Europaudvalget 2005-06
EUU Alm.del Bilag 314
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JOB(06)/200
Negotiating Group on Market Access
22 June 2006
TOWARDS NAMA MODALITIES
Introduction
I present this document for submission to the Trade Negotiations Committee in response to
the request of Members for proposed language of full modalities for the Non-Agricultural Market
Access (NAMA) negotiations. I regret that I am unable to fulfil that mandate, as a result of the failure
of the Negotiating Group to find consensus on many important issues, and that the present report is, at
best, a step in the direction of full modalities. This explains the title of my document.
This also explains why I decided to preserve the structure of my April 28, 2006 report to the
TNC for this document. I believe that this format remains an effective mechanism to display the
mandate of the negotiations, the results of the negotiations thus far and the principal issues and
options on questions that remain unresolved. To recall this format:
-
the first column contains Annex B of the General Council decision of 1 August 2004
(commonly referred to as the "NAMA Framework"), as amended or supplemented by the
relevant paragraphs of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration. The additions from the
Ministerial Declaration have been indicated in bold;
the second column shows possible modalities language. In some cases the issue has
matured and the language is agreed. In other cases it was a simple transposition of the
language in the July Framework. In yet other instances, it is language that I felt I could
risk proposing on my own responsibility. Rest assured, those instances are a few: I took
such initiative only in those cases where I felt that the points of divergence were not that
entrenched and could be bridged at this time; and
the third column is the Chair’s commentary on the issues. I have not given an exhaustive
narrative of the position of Members. Instead, I have briefly presented the issues and, in
some instances, taken the liberty of providing some guidance for future discussions. In
others instances, I felt I could not provide guidance because Members were unable to
create that opportunity for me.
-
-
Where this document diverges from my April report is in the inclusion of an Annex. In this
Annex, I have reproduced the various textual proposals submitted to the Negotiating Group on issues
on which we do not yet have consensus and where the divergence is too great for me to bridge at this
time. While this will certainly give Members a comprehensive picture of where we stand on all
NAMA issues, it will not make their lives any easier. On some issues, as you will discover, the
Annex represents a complex menu of options which Members will not have an easy time navigating.
There is another important dimension to the NAMA negotiations and to the interpretation of
both the agreed modalities and the possible options for resolving outstanding issues presented in this
document. This is what I have referred to as the “brackets” on the entire NAMA negotiations – that
is, the agriculture negotiations. The simple fact is that progress in the NAMA negotiations have, at all
times, been both constrained by and conditional upon progress in the agriculture negotiations. This is
true both in respect of the overall negotiations and in respect of specific issues, including the level of
ambition in the formula, the overall degree of flexibilities, and the treatment of preference erosion,
small, vulnerable economies and recently acceded Members.
06-2992
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JOB(06)/200
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Over the past few weeks, I have been trying to obtain agreement on the “architecture” for
resolving each of the issues. My intent was to prepare a final stage in the negotiations which would
be concentrated only on the numbers – the level of ambition. I cannot claim much success. We were
able to confirm the architecture of the treatment of paragraph 6 countries and to agree on the
substance of the issues related to least-developed countries. On other issues, I can claim only partial
success. In respect of small, vulnerable economies and recently acceded Members, we have
tentatively agreed only partial elements of the final solution. On the remaining issues, I can offer no
more than possible approaches to finding an eventual solution.
I have faithfully adhered to the principle of the bottom-up approach, and this document is a
reflection of the degree of convergence between Members on the issues.
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
Preamble
1. This Framework contains the initial elements for
future work on modalities by the Negotiating Group
on Market Access.
Additional negotiations are
required to reach agreement on the specifics of some
of these elements. These relate to the formula, the
issues concerning the treatment of unbound tariffs in
indent two of paragraph 5, the flexibilities for
developing-country participants, the issue of
participation in the sectorial tariff component and the
preferences. In order to finalize the modalities, the
Negotiating Group is instructed to address these issues
expeditiously in a manner consistent with the mandate
of paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration
and the overall balance therein.
2. We reaffirm that negotiations on market access for
non-agricultural products shall aim to reduce or as
appropriate eliminate tariffs, including the reduction
or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs, and tariff
escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers, in particular
on products of export interest to developing countries.
We also reaffirm the importance of special and
differential treatment and less than full reciprocity in
reduction commitments as integral parts of the
modalities.
3.
We acknowledge the substantial work
undertaken by the Negotiating Group on Market
Access and the progress towards achieving an
agreement on negotiating modalities. We take note of
the constructive dialogue on the Chair's Draft
Elements of Modalities (TN/MA/W/35/Rev.1) and
confirm our intention to use this document as a
reference for the future work of the Negotiating
Group. We instruct the Negotiating Group to continue
We recall paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration in which we agreed "to negotiations
which shall aim, by modalities to be agreed, to reduce
or as appropriate eliminate tariffs, including the
reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs,
and tariff escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers, in
particular on products of export interest to developing
countries. Product coverage shall be comprehensive
and without
a priori
exclusions. The negotiations
shall take fully into account the special needs and
interests of developing and least-developed country
participants, including through less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments, in accordance
with the relevant provisions of Article XXVIII
bis
of
GATT 1994 and the provisions cited in paragraph 50
below. To this end, the modalities to be agreed will
include appropriate studies and capacity-building
measures to assist least-developed countries to
participate effectively in the negotiations."
Further to the Doha mandate, and building on the
results reached in Annex B of the General Council
Decision of 1 August 2004 (NAMA Framework) and
paragraphs 13 to 24 of the Hong Kong Ministerial
Declaration, we establish the modalities for the
NAMA negotiations as set out below.
JOB(06)/200
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
its work, as mandated by paragraph 16 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration with its corresponding
references
to
the
relevant
provisions
of
Article XXVIII
bis
of GATT 1994 and to the
provisions cited in paragraph 50 of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration, on the basis set out below.
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
JOB(06)/200
Page 4
Formula
Formula
4.
We recognize that a formula approach is key to
reducing tariffs, and reducing or eliminating tariff
peaks, high tariffs, and tariff escalation. We agree that
the Negotiating Group should continue its work on a
non-linear formula applied on a line-by-line basis
which shall take fully into account the special needs
and interests of developing and least-developed
country participants, including through less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments.
14. We adopt a Swiss Formula with coefficients at
levels which shall
inter alia:
Reduce or as appropriate eliminate tariffs,
including the reduction or elimination of tariff
peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation, in
particular on products of export interest to
developing countries; and
Take fully into account the special needs and
interests of developing countries, including
through less than full reciprocity in reduction
commitments.
Architecture of the formula
We agree that the following Swiss Formula shall apply on
on a line-by-line basis:
There is no consensus on the structure of the formula.
There continue to be two Swiss formula options on the
table - one is the simple Swiss formula with two
coefficients (one for developed and one for developing
country Members) and the other is the so-called ABI
formula.
On the basis of the discussions of the Negotiating
Group and my consultations with Members, I believe
that there is broader and stronger support for the
simple Swiss formula with two coefficients and that the
discussions should focus on this structure as the more
likely to attract a consensus. It should be noted,
however, that this support depends on the level of the
coefficients and whether they will deliver on Members'
interpretations of the Doha mandate and/or
paragraph 24 of the Hong Kong Ministerial
Declaration. Putting this in different terms, the key
questions are: (1) the interpretation of “less than full
reciprocity in reduction commitments”; (2) the extent
to which “real market access” must also be achieved;
and (3) the comparability of any outcome in NAMA to
the ambition achieved in Agriculture.
15. We reaffirm the importance of special and
differential treatment and less than full reciprocity
in reduction commitments, including paragraph 8
of the NAMA Framework, as integral parts of the
modalities. We instruct the Negotiating Group to
finalize its details as soon as possible.
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
Formula coefficients
There is no consensus on the coefficients for the tariff-
reduction formula.
I do not believe that the
discussions in the Negotiating Group provide a basis
on which to establish the coefficients, or even to
propose a range of numbers within which to focus the
discussion
Elements regarding the formula
5. We further agree on the following elements
regarding the formula:
We further agree on the following elements regarding
the formula:
Elements regarding the formula
Product coverage shall be comprehensive without
a priori
exclusions.
(a) Product coverage shall be comprehensive
without
a priori
exclusions as reflected in
document [...].
Product Coverage
There is no consensus on product coverage. There is
a wide view that the ideal outcome would be an
agreed list with no deviations. However, in light of
the impasse in the Negotiating Group, I tabled a
proposal for an agreed list (JOB(06)/126/Rev.1) that
would include a footnote recording the deviation of
two Members without altering the rights of other
Members.
Most Members are in favour of an agreed list and
were uncomfortable with the proposed footnote.
Notwithstanding their reluctance, some Members have
expressed a willingness to accept my proposal.
Others have insisted on an agreed list with no
footnotes or have indicated that they would add their
own deviations to the footnote, exacerbating the
problem.
It would be unfortunate if we were not able to achieve
full agreement on the products covered in the NAMA
negotiations. This is essential for the tabling of
18. We take note of the level of common
understanding reached on the issue of product
coverage and direct the Negotiating Group to
resolve differences on the limited issues that
remain as quickly as possible.
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
JOB(06)/200
Page 6
schedules and also enhances transparency for traders.
It may also avoid disputes in the area of classification
and resolve the ambiguities from the Uruguay Round.
In short, my first best solution is to have an agreed list
with no deviations. My second-best solution is to have
an agreed list with full transparency of any deviation
Unbound Tariffs
tariff reductions or elimination shall commence
from the bound rates after full implementation of
current concessions; however, for unbound tariff
lines,
we adopt a non-linear mark-up approach
to establish base rates for commencing tariff
reductions.
(b) Tariff reductions or elimination shall commence
from the bound rates after full implementation of
current concessions; however, for unbound tariff
lines, we adopt a constant non-linear mark-up of
[…] percentage points to the MFN applied rate in
the base year to establish base rates for
commencing tariff reductions.
Treatment
There is consensus on the architecture of the treatment
of unbound tariffs, which is a constant, non-linear
mark-up.
Mark-up
There is no consensus on the level of the mark-up, but
it is clear that the range is between 5 and 30
percentage points.
While Members have their
preferences, and there continue to be sensitivities over
low and high unbound rates, a great deal of flexibility
has been signalled. This flexibility was even more
apparent after the simulations of the effects of various
formula approaches were issued, as these
demonstrated that the effect of the mark- up is
relatively small once the formula is applied.
Base year
the base year for MFN applied tariff rates shall be
2001 (applicable rates on 14 November);
(c) The base year for MFN applied tariff rates shall be
2001 (applicable rates on 14 November);
There is consensus on this issue.
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
Credit for bound autonomous liberalization by
developing countries
credit shall be given for autonomous liberalization
by developing Members provided that the tariff
lines were bound on an MFN basis in the WTO
since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round;
(d)
There is no consensus on this issue. Few developing
Members have bound autonomous tariff reductions
since the Uruguay Round. While some Members have
noted the importance of this issue, they have also
acknowledged that it is a difficult concept to
operationalize. Perhaps as a result, until very
recently, no proposal had been tabled and no
discussion had been held on this subject. However, a
proposal was tabled just before the preparation of this
document. The proposal suggests that an unspecified
number of additional points should be added to the
coefficient in the formula for those lines which were
bound autonomously. There has been no discussion of
this proposal, which does not provide specifics on how
to assess the value of the liberalization for the purpose
of adjusting the coefficient.
Ad valorem equivalents
all non-ad
valorem
duties shall be converted to
ad
valorem
equivalents on the basis of
the
methodology
outlined
in
document
JOB(05)166/Rev.1
and bound in
ad valorem
terms;
(e) all non-ad
valorem
duties shall be converted to
ad valorem
equivalents on the basis of the
methodology
outlined
in
document
JOB(05)/166/Rev.1 and bound in
ad valorem
terms;
A useful multilateral verification process of AVE
submissions is ongoing and will need to be concluded
soon after the establishment of modalities.
Nomenclature
negotiations shall commence on the basis of the
HS96 or HS2002 nomenclature, with the results of
the negotiations to be finalized in HS2002
nomenclature;
(f) negotiations shall commence on the basis of the
HS96 or HS2002 nomenclature, with the results of
the negotiations to be finalized in HS2002
nomenclature to the extent possible.
Members have the option of submitting schedules in
HS96 or HS2002. However, in the former case, the
question of finalizing the results in HS2002 will
present a challenge to Members and/or the Secretariat
due to time constraints. My proposal would be to
make the finalization of results in HS2002 a “best
efforts” provision.
JOB(06)/200
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
JOB(06)/200
Page 8
Reference period
- the reference period for import data shall be 1999-
2001.
(g) the reference period for import data shall be
1999-2001
There is consensus on this issue.
Implementation period
(h) the implementation period for tariff reductions for
developed-country Members shall be [..] years and
for developing country Members [...] years, to be
implemented [...].
I suggest that the question of implementation periods
be addressed in a new paragraph which would include
both the longer implementation periods for developing
Members subject to formula cuts (currently addressed
in paragraph 8), but also the implementation period
for developed countries. Regarding the number of
years proposed for implementation, Members’
positions are not yet certain enough for me to propose
numbers at this stage. My language also leaves open
the question of how the tariff reductions will be
implemented (e.g. staging etc.), as this has not yet
been agreed by Members.
Flexibilities for developing Members with low
binding coverage
1
6. We furthermore agree that, as an exception,
participants with a binding coverage of non-
agricultural tariff lines of less than [35] percent would
be exempt from making tariff reductions through the
formula. Instead, we expect them to bind [100]
percent of non-agricultural tariff lines at an average
level that does not exceed the overall average of
bound tariffs for all developing countries after full
implementation of current concessions.
We furthermore agree that, as an exception,
participants with a binding coverage of non-
agricultural tariff lines of less than 35 percent would
be exempt from making tariff reductions through the
formula. Instead, we expect them to bind [70-100]
percent of non-agricultural tariff lines at an average
level that does not exceed the overall average of
bound tariffs for all developing countries after full
implementation of current concessions which is at
28.5%.
Flexibilities for developing Members with low
binding coverage
There is consensus on the architecture of this
exception. The negotiation is now focussed on the
binding that such Members would be expected to
make. I would note that the proponents of this
paragraph have indicated that their acceptance of the
28.5% average binding level was conditional upon an
acceptable level of binding coverage. While most
other Members are willing to show some flexibility on
the binding coverage, they have generally indicated
that 70% is unacceptably low. They recognize that
other developing Members availing of paragraph 8
flexibilities will have the possibility to maintain 5% of
1
Developing Members concerned are: Cameroon; Congo, Côte d'Ivoire; Cuba; Ghana; Kenya; Macao, China; Mauritius; Nigeria; Sri Lanka; Suriname; and Zimbabwe.
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
tariff lines unbound and, as a result, they are willing
to consider a 95% percentage binding coverage for
these Members. Others have shown greater flexibility.
Some have suggested that, as the target tariff average
was fixed on the basis of the "overall average of
bound tariff for all developing countries after full
implementation of current concessions", the same
rationale could be used to determine their binding
coverage (i.e. 81% if all developing countries except
LDCs are included; 93% if the paragraph 6 countries
are removed.).
Sectoral negotiations
7. We recognize that a sectorial tariff component,
aiming at elimination or harmonization is another key
element to achieving the objectives of paragraph 16 of
the Doha Ministerial Declaration with regard to the
reduction or elimination of tariffs, in particular on
products of export interest to developing countries.
We recognize that participation by all participants will
be important to that effect. We therefore instruct the
Negotiating Group to pursue its discussions on such a
component, with a view to defining product coverage,
participation, and adequate provisions of flexibility for
developing-country participants.
1. We reaffirm that the sectoral tariff reduction
component is another key element to achieving the
objectives of Paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration. Participation in sectoral initiatives is on a
non-mandatory basis. Such initiatives shall aim to
reduce, harmonize or as appropriate eliminate tariffs,
including the reduction or elimination of tariff peaks,
high tariffs and tariff escalation, over and above that
which would be achieved by the formula modality, in
particular on products of export interest to developing
countries.
2. We recognise the progress made in a variety of
sectors, where discussions among participants in the
sectorals have focused on: defining the critical mass
which may include the share of world trade and level
of participation of competitive producers; the scope of
product coverage; the implementation schedule; and
special and differential treatment for developing-
country participants.
3. At the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference,
Ministers instructed members to identify sectors which
could garner sufficient participation. Members have
Sectoral negotiations
As there is wide agreement on the core issues, I have
taken the initiative of proposing compromise language
on sectoral negotiations. I believe that, at the Hong
Kong Ministerial, Ministers resolved the most
contentious issue on sectoral negotiations – the non-
mandatory nature of participation in such initiatives.
I believe that the other concerns which have been
voiced concerning language proposed by ten Members
and circulated as JOB(06)/125 can be bridged. I have
used this document as the basis for my proposed text.
I would note that a concern was raised that, given the
lack of clarity on matters such as critical mass and the
potential impact that sectorals could have on products
of export interest to least-developed countries,
sectorals should not be part of the modalities
language. However, it is difficult for me to ignore the
fact that Ministers have agreed that sectorals are a
"key element" in the NAMA negotiations. I believe
that such concerns could be accommodated through
dialogue between concerned Members and the
proponents of sectoral initiatives, especially in the
area of product coverage, implementation periods and
special and differential measures.
16. In furtherance of paragraph 7 of the NAMA
Framework, we recognize that Members are
pursuing sectoral initiatives. To this end, we
instruct the Negotiating Group to review proposals
with a view to identifying those which could garner
sufficient
participation
to
be
realized.
Participation should be on a non-mandatory basis.
JOB(06)/200
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
started submitting specific textual proposals on the
following sectors: Autos and related parts, Bicycles
and related parts, Chemicals, Electronics/Electrical
products, Fish and fish products, Forest products,
Pharmaceuticals and medical devices, Gems and
Jewelry, Raw materials, Sports equipment, Hand
Tools and Textiles, Clothing and Footwear.
4. We instruct Members participating in the sectoral
initiatives to intensify their work and finalise the
details of each sector in order to be in a position to
incorporate any outcomes of such negotiations on a
conditional basis in the draft comprehensive schedules
of participating members at the time of their
submission. Work could continue thereafter, if
necessary, to encourage broader participation in the
sectoral initiatives referred to under paragraph 3
above or in any additional sectoral initiatives aiming
at greater-than-formula reduction or elimination of
tariffs in particular on products of export interest to
developing countries.
Chairman's remarks
JOB(06)/200
Page 10
Harmonization proposal on the Textiles and Clothing
Sector
A sectoral proposal on tariff harmonization in the
textile and clothing sector has been submitted by
Turkey. Many Members, including the proponent,
have acknowledged that it is a sectoral initiative
which is different in nature from the other sectoral
initiatives on which work is currently ongoing. It
proposes mandatory participation and leaves open the
possibility of an outcome that is not over and above
that which would be achieved by the formula. While
this proposal enjoys the support of some Members, it
is also firmly opposed by many others, who argue that
it does not satisfy the requirements of the mandate
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
from Ministers. It is clear that the proponents will be
challenged to garner sufficient support for this
proposal.
Flexibilities for developing Members subject to the
formula
8.
We
agree
that
developing-country
participants shall have longer implementation periods
for tariff reductions.
Flexibilities for developing Members subject to the
formula
Implementation Period
(See section on implementation period above.)
In addition, they shall be given the following
flexibility:
Developing-country participants shall be given the
following flexibility:
Architecture
There is consensus on the architecture of paragraph 8
flexibilities.
(a)
applying less than formula cuts to up to [10]
percent of the tariff lines provided that the cuts
are no less than half the formula cuts and that
these tariff lines do not exceed [10] percent of
the total value of a Member's imports; or
(a)
applying less than formula cuts to up to [10]
percent of the national tariff lines provided that
the cuts are no less than half the formula cuts and
that these tariff lines do not exceed [10] percent
of the total value of a Member's non-agricultural
imports; or
Numbers
There is no consensus on the percentage of tariff lines
that will be covered by these flexibilities. However,
while some Members continue to believe that the
current numbers in 8(a) and 8(b) are the minimum or
maximum of what should be offered, my sense is that
Members could agree to the numbers already in the
brackets provided the coefficients in the formula are
satisfactory. My advice, therefore, would be to treat
these numbers as a working hypothesis and focus
discussions on the coefficients in the formula.
Alternative to the use of paragraph 8 flexibilities
There is no consensus on the proposal submitted by
Mexico which suggested adding 5 points to the
coefficient for any developing Member that did not
exercise its right to use paragraph 8 flexibilities.
Some Members have supported this proposal but
(b) keeping, as an exception, tariff lines unbound, or
not applying formula cuts for up to [5] percent of
tariff lines provided they do not exceed [5]
percent of the total value of a Member's imports.
(b) keeping, as an exception, tariff lines unbound, or
not applying formula cuts for up to [5] percent of
national tariff lines provided they do not exceed
[5] percent of the total value of a Member's non-
agricultural imports.
We furthermore agree that this flexibility could not be
used to exclude entire HS Chapters.
We furthermore agree that this flexibility could not be
used to exclude entire HS Chapters.
JOB(06)/200
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
JOB(06)/200
Page 12
indicated reservations about the number of additional
points to be added to the coefficient. Others have
expressed opposition to the proposal, arguing that it
would establish a precedent for an “a-la-carte”
application of the formula.
Small, Vulnerable Economies
21. We note the concerns raised by small,
vulnerable economies, and instruct the Negotiating
Group to establish ways to provide flexibilities for
these Members without creating a sub-category of
WTO Members.
The criteria
With the exception of developed countries, Members
having a share of NAMA trade (exports and imports)
of less than [0.1%] of world trade for a reference
period of 1999 to 2001, or best available data, as
contained in document TN/MA/S/18 may use the
following modality for tariff reduction:
The criteria
There is consensus on the use of this criterion to
determine eligibility for additional flexibilities as a
small, vulnerable economy.
While recognizing that this benchmark establishes
only that an economy is small, in terms of its NAMA
trade, Members have acknowledged the difficulties of
articulating additional criteria to establish that
economies are also vulnerable and can accept the
single criterion.
The proponents have proposed additional criteria
related to agricultural trade and total goods (both
NAMA and agriculture) trade. Many Members oppose
the use of such criteria, arguing that this would create
a new sub-category of Members. I would note, in this
regard, that it is important for many Members that the
treatment of small, vulnerable economies in these
negotiations does not create a precedent for future
negotiations.
Finally, it was noted that this criterion should be
understood as only a “trigger” for eligibility – that is,
the criterion alone should not define the group of
countries that will have access to these flexibilities.
Members will recall that the proponents do not
include all countries with trade below this threshold.
Small, Vulnerable Economies
It is understood that this does not create a sub-
category of WTO Members.
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
The treatment
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
The treatment
There is no consensus on the treatment of small,
vulnerable economies.
There are two basic options on the table: a paragraph
6-type solution or a paragraph 8-type solution. The
first option has two variations, one put forward by the
SVEs proponents and the second by Norway. The SVE
proponents have suggested a banded approach while
Norway's proposal is more similar in structure to
paragraph 6, with a single target tariff average. The
second option is to use a paragraph 8-type solution,
which would envisage increasing the flexibilities in
paragraph 8. There are different permutations of this
option including adding percentage points to the
existing numbers in paragraph 8; removing the trade
limitation, combining sub-paragraph (a) and (b), and
by extending the implementation period.
Unfortunately, I am unable to provide much guidance
on this issue. I would note that one factor which has
made this discussion difficult is the diverse tariff
profiles of the SVE proponents. Beyond this, I can only
repeat my view that a satisfactory contribution from
these Members can be achieved using either the
paragraph 8 or paragraph 6 approach. The central
question, therefore, is how great a contribution is
required of these Members.
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
JOB(06)/200
Page 14
Least-Developed Countries (LDCs)
Flexibilities for LDCs
9.
We agree that least-developed country
participants shall not be required to apply the formula
nor participate in the sectorial approach, however, as
part of their contribution to this round of negotiations,
they are expected to substantially increase their level
of binding commitments.
We recall the decision of July 2004 General Council
to exempt LDCs from participating in the formula for
tariff reduction and the sectoral approach. However,
as part of their contribution to this Round of
negotiations, LDCs are expected to substantially
increase their level of tariff binding commitments.
We therefore reaffirm that individual LDCs will
determine the extent and level of tariff binding
commitments in accordance with their individual
development objectives.
Market Access for LDCs
10.
Furthermore, in recognition of the need to
enhance the integration of least-developed countries
into the multilateral trading system and support the
diversification of their production and export base, we
call upon developed-country participants and other
participants who so decide, to grant on an autonomous
basis duty-free and quota-free market access for non-
agricultural products originating from least-developed
countries by the year […].
We reaffirm the need to help LDCs secure beneficial
and meaningful integration into the multilateral
trading system. In this regard, we recall the
Decision
on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries
contained in decision 36 of Annex F of the Hong
Kong Ministerial Declaration (the "Decision"), and
reaffirm our commitment to fully implement the
Decision as agreed.
We reaffirm our commitment to ensuring that
preferential rules of origin applicable to imports from
LDCs will be transparent, simple and contribute to
facilitating market access in respect of non-
agricultural products.
We also reaffirm our commitment to progressively
achieve compliance with the Decision referred to
above, taking into account the impact on other
developing countries at similar levels of development.
Least-Developed Countries (LDCs)
Flexibilities for LDCs
There is consensus on this language.
Market Access for LDCs
There is consensus on this language, subject to
confirmation from capitals by some Members.
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
We reaffirm that developing country Members shall
be permitted to phase in their commitments and enjoy
appropriate flexibility in coverage.
Accordingly, by the time Members submit their
comprehensive draft schedules of concessions,
developed-country Members shall, and developing-
country Members declaring themselves in a position to
do so should:
-
inform the WTO of the products that are currently
covered under duty free and quota free market
access for LDCs;
notify the internal procedures by which they will
implement the Decision; and
provide an indication of the possible time frame
within which they intend to fully implement the
Decision as agreed.
Chairman's remarks
-
-
Recently Acceded Members (RAMs)
11.
We recognize that newly acceded Members
shall have recourse to special provisions for tariff
reductions in order to take into account their extensive
market access commitments undertaken as part of
their accession and that staged tariff reductions are
still being implemented in many cases. We instruct
the Negotiating Group to further elaborate on such
provisions.
In recognition of their extensive market access
commitments undertaken as part of their accession
and that staged tariff reductions are still being
implemented in many cases, the Recently Acceded
Members shall have an additional implementation
period of [ ] years in respect of [ ].
Recently Acceded Members (RAMs)
Who is a RAM?
An informal understanding was reached that for the
purposes of complying with paragraph 58 of the Hong
Kong Declaration concerning RAMs, the relevant
negotiating bodies should consider the situation of all
those Members who have acceded to the WTO since
its establishment, with the exception of those who have
since become members of the European Union and
those who are LDCs. In addition, any further
countries which acceded before the conclusion of the
negotiations under the DDA should also be
considered. It is also understood that if Bulgaria
becomes a member of the European Union before the
In recognition of their extensive market access
commitments undertaken as part of their accession
and their current economic circumstances, Armenia,
Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova shall not be required
to undertake tariff reductions.
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
JOB(06)/200
Page 16
conclusion of the Round, it would not be considered a
RAM for the purposes of paragraph 58 of the Hong
Kong Declaration.
On that basis, the potential list of RAMs for the
purposes of paragraph 58 of the Hong Kong
Declaration would be as follows: Ecuador, Bulgaria,
Mongolia, Panama, Kyrgyz Republic, Jordan,
Georgia, Albania, Oman, Croatia, Moldova, China,
Chinese Taipei, Armenia, Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia and Saudi Arabia.
Treatment of RAMs
There is consensus that additional flexibility in the
form of longer implementation periods should be
extended to all recently acceded Members. However,
Members have differing views on how such longer
implementation periods should apply. Some have
argued that the extension should apply to all tariff
lines while others would restrict the extension to tariff
lines on which accession commitments have not yet
been fully implemented.
There is also consensus that the small, low-income
economies in transition (Armenia, Moldova and
Kyrgyz Republic) should be given special
consideration.
There is a widely held view among Members that, in
addition to these flexibilities, RAMs should also make
use of other flexibilities for which they are eligible (for
example, there may be a number of RAMs who may be
eligible to use the flexibilities for developing countries
that apply the formula, or for small, vulnerable
economies).
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
A proposal was submitted by China providing options
for additional flexibilities that might be accorded to
RAMs, including a higher coefficient, greater
paragraph 8 flexibilities and grace periods for the
implementation of the formula. In addition to these
flexibilities, Croatia proposed that the grace period
and implementation period be increased. Little
support was expressed for these proposals.
Supplementary Modalities
12.
We agree that pending agreement on core
modalities for tariffs, the possibilities of
supplementary modalities such as zero-for-zero sector
elimination, sectorial harmonization, and request &
offer, should be kept open.
We agree that Members may use the request & offer
approach as a supplementary modality following
agreement on the core modalities.
Supplementary Modalities
Supplementary modalities will be used once the
formula has been agreed to. In my view, the only
supplementary modality which is feasible from a
practical point of view, once the core modality is
agreed to, is the request & offer modality. I would
note that sectoral negotiations provide a vehicle for
zero-for-zero
tariff
elimination
and
tariff
harmonization, and that the doors remain open to new
proposals on sectoral agreements. I do not know what
other type of supplementary negotiation is available,
so am not sure of the relevance of the term "such as"
in the July Framework language. In other words, the
language in the July Framework strikes me as being
outdated. I have proposed some new language in the
middle column to take account of the evolution of the
negotiations
Elimination of low duties
13. In addition, we ask developed-country participants
and other participants who so decide to consider the
elimination of low duties.
In addition, we ask developed-country participants
and other participants who so decide to consider the
elimination of low duties.
Elimination of low duties
Presumably, the question of elimination of low duties
will be taken up after agreement on the formula and at
the discretion of Members. Therefore, I believe that
the language can be transferred from the July
Framework to the middle column.
JOB(06)/200
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
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Page 18
Non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
14. We recognize that NTBs are an integral and
equally important part of these negotiations and
instruct participants to intensify their work on NTBs.
In particular, we encourage all participants to make
notifications on NTBs by 31 October 2004 and to
proceed
with
identification,
examination,
categorization, and ultimately negotiations on NTBs.
We take note that the modalities for addressing NTBs
in these negotiations could include request/offer,
horizontal, or vertical approaches; and should fully
take into account the principle of special and
differential treatment for developing and least-
developed country participants.
We reaffirm that negotiations on NTBs are an integral
and equally important element to achieving the
objectives of paragraph 16 of the Doha Ministerial
Declaration. The NTB initiatives shall aim to reduce
or eliminate, as appropriate, non-tariff barriers, in
particular on products of export interest to developing
countries and to enhance market access opportunities
achieved through the tariff formula modality and
sectoral initiatives.
Progress has been made in the identification,
examination and categorization of non-tariff barriers.
Discussions have focused on defining the nature of
the barrier, the scope of products affected and
potential solutions. Some Members have also already
submitted specific requests and specific negotiating
proposals, including on horizontal issues such as
export taxes, export restrictions, remanufactured
goods and a future mechanism for resolving NTBs, as
well as on vertical initiatives on automobiles,
electronic products, textiles, clothing and footwear
and wood products.
Members have expressed different views regarding
these proposals and negotiations are now required to
obtain results in line with the mandate.
Members are instructed to finalize their NTB work in
2006 before the conclusion of the tariff negotiations in
order to multilateralize the outcomes through
inter
alia
incorporating them where appropriate into Part
III of schedules. We recall that these non-tariff
barrier negotiations can include request/offer,
horizontal and vertical approaches and they should
also take fully into account the principle of special
Non-tariff barriers (NTBs)
As there is wide agreement on the core issues, I have
taken the initiative of proposing compromise language
on NTBs. This text merges two textual proposals on
the table - one from the US/EC and the other from the
NAMA-11 group of developing Members, which based
itself on the US/EC text.
Important details remain to be sorted out in respect of
all the proposals, but in respect of some proposals the
unresolved issues are more fundamental than for
others. In particular, many Members oppose the
proposals to negotiate disciplines in respect of export
taxes or export restrictions, arguing that these issues
fall outside the explicit mandate and the balance of
issues struck in Doha. Others note that there is no
agreed definition of a non-tariff barrier to guide the
discussions. While no decisions on specific NTB
proposals are required at this time, I make these
points only to underline that, while we may be able to
agree on modalities language on the process, a
consensus on the substance of some NTB proposals
remains, at best, uncertain.
22. We note that the Negotiating Group has made
progress in the identification, categorization and
examination of notified NTBs. We also take note
that Members are developing bilateral, vertical and
horizontal approaches to the NTB negotiations,
and that some of the NTBs are being addressed in
other fora including other Negotiating Groups. We
recognize the need for specific negotiating
proposals and encourage participants to make such
submissions as quickly as possible.
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
and differential treatment for developing and least-
developed country participants.
Chairman's remarks
Appropriate
Measures
15.
We recognize that appropriate studies and
capacity building measures shall be an integral part of
the modalities to be agreed. We also recognize the
work that has already been undertaken in these areas
and ask participants to continue to identify such issues
to improve participation in the negotiations.
Studies
and
Capacity
Building
Appropriate
Measures
Studies
and
Capacity
Building
We commit ourselves to exploring and enhancing
effective delivery mechanisms to assist LDCs, and
Members in the early stages of development, through
trade capacity-building measures to assist them in
addressing challenges that may arise from increased
competition as a result of MFN tariff reduction and
inherent supply side capacity constraints. These
mechanisms shall be designed to enable LDCs, and
Members in the early stages of development, to take
advantage of increased market access opportunities
and shall assist them to meet technical
standards/requirements and to address product and
market diversification as well as to overcome other
non-tariff measures.
This language has very wide support. Some Members
expressed concerns about the fact that the scope of the
paragraph may have been expanded through the
inclusion of the phrase "Members in the early stages
of development". In their view this paragraph was
only meant for LDCs. However, others noted that the
language in the July Framework did not specify that
such measures were for LDCs uniquely. In any event,
no Member disputes that such assistance should be
provided to LDCs, nor that the broader Aid-for-Trade
initiative should include similar assistance for other
developing Members.
Non-reciprocal preferences
16.
We recognize the challenges that may be
faced by non-reciprocal preference beneficiary
Members and those Members that are at present highly
dependent on tariff revenue as a result of these
negotiations on non-agricultural products. We instruct
the Negotiating Group to take into consideration, in
the course of its work, the particular needs that may
arise for the Members concerned.
20.
As a supplement to paragraph 16 of the
NAMA Framework, we recognize the challenges
that may be faced by non-reciprocal preference
beneficiary Members as a consequence of the MFN
Non-reciprocal preferences
Assessment of the scope of the problem
Pursuant to Ministers’ instructions at Hong Kong, the
Negotiating Group continues to assess the scope of the
preference erosion problem. This assessment was
greatly assisted by a Secretariat analysis of the key
products, key countries and key markets concerned.
While no final conclusions have been reached,
Members agreed that this was a useful analysis, which
should be pursued and which could provide the basis
for a discussion of possible solutions.
JOB(06)/200
Page 19
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
liberalization that will result from these
negotiations. We instruct the Negotiating Group to
intensify work on the assessment of the scope of the
problem with a view to finding possible solutions.
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
JOB(06)/200
Page 20
Possible solutions
There is no consensus on possible solutions. The
Negotiating Group will need to turn to this question
after Members are satisfied that the scope of the
problem has been sufficiently defined. Having said
this, Members have expressed views – indeed, strong
views – on possible solutions.
All Members support targeted Aid-for-Trade to
address the underlying challenges faced by preference
receiving countries – the diversification of their
exports and strengthening of their competitiveness.
Many Members are at least open to a discussion of a.
trade solution, in addition to Aid-for-Trade, but only
in respect of longer implementation periods. There is
little support for a correction coefficient, the other
measure suggested by the proponents of this issue.
However, some Members are opposed to any trade
measures to respond to the preference problem, as this
would be at the expense of their own access to major
markets.
There has also been some discussion of whether
special consideration should be given to Members
who are not beneficiaries of preferences and who may
be most affected as a result of a trade solution, such as
a longer implementation period for tariff reduction on
the key products. A proposal was presented by Sri
Lanka suggesting immediate access to preferential
regimes for such affected Members. Support for this
proposal was mixed but some Members have signalled
their possible support for special consideration for
these countries through shorter implementation
periods.
I would also underline that the resolution of this issue
is, even more than others, intimately linked to a
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
satisfactory approach being taken in the agricultural
negotiations on the same questions.
Tariff Revenue Dependency
No textual proposal has been submitted on the issue of
tariff revenue dependency. It is my sense, therefore,
that the proponents are satisfied that this issue is
being resolved through other parts of the modalities.
Non-agricultural environmental goods
17.
We furthermore encourage the Negotiating
Group to work closely with the Committee on Trade
and Environment in Special Session with a view to
addressing the issue of non-agricultural environmental
goods covered in paragraph 31 (iii) of the Doha
Ministerial Declaration.
Non-agricultural environmental goods
There is no consensus on this subject, beyond the
existing mandate.
A proposal was put forward by a group of Members
concerning the treatment of environmental goods in
the context of the NAMA negotiations.
These
Members proposed tariff elimination on those
products, to be defined by the CTESS. However, this
proposal was met with opposition. An alternative
textual proposal was submitted by another group of
countries proposing that the work of the CTESS to
define the approach and a possible list of
environmental goods must be completed before any
discussion of the treatment of such goods can be taken
up in the NAMA negotiations.
Many Members also believe that participation in any
initiative in respect of environmental goods should be
non-mandatory, while others feel that there is a
mandate in 31 (iii) to do something more on these
products than on those treated under the formula or
the sectoral negotiations.
As there is no progress on this issue to record at this
time, my suggestion would be to transfer the July
Framework language to the modalities paper.
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July Framework, modified or supplemented by the
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (in bold),
as appropriate
Modalities
Chairman's remarks
JOB(06)/200
Page 22
Paragraph 24
24.
We recognize that it is important to
advance the development objectives of this Round
through enhanced market access for developing
countries in both Agriculture and NAMA. To that
end, we instruct our negotiators to ensure that
there is a comparably high level of ambition in
market access for Agriculture and NAMA. This
ambition is to be achieved in a balanced and
proportionate manner consistent with the principle
of special and differential treatment.
Paragraph 24
A proposal (TN/MA/W/67) has been made in respect
of operationalizing this paragraph. While there was
some support for this proposal, and most Members
thought it a useful contribution to the negotiations,
many of the Members who have taken the floor during
discussions on this issue were of the view that
individual Members will judge for themselves whether
the requirements of this paragraph have been met.
_______________
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ANNEX:
Specific textual proposals on issues in which broad divergences remain
I.
A.
FORMULA
A
RCHITECTURE
Option 1: A Simple Swiss formula with two coefficients, one for developing and the other
for developed Members:
t
1
�½
(a or b)
t
0
(a or b)
t
0
where,
t
1
=
t
0
=
a=
b=
Final bound tariff
Base rate
Coefficient for developed Members
Coefficient for developing Members subject to the formula.
or
Option 2: ABI formula
t
1
�½
B
t
a
t
0
B
t
a
t
0
where,
t
1
t
0
t
a
B
is the final rate, to be bound in
ad valorem
terms
is the bound base rate
is the average of the current bound rates
is a coefficient, its value(s) to be determined by the participants
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B.
C
OEFFICIENTS
Option 1: Proposal by Pakistan
(TN/MA/W/60)
These coefficients should be based on an objective criterion; taking the overall average of the bound tariff
lines for developed and developing countries as their respective coefficients. These averages have been
worked out to be 5.48% for developed countries, and 29.12% for developing countries
2
. For the sake of
simplicity these could be taken as 6 and 30.
Option 2: Proposal by Canada; Hong Kong, China; New Zealand, Switzerland,
Chinese Taipei and the United States
(Room document of 8 June 2006)
The coefficient for developed countries (A) shall be at most five less than the developing country coefficient
(B). For example, the developed country coefficient (A) would be [10 or less] provided that the coefficient
for the developing countries applying the formula is within five points of the developed country coefficient.
The calculation was based on the data taken from document TN/MA/S/4/Rev.1/Corr.1. The
developed countries mean, Australia, Canada, EC, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the
US, and those developing countries that will apply the formula (i.e. excluding countries under Paragraph 6 & 9).
2
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II.
A.
ELEMENTS REGARDING THE FORMULA
C
REDIT FOR BOUND AUTONOMOUS LIBERALIZATION MEASURES BY
D
EVELOPING COUNTRIES
- Proposal by the NAMA-11
(Room document of 16 June 2006)
(d) Noting that some developing countries have bound
3
their tariffs on an MFN basis in the WTO since the
conclusion of Uruguay Round, credit shall be given for such autonomous liberalization provided that the
tariff lines were bound before commencement of the Doha Round. Credit will be effected by allowing the
relevant developing country Member to use a coefficient [ ] points higher than the applicable coefficient to
that Member in the agreed formula, for undertaking further reduction of these autonomously bound tariff
lines.
III.
A.
SECTORALS
H
ARMONIZATION PROPOSAL ON THE
T
EXTILES AND
C
LOTHING
S
ECTOR
- Proposal by Turkey
(Presentation of 14 June 2006)
Methodology:
Parallelism with certain aspects of the formula:
The same coefficients will be utilized.
Different average rates of harmonization for developed and developing countries.
Maximum tariff rate for a Chapter will be the Swiss Formula coefficient.
Harmonization will be at the average rates derived through the application of the Swiss Formula
with "to be agreed" coefficients in each Chapter.
Reduction in each tariff line with no exception.
IV.
A.
PARAGRAPH 8 FLEXIBILITIES
A
LTERNATIVE TO THE USE OF PARAGRAPH
8
FLEXIBILITIES
- Proposal by Mexico
(Room document of 21 April 2006)
Developing country Members that do not use the flexibilities provided for in paragraph 8 of Annex B of the
July framework, will be allowed 5 additional points in the coefficient in the application of the tariff reduction
formula.
3
India (WT/Let/374), Korea (WT/Let/302), Pakistan (WT/Let/424), Sri Lanka (WT/Let/398)
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V.
A.
SMALL, VULNERABLE ECONOMIES
P
ARAGRAPH
6-
TYPE SOLUTION
Option 1: Proposal by the SVE group
(Room document of 15 June 2006)
The treatment proposed for small, vulnerable economies would be that these countries would not be subject
to formula cuts, but would bind 100% of their non-agricultural tariff lines at average levels reflected in the
following bands:
Current Bound
Average %
≤ 37
38 – 47
48 – 57
≥ 58
1.
2.
3.
4.
Average % Cut
[….]
[….]
[….]
[….]
Expected Final Bound
Average %
[….]
[….]
[….]
[….]
Tariff reduction for
SVEs shall be on the basis of lower tariff cuts for those in the lower bands and
higher cuts for those in the higher bands
In meeting this requirement, beneficiaries would make minimum reductions of [ ] percent on a
maximum of [ ] percent of individual tariff lines
In the specific case of Fiji with less than 50% binding coverage, Fiji shall be allowed to keep [5%]
of their lines unbound while binding the remaining [95%] at an average of [ ].
The implementation of the tariff reduction commitments should be staged over a longer period than
other developing countries in order to ensure a smooth liberalisation process and not jeopardise the
industrial and social development prospects of the small, vulnerable economies.
Option 2: Proposal by Norway
(Room document of 6 June 2006)
Such Members will bind [100%] of their non-agricultural tariffs. The average bound tariff level of such a
Member will not exceed [X] percent after the implementation period. In meeting this requirement,
beneficiaries would make minimum reductions of [Y] percent on individual tariff lines.
B.
P
ARAGRAPH
8-
TYPE SOLUTION
Option 3: Proposal by Costa Rica and Uruguay
(Room document of 30 May 2006)
Developing countries that have been identified by the above mentioned criteria to be small and vulnerable
economies will benefit from a unique [X] additional percentage points to the figure currently in brackets in
Paragraph 8(a) or Paragraph 8(b)
4
.
Option 4: Proposal by the NAMA-11
(Room document of 6 June 2006)
i.
Once the number in brackets of paragraph 8 (a) and (b) has been agreed for developing countries,
additional flexibility beyond that shall be identified for SVEs; further relaxation of the trade limitation, in
particular, is an avenue worth exploring, considering the economic situation of SVEs, with a longer
implementation period; or
ii. The SVEs could be permitted access to paragraphs 8 (a) and (b) cumulatively, with a longer
implementation period.
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VI.
RECENTLY ACCEDED MEMBERS
Option 1: Proposal by China
(Room document of 12 June 2006)
Croatia proposed some changes which have been incorporated below
1. The coefficient for the Swiss formula applicable to Recently Acceded Members shall be 1.5 times of that
for developing-country participants.
2. In addition, the Recently Acceded Members shall be given the flexibility of applying less than formula
cuts to up to 15 percent of tariff lines provided that the cuts are no less than half the formula cuts; or
the Recently Acceded Members may choose exemption from formula cuts for up to 10 percent of tariff lines.
3. The Recently Acceded Members shall have an implementation period [3-5] years longer than that for
developing-country participants.
4. The Recently Acceded Members shall have a grace period for [3-5] years before the start of
implementation of DDA commitments.
Option 2: Proposal by the NAMA-11
(JOB(06)/194)
NAMA 11 recognises the diversity in the tariff profiles of the RAMs as well as their specific situations.
Accordingly, it would be appropriate that RAMs that declare themselves to be akin to developed countries
should adopt the modalities applicable to developed countries. Other RAMs should adopt the modalities
applicable to developing countries or LDCs, as the case may be, with all the attendant flexibilities and special
and differential provisions. The NAMA 11 also proposes that the RAMs be allowed a longer implementation
period.
The particular situation of some recently-acceded low income economies in transition shall be considered
separately, to allow them adequate and appropriate flexibilities.
The additional [X] percentage points will depend on the share of NAMA trade to be agreed in the
selection criteria. These [X] percentage points would be higher if the threshold of NAMA trade is lower, and
vice versa.
4
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VII.
NON-RECIPROCAL PREFERENCES
A.
P
OSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
- Proposal by the NAMA-11
(JOB(06)/194)
In this regard, the NAMA 11 proposes a two-pronged solution:
i) A longer implementation period for the reductions affecting such tariff lines.
This implementation period
for those developed country Members who provide preferences shall not be longer than the implementation
period set for developing country Members.
ii) Additional technical and financial assistance, including through the Aid for Trade initiative,
to help
address supply constraints, promote diversification of markets, export basket and sources of imports and
mitigate the costs of adjustment and restructuring.
Developed countries who have been granting long standing preferences shall explore ways to achieve the
fuller utilization of existing schemes, including, for example through the simplification of rules of origin.
The developed countries shall ensure that adequate steps will be taken to remedy the disproportionate adverse
effects on non-beneficiaries by any measures agreed in this regard.
B.
T
REATMENT OF
M
EMBERS MOSTLY AFFECTED BY A TRADE SOLUTION
- Proposal by Sri Lanka
(Room document of 16 June 2006)
As it has proposed by some Members
5
, a longer implementation period for the reductions, affecting tariff
lines sensitive to preference erosion, becomes a part of modalities; steps should be taken to remedy its
adverse effects, at a disproportionate level, on some non-beneficiaries of preferences. The Secretariat paper
identifies, in the case of the United States, small group f countries with such disproportionate impact
6
.
To minimize the adverse impact on non-beneficiaries whose exports under “tariff lines sensitive to the
preference erosion”, to the particular developed country market, cover Y% of total exports should be
provided preferential access
7
to that market, from the beginning of the implementation period.
ACP and NAMA-11.
These include Bangladesh, Cambodia and Sri Lanka. The share of exports of the 22 most sensitive
products form the ACP list to the United States consists of over 48.2% for Sri Lanka, 52.9% for Bangladesh and
59.4% for Cambodia.
7
Most favourable non-reciprocal preference extended to ACP member with similar rules of origin.
6
5
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VIII.
NON-AGRICULTURAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS
Option 1: Proposal by Canada, the EC, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland and the
United States
(Room document of 14 June 2006)
Further to paragraph 31(iii) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration we agree to eliminate tariffs on
environmental goods as soon as possible, but no later than 2008 for developed countries and those developing
countries declaring themselves in a position to do so. For other developing countries, tariffs should be
eliminated by X years thereafter. Further flexibilities for developing countries may include exclusions for a
limited number of products (e.g., similar to a “complementary” or “development” list). "
Option 2: Proposal by the NAMA-11
(Room document of 16 June 2006)
The Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session (CTE-SS) is addressing the mandate contained
in paragraph 31 of the Doha Declaration with a view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and
environment. Without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations, this could be achieved by means, inter
alia, of the CTE-SS agreeing on approaches to the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariffs and no-
tariff barriers to consensually defined environmental goods and services.
While encouraging the Negotiating Group on NAMA to work closely with the CTE-SS on relevant issues,
Ministers note that treating environmental goods in the NGMA before the CTE-SS has fulfilled its mandate
would amount to prejudging the outcome of negotiations under paragraph 31 iii.
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