of specialisation and constitution of effective units under a voluntary “bottom-up” approach. The Operations Centre – in cooperation with the bodies concerned in the Member States, the Commission and the Council – would make proposals to the Member States on the means that it considers should be made available to the European civil protection force.



Proposed timetable



**1 July 2006 → 30 June 2007
(Finnish and German Presidencies)**

Humanitarian aid/Civil protection

1. Establishment within a year of the following seven scenarios – MIC in close cooperation with the Member States and the stakeholders (other Commission Directorates-General, the Council General Secretariat's Civil/Military Cell):

- earthquakes and tsunamis
- forest fires and other fires
- flooding
- industrial and nuclear accidents
- terrorist attacks
- disasters at sea
- pandemics.

2. Establishment of "menu" of needs for each scenario.

3. Those Member States that wish to do so start taking account of the "menu" in their organisation.

4. Alignment of MIC and ECHO emergency structures for external relations.

5. Reinforcement of MIC with Member State experts to form the basis of the operations centre.

6. European Council decision to establish a EuropeAid civil protection force.

External relations

1. Study into possibility of "common" financing from the CFSP budget for **operations to evacuate** EU citizens abroad.

2. Empowerment of heads of delegation to act in emergencies in liaison with Member States' diplomatic and consular services and establishment of contingency fund for heads of delegation.

3. Identification of six regional delegations and preparation of organisational set-up for three of them.

4. Establishment of structure for the two "emergency" and "consolidation" databases.



Assistance to EU citizens in the event of a crisis/Consular matters

- 1. Assessment of the Member States' consular capacities**, in order to anticipate needs in the event of a crisis, and identification of best assistance and evacuation practices at national consulates abroad.
2. Preparation of Commission proposal on the **four pilot areas** for establishing EU consulates.
3. Start of work on EU consular code.

**1 July 2007 → 30 June 2008
(Portuguese and Slovenian Presidencies)**

Humanitarian aid/Civil protection

- 1.** In follow-up to the Berend Report, the Council, Commission and Parliament hold a tripartite meeting to adapt the EU Solidarity Fund Regulation to finance civil protection training and the purchase of certain types of equipment.
- 2.** Preparation of operations protocols by the "enhanced MIC" (future operations centre) assisted by the Member States and the Council General Secretariat.
- 3.** Feasibility study on legal cover necessary for civil protection missions within the EU.
- 4.** Stepping-up of joint training and implementation of an annual exercise open to all Member States and organised by the future operations centre.
- 5.** Commission proposal for setting up a European civil protection force (EuropeAid). Adjustment of visibility factors for external aid.
- 6.** Setting-up of "Civil Security" Council by Heads of State and Government.
- 7.** Launch of feasibility study for foundation or specialisation of a European victim-identification laboratory and one or more laboratories specialising in bioterrorism.

External relations

1. Entry into service of the three regional delegations specialising in crisis management after finalisation of organisational set-up.
2. Introduction of new administrative and financial framework for heads of delegation.
3. Creation of the two “emergency” and “consolidation” databases.
4. Training of first joint assessment teams for “emergency” and “consolidation”.
5. Application of institutional provisions on external action and civil protection.

Assistance to EU citizens in the event of a crisis/Consular matters

1. Identification and training of consular flying squads of volunteer diplomats.
2. Presentation and adoption of the Commission proposal on the four experimental regions for setting up EU consulates. Failing that, enhanced cooperation for those wishing to press ahead.
3. Presentation of Commission proposal for an **EU consular code**.

1 July 2008 → 30 June 2009 (French and Czech Presidencies)

Humanitarian aid/Civil protection

1. Discussion in Council of act creating the EuropeAid European civil protection force.
2. At end of period, adoption of act creating the EuropeAid European civil protection force or, failing that, start of enhanced cooperation between those countries wishing to press ahead under Article 43 (Title VII of Treaty on European Union).
3. Setting-up of the force’s operations centre and training college. Choice of college’s location by Council.
4. Proposal for EU regulation on the legal cover necessary for civil protection operations within the EU.
5. Initial application of scenarios and their testing during the annual exercise.

External relations

Evaluation of first three regional delegations specialising in crisis response.

Assistance to EU citizens in the event of a crisis/Consular matters

1. Introduction of consular flying squads and first joint training courses.
2. Evaluation of working of four experimental regions and extension to other areas.

**1 July 2009 → 30 June 2010
(Swedish and Spanish Presidencies)**

Humanitarian aid/Civil protection

1. Launch of initial approval procedures for units of the "EuropeAid" force. The Member States choose items from the proposed "menu" that they undertake to make available to the force.
2. Grouping of humanitarian action and civil protection under the authority of a single European Commissioner.
3. First integrated operation involving humanitarian aid and the resources of the European civil protection force.

External relations

Extension of organisational set-up of first three regional delegations to another three.

Assistance to EU citizens in the event of a crisis/consular matters

1. Drafting of an EU consular code.
2. Foundation or specialisation of a European victim-identification laboratory and laboratories specialising in bioterrorism.
3. Adoption of EU consular code. Failing that, enhanced cooperation between those countries wishing to press ahead.





Technical report

Inventory and analysis of future requirements

Introduction

In the past few years the European Union has responded to all kinds of natural disasters throughout the world – most recently when hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans and after the earthquake in Pakistan – and within Europe too – for example by sending civil protection teams to deal with the floods in Arles, France in 2003 or to fight the forest fires in Portugal in 2005.

Within the European Union, the Member States show solidarity by offering their national resources for use in emergency situations when the Union is affected by natural disasters, industrial accidents or pollution at sea. Individually the Member States do not always have adequate capacity to cope with major crises. Another element is the Solidarity Fund set up in 2002, which in certain circumstances will reimburse the authorities of the stricken Member State within ten weeks of the disaster happening.

The situation outside the Union is different: the national civil protection resources made available by the Community civil protection mechanism can indeed always enhance the European Union disaster response capability, under the political coordination of the Presidency in office of the European Union. But the essential role is played by the combination of the European humanitarian aid policy (ECHO) and the external relations policy in the broad sense (emergency response instruments and reconstruction aid instruments).

European humanitarian aid action comes under the overall coordination organised by the United Nations and offers an immediate response and a long-term response. There is value added in three respects: first, geographical cover (ongoing operations in some sixty countries) is much more extensive than that of individual Member States. This extensive coverage means that in many cases the Commission is already on the spot when a disaster occurs. Second, the Commission is far more involved than others as a humanitarian aid donor. While it is true that the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO) funds projects carried out by partners rather than taking direct action, funding is granted in response to an analysis of needs conducted on the ground by the Commission itself and not just by its partners. ECHO keeps a close eye on projects and is in constant dialogue with the partners, the donors, the Member States, the national authorities, etc., to ensure that the aid provided is the most suitable and goes to those most in need. This involvement is made possible by the network of ECHO experts on the spot and the collaboration with the Union delegations worldwide. and third, the impartiality of Community humanitarian aid makes it more acceptable in certain difficult contexts where aid from a specific EU Member State would be looked on less favourably.

The European Union's other advantage lies in the reconstruction programmes. These enable Europe to work on a long-term basis with a **set of instruments**¹⁹ made up of European programmes linked to external relations over all geographical areas. Even if they are not discussed in detail in this report, which is devoted essentially to emergency response methods, it must be stressed that only the major Community geographical programmes (ALA, MED, TACIS, CARDS, etc.) give European Union action a long-term dimension. They are therefore an important factor of visibility. The analysis below will focus on three European Union rapid political response instruments: the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, the Peace for Africa facility, and civilian crisis management.

The European delegations abroad are also a very important tool that this report will be looking at to consider their possible role in responding to crises and providing assistance to citizens.

19. Annex 2 is taken from the 2003 Commission document on civilian crisis management instruments, it gives an idea of the many kinds of programme than can be called on

Finally, the European Union's added value is its ability to **cover the entire crisis cycle** (preparation, emergency response and ending with the consolidation response) with substantial and coordinated resources. The impact of the response on the ground is greater and the overall cost lower than the aggregate cost of all the individual responses.

The purpose of this technical report is to:

- ➔ present the action of the European Union through its various instruments and illustrate the contribution to crisis response (Part One),
- ➔ consider real needs (Part Two)

Crisis situations and the instruments currently available to the EU

1. Crisis situations

A. Natural disasters²⁰

According to the European Commission's Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid ("ECHO"), over 300 million people worldwide are affected every year by natural disasters, mainly in the developing countries.

The European Union responds to natural disasters in two ways:

1. Humanitarian aid: a specialised Commission office (ECHO) was set up in 1992, and since then humanitarian aid has been given to some 85 countries around the world. The proportion of ECHO's budget spent on natural disasters averages 17%. The most common disasters are hurricanes (especially in Central America), floods, drought, earthquakes and epidemics. ECHO steps in when national and local authorities are not able to meet humanitarian needs.

2. The Community Civil Protection Mechanism: The Community mechanism has been brought into play in the earthquakes in Algeria (2003), Iran (2003), and Morocco (2004), the floods in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan (2005), the Asian tsunami (2004), where several teams were sent to four affected countries (Thailand, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Indonesia), and more recently in the United States, following hurricane Katrina (2005), and in Pakistan, following the earthquake there (2005). In most case the victims also received humanitarian aid.

B. Complex humanitarian crises²¹

ECHO is one of the world's major humanitarian organisations, with an annual budget of €500 million. Since 1992 it has provided a response to natural disasters and to complex humanitarian crises, both as a matter of urgency and on a long-term basis; in particular, it attempts to tackle crises that have been "forgotten" by the media and by the international community. These are often long-standing crises to which no political solution is yet forthcoming.

Natural disasters sometimes aggravate the effects of conflicts or post-conflict situations from which populations have not yet recovered. This was the case, for example, with the drought that affected Afghanistan for several years.

Every year ECHO helps about 18 million people, in more than 60 countries, through its 200 partners: European NGOs, the Red Cross organisations, and the United Nations agencies, especially the High Commissioner for Refugees.

C. Conflicts²²

Alongside natural disasters and humanitarian crises, EU intervention may be occasioned by conflict. Two of the five key threats facing Europe referred to by the European security strategy are regional conflicts and state failure.²³

According to **Conflict Barometer 2005**²⁴, there were 249 conflicts in the world in 2005. Their intensity was variable, but measurable: 74 of them were classified as "crises"²⁵, which in some cases were taking place in the heart of Europe. Between 2004 and 2005 the number of conflicts of this kind increased from 50 to 74. In 2005 there were 24 situations with a higher intensity, including two wars; these were concentrated in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, regions of the world with which the EU has close political and economic ties.

20. See map No 1, page 16, MIC interventions inside and outside the European Union since 2002

21. See map No 3, page 22, ECHO interventions and regional offices 2005


22. See map No 4, page 34, Civilian crisis-management operations and interventions using the rapid reaction mechanism (2001-2006)

23. European security strategy, proposed by Javier Solana, Secretary-General and High Representative, and approved by the Heads of State and Government at the European Council meeting in Brussels on 12 December 2003

24. Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer 2005

25. A "crisis" is defined as "a tense situation in which at least one of the parties uses violent force in sporadic incidents"

Map No 4: Civilian crisis-management operations and interventions using the rapid reaction mechanism (2001-2006)



2. Instruments available to the EU

The added value represented by the EU is manifest in the tools available to it, which allow the entire cycle of a crisis to be covered.

A. For anticipating responses

From preparedness for natural disasters to conflict prevention, measures can be planned to respond to crises of any kind, using a range of across-the-board and specific tools.

→ Monitoring the environment and security

The Union has a general tool, the GMES system²⁶, which is intended to remedy the fragmentation of national observation systems that use different national capacities and standards.

The European Space Agency is implementing the space component, and the Commission is handling the identification and development of the services that the system is to provide to public authorities. The Commission here seeks to help the authorities in their decision-making in respect of the environment and security.

26. Discussed in the Commission Communication to the Council and Parliament, COM(2005) 565 final, 10 November 2005

This initiative, which is being steered by the EU, will allow **three fast-track services to be introduced by 2008: land monitoring, marine services and emergency response**. It will also put additional capacity at the disposal of European defence and security policy. Civil and military synergies will be sought in order to arrive at a better use of resources, in full complementarity with the EU Satellite Centre.

To support the GMES programme an office for global monitoring for environment and security will be set up in the Commission's Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry from 1 June 2006.

→ Preventing natural disasters

Preventive measures have already been financed by the Commission, in close cooperation with the UN, with a view to improving the EU's capacity to respond. The Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System ("GDACS") allows the impact of natural disasters to be assessed.²⁷

The loss of human life in the Asian tsunami might have been smaller, at least in the regions furthest removed from the epicentre, if early warning systems had been in place (disaster preparedness). Likewise, the physical and human damage caused by the Bam earthquake would have been less serious if buildings had complied with strict earthquake standards (disaster reduction). Landslides can be avoided by proper land-use planning (disaster prevention). In the **research field**, the Commission has organised a substantial number of meetings of specialists. A workshop on the danger of tidal waves in Europe has taken stock of progress and requirements in research into early warning systems. Another seminar on research into the impact of tidal waves and natural disasters has discussed the socio-economic implications of tsunamis. Calls for proposals under the research programmes are regularly linked to these aspects. Lastly, the Commission is coordinating the production of a study of early warning systems for tidal waves.

ECHO's disaster preparedness programme, known as "**DIPECHO**", financed more than 319 projects worldwide between 1996 and 2004, for a total budget of €78 million. It aims at training, capacity-building, awareness-raising, and the provision of early warning and planning and forecasting measures to civil society groups and to national and local authorities. As part of the response to the tsunami, for example, the Commission is helping to finance the early warning system in the region. It is also supporting the mainstreaming of disaster preparedness into development cooperation.

The Community Civil Protection Mechanism allows potential responses to disasters to be prepared. The mechanism is equipped with a database recording information on the available capacities of national civil protection authorities. Using this database the Member States can establish what kind of assistance is available through the mechanism before any emergency arises. This enables them to gain precious time in the event of an emergency, and to call on that assistance if they need it. In addition, knowing what help is available allows them to classify resources in order of priority at national level and to promote synergies and complementarity at Community level, thus raising the general level of protection throughout the EU. The mechanism also provides access to the content of the military database compiled by the EU Military Staff, which gives an overall view of the resources available to handle the consequences of disasters.

In recent months the Commission has been working on scenarios with a view to taking stock of the resources that each Member State is in a position to provide in the event of a serious terrorist attack in another Member State. All of these resources are included in the database. The exercise will enable Member States to determine what are the gaps and weaknesses in the European system of civil protection, and are an essential step on the road to greater interoperability of the available resources. This project should be extended to the other disasters, whether natural or not, which most strongly justify the mobilisation of civil protection resources.

The experts and project heads included in the database have been asked to take part in training programmes which include courses, exercises and exchanges of specialists. The Community has to ensure that once they are deployed the teams and resources can operate effectively together in line with the accepted standards and methodologies. More than 300 team heads and experts have so far attended courses organised as part of the Community mechanism. The Commission has also financed a number of simulations involving civil protection teams from different Member States with a view to ensuring that there is total interoperability between teams on the ground. The investments made in recent years in training, exercises and preparedness have made it possible effectively to mobilise civil protection resources in order to go to the assistance of disaster-hit countries inside and outside the EU.

27. See www.gdacs.org

28. In order to tackle trade in tropical timber linked to the financing of armed conflict, the EC has started implementing the 'Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade' programme, which includes a bilateral system for certifying exports of tropical timber from certain partner countries to the EU

A Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS) is also being operated in order to ensure effective sharing of information between the MIC and the national points of contact. Lastly, the Commission's civil protection unit is responsible for two civil protection programmes: the Civil Protection Action Programme and the marine pollution programme, which are intended to support and supplement the efforts deployed by the Member States for the protection of people, property, and hence the environment in the event of natural or technological disasters. They also seek to facilitate cooperation, the exchange of know-how and mutual assistance between the Member States in these areas.

→ Preparedness for public health crises

The **Health Emergency Operations Facility (HEOF)** is intended to provide information and data to give the Commission an overall view of pandemics and epidemics. It also seeks to facilitate communication between crisis managers in the 25 Member States, the associated countries, international health organisations and medical emergency professionals. Experience in its first two years suggests that it is important to expand the Community's capacity to react and preparedness for health emergencies, and to enable the Commission to play a role in the coordination of health emergencies and cross-border bio-terrorist attacks.

The Centre currently has two alert systems in operation, and a third under development:

- The Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) is used where there is a danger of a communicable disease (emergencies reported by the Member States via the crisis room and the communications centre).
- RAS-BICHAT is used for CBRN threats; it links the Health Security Committee to the Member States' contact points.
- RAS-CHEM is intended to link the EU's poison centres.

In 2006 the HEOF, which now has a specific budget allocation, will acquire new equipment and software so that it can:

- provide Member States with services helping them to better handle health problems, epidemics and bioterrorist attacks;
- provide the Commission with an overview of the health situation,
- build and share knowledge on handling health emergencies throughout Europe;
- assess the situation in emergencies and provide a basis for deciding whether to alert the "health community";
- align the activities of the EU health community with those of international bodies;
- enhance communication and the pooling of know-how between experts in different disciplines, Member States' organisations, the World Health Organisation and the other international organisations;
- coordinate the Member States' command and control activities during emergency operations at Community level.

→ Preventing conflict

Measures to prevent the use of **natural resources** to finance conflict are developing all the time. The European Community is a key contributor to the Kimberley Process, a multilateral initiative against conflict diamonds. It is now time to consolidate the achievements made so far by the Kimberley Process and to apply at least some aspects of the Kimberley Process to other high-risk resources, such as gold, coltan and timber.²⁸

The Kimberley Process: harnessing trade policy to preventing conflict

The Kimberley Process was launched in 2000 by a coalition of governments, NGOs and the diamond industry to tackle “conflict diamonds” – diamonds produced in conflict zones and used by rebel movements to finance their activities, as was the case during the civil wars in Angola, Sierra Leone and the DRC in the late 1990s. Since January 2003 the Kimberley Process has been operational as the Kimberley Process Certification System (KPCS). This multilateral trade instrument binds all participating countries (and the European Community, whose participation covers all EU Member States) to comply with common standards in the production and trading of rough diamonds, and in particular to make sure that every international shipment of diamonds is covered by a 'Kimberley certificate' attesting to its lawful provenance. The system is backed up by tight international controls and the possibility of disciplinary action in the event of serious breaches. The KPCS now covers almost all rough diamonds traded on the world market. Its benefits for countries like the DRC and Sierra Leone in terms of preventing conflict and building peace (through tighter control of the diamond industry) are uncontested, though considerable efforts are still needed to strengthen internal controls in many participating countries.

B. Responding to emergencies

An emergency response capacity is necessary to relieve human suffering. It primarily takes the form of *humanitarian aid* and may involve *civil protection* resources (in the event of, say, a natural disaster).

Emergency relief is aimed at providing food aid, access to water, field hospitals, tents for refugees, doctors, etc. Emergencies are not confined to natural disasters. They can include **natural disasters against the background of a long-running crisis**, as in the case of the flooding in southern Algeria that hit Sahrawi refugees, where ECHO has repeatedly intervened and where the Community Civil Protection Mechanism's Monitoring and Information Centre handled the delivery by air of additional aid during the emergency phase.

The emergency response is not therefore confined to the days and weeks immediately following a disaster. Its duration is determined by the conditions on the ground. After an earthquake, the need for field hospitals or water purification equipment can last for months if infrastructure has been destroyed.

→ ECHO

ECHO's machinery for responding to disasters has proved its worth on many occasions. This has been recognised by a good many evaluations and the reports of the Court of Auditors.

The round-the-clock monitoring system set up by ECHO and the flexible procedures for taking decisions in emergencies permit a very rapid response, even during holidays (e.g. the response to the Bam earthquake and the Tsunami). Since 2001 the Commission has had a fast-track decision-making procedure that enables it, pending the approval of financing decisions for larger amounts, to grant up to EUR 3 million to UN organisations, the Red Cross

and NGOs within 72 hours of a disaster. When the Tsunami struck, the initial EUR 3 million was made available the same day. In addition to its financial response, ECHO sends experts to the scene to coordinate matters and assess needs. 100 international experts are currently employed in 60 or so offices across the world, six of them regional offices with a rapid-reaction capability.

The emergency response to the earthquakes in Algeria, Iran, Morocco and Pakistan

ALGERIA: On 21 May 2004 an earthquake shook northern Algeria. To meet the basic humanitarian needs, the Commission, through ECHO, granted EUR 1 million to provide medical care, sanitation and temporary shelters. A further EUR 1 million was granted a few months later to help those still without shelter. The presence in Algiers of a full-time relief expert made the operation easier to coordinate. The Community Civil Protection Mechanism was activated the same day, resulting in the mobilisation of 19 civil protection teams, including search-and-rescue teams and field hospitals, and a team of EU coordinators.

IRAN: On 26 December 2003 the Bam earthquake claimed 30 to 40 000 victims. Despite the considerable resources fielded by the Iranian government and the country's Red Crescent Society, the scale of the earthquake was such that Iran appealed for international assistance. On 27 December the Commission granted EUR 2.3 million to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, UNICEF and NGOs to help provide emergency food aid, tents, a field hospital (which operated for 8 months), drinking water and sanitation, and logistical back-up (establishment of a telecommunications centre) for organisations working on the ground. Two experts were sent to coordinate activities with other donors, including the OCHA team. This emergency aid was followed six weeks later by a further grant of EUR 6.2 million. At the same time the Community Civil Protection Mechanism helped mobilise and coordinate 13 EU civil protection teams, including search-and-rescue and medical teams.

MOROCCO: On 24 February 2004 Morocco was hit by a major earthquake. The MIC, in coordination with the Presidency, rapidly established contact with the EU delegation in Morocco and the Moroccan mission to the EU. That evening the Moroccan authorities requested EU assistance via the MIC. The request for emergency assistance sent by the MIC to all countries involved in the Mechanism resulted in the dispatch of a number of search-and-rescue teams, medical aid and generators. At the same time, in close consultation with the Presidency, an EU coordination team was set up to coordinate the civil protection teams. ECHO also sent a relief expert to assess the situation. On 26 February Morocco was granted EUR 975 000 for medical aid, sanitation (provision of drinking water) and temporary shelters.

PAKISTAN: The EU showed solidarity by providing rapid and substantial aid. The amount and nature of the assistance granted reflects the scale of the need and the difficult terrain. Between 8 October, when the earthquake struck, and mid-December, EUR 48 million was mobilised in a number of tranches to cover emergency and subsequent needs. The emergency aid covered health, water and sanitation, the provision of tents, food, basic necessities and logistics (transport and telecommunications) and coordination. On the spot, the ECHO team already working in Pakistan was given more staff to assess needs, monitor the operations financed and help with coordination. The Community Civil Protection Mechanism supported and facilitated the mobilisation and coordination of twenty or so civil protection teams in the days following the disaster. To address the most pressing needs, the Mechanism also provided tents, plastic sheeting, blankets and mattresses. In consultation with the Presidency, an EU coordination team was set up.



→ The Community Civil Protection Mechanism

The Mechanism is recent (set up in 2001²⁹) and **simple in its working**, since it enables the resources and equipment available in the Member States to be pooled in the event of major disasters.³⁰ The Mechanism is not a financial instrument; it is geared to mobilising the existing resources (usually search-and-rescue equipment, medical services, temporary accommodation, sanitation equipment, etc.) needed to save lives and relieve suffering in the days immediately after a disaster. Civil protection operations also help protect the environment and property, including the cultural heritage, so helping reduce loss of life, the numbers of injured and material, economic and environmental damage.

The core of the Mechanism is the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC), which receives warnings and handles requests for assistance round the clock. The Mechanism operates both inside and outside the EU. It covers all Member States, the candidate countries and the countries of the European Economic Area. It therefore numbers 30 members: the 25 EU Member States, Bulgaria, Romania, Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland. It comprises an intervention/operations phase and a prevention/preparedness phase.

In the event of an emergency outside the EU, the Presidency-in-office handles diplomatic and political coordination. The Mechanism works in the same way as it would in an internal disaster. The country concerned must send a request for assistance to the MIC, which forwards that request to the Mechanism's member countries. The MIC then coordinates the means made available by the Member States on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, if the country affected by the disaster requests it, the MIC can mobilise and deploy small teams of experts within a few hours of the disaster. These teams can also assess specific needs on the spot, coordinate assistance operations and liaise with the competent authorities and international organisations involved (especially the UN). The MIC can also offer technical support, such as providing satellite pictures.

The pooling of means of transport ensures that all available assistance can be provided rapidly and cost-effectively. Cooperation at European level enables the Member States to avoid needless duplication of resources and increase the impact of Europe's collective response, so providing a practical expression of Europe's solidarity with Member States hit by disaster.

29. Council Decision 2001/792/EC.

30. Including search-and-rescue equipment, medical services, temporary shelters, etc.

Examples of recent civil protection operations

Five years after its creation, the Community Civil Protection Mechanism has proved that it can work well even in difficult circumstances.

On 29 August 2005 Hurricane Katrina struck Louisiana, hitting shore at Grand-Isle, 90 km south of New Orleans, at a speed of up to 200 km/h. Sweeping through New Orleans, it left a trail of wreckage and thousands of people homeless. In the space of 24 hours, almost 80% of the city was under water. The situation was made even worse by the general sanitary conditions and the lack of law and order. Fires also broke out in several parts of the city.

Informal contacts were immediately established with the United States, the Commission Delegation in Washington, the MIC and the UK Presidency. At 6.32 on Sunday 4 September, the United States made an official request for assistance to the MIC and the UK Presidency. The US government submitted its request via the Commission delegation in Washington. The European response was channelled through the Civil Protection Mechanism.

24 hours after the request for European assistance, the first planeload of emergency equipment sent by the Mechanism landed in the US. By the next day all EU Member States had offered specific, practical help: medical teams, high-volume pumps, ready meals, boats to provide shelter, etc.

The US request for assistance rounded off a year in which numerous demands were made on the Mechanism both inside and outside the EU. In South-East Asia, field hospitals were supplied, and rescue teams and medical experts dispatched. Slovakia and Germany sent pumps and generators, and Austria and Belgium sandbags, to flood-hit regions of Romania and Bulgaria. Water bombers from France and Italy, and helicopters from Germany and the Netherlands, were involved in fighting forest fires in Portugal. Following the earthquake in Pakistan, 25 of the countries involved in the Mechanism offered assistance in the form of food aid, blankets, medical teams, search-and-rescue teams, equipment or money. A number of search-and-rescue teams were deployed in the first stage of the operation.

Throughout all these emergencies, the Mechanism and its Monitoring and Information Centre played a crucial role in the dissemination of information from all agencies involved. This enabled the civil protection equipment available to be used to maximum effect in the places where aid was needed.

31. Annex 3 –
Rehabilitation and
reconstruction aid
for countries affected
by the tsunami

C. Preparing long-term action

This “consolidation” response builds on the previous stage economically and politically to pave the way for reconstruction. The aim is to identify upstream measures providing longer-term support for the emergency response.

The EU is providing a substantial contribution in regions in conflict (Afghanistan in 2002, Iraq in 2003) in terms both of relief and reconstruction. Its network of delegations (over 130 across the world) provides useful back-up for this effort. Reconstruction programmes also play a key role in supporting the crisis response, as was demonstrated by the Commission's recent contribution to tackling avian flu in Asia (EUR 80 million), and indeed by the response to the tsunami³¹ and the earthquake in Pakistan.

Humanitarian aid is extended and thereby serves to link relief, rehabilitation and development by tailoring its emergency programmes to supporting longer-term action.

Sectoral rules for emergencies have been developed, chief among them being the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) set up in 2001. It has enabled the EU to respond rapidly to the needs of a country gripped by political instability or suffering the effects of a disaster, in whatever part of the world, within six months of the start of an emergency. Today the RRM (and the stability instrument provided for in the future financial perspective) involves civilian operations (excluding humanitarian aid) to maintain or restore stability in emergencies or emerging crises. Such operations are also vital to the implementation of Community aid via assistance and cooperation programmes and policies. The Rapid Reaction Mechanism comprises both economic and political measures (including aid for rebuilding a state or for instituting democracy).

The Peace Facility for Africa, set up in May 2004, is one of the most innovative instrument of the EU's external action. It was created at the behest of Africa's leaders, who, at the July 2003 African Union summit in Maputo, asked the EU to establish an instrument in support of African leadership in the continent's peace and security. It enshrines the principles of ownership by Africa, solidarity and partnership between Africa and Europe. Based on the Cotonou Agreement,³² the Peace Facility has used EUR 250 million from the European Development Fund to promote security and development. Its strategy has been to support peacekeeping operations by African organisations. It has supported two operations in the Central African Republic (FOMUC) and three successive operations in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan (AMIS).

Darfur

The Darfur crisis broke out in February 2003 and rapidly developed into a complex military conflict and a major humanitarian disaster. In three years it has been the cause of about two million displaced persons and over 100 000 refugees in Chad and has claimed – estimates vary – from 200 000 to 400 000 lives.

The EU has been actively involved in the political and financial response to this crisis. It has combined a crisis-management approach with a broader approach, taking account of the changing structure of power, resources and influence in Sudan and the regional and international dimension.

The political solution to the Darfur crisis is a crucial factor in the success of the comprehensive peace agreement signed in January 2005, so ending over 20 years of North-South conflict. The EU's political response was based on a fundamental partnership with the African Union, supporting its leadership on the ground and at the Abuja negotiations. Since January 2004 the EU and its Member States have provided the African Union with substantial support to stabilise the situation in Darfur. This support was a key factor in the Abuja talks, the ceasefire commission and the planning support, equipment and funding provided for the AMIS missions. It is also visible in the appointment of Mr Pekka Haavisto as EU Special Representative for Sudan in July 2005.

To permit an emergency relief operation, the parties to the conflict signed a ceasefire on 8 April after talks sponsored in N'Djamena by the government of Chad. An African Union mission (AMIS) began by deploying 120 ceasefire monitors and has now reached a strength of 7600 soldiers.

Since 2003 the EU has distributed humanitarian aid (through ECHO) and food aid, primarily for refugees fleeing Darfur for neighbouring Chad. Darfur has accounted for almost 70% of all humanitarian and food aid to Sudan, which in 2005 amounted to about EUR 118.5 million.

Lastly, when the response to a crisis has a *foreign policy dimension*, the EU responds in the framework of the civilian ESDP and via the *Rapid Reaction Mechanism*. Civilian crisis management is a recent addition to the EU's external action but it has quickly established itself as a fixture alongside more traditional aspects of external relations such as development, trade and the environment. Since the first civilian crisis-management operation (EU police mission in Bosnia) on 1 January 2003, the number of missions has grown steadily (one in 2003, six in 2004 and 12 in 2005). These missions are currently focused on Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans. A mission has also been launched with a view to supporting the peace process in Indonesia.

32. Article 11 on "Peace-building policies, conflict prevention and resolution"

Aceh

EU action in Aceh is an example of the continuity and coherence of the EU's action through the successive phases of a crisis: emergency, crisis management and reconstruction. It also illustrates the **great potential of the instruments available to the EU** when managing crises and settling conflicts. Thus, on 26 December 2004, the EU's response to the tsunami combined elements of **emergency humanitarian aid and civil protection**. And this EU commitment continued throughout 2005, combining **medium- and long-term reconstruction programmes**³³ with a **political response**, in full recognition of the need and advisability of supporting a peace process between the GAM rebels in Aceh province and the Indonesian government. The EU's action in Aceh is exemplified not just by the reconstruction works scheduled over a period of years but by political support to stabilise the province, such stabilisation being a precondition for any lasting reconstruction.

The **political response** provided in this instance is an example of a "cross-pillar" response to a post-conflict/post-disaster situation that has been well coordinated by the EU institutions:

a) Starting in April 2005, the Commission, through the **Rapid Reaction Mechanism**, supported President Ahtisaari's efforts to mediate during the talks between the Indonesian government and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). These negotiations led the parties to sign a memorandum on 15 August 2005.

b) In July 2005, the Indonesian authorities asked the EU to help the country implement the final agreement between the parties. A similar request was made to five ASEAN countries. A **civilian crisis-management operation (the Aceh Monitoring Mission or AMM)** was launched by the Council. The six-month operation started on 15 September and involved 230 monitors from the EU and the ASEAN countries concerned. Its mandate covers supervising the withdrawal and destruction of weapons, the demobilisation of combatants, the withdrawal of government troops and aspects connected with the conversion of GAM into a political party. This mandate was recently extended to 15 June 2006, to cover the period up to the local elections.

c) **Community instruments** are also helping secure peace in Aceh in the long term, not just through post-tsunami reconstruction programmes (about EUR 350 million over five years) but by programmes focusing more directly on governance and institutional reforms. The Commission has introduced the following measures aimed at supporting the peace process in the medium and long term (about EUR 25 million over three years):

- ➔ assistance for the reintegration of former prisoners and combatants and for local communities affected by the conflict (Rapid Reaction Mechanism and aid for displaced persons)
- ➔ support for the preparation of local elections (assistance programme for Asia and Latin America – ALA)
- ➔ support for local governance (ALA)
- ➔ support for the rule of law and human rights (ALA).

There are also plans for an **EU election observer mission** to monitor the first local elections.

INDONESIA BANDA ACEH



IKONOS – January 10, 2003
PRE-DISASTER IMAGE



IKONOS – December 29, 2004
POST-DISASTER IMAGE

33. See Annex 3 – Rehabilitation and reconstruction aid for countries affected by the tsunami

The future: a better assessment of needs

1. Improving the EU's crisis response

This first requires work to be done within the European Union. As regards our response to external crises, the Commission Communication of 20 April 2005³⁴ gave **an overall analysis of the method** to be followed based on three simple ideas: **improving the coordination** of crisis response, **improving the mission launch phase** and **creating a specific financial instrument for crisis response outside the EU** (with the exception of humanitarian aid, which has its own instrument). Since then, specific action has been taken, although some measures are still being implemented.

In addition to this methodological analysis, we also need a complete needs assessment.

A needs assessment would enable the **United Nations**, which coordinates the international humanitarian response, to **have precise information on European capability** in the event of an emergency humanitarian response. It would enable **the UN's existing capability to be supplemented** (in particular for industrial/environmental risks). Lastly, it would allow progress to be made in terms of **more rapid deployment**.

2. Civil protection response: what is needed?

Emergency responses to this type of crisis are first and foremost a problem of capacity. At present, pooling of resources takes place only on an ad hoc basis. Each Member State decides on a case-by-case and voluntary basis whether it is able to provide the civil protection resources requested or not. This system means that the speed with which European assistance can be deployed depends on the national decision-making processes in the 25 Member States.

To move from a case-by-case response to a pooling of resources for civil protection, units available for Community operations would have to be identified or set up. Member States could be invited to choose from a list of proposed needs and to indicate which resources could be made available in an emergency. They could agree to keep a small number of main units permanently in reserve for European civil protection operations. This would ensure that a few main units were available and ready to intervene at any moment, and would significantly reduce the time needed to mobilise civil protection resources. Such units would need to be able to deploy rapidly and be totally autonomous. The interoperability of these units, which would be at the heart of any European civil protection operation and would form the effective core of a European civil protection force, should be developed through joint exercises and training.

Should the resources declared in this way by the Member States be judged insufficient, the gaps should be filled by way of solutions allowing access to additional resources (such as large multi-purpose aircraft, mobile field hospitals, high-capacity pumps, etc.) to boost the EU's ability to act. This approach is a necessary precondition for the Community to be able to respond at any time to a request for assistance from one of its Member States or from a third country, even if the national resources of the other Member States are insufficient or unavailable. It would provide additional protection and security such as cannot be guaranteed by the Member States acting individually.

It would also allow the Member States to account for the possibility of EU-wide assistance in their national planning, to prioritise resources and to ensure that the EU response is more cost-effective. It would enable them:

- to benefit from economies of scale and avoid excessive costs;
- to ensure that a minimum level of assistance can be available at any time and deployed rapidly;

34. Reinforcing EU Disaster and Crisis Response in Third Countries

→ to give practical effect to the Council's undertaking to provide mutual assistance in a spirit of solidarity and its desire to create a Community rapid reaction capability;

→ within the EU, to provide a safety net so that each Member State can count, if needed, on voluntary civil protection assistance from the other Member States to boost its national reaction capability.

Based on past experience of the Community civil protection mechanism, we can identify **five scenarios** for which requests for assistance are highly likely and for which the added value of closer cooperation at European level is undeniable:

→ **Floods:** this category covers various flood scenarios, including coastal and inland floods across a wide territory and several countries. They destroy infrastructure and homes and require the evacuation of thousands of people and the supply of first aid to thousands of others. Outside the EU, the following bodies are likely to deploy in emergencies: the United Nations, the Red Cross, NGOs and possibly NATO. Through ECHO, the European Commission would also take part in the response.

→ **Forest fires:** this scenario includes all types of forest fire, especially active forest fires across a wide territory supporting mass tourism. They affect hundreds of thousands of hectares, causing severe damage to the environment and to property. And they also isolate holiday camps and villages.

→ **Earthquakes:** this scenario comprises earthquakes (and possibly tsunamis) with the following features: earthquakes with a force of at least 6 on the Richter scale in a densely populated area; almost total destruction of the major towns; massive loss of human life and large numbers injured; major requirements in terms of food, water, blankets and tents; and destruction of the local health system.

→ **Industrial accidents/CBRN attacks:** involving the dispersion of dangerous chemical substances, radioactive substances or viral or bacteriological organisms.

→ **Marine pollution accidents:** this scenario involves a major oil slick from an oil tanker carrying over 10 000 tonnes of oil in very poor weather conditions and which is likely to have a significant environmental and socio-economic impact along the coasts of several Member States.

The table opposite shows the key elements which should form the basis of the EU's response to requests for civil protection assistance. Whenever the EU responds to a disaster, it should be able to count on the availability of these key elements. This is an average hypothesis, based on past experience of the Community civil protection mechanism. These resources would not suffice in the event of an exceptionally serious disaster or very specific types of emergency. Instead, they correspond to a reasonable working basis for an appropriate Community response to the five scenarios identified above.

NEED	Relevant in the following scenarios	Type of equipment/personnel required to address the need	Operational readiness ³⁵ (in hours)	Average/estimated team size	Minimum quantity required to ensure a credible European response
1. Pumping and drainage	Flood	• Medium / high capacity pumps (equipment and personnel)	12	15	15
2. Water sanitation and purification of drinking water	Flood/CBRN	• Water sanitation unit (equipment and personnel)	12	20	10
3. Emergency medical care	All	• Emergency medical assistance teams • Field hospitals (as defined by WHO ³⁶)	6 6	15-25 25-35	20 10 ³⁷
4. Aeromedical evacuation ³⁸	All	• Medevac aircraft (staffed)	6	25	10 ³⁹
5. Aerial fire fighting	Forest fires	• Water bomber aircraft (staffed)	12	3-5	10
6. Search and rescue	Earthquakes	• USAR team	6	25-35	10
7. Public mass decontamination	CBRN	• CBRN decontamination teams	6	25	40 ⁴⁰
8. Oil recovery	Oil spills	• Oil recovery vessels	12	10-20	4 (EMSA)
9. Aerial transport	All	• Strategic air lift capacity (long distance) to transport assistance from EU to affected country • Mass evacuation of European citizens • Cargo and medium lift helicopters for local transport (access to remote areas, etc.)	6 6 6	3-5 5 3	10 10 5
10. Disaster victim identification	All	• DVI teams (incl. forensic pathologists, forensic dentists and fingerprint-experts)	12	4-10	5

35. This is the time from notification until readiness for departure

36. The WHO defines field hospitals as "mobile self-contained and self-sufficient facilities (tents, inflatable or containerized modules) with 10 or more beds, one or more operating rooms and basic laboratory and diagnostic facilities including mobile X-ray"

37. The minimum guaranteed treatment capacity would therefore be in the range of 100 patients at any time

38. Aeromedical evacuation is defined as the movement of patients under medical supervision to and between medical treatment facilities by air transportation

39. This should ensure an estimated minimum medevac capacity of 250 patients at any time

40. Estimated capacity of 30 persons per hour per team; each unit can operate for maximum 6 hours

3. Humanitarian response: what is needed?

The humanitarian aid managed by the Commission has established itself as part of the Union's overall response to the crises, conflicts and development problems encountered in third countries. The link with development policy was first made downstream, by linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD). Upstream, preparedness for disasters has mainly been financed by the humanitarian budget but also by raising awareness in other Commission departments so that this dimension is taken into account.

On the basis of the experience gained, the EU response can still be improved by:

→ **boosting ECHO's capacity to send a sufficient number of experts with the proper training to a new theatre of operations.** A special effort has been made in this area by increasing the number of experts and having them attend United Nations and Red Cross rapid response training (UNDAC and FACT). This effort needs to be continued, even though it has already borne fruit (for example in Pakistan in October 2005).

→ **following a needs-based approach:** events such as the Asian tsunami prompt a large wave of generosity from private and public donors. Unfortunately, disasters and other crises do not as a rule receive the same media coverage and response. The Commission's role is to ensure that humanitarian aid arrives wherever it is needed and to alert the Member States and other donors to forgotten crises.

→ **improving coordination:** this is an imperative at all stages in a crisis. However, it is during the emergency phase that coordination is most necessary and most difficult. This is due not only to realities on the ground, but also to the speed at which action has to be set in motion, the large number of actors involved, the absence of a strong coordinating body, and the temptation of the different actors involved to boost their political and media profile. These shortcomings can be mitigated in two ways: first by ensuring that the coordinating body (the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) is capable of performing the task and that its authority is recognised by the various actors. Second by preparing actors (humanitarian organisations, donors, United Nations bodies, civil protection teams, the military, national authorities) in advance through awareness and training programmes and by establishing practical modes of operation.

→ **improving the response by humanitarian operators:** the Commission does not intervene directly but finances action by UN agencies, the Red Cross and NGOs. However, as an active donor, the Commission supports these organisations by giving them the means to act, for example by financing logistical support (transport, telecommunications) and the pre-positioning of emergency supplies. The possibility of increasing such support should be examined.

The table opposite gives an indication of the types of disasters we face. The initial response always comes from the local authorities and local people and organisations. In an earthquake, it is often the local teams, rather than the international ones, that save the most lives. To improve the humanitarian response, **one fundamental aspect, then, is to strengthen the capacity of local bodies to deal with disasters themselves.**

Logistics is probably the most important aspect in a crisis and the aspect that is most dependent on the specific circumstances of any given disaster. Here, too, the **international humanitarian response would be easier if the products needed were nearby: local or regional stocks.**

As regards transport, the key is not only the speed with which resources are mobilised **but above all how close they are to the scene.** Thus, in a scenario where access is difficult or where it proves necessary to use military resources, how close these resources are is a crucial factor (example: in the Pakistan earthquake, where the military resources were in Afghanistan).

	TYPE OF DISASTER	TYPE OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY NEEDS	AVERAGE DURATION OF EMERGENCY INTERVENTION	ELEMENTS THAT COULD FACILITATE A RESPONSE TO NEEDS	EXISTING CAPACITIES
1	Earthquake, tsunami	A. Medical aid, shelter, domestic products, water and sanitation B. Food aid	6 months	Prepositioning of nonfood products such as tents and blankets in the vicinity	Red Cross family mobile hospitals and water and sanitation modules. Emergency medical stocks with several organisations
2	Floods and landslides	A. Shelter, domestic products, water and sanitation B. Medical aid, food aid	6 months	Prepositioning of nonfood products such as tents and blankets in the vicinity	Red Cross family and water and sanitation modules
3	Tropical storms	A. Shelter, domestic products, medical aid, water and sanitation B. Food aid	6 months	Prepositioning of nonfood products such as tents and blankets in the vicinity	Red Cross family and water and sanitation modules
4	Epidemics	A. Medical aid (vaccination)	3 months	Prior agreements with vaccine producers	
5	Volcanic eruptions	A. Medical aid, water and sanitation B. Shelter, food aid, domestic products	3 months		Red Cross family and water and sanitation modules
6	Drought (famine)	A. Food aid, nutritional aid, medical aid, water and sanitation B. Shelter, domestic products	6 to 12 months	Prepositioning of special supplies such as HPB (highprotein biscuits)	
7	Conflicts: local population	A. Food aid, nutritional aid, medical aid, water and sanitation, domestic products B. Shelter, mine clearance	6 months after stabilisation of the situation	Prepositioning of nonfood products in the vicinity	Red Cross family mobile hospitals and water and sanitation modules. Emergency medical stocks with several organisations
8	Conflicts: refugees and internally displaced persons	A. Food aid, nutritional aid, medical aid, water and sanitation, domestic products, shelter B. Mine clearance	6 months after stabilisation of the situation	Prepositioning of nonfood products in the vicinity	Red Cross family mobile hospitals and water and sanitation modules. Emergency medical stocks with several organisations

4. Response to political crises: what is needed?

In the light of the experience gained in the five years of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism's existence and the twelve civilian crisis management operations currently under way, improving the response to some of the threats cited in the European Security Strategy calls for **optimum coordination between the civilian ESDP and the Community instruments**. The civilian ESDP has added a significant **political dimension** to the European Union's external relations in recent years. This action should be supported using the Community instruments.

There needs to be an assessment of the choice of instruments used by the European Union to respond to crises of this type, centred around a combination of the following elements:

→ **the semi-governmental nature or the executive aspect of the mission**, as in the case of semi-governmental missions or missions with an executive aspect – for instance the mission to reform the security sector in the DRC (EUSEC DRC) or the police mission for the Palestinian Territories (EU POL COPPS).

→ **the launch capacity in real time**: ESDP missions are EU missions launched in real time (with the Political and Security Committee – PSC – providing week-to-week political leadership): a) the staff for civilian crisis management operations come from public authorities (magistrates, police officers, etc.); b) staff are available and can be deployed at short notice under the authority of an EU head of mission; c) joint actions ordering the deployment of an operation are taken in record time; d) these missions are managed directly by an EU head of mission; e) the results of these missions can be evaluated within a year and sometimes after six months, as the operations are short.

→ **managing the political risk**: the Political and Security Committee corresponds to the degree of political risk associated with the operations. It is composed of ambassadors from the Member States answering directly to their national governments and thus represents the most appropriate risk-management instrument possible in view of the political environment in which operations are carried out.

Operations in countries with special political and security conditions can be run only in **close cooperation** with the Member States.

The crisis platform recently set up in the European Commission's Directorate-General for External Relations is working closely with the Member States and the Council's General Secretariat to draw up consistent approaches in civilian crisis management.

Set up on 1 February 2006, it is working on:

→ **creating effective EU instruments to respond to political crises**. It is thus seeking to speed up the start-up phase of ESDP missions (in financial and logistical terms) to allow faster on-the-spot deployment of EU missions. It is also working with the Council's General Secretariat, which is seeking to create joint EU situation evaluation teams. These efforts are to be backed up by joint training, so as to boost the EU's effectiveness even further.

→ **devising and implementing crisis responses**. The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (and the future stability instrument) is one of the instruments that could be mobilised to **respond to crises**.

→ **one of the major issues in the coming years** will also be to mobilise the European Commission's delegations abroad so as to gear them better to respond to crises.

5. Assistance for European citizens: what is needed?

- **Before a crisis**, information must be provided for citizens on the procedures to be followed in the event of a crisis in a country outside the EU. An information campaign for a targeted audience should be organised in airports and other targeted sites (travel agencies, tour operators, press, etc.).
- **Training schemes and information updates for members of consular teams**, for example on the legal bases and international conventions applicable, on procedures for operations, on identification of persons, on-the-spot inquiries and cooperation with local authorities, international transport contracts (for the repatriation of survivors).
- There should be an **exchange of information** between consular teams on procedures for the transport of victims in compliance with the applicable conventions; on the rules for the issue of visas; on travel documents and laissez-passer, the protection of long-term residents; and on public health rules (international conventions) in the event of pandemics and return via the external EU frontier.
- Lastly the **Commission delegations** could provide practical and logistical support, for example by accompanying EU representatives to meetings with the government and local authorities; by helping to establish contacts between teams and the police, hospitals, etc.; by playing a part in updating evacuation plans to ensure that teams are covered; by liaising with the Monitoring and Information Centre of the Community Civil Protection Mechanism. The Centre can provide operational assistance through its network linking the Member States round the clock, especially by exchanging information on the Member States' needs in terms of victim-identification, repatriation and medical-evacuation teams.





Annexes

Annex 1- Mission statement

Wolfgang Schäussel
President
of the European Council

José Manuel Barroso
President
of the European Commission

2/209 30 -01- 2006

Vienna and Brussels, January 2006

Excellency,

We would like to invite you to undertake a study of the European Unions role in responding to crises with a particular focus on consular assistance during disasters and other similar emergency situations in third countries. Such a contribution would make the added value of the EU visible to European citizens and would therefore provide also a concrete contribution to the concept of "citizenship of the European Union".

Tragedies like the Asian Tsunami have revealed that this is an area where our citizens would strongly support a bigger and more visible role for the Union. Solidarity, protection and assistance are particularly important under those most challenging situations that can exceed the capacities of individual Member States to deal with them rapidly, efficiently and comprehensively.


Specifically, the mandate that we have in mind for your work is to develop options and recommendations for the possible further development of EU capabilities in terms of coordination and cooperation and in order to ensure a coherent and visible EU presence. The aim should be to build on what already exists, based on the work done in the action plan developed in the post-Tsunami period. In conducting this work, we would naturally expect you to work closely with the relevant actors in the Commission and the Council Secretariat as well as the competent authorities in Member States, the European Parliament and other internal and external stakeholders.

You should aim to complete your report by May 2006 in view of the report of the Austrian Presidency for the European Council of June 2006.

The European Commission would envisage appointing you as a Special Advisor to the President for the purposes of this work.

Yours sincerely,


Wolfgang SCHÜSSEL


José Manuel BARROSO

HE Mr. Michel Barnier
5, rue des grands Augustins
F-75006 Paris

Annex 2 - European Union instruments

Regulation	ECHO	Food Security	Uprooted People	Rehabilitation	NGO Co-financing	EIDHR	Mine Action	Civil Protection	MEDA	TACIS	CARDS	ALA	EDF	RRM
Action														
Eligible regions	All	All	Asia, Latin America	All except SE Europe	All developing	All	All	All	Mediterranean	Europe Central Asia	SE Europe	Asia, Latin America	Africa, Pacific Caribbean	All
Humanitarian Aid	✓	✓	✓					✓					✓	✓
Food Aid	✓	✓	✓										✓	✓
Food security		✓											✓	✓
Securing the livelihoods and safety of refugees/ refugee return	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓		✓	✓
Civilian emergency assistance			✓	✓				✓				✓	✓	✓
Mine action	✓			✓			✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓
Rehabilitation			✓								✓	✓	✓	✓
Reconstruction				✓							✓	✓	✓	✓
Infrastructure development									✓	✓	✓		✓	✓
Economic development									✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Budgetary support									✓			✓	✓	
Consolidation of democracy					✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Rule of law					✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Inst, legal and regulatory framework					✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Human rights					✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Elections						✓					✓		✓	✓
Conflict Prevention						✓					✓		✓	✓
Customs/Border management				✓					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Annex 3 - Rehabilitation and reconstruction aid for countries affected by the tsunami

EU GRANT ASSISTANCE	PLEGGED (GRANTS)	COMMITTED IN 2005	% COMMITMENTS VS. PLEDGES	DISBURSED AS TO NOV 2005	% DISBURSEMENTS VS. COMMITMENTS
Commission	350.000.000	169.215.000	48%	75.675.516	45%
Austria	44.000.000	16.662.309	38%	7.167.187	43%
Belgium	15.000.000	7.600.000	51%	12.050.000	159%
Cyprus	309.289	309.289	100%	274.009	89%
Czech Republic	8.000.000	6.300.000	79%		
Denmark	29.600.000	30.834.000	104%	19.572.900	63%
Finland	30.000.000	14.320.000	48%	3.700.000	26%
France	23.000.000	25.000.000	109%	24.000.000	96%
Germany	457.444.300	222.000.000	49%	76.250.000	34%
Greece	11.500.430	11.500.000	100%	700.000	6%
Hungary	16.172.000	1.133.796	7%	1.150.000	101%
Ireland	10.935.000	10.950.465	100%	9.690.965	88%
Italy	115.000.000	75.000.000	65%	31.700.000	42%
Luxembourg	3.700.000	3.700.000	100%	1.003.000	27%
Malta	1.060.000	1.060.000	100%	470.000	44%
Netherlands	237.609.411	184.805.809	78%	64.022.264	35%
Poland	400.000	247.000	62%	247.000	100%
Portugal	8.000.000	5.058.112	63%	3.000.000	59%
Slovakia	256.000	256.000	102%	196.000	77%
Slovenia	284.000	284.000	100%	284.000	100%
Spain	11.626.000	10.958.000	94%	1.365.000	12%
Sweden	32.000.000	43.313.000	135%	11.935.000	28%
United Kingdom	64.908.000	61.700.000	95%	22.430.000	36%
TOTAL	1.470.804.430	902.206.780	61%	366.882.841	41%

Annex 4 - List of interviews

I - European institutions

Council of the European Union

Mr Javier SOLANA, Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union/High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

Mr Pierre de BOISSIEU, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union – Deputy Secretary-General

Mr Gijds de VRIES, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union - Coordinator for the fight against terrorism

Mr Robert COOPER, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union – Director-General for External Economic Relations, Politico-Military Affairs

General PERRUCHE, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union - Director-General of the European Union Military Staff

Mr William SHAPCOTT, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union - Director of the Joint Situation Centre of the European Union

Mr Patrice BERGAMINI, Member of the office of Secretary-General /High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

Ms Cesira D'ANIELLO, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union – Head of the Coordination Unit, Assistant to the Director-General

European Parliament

Mr Elmar BROK, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament

European Commission

Mr Jacques BARROT, Vice-President of the Commission, Commissioner with responsibility for transport

Mr Franco FRATTINI, Vice-President of the Commission, Commissioner with responsibility for justice, freedom and security

Ms Benita FERRERO-WALDNER, Commissioner with responsibility for external relations and European neighbourhood policy

Mr Louis MICHEL, Commissioner with responsibility for development and humanitarian aid

Mr Stavros DIMAS, Commissioner with responsibility for the environment

Mr José CUTILEIRO, Special Adviser to the President of the Commission

Mr Joao VALE DE ALMEIDA, Chef de cabinet to Mr Barroso, President of the European Commission

Mr Fernando ANDRESEN GUIMARAES, Member of the office of Mr Barroso, President of the European Commission

Mr Patrick CHILD, Chef de cabinet to Ms Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner with responsibility for external relations and European neighbourhood policy

Mr Benoît LE BRET, Chef de Cabinet to Mr Barrot, Vice-President of the Commission, Commissioner with responsibility for transport

Mr Eneko LANDABURU, Director-General, Directorate-General for External Relations

Mr Antonio CAVACO, Director-General, Humanitarian Aid, European Commission

Mr Jonathan FAULL, Director-General, Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security

Mr Peter CARL, Director-General, Directorate-General for the Environment

Mr Stefano SANNINO, Director, Crisis Platform and Policy Coordination in CFSP, Directorate-General for External Relations

Mr Thierry DE SAINT MAURICE, Director, External Service, Directorate-General for External Relations

Mr Paul WEISSENBERG, Director, Aerospace, Security, Defence and Equipment, Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry

Mr Ulrich KNUEPPEL, Adviser, Directorate-General for External Relations

Mr Philippe WILLAERT, Adviser, Directorate-General for External Relations

European Commission Delegations/Representations

Mr Fernando VALENZUELA, Head of the European Commission Delegation to the United Nations in New York

Mr Reijo KEMPPINEN, Head of the European Commission Representation in the United Kingdom

Mr Gerhard SABATHIL, Head of the European Commission Representation in Germany

Ms May Ann RAMSAY, Deputy Head of the European Commission Representation in Sweden

Mr Charles-Michel GEURTS, European Commission Delegation to the United Nations in New York

II - Member States of the European Union

Germany

Mr Wolfgang SCHAÜBLE, Federal Minister for the Interior

Mr Reinhard SILBERBERG, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Mr Peter ALTMAIER, Member of the German Parliament, Parliamentary State Secretary in the Federal Ministry for the Interior

Federal Ministry for the Interior

Mr Joachim STEIG, Director, Internal Security Department

Mr Lothar FREISCHLADER, Diplomatic Adviser to the Federal Minister for the Interior

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Mr Peter TEMPEL, Director, European Affairs Department

Mr Dr. Heinz-Peter BEHR, Director, Crisis Centre

Austria

Ms Ursula PLASSNIK, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs

Ms Liese PROKOP, Federal Minister for the Interior

Ministry for the Interior

Ms Barbara FISCHER, Member of the Minister's Office

Mr Peter WIDERMANN, Deputy Director-General, Civil Protection, President SCIFA

Ms Doris ITA, Head of Unit, Civil Protection

Ms Petra UNTERWEGER, Civil Protection

Ms Karin ZETTELMANN, Civil Protection

Ms Susanne KLEIN, International Affairs

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Mr Thomas OBERREITER, Member of the Minister's Office

Mr Johannes KYRLE, Ambassador, Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs

Ms Elisabeth TICHY-FISSELBERGER, Ambassador, Deputy Director-General for Economic and European Affairs, Head of the Directorate for Institutional Questions

Mr Wolfgang PAUL, Ambassador, Head of the Directorate for Consular Affairs

Mr Peter LAUNSKY-TIEFFENTHAL, Minister Plenipotentiary, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Mr Karl PRUMMER, Department for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Head of Unit, European Security Policy

Ms Kathrin BLANCK-PUTZ, Department for the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Mr Franz HÖRLBERGER

Permanent Representation of Austria to the European Union

Mr Gregor WOSCHNAGG, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Austria to the European Union, President of the Permanent Representatives Committee

Ms Jutta EDTHOFER, Second Secretary, Permanent Representation of Austria to the European Union

Denmark

Permanent Representation of Denmark to the European Union

Mr Jorgen A. GAMMELGAARD, Deputy Representative on the Political and Security Committee

Finland

Permanent Representation of Finland to the European Union

Mr Teemu TANNER, Ambassador, Representative of Finland on the Political and Security Committee

Ms Miia ARO-SANCHEZ, Second Secretary, Coordinator Political and Security Committee (Nicolaidis)

Ms Henriika LEPO, Permanent Representation of Finland to the European Union, Legal Affairs

Ms Tuula TURUNEN, Permanent Representation of Finland to the European Union, Counsellor

France

Mr Nicolas SARKOZY, Minister for the Interior and Regional Planning

Ms Catherine COLONNA, Minister with responsibility for European Affairs

Ministry for the Interior and Regional Planning

Mr David MARTINON, Adviser on foreign affairs, Member of the Office of Mr Nicolas Sarkozy, Minister for the Interior and Regional Planning

Mr Gérard COURTOIS, Adviser on civil security, Member of the Office of Mr Nicolas Sarkozy, Minister for the Interior and Regional Planning

Mr Christian GALLIARD DE LAVERNEE, Director, Defence and Civil Security (DDSC)

Mr Didier LOPINOT, Head of mission, International and European Affairs

Mr Philippe OTT, Chargé de mission, International and European Affairs

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Mr Jean-Louis FALCONI, Head of service, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Mr Gilles BRIATTA, Director, European Cooperation

Mr Philippe SETTON, Deputy Director, General Affairs and Future of the Union

Permanent Representation of France to the European Union

Mr Pierre SELLAL, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France to the European Union

Ms Christine ROGER, Ambassador, Representative of France on the Political and Security Committee

Mr Jérôme MONTANT, Counsellor, Permanent Representation of France on the Political and Security Committee of the European Union

Mr Erkki MAILLARD, Permanent Representation of France on the Political and Security Committee of the European Union

Mr François-Xavier BOURGES, Counsellor, Justice and Home Affairs

Italy

Mr Gianfranco FINI, Minister for Foreign Affairs
Mr Gianni LETTA, State Secretary, Prime Minister's Office

Prime Minister's Office – Department of Civil Protection

Dott. Guido BERTOLASO, Head of Department
Dott. Agostino MIOZZO, Director, Bureau of International Relations
Dott. Alessandro BARISICH, Senior Adviser for International Affairs
Dott.ssa Elvira CASTELLANO, Responsible for European questions

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Ambassador Paolo PUCCI di BENISICHI, Secretary-General
Ambassador Ferdinando NELLI FEROCI, Director-General for European Integration
Mr Luca GIANANTI, European Correspondant, Coordinator for the CFSP and the ESDP
Ms Elisabetta BELLONI, Responsible for the Crisis Unit

Luxembourg

M. Jean-Louis SCHILTZ, Ministre de la Coopération et de la Défense

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Mr Marc BICHLER, Director for Development Cooperation

United Kingdom

Mr Douglas ALEXANDER, Minister of State for Europe

Cabinet Office

Mr Kim DARROCH, Prime Minister's European Policy Adviser and Head of Secretariat
Ms Catherine DAY, Desk-officer, EU external relations in the Secretariat
Mr Pete ROSE, Secretariat for Defence

Foreign Office

Mr Paul SIZELAND, Director, Consular Directorate. Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Mr David FITTON, Head, Consular Crisis Group
Mr Bruce MANN, Head, Civil Contingencies Secretariat
Mr Peter TALANTIRE, Director, Evaluation, Commitments and Legislation
Ms Charlotte VAN BAAK, Diplomat

Department for International Development (DFID)

Mr Jim DRUMMOND, Director, United Nations, Conflict and Humanitarian Division
Mr Jack JONES, United Nations, Conflict and Humanitarian Division

Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom to the European Union

Mr Vincent DEVINE, Adviser CFSP & ESDP, Deputy Representative on the Political and Security Committee

Sweden

Ms Leni BJÖRKLUND, Minister for Defence
Mr Hans DAHLGREN, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs

Ministry for Defence

Mr Johan RAEDER, Director, Head of Department for International Affairs and Security Policy
Mr Olle JONSSON, Director, International Relations, Department for Civil Affairs
Ms Susanna LIF, Political adviser
Mr Lennart JOHANSSON, Senior expert

Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Mr Fredrik JÖRGENSEN, Deputy Director-General, Head of the Department for Consular Affairs and Civil Law
Ms Charlotte WRANGBERG, Director, Department for Consular Affairs and Civil Law
Mr Tommy ANDERSSON, European Coordinator, Department for Consular Affairs and Civil Law
Mr Carl-Magnus HYLTEINIUS, Director-General for Consular Affairs
Mr Fredrik JÖRGENSEN, Deputy Director-General, Head of the Department for Consular Affairs and Civil Law

Embassy of Sweden to France

Mr Frank BELFRAGE, Sweden's Ambassador in Paris
Ms Anna HAMMARGREN, Minister Plenipotentiary

Permanent Representation of Sweden to the European Union

Ms Pia ÖVELIUS, Counsellor, Defence
Mr Björn LYRVALL, Ambassador, Representative of Sweden on the Political and Security Committee

III - Third countries

Canada

Mr Shawn BARBER, Director, Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Group
Ms Elissa GOLBERG, Director, Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Response Group
Ms Wendy GILMOUR, Director, Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Group
Mr Kevin O'SHEA, Minister-Counsellor, Deputy Head of the Mission of Canada to the European Union
Ms Catherine BOUCHER, First Secretary, Political Affairs, Mission of Canada to the European Union.

IV - United Nations Organisation

Ms Margareta WAHLSTROM, Assistant Under-Secretary-General, Humanitarian Affairs, Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Mr Wolfgang WEISBROD-WEBER, Director, Europe and Latin America, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
Ms Louise FRECHETTE, Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations

V - Red Cross

Professor Jean-François MATTEI, President of the French Red Cross
Mr Antoine PEIGNEY, Director, International Relations and Operations
Mr Luc HENSKENS, Director, Red Cross/EU Office

VI - Institute for Security Studies

Ms Nicole GNESOTTO, Director, Institute for Security Studies

VII - European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control

Ms Zsuzsanna JAKAB, Director of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control

Prof. Johan GIESECKE, Head, Unit for Scientific Advice

Dr. Denis COULOMBIER, Head, Unit for Preparedness and Response

Dr. Andrea AMMON, Head, Unit for Surveillance and Communication

VIII - European Space Agency

Mr Jean-Jacques DORDAIN, Director-General

Ms Claudie HAIGNERE, Former Minister responsible for research and the new technologies and former Minister responsible for European Affairs

I would also like to thank the members of the informal group I set up within the European Commission and who provided me with their advice and expert knowledge: **Mr Antonio CAVACO**, Director-General, Humanitarian Aid, European Commission; **Mr Johannes LUCHNER**, Head of Unit, Humanitarian Aid DG, European Commission; **Ms Henrike TRAUTMANN**, Assistant to the Director-General, Humanitarian Aid, European Commission; **Mr Hervé DELPHIN**, member of the office of Louis Michel, Commissioner with responsibility for development and humanitarian aid; **Mr Hubert GAMBS**, member of the office of Ms Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner with responsibility for external relations and European neighbourhood policy; **Mr Vincent GUEREND**, member of the office of Ms Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner with responsibility for external relations and European neighbourhood policy; **Ms Pia BUCELLA**, Director, Governance, Communication and Civil Protection, Directorate-General for the Environment; **Mr Nicolas THERY**, Adviser, Directorate-General for the Environment; **Mr Ranieri SABATUCCI**, Assistant to the Deputy Director-General, Development; **Mr Olivier LUYCKX**, Assistant to the Director-General, Development; **Ms Marleen HARFORD**, Director, Secretariat-General; **Ms Isabelle BENOLIEL**, Principal Adviser, Directorate-General for Health and Consumer Protection; **Mr Francisco FONSECA MORILLO**, Director, Directorate-General for Justice, Freedom and Security; **Ms Myriam SOCHACKI**, Adviser, Directorate-General Bureau of European Policy Advisers

Annex 5 - List of documents consulted

The work of the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER II) between January 2005 and May 2006 and the work of the Council working parties connected with Civil Protection and Consular Affairs were taken into account in the report.

More specifically the following documents were consulted:

21/03/2006: Report by Mr Rolf Berend on the European Union Solidarity Fund adopted by the European Parliament's Committee on Regional Development

03/03/2006: Information report on behalf of the delegation for the European Union on Community action on civil protection, by Mr Paul Girod, Senator – France

13/02/2006 – 15/02-2006: Report on Wilton Park Conference *Improving the emergency response in Europe*

26/01/2006: COM (2006) 29 final – Proposal for a Council Decision establishing a Community civil protection mechanism (recast) – SEC (2006)113

20/12/2005: The EU's contribution to the international response to the 2004 Asian Tsunami – Achievements, next steps and lessons learnt – Discussion Paper – High-level Meeting, Brussels – Department for International Development, United Kingdom

29/11/2005: (document 15106/05 of the Presidency and the counter-terrorism coordinator to Coreper, Limited) – EU emergency and crisis co-ordination arrangements

18/11/2005: Progress report on the Commission's response to the Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004 and the reinforcing of the EU crisis and disaster response in third countries

09/2005: Disasters, Diseases, Disruptions: a new D-drive for the EU, Institute for Security Studies

10/11/2005: Commission communication to the Council and the European Parliament *Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES): from concept to reality*

29/07/2005: Report to the Prime Minister by the interministerial delegate, Mr Jean-Claude Mallet, for France's aid to the countries affected by the tsunami

20/04/2005: Commission communication to the Council, the European Parliament the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions *Reinforcing EU disaster and crisis response in third countries*

20/04/2005: Commission communication to the Council, the European Parliament the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions *Improving the Community Civil Protection Mechanism*

6/04/2005: COM (2005) 113 final – Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a Rapid Response and Preparedness Instrument for major emergencies

28/01/2005: Presidency document – Follow-up to extraordinary CAGRE of 7 January 2005 on the earthquake and tsunamis in the Indian Ocean – European Union Action Plan

13/12/2004: General Secretariat – The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union

