PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Europaudvalget 2014-15 (1. samling)
EUU Alm.del Bilag 215
Offentligt

Great Power Politics and the Ukrainian Crisis

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

DIIS RePoRt 2014:18

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

This report is written by Henrik Boesen Lindbo Larsen and published by DIIS

as part of the Defence and Security Studies for the Danish Ministry of Defence.

Henrik Boesen Lindbo Larsen, PhD

Consultant on Defence and Security Studies at

DIIS . Danish Institute for International Studies

Postdoctoral Research Fellow,

International Security Program,

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,

Harvard Kennedy School of Government

[email protected]

DIIS . Danish Institute for International Studies

Østbanegade 117, DK 2100 Copenhagen

Tel: +45 32 69 87 87

E-mail: [email protected]

Web: www.diis.dk

Layout: Lone Ravnkilde og Viki Rachlitz

Printed in Denmark by: Bording A/S

ISBN 978-87-7605-696-4 (print)

ISBN 978-87-7605-695-7 (pdf)

DIIS publications can be downloaded free of charge or ordered as hardcopies from www.diis.dk

For academic citation:

Larsen, H.B.L., 2014.

‘Great Power Politics and the Ukrainian Crisis:

NATO, EU and Russia after 2014’,

Report 2014:18, Copenhagen: DIIS, Danish Institute for International Studies.

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Contents

Summary

Introduction

Ukraine between Russia and the eU

Reactions to Russia’s Crimean Annexation

Germany

Poland

United States

France

United Kingdom

Recalibrating euro-Russian Relations

Countering Russia

Assisting Ukraine

Reinforcing NATO

Bibliography

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Managing Euro-russian rElations BEyond 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

ExEcUTivE sUmmARy

this report assesses the relationship between europe and Russia as the sum of great

power reactions to the Ukrainian crisis and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Despite

agreement on a no business-as-usual principle, important national nuances have arisen

stemming from different historical bonds to eastern europe and Russia (Germany, Poland,

United States) or different interests in the region (France, United Kingdom).

the report calls for a recalibration of the europe-Russia relations along three dimensions

based on the great power pattern: imposing moderate sanctions and thus letting markets

punish Russia, given its vulnerability to international investors; placing the eU at the

forefront of implementing the Association Agreement already in place to assist Ukraine

in painful but needed reforms; and getting NAto to reinforce its eastern posture to

incentivize de-escalation.

the Ukrainian crisis must be recognized and managed as a predominantly political-

economic rivalry involving relatively strong Russian interests in this common

neighborhood with the eU.

Managing Euro-russian rElations BEyond 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

iNTROdUcTiON

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

The Ukrainian crisis that started with the Euromaidan

protests in November 2013 and have culminated thus

far in Russia’s annexation of Crimea represents the

biggest geopolitical shock to the European security

system since the end of the Cold War. On this occa-

sion Russia was prepared not only to use military

force but also to pursue a forward policy by annexing

territory. If the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 had put an

effective halt to further NATO enlargements, the

Crimean crisis of 2014 was about preventing the EU

from extending its eastern neighborhood closer

through forms of association.

The report represents an independent contribution to

the vast body of policy and academic commentaries

already published on the implications of Russia

reasserting itself. It focuses specifically on great-

power reactions as a basis for a more realistic

assessment of how policymakers can and should

navigate the new perils of European security. The

report is structured in the following way:

■

A brief overview of the increased competition

between Russia and the EU that has caused

Ukrainian politics to spiral into an international

crisis and the geopolitical dilemmas that Russia’s

land grab in Crimea pose in terms of policy

this report focuses on great-power

reactions as a basis for a realistic

assessment of how policymakers can

and should navigate the new perils of

european security

response.

■

An analysis of the foreign-policy reactions of the

Western great powers, namely Germany, Poland,

the United States, France, and the United Kingdom,

with particular attention to sectional interests or

the revival of historical sensitivities that account

For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the

Crimean crisis has forced Western powers to seek a

new equilibrium between balancing Russia through

forceful countermeasures or accommodating mutual

security interests in an East-West dialogue. Basically

incompatible ways of thinking about security are

complicating the management of state relations in the

spirit of a cooperative and inclusive Euro-Atlantic

space. This calls for a qualitative assessment of the

political purpose underlying the Western attempt to

promote political-economic integration in Eastern

Europe, concentrating on how this clashes with

Russia’s determination to contain this aim.

This report discusses the management of East-West

relations going forward given a new geopolitical

situation in which Russia controls territory in all three

borderline republics that aspire to closer ties with the

EU (Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova). It provides a study

in European great-power politics with the aim of

exploring the possibilities for successfully managing

East-West relations, defined as the restoration of

stable security interactions through accommodation,

balancing, or a mixture of both.

■

for predictability in action over time.

The pattern of reaction and its impact on Russia,

which provide an assessment of viable Europe

Russia readjustments and institutional responses

to the changed eastern neighborhood (EU, NATO),

given the conflict’s protracted economic

implications.

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

UkRAiNE bETwEEN RUssiA

ANd ThE EU

While european policy makers were well aware of

Russia’s objections to NAto enlargements, the

Ukrainian crisis came as a big surprise in terms

of the depth and severity of Russia’s objections

to a growing EU influence in the common

neighborhood.

The relationship between the EU and Russia deterior-

ated significantly after 2009, when the EU launched its

Eastern Partnership to cover the eastern dimension of

the existing European Neighborhood Policy. Russia

quickly developed a hostile zero-sum attitude to the

EU’s growing influence in the region, launching its own

alternative Eurasian Customs Union in 2011 with

Kazakhstan and Belarus, and leaving no doubt that it

would like to see other post-Soviet states joining in

too.

Russia’s integration project suffered severe setbacks

when Ukraine was scheduled to sign an Association

Agreement (AA) with the EU during the Eastern

Partnership summit in Vilnius in November 2013, an

agreement that had been initialed in 2012. At the same

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

time, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia were supposed

to initial an AA after years of negotiation with the EU.

The AA is a framework for closer political association

and includes as its most substantial element the Deep

and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), in

which candidate countries commit themselves to

implement EU laws and regulations in return for

enhanced access to the EU market. To a large extent

the EU formulated association with itself or with

Russia as an either/or question, which may have

increased Russia’s already hostile attitude to the AA

and the DCFTA.

Russia exerted intense pressure on the neighborhood

republics not to opt in to the EU initiative approaching

the Vilnius Summit, using trade sanctions and threats

to cut energy supplies. In the case of Armenia, it also

threatened to withdraw its military presence from the

country. As a result, only Moldova and Georgia

remained on the DCFTA course, while Armenia opted

for the Eurasian Customs Union. Russia rewarded

Ukrainian President Yanukovich’s decision not to sign

AA in November 2013 with a package of much-needed

economic benefits, including $15 billion of credit, the

elimination of trade sanctions, and lower gas prices

(Lehne, 2014: 7-8). Yanukovich’s decision not to sign

was at first seen as a victory for Russia’s hard power

game, but the Euromaidan protests in Kiev and other

major cities in Ukraine that were provoked by this

decision showed the persistence of the EU’s soft

power.

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

As the situation threatened to spiral out of control, with

casualties increasing in the Maidan, Poland, Germany,

and France (acting on behalf of the EU) brokered a

deal between President Yanukovich and the opposi-

tion. The deal signed on February 21 restored

Ukraine’s constitution of 2004 and scheduled elections

for May 2014. The loss of life in the Maidan arguably

made Yanukovich’s position untenable and contri-

buted to his rapid ouster. On February 27, the new

interim government in Kiev announced that it intended

to reverse Yanukovich’s decision and to sign up to the

DCFTA. Russian ‘green men’ gained military control

over Crimea on March 2. The European Commission

soon thereafter pledged $15 billion in loans and grants

to keep the new government in Kiev financially afloat

in the face of looming bankruptcy – the same amount

Moscow had initially offered Yanukovich as a reward

for not signing the AA. The referendum on the status

of Crimea, held on March 16, was in favor of Crimea

joining the Russian Federation, and Russia formalized

its annexation of the peninsula on March 18. The

interim government in Kiev signed the political

framework of the AA, but not as yet the DCFTA, with

the EU on March 21. These events demonstrated that

Russia and the EU were the main external actors

affecting political developments in Ukraine.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea, despite her strong and

well-established historical and ethnic ties to the

peninsula, is a far-reaching step that represents the

greatest revision of Europe’s geopolitical landscape

since German reunification. Territorial annexation

represents a major geopolitical rupture, one that

shows that Russia is no longer playing by established

international rules. The West’s recognition of Kosovo

and Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South

Ossetia in 2008 nourished great mutual distrust, but

neither were cases of outright territorial expansion.

Moreover, in annexing Crimea, Russia violated the

assurances concerning Ukraine’s territorial integrity

that were enshrined in the 1994 Budapest Memor-

andum in return for Ukraine giving up its nuclear

arsenal. Russia, according to NATO estimates,

stationed about 35,000-40,000 combat-ready troops

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

on Ukraine’s eastern border, nourishing fears of further

military incursions as a response to Kiev’s anti-

separatist crackdown.

Russia now enjoys control over all of the three

post-Soviet borderline republics that aspire to closer

association with the EU or NATO: Georgia, Moldova,

and Ukraine. None of these countries can seriously

start accession negotiations unless they are willing de

jure to give up their now de facto separatist entities

(Abkhazia/South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Crimea).

When it comes to association agreements, Russia

retains the ability to exert pressure on the govern-

ments of these countries through gas cut-offs, trade

embargoes, or the further encouragement of separat-

ism. The annexation of Crimea expressed Russia’s

determination not only to contain the EU, but also to

strengthen its own Moscow-centric integration

projects.

One should not underestimate the significant amount

of soft power which Russia enjoys in many parts of

Eastern Europe. On the economic side, being on good

terms with Russia implies visa-free regimes and easy

access for immigrant workers to the Russian labor

market, due in no small part to Russia’s own shrinking

demography. Seasonal work and remittances are a

much-needed economic boost to small economies

like Georgia or Moldova. On the ‘cultural’ side, Russia

enjoys the predominance of Russian media, especially

TV, with a powerful ability to influence public opinion

among CIS countries where Russian remains the

dominant lingua franca. Ethnic ties and a shared

history and religion are effective in mobilizing do-

mestic constituents, as shown by the strong pro-Rus-

sian sentiments in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.

■

the simultaneous reliance on hard and soft

power leaves the Western powers bewildered

about how to deal with Russia’s unilateral

redrawing of the borders of eastern europe

The simultaneous reliance on hard and soft power

leaves the Western powers bewildered about how to

deal with Russia’s unilateral redrawing of the borders

of eastern Europe. Putin challenges the plus-sum

thinking that characterizes the attempt to expand the

liberal security community through forms of associ-

ated affiliation. The new geopolitical situation is

closing down some opportunities while opening up

others. Although Russia’s hard-power assertiveness

has dismembered Ukraine as a coherent state, it has

strengthened Ukraine’s otherwise weak sense of

nationhood and pushed Kiev and moderate forces

further westwards. This changed geopolitical land-

scape begs three essential questions:

To what extent should Russia be confronted with

sanctions, and with what long-term aim?

To what extent, and using which incentives, should

the neighborhood countries be supported?

To what extent does the Crimean crisis give reason

to reassert NATO’s Article 5?

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

REAcTiONs TO RUssiA’s

cRimEAN ANNExATiON

the reaction to the Crimean crisis calls for a primary focus on the great powers, which is

essential to understanding how the relationship between Russia and europe may develop

beyond the crisis.

As during other major international crises such as the invasion of Iraq in 2003 or the

Russo-Georgian war in 2008, it is great powers that structure the international pattern.

the Ukrainian crisis witnessed the strong involvement of two european powers with strong

ties to the post-Soviet region (Germany, Poland) and less direct involvement by three other

powers (United States, France, United Kingdom).

Together, these five states constitute the stable pattern around which international

coalitions align in an otherwise great variety of foreign-policy preferences on the crucial

Russia question. the position of each power is analyzed in turn, addressing the historical

narratives that account for stability over time.

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Germany

Berlin has risen to the challenge of formulating a

consistent foreign-policy stance and, indeed, has

emerged as a pivotal actor on European–Russia

affairs. Although Germany has emerged from the

recent economic crisis as Europe’s strongest country,

it was not until the Crimean crisis that it came to

assume an actual political leadership role that went

beyond mere rhetorical signals. By contrast to the

Russo-Georgian war of 2008, when France was in the

front seat, this time it was Germany that appeared as

the key European state determined to meet Russia’s

annexation with gradual sanctions. Whereas in 2008 it

was reluctant to impose sanctions, such as suspend-

ing the EU–Russia Partnership and Cooperation

Agreement and the NATO–Russia Council, in 2014

Germany changed its position towards one of gradual

confrontation as a response to further Russian

escalations. On the other hand, Germany wanted to

facilitate de-escalation by avoiding NATO deployments

and keeping communication channels open.

Moreover, Merkel made it clear that Germany would be

ready to stand united with the other 27 EU members

and the United States in imposing sanctions

(Bundestag, 2014). After Russia’s formal annexation of

Crimea, Germany consequently agreed to the imposi-

tion of travel bans and asset freezes targeting top

Russian business people and politicians and signaled

a willingness to proceed to trade sanctions if Russia

were to escalate the crisis further. Merkel declared that

the G-8 format effectively no longer existed (BBC,

2014a). On the other hand, Germany was on the

conservative side on the issue of expanding the list of

blacklisted Russians, as expressed by Steinmeier: ‘[w]

nineteenth and twentieth centuries’, while implying

that the ‘right of the strong is being pitted against the

strength of the right, and one-sided geopolitical

interests against understanding and cooperation’.

Merkel rejected the perception of the Association

Agreement (AA) as directed against Russia and as an

either/or choice for Ukraine between the West and

Moscow.

the eU lives up to Berlin’s ideal ‘civilian

power’ principles for how influence should be

exerted because it works through economic

incentives

e’re doing a balancing act, whereby we can still find a

diplomatic solution and not paint ourselves into a

corner’ (EUobserver, 2014a). Steinmeier paid a visit to

Donetsk on March 23 and called for international

financial support to Ukraine, adding that the Crimean

crisis must not cause Ukraine to split up (Euronews,

In the early phase of the Ukrainian crisis, German

Foreign Minister Steinmeier reacted to the unrest in

Ukraine with conciliatory rhetoric, saying that both

Russia and Europe should work for the stabilization of

the country and to prevent the creation of new

divisions in Europe. Germany from an early stage

supported the creation of a ‘Contact Group’ led by the

OSCE (Boston Globe, 2014). However, Germany’s

position quickly shifted after Russia’s military incur-

sion into Crimea, and especially after Russia’s formal

annexation of the peninsula. Steinmeier condemned

Russia’s ‘attempt to splinter Europe’ (Radio Free

Europe, 2014). In a speech to the German Bundestag

on March 13, Angela Merkel called upon Russia to

abandon what she referred to as the ‘politics of the

2014).

Steinmeier supported the suspension of activities in

the NATO–Russia Council but nevertheless stressed

the need to keep channels open to prepare for the pos-

sibility of de-escalation. Unhappy with NATO Secretary

General Rasmussen’s wording (in an op-ed in Die

Welt) that the path to NATO membership remains

open for Ukraine, Steinmeier responded that ‘NATO

membership for Ukraine is not pending’ and adding

that foreign policy was in danger of becoming

militarized (Atlantic, 2014). The Chancellery simultan-

eously refused to deploy large numbers of troops as

requested by Poland and the Baltic States because it

would give Russia reasons for breaching treaties.

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Steinmeier claimed that the deployment of a signific-

ant NATO force in Poland would not be completely in

line with the 1997 accords with Russia committing

NATO to refrain from stationing large numbers of

troops in former Warsaw Pact countries (Reuters,

2014a). On the other hand, Germany supported the

deployment of AWACS to increase security on NATO’s

borders with Russia (EUobserver, 2014b). In April

Germany also took the step of halting the export of

German weapons to Russia ‘as matter of principle’

(Telegraph, 2014c).

Germany’s reaction to the Crimean crisis is best

described as a continuation of its Ostpolitik, a key

foreign policy guiding principle since the Cold War.

Germany saw the ability to reach out and facilitate

dialogue as means of promoting détente with eastern

Europe and the Soviet Union as a major contribution to

the peaceful end of the Cold War. After assuming

office, Steinmeier made it clear that he would continue

to work in the tradition of Ostpolitik when in 2006 the

German Foreign Ministry described its policy towards

Russia as one of ‘rapprochement through economic

interlocking’ (Stelzenmüller, 2009: 93-94). Germany

perceives itself as the most important bridge-builder

between Europe and Russia, based on the assumption

that its greatest triumph would be the successful

integration of Russia into a rule-based international

order.

A powerful historical narrative compels Germany’s

empathetic engagement with and integration of

Moscow. First, Germany sees in Russia a negative

parallel to its own national fate. Just as the harsh

conditions imposed on Germany under the Treaty of

Versailles in the 1920s and 1930s after its First World

War defeat led to the rise of National Socialism, it is

crucial that Russia today is not marginalized in the

current international system after its so called ‘defeat’

in the Cold War. Germany therefore generally seeks to

avoid confrontational moves that could risk cornering

Russia and pushing it further into increased domestic

upheaval involving nationalism and militarism (Chivvis

and Rid, 2009: 118). Secondly, Germany retains a

fundamental, tacit feeling of guilt from the atrocities it

committed in eastern Europe and Russia during the

Second World War. Germany’s own process of coming

to terms with the past provides a powerful impetus for

abstaining from criticizing Russia, even though

decision-makers are rarely explicit about it.

Germany’s dovish attitude can be traced back to one

generational factor: among the generation presently in

power in Germany, many look gratefully to Russia for

having supported German reunification in the 1990s

and for its willingness to engage in genuine efforts to

dissolve the communist bloc. Some nuanced differ-

ences, however, can be identified between the Social

Democratic Party (SDP) to which Steinmeier belongs

and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to which

Merkel belongs, the latter being generally more hostile

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

(Krause, 2004: 48-49). Berlin adheres to internationally

agreed principles and reacts strongly to overt

breaches against it because Germany fears the

deterioration of relations into obsolete power rivalry

for spheres of influence in Europe. Moreover, Germany

has a traditionally strong preference for working

through the EU, which Berlin sees as a benign interna-

tional actor. Rather than NATO, with its far stronger

hard-power component, the EU lives up to Berlin’s

ideal ‘civilian power’ principles for how influence

should be exerted because it works through economic

incentives. Whereas in 2008 Germany showed

sympathy for Russia’s opposition to NATO extending

its Membership Action Plans to Ukraine and Georgia, it

has shown less understanding for Russia’s wish to

contain the EU because it perceives the latter as an

inherently benign civilian actor.

Germany has been trapped between two contradictory

to Russia than the former and increasingly critical of

Putin’s authoritarian style (Nünlist, 2014). As another

example, CDU Finance Minister Schäuble drew an

analogy between Russia’s annexation of Crimea and

Hitler’s annexation of the Sudetenland (Spiegel,

2014a). Merkel has consistently been more critical of

Russia than Steinmeier, who earlier during his time as

foreign minister spoke openly about the need for

establishing Germany’s equidistance between

Washington and Moscow. Recent opinion polls in

Germany have shown, fuelled most recently by

revelations of National Security Agency surveillance

activities in Europe, a populace so distrustful of the

United States that it sceptical of following it in

geopolitical conflict (Wall Street Journal, 2014e).

On the other hand, Germany’s strong commitment to

international law compels it to condemn territorial

annexation. German foreign policy-making at all levels

cherishes multilateralism, international rules, and

consensus-building almost as goals in their own right

concerns in its response to the seizure of Crimea: its

fundamental commitment to international law and

economic integration versus its role as a bridge-

builder to Russia. In addition to its strong moral

concerns, one should also take into account Ger-

many’s strong dependence on Russian gas supplies

(35 percent of its imports), which have pushed Berlin

away from the idea of proceeding to trade sanctions

because it would hurt the German economy just as it

is recovering from the financial crisis. The inaugura-

tion of the North Stream direct gas pipeline between

Germany and Russia in 2012 signaled a continued

strong bilateral relationship based on economic

interests, in contrast to other EU members’ attempts

to promote a Southern Energy corridor weakening

Russia’s position as energy supplier. German industry

has warned that 6,200 German companies work in

Russia, accounting for 300,000 jobs (Ostausschuss,

2014), but Steinmeier has stated instead that there

can now be no business as usual with Russia

(EUobserver, 2014c).

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Poland

Warsaw’s position in many ways represents the

antithesis of Berlin’s in the sense that it has called for

a strong military build-up in existing NATO countries,

extending a supporting hand to Kiev, and has called for

common measures to punish and isolate Russia for its

actions in Ukraine. In 2008, in concert with the Baltic

States and Ukraine, Polish politicians reached out to

the Georgian government by flying to Tbilisi to act as

human shields against the Russian invasion. However,

the move was isolated as a predominantly symbolic

gesture detached from the broader Western effort of

which the suspension of the NATO–Russia Council

was the most tangible evidence. The Ukrainian crisis,

conversely, has underlined Poland’s rise from its

As initiator (with Sweden) of the EU’s Eastern Partner-

ship, Poland put a great deal of effort and national

prestige into Ukraine accepting the AA and in ensuring

Kiev’s continued west-leaning course. Foreign Minister

Sikorski emphasized Poland’s role as a European

leader on the Ukrainian issue: ‘the EU will not take any

decisions concerning Ukraine without Poland. Many

European governments expect Poland to be a leader

on this issue given Poland’s historical and diplomatic

experience and the role it plays in the Eastern Partner-

ship policy’ (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a).

marginal position as a new NATO member in 1999 to

being among the top six most influential countries

today.

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Poland advocated the immediate extension of a

promise of EU membership to Ukraine (EUobserver,

2014f). Moreover, it was strongly opposed to Russian

demands for the federalization of Ukraine: ‘[w]e cannot

agree to a colonial discourse that it is foreign powers

which impose a constitution on a large European

state. Ukraine, if it wants to, will decentralize on its

own’ (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014c).

As in its role as a mediator in the Orange Revolution in

2004-05, Poland was a major actor in brokering the

deal on February 21 ending the violent conflict

between pro-Europe protesters and the Yanukovich

government. From an early stage the Polish parlia-

ment called on the Ukrainian authorities to settle the

conflict through public dialogue and gradual state

reform according to European standards (KyivPost,

2013). Sikorski was caught on camera warning the

opposition, ‘If you don’t support this [deal] you’ll have

martial law, the army, you will all be dead’ (Telegraph,

2014a) as a testimony to Poland’s direct involvement.

Poland (along with Sweden and the United Kingdom)

initiated the deployment of the CSDP mission to

Ukraine to help it carry out reforms of its security

apparatus (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b).

As Sikorski also stated: ‘I think Ukraine is paying the

price of 20 years of strategic illusions of being able to

be neutral and of not paying enough attention to their

security sector’ (Washington Post, 2014a).

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Poland turned out to be the strongest supporter of a

Cold-War style reassurance of military protection.

Poland (along with Lithuania) called for a NATO

meeting under Article 4 in response to Russia’s

incursion into Crimea. Sikorski said that the time had

not yet come to fear a military threat: ‘It’s just that we

are concerned for ominous developments on the

territory of an important partner of NATO. And that’s

why it has been important and correct to raise NATO’s

situational awareness. And, of course, the question

remains whether Crimea is the limit or whether it’s

phase one, and then, of course, it could get much more

serious’ (CNN, 2014). As the build-up of Russian

troops threatened to intervene in eastern Ukrainian

Sikorski advocated a hawkish line in terms of sanc-

tioning Russia, describing it as a ‘predator’ and stating

that ‘we know that by eating predators only have even

more appetite’ (Spiegel, 2014b). On the other hand, it

was less clear what such sanctions could entail: ‘The

EU’s reaction demonstrates that we are united and

that sanctions are possible and will be severe.

Moreover, we are showing Moscow a way out of the

crisis, and I think that Russia should expect severe

economic sanctions if it decides to invade the rest of

Ukraine’ (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a). He

added that ‘[o]nly about 30 percent of the natural gas

in the EU originates from Russia. Norway is a larger

supplier. I do not believe Russia can use it to put us

under pressure. Moscow needs our money’ (Spiegel,

2014c). Sikorski was disappointed with the EU’s actual

willingness to sanction Russia’s inner circles, declaring

‘the US is from Mars and we’re from Venus – get used

to it’ (EUobserver, 2014a).

Poland is very explicit about the lessons it has drawn

from the twentieth century that compels it to stand in

solidarity with its Ukrainian kin against Russia. Poland

sees the events in Ukraine through the lens of its own

destiny as a victim of great-power partitioning, leading

either to the destruction of the Polish state or it being

reduced to a satellite state under Moscow’s tutelage.

In the words of Foreign Minister Sikorski, ‘[w]e were

partitioned by Russia in the eighteenth century – liter-

ally our country was occupied. And this was also done

on the pretext of protecting national minorities. So it’s

separatism, Poland asked NATO for the deployment on

its territory of two heavy brigades corresponding to

around 10,000 troops (Financial Times, 2014). Polish

Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that the pace at

which NATO was increasing its military presence was

unsatisfactory (Reuters, 2014). The Polish Ministry of

Foreign Affairs (2014a) declared the NATO decision to

reinforce defense capabilities on the eastern border to

be a ‘good way of strengthening our position ahead of

the negotiations’.

an old story. It’s like watching an opera whose libretto

is known in advance.’ Sikorski further added that, ‘[i]n

Europe there isn’t a country that doesn’t have national

minorities, and if we started changing borders on the

pretext of protecting them we would be back to the

hell of the 20th century’ (Polskie Radio dla Zagranicy,

2014).

Although being careful in drawing direct parallels

between Putin’s Russia and Hitler’s Germany, Polish

decision-makers insinuated that there were such

similarities. Tusk has said that ‘[h]istory shows – al-

though I don’t want to use too many historical

comparisons – that those who appease all the time in

order to preserve peace usually only buy a little bit of

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

time’ (EUobserver, 2014e). In the same vein, Sikorski

declared that ‘[n]o one has the unilateral right to move

borders in response to presumed ethnic grievances.

We’ve seen what happened when a European leader

tried to do that before: the peoples of the Soviet Union

paid one of the biggest prices for this’ (Telegraph,

2014b).

lessons from us than from their former colonial

masters or from countries with strong ties to their

former dictators. Poland is true to herself when we

play the role of a beacon of international solidarity on

democratization’ (Foreign Affairs, 2013). Poland

identifies with countries with similar geopolitical

concerns as Poland did in the past (Lasas, 2010:

1062-63), first in breaking free from a Moscow-im-

posed hegemony, and secondly in assisting in

Poland’s willingness to risk a substantial

deterioration of the relationship with Russia

must be ascribed to historical animosities

overruling its material dependence

developing a democratic system at the domestic level.

In sum, a strong and unequivocal historical narrative

broadly shared by domestic constituents drives

Poland to take a confrontational posture against

Russia, which entails not only sanctions but also

Moreover, for historical reasons Poland looks at the

West European powers with greater skepticism as to

their ability and courage to stand up for NATO’s

principles. Sikorski described those who think that

Ukraine can save itself by sacrificing Crimea as

‘pocket Chamberlains’, adding that Europe has never

lacked such people (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

2014a). Making a clear reference to 1939, when the

United Kingdom and France declared war but did not

live up to their commitment to start fighting Germany

after it had invaded Poland, Tusk declared that ‘[w]e

know from history that guarantees can be empty. The

guarantees of serious countries about Ukraine’s

territorial integrity also turned out to be guarantees of

doubtful quality. We want Poland to be defended by

the military, not only by words written in a treaty’

(Financial Times, 2014). Poland values its bilateral

relationship with the United States over the paper

guarantees the multilateral institution that is NATO.

Finally, Poland has historical ties with the post-Soviet

region, especially Ukraine, whose western regions

were part of Poland before 1939. Poland represents by

far the biggest country among the former communist

states and, given its own successful transition to

democratic rule, sees itself as a mentor and a bridge-

builder between the established democracies and the

emerging democracies in the east. Sikorski earlier

declared that ‘[…] some of these countries think of us

as role models. We are more comparable to them than

the United States. And they are more willing to take

reinforced NATO guarantees and increased direct

support of Kiev. The sharp contrast between the Polish

and German foreign policy reactions highlights the

imperfections of political economy in explaining

divergent foreign policies. Russia is a bigger export

partner for Poland than for Germany. Poland’s

dependence on Russian gas as a share of domestic

consumption (54.2 percent) is higher than Germany’s

(39.9 percent) (Ratner et al., 2013: 10). Poland’s

willingness to risk a substantial deterioration of the

relationship with Russia must be ascribed to historical

animosities overruling its material dependence.

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

United States

On the rhetorical level Washington played a rather

hawkish line against Russia and voiced strong support

for the pro-European forces in Ukraine from an early

stage. On the other hand, today’s situation is different

from the US position under George W. Bush, who in

2008 was ready to reward Ukraine with NATO mem-

bership for its fragile democratic progress after the

Orange Revolution. At the time the United States also

had a large number of military advisors stationed in

Tbilisi, none of which can be said to be the case in Kiev

today. The US ‘reset’ with Russia in 2009 heralded a

new period of pragmatic management of relations: in

Vice President Biden’s words, ‘the United States and

Russia can disagree but still work together where our

interests coincide’ (Biden, 2009). The seriousness of

the Ukraine disagreement, however, left the Obama

administration challenged by suddenly having to

readjust to a combative diplomatic line underpinned

by sanctions and coordinated efforts with the EU.

The United States plays a naturally primordial role in

reassuring its eastern allies about NATO’s willingness

to defend them. At the beginning of the conflict,

Washington’s Article 5 reassurances were predomin-

antly rhetorical, exemplified by Vice President Biden’s

visits to Lithuania and Poland at the end of March and

his declaration that ‘[w]e will respond to any aggres-

sion against a NATO ally’ (White House, 2014a). As a

short-term measure the United States decided to add

six fighter aircraft to the NATO air-policing mission

over the Baltic States, and it also dispatched twelve

F-16 fighters for a training exercise in Poland (White

House, 2014b). Washington subsequently dispatched

a total of 600 troops, 150 of them to Poland for a

bilateral infantry exercise and 450 to the Baltic States

for similar exercises (US Department of Defense,

bailout cash that the EU countries mustered in

financial support of Kiev ($15 billion) after Russia’s

annexation of Crimea, the US contribution was only $1

billion (Voice of America, 2014).

the Ukrainian crisis has highlighted the

enduring dilemmas of democracy promotion

for a global power in retrenchment

2014). In June Obama proposed $1 billion in additional

defensive reassurances, including the pre-positioning

of military equipment in Europe and infrastructural

improvements.

As a non-EU member enjoying less structural power in

terms of its influence over Ukrainian politics, Washing-

ton played an important bilateral role in supporting the

Euromaidan protests and the interim government.

Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and the

Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt distributed

cakes in symbolic support of the protesters on the

Maidan in Kiev in December. Covert US activism was

also uncovered. CIA head John Brennan was reported

to be present in Kiev in mid-April. A leaked telephone

call between Nuland and Pyatt revealed that the United

States was involved in speculations about suitable

post-revolution candidates for assuming power in

Kiev. The leak, moreover, showed US frustration with

the EU in the latter using its long-term power of

attraction rather than playing an activist role (BBC,

2014b). However, compared to the amount of hard

Washington imposed more far-reaching sanctions

against Russia than did the EU. Targeting President

Putin’s inner circles and selected Russian companies

with travel bans and asset freezes, Washington made

it clear that Russia would have to suffer ‘costs’ for its

behavior. The United States has declared that sanc-

tions will not yet involve any attempt to target key

industries of the Russian economy such as mining,

energy, or the financial sectors, but that these meas-

ures could still be considered if Russia were to send

troops into eastern Ukraine (France24, 2014). The US

Treasury has powerful tools with which to impact Rus-

sia’s ability to access the global banking and trade

systems, imposing both investment and reputational

costs (Zarate, 2014). At the rhetorical level, Secretary

of State Kerry condemned Russia’s invasion of Crimea,

calling it an ‘incredible act of aggression’ (Reuters,

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

2014b). President Obama pejoratively classified

Russia as a ‘regional power’ that was threatening its

immediate neighbors not out of strength but out of

weakness (White House, 2014c).

The US commitment to supporting the free choice of

political and economic union goes back to the vision

of a ‘Europe whole and free’ into which subsequent

presidents wanted to infuse a strong US leadership.

The fall of the Berlin Wall was seen as a triumph of US

determination to defend freedom and democracy in

Europe through NATO and to make up for the earlier

abandonment of eastern Europe (Munich, Yalta). The

successful democratic transitions in central and

eastern Europe in the 1990s and 2000s were seen

through the lens of US and allied determination to

expand the EU and NATO. The war in Georgia in 2008

defied the US narrative and was interpreted as ‘the

resurgence of history’ by virtue of Russia’s attempt to

maintain a sphere of influence in eastern Europe.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 was interpreted

similarly as an attack against the free will of nations.

In a speech to European youth in Brussels, President

Obama described history as an ‘ongoing clash

between two sets of ideas [democracy versus

autocracy] both within nations and among nations’

(White House, 2014d). He added, ‘that’s what’s at

stake in Ukraine today. Russia’s leadership is challen-

ging truths that only a few weeks ago seemed

self-evident – that in the 21st century, the borders of

Europe cannot be redrawn with force, that interna-

tional law matters, that people and nations can make

their own decisions about their future’. Obama further

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

ment of NATO guarantees. The United States cannot

afford to let Russia undermine the European security

system. Burden-sharing with the EU in respect of its

powerful economic resources has proved to be crucial

in keeping Kiev afloat for the time being. The question

is not US economic dependency on Russia, which

the question is not US economic

dependency on Russia, which

remains insignificant, but whether

Washington in the long run will be

able to resist the temptation to fall

back on its reset policy to address

security issues outside europe

remains insignificant, but whether Washington in the

long run will be able to resist the temptation to fall

back on its reset policy to address security issues

outside Europe, notably Syria (chemical disarmament)

and Iran (curbing nuclear ambitions), areas where

Washington is strongly dependent on Moscow’s

cooperation (Fikenscher, 2014).

warned, ‘[t]o be honest, if we defined our interests

narrowly, if we applied a cold-hearted calculus, we

might decide to look the other way... Our own borders

are not threatened by Russia’s annexation. But that

kind of casual indifference would ignore the lessons

that are written in the cemeteries of this continent...

And that message would be heard not just in Europe,

but in Asia and the Americas, in Africa and the Middle

East’ (White House, 2014d).

In sum, the Ukrainian crisis has highlighted the

enduring dilemmas of democracy promotion for a

global power in retrenchment. The Obama administra-

tion, already blamed by the opposition for naively

believing it could reset relations with Moscow to focus

on the Asia-Pacific, has been under pressure to pursue

a harder line in terms of sanctions and the reinforce-

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

France

Paris sided with Washington and initially against Berlin

on the need for harsher sanctions against Russia.

Compared to its role as mediator in the Georgian

crisis, when Sarkozy, in his function as EU president,

bent over backwards to forge a European consensus,

this time France was better able to allow itself an

independent foreign policy stance. Foreign Minister

Fabius called Russia’s annexation the worst since the

end of the Cold War, adding that ‘we want firmness to

prevail and for Putin not to go any further, but at the

same time we want to de-escalate the situation via

dialogue’ (Reuters, 2014c). Fabius supported the

suspension of Russia’s G-8 participation and can-

celled a scheduled visit to Russia by its foreign and

defense ministers, but decided not to cancel Putin’s

visit to France in June to celebrate the seventieth

anniversary of the Normandy landings (Reuters,

French Prime Minister Ayrault called for everything to

be done to respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity. He

further said that ‘Ukrainians want democracy, and we

can understand that […] They are turning to Europe, to

European democracies. It is Ukrainians who must

build their future’ (RFI, 2014). On the other hand,

France has been wary of reaching out to Ukraine. As

early as in February 2014, French officials communic-

ated that Western countries should await the Ukrain-

ian elections in May before pledging large-scale

assistance, arguing that this would undermine the

push for reform and alienate Moscow (Wall Street

Journal, 2014a). France not only opposed any mention

2014c). France threatened wider economic sanctions

as pro-Russian separatists stormed government

buildings in eastern Ukraine.

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

of Ukrainian EU membership, but also wanted to affirm

that Ukraine would never become a member (EUob-

server, 2014f). The French position is not new,

however, but fits its vision of a Europe of concentric

circles consisting of core countries (including itself)

and associated members such as Turkey or Ukraine

on the periphery.

dependence on Russia is limited due in no small part

to its reliance on nuclear energy. On the other hand,

France faced one sectional dilemma, namely its

significant arms trade with Russia (the highest among

European countries), and notably the sale of Mistral

amphibious assault vessels produced in France.

The timing of the arms trade is problematic (the first

vessel is scheduled to arrive in October), but France

Paris’s reactions were cooler and reflected

more general concerns about a european

balance of power and world order

has 1,000 jobs directly at stake at a time when

unemployment is already high and the French arms

industry needs customers. President Hollande was

elected with the promise of creating more jobs.

Moreover, a breach of the $1.7 billion contract would

France has been a strong supporter of backing NATO’s

Article 5 with concrete action (despite common views

to the contrary) and taking the possibility of challenges

to NATO’s credibility as a collective defense alliance

seriously (Ministère de la Défense, 2013: 52). It was,

for instance, the biggest contributor to the Steadfast

Jazz exercise (with 1,200 troops), which NATO held in

Poland in November 2013. France deployed four

fighter jets to Poland along with seventy support

personnel to reassure its eastern allies as a response

to the annexation of Crimea (Newvision, 2014). On the

other hand, France has made it clear that military

action in Ukraine itself would not be an option (Wall

Street Journal, 2014c).

France does not have the same emotional connection

to the Ukrainian crisis and the eastern neighborhood

as Germany and Poland, nor, for that matter, as the

United States. Paris’s reactions were cooler and

reflected more general concerns about a European

balance of power and world order. Referring to

Ukraine’s 1994 renunciation of nuclear weapons,

Fabius stated that the Russian annexation of Crimea

made nuclear non-proliferation less relevant and that

the broken taboos tell us something about tectonic

shifts happening, the full scope of which are as yet

unknown (Brookings, 2014). France’s economic

entail heavy penalty payments (Economist, 2014).

France has not been willing to halt the trade despite

allied pressure; in the words of Foreign Minister

Fabius, ‘the rule with contracts is that contracts which

have been signed are honored’ (Economist, 2014).

Fabius said that the deal could be cancelled as part of

a third wave of sanctions but, in this case, that this

would be part of a general effort, notably the United

Kingdom taking equivalent measures against the

financial assets of Russian oligarchs in London (TF1,

2014). Fabius’ remark came as a response to the UK

proposal to punish Russia through restrictions on

military cooperation and the arms trade.

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

United Kingdom

London reacted with traditional hawkishness against

Russia in line with previous conflicts with Russia such

as the Litvinenko case, the closure of the British

Council in Russia, or allegations of Russian spying

activity. Hague described the situation as the biggest

crisis in the 21st century and warned that Russia

would face significant costs for its behavior in

international affairs (Mirror, 2014). Russia’s annexation

of Crimea caused a new wave of hawkish UK re-

sponses. Foreign Secretary William Hague uttered a

wish for fundamental change, suggesting that the

relationship with Russia would be ‘one in which

institutions such as the G8 work without Russia;

military co-operation and defense exports are

permanently curtailed; decisions are accelerated to

reduce European dependence on Russian energy

exports; foreign policy plays a bigger role in energy

policy; Russia has less influence in Europe; and

European nations do more to guard against a repeti-

tion of the flagrant violation of international norms’

(Guardian, 2014a).

Although London has been a hardliner against

Moscow, it is in a more favorable position than the

Foreign Secretary Hague travelled to Kiev as the first

high-ranking western official in Ukraine after Russia’s

military incursion into Crimea. The United Kingdom

has called for a firm NATO reinforcement: in the words

of Defense Secretary Hammond, ‘[c]ertainly one of the

things we are looking at is a greater participation in

exercises in the Baltic States, the eastern European

NATO member countries, as a way of reassuring them

about our commitment to article five […]’ (Guardian,

2014c). The Crimean crisis represents an awakening

for the United Kingdom, judging from the fact that the

National Security Strategy of 2010 places a conven-

tional attack against NATO in the lowest priority

category in terms of both its likelihood and its impact

(U.K. Ministry of Defence, 2010: 27).

(Guardian, 2014a). The United Kingdom decided to

suspend all military cooperation with and defense

exports to Russia, and urged its European allies to

follow suit.

London has been careful not to risk sanctions

that would damage its own sectional

interests, namely its status as a major haven

for Russian capital and Russian expats

other European great powers because it does not rely

on Russian gas and does not have a significant

pending arms trade deal on which many jobs depend.

By comparison to the French deal, last year the United

Kingdom granted licenses for arms exports to Russia

of approximately £80 million (Guardian, 2014b).

Acknowledging the fruitful relationship with Russia

developed over the years, Hague said that its actions

in Ukraine ‘hark back to a wholly different era’. He

continued that ‘[a]ll nations, including Russia, depend

on a rules-based international system. For those rules

to remain credible there must be costs attached to

breaking international agreements. If we do not defend

these principles in Ukraine, they will be threatened

elsewhere in Europe and the world’ (Telegraph, 2014d).

Hague argued that European nations should not ‘run

scared’ before Russia’s ‘bullying behavior’ (Telegraph,

2014d). Similarly, Prime Minister Cameron is reported

to have told his EU partners that sanctions are not

painless: ‘if you throw a punch, your wrist gets hurt’

However, it should be noted that London has been

careful not to risk sanctions that would damage its

own sectional interests, namely its status as a major

haven for Russian capital and Russian expats, whose

children attend British schools and universities

(Schwarzer and Stelzenmüller, 2014: 8).

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

REcAlibRATiNg

EURO-RUssiAN RElATiONs

Great-power reactions to Russia’s land grab in eastern europe reveal a pat-

tern in which they all agree that there can be no business as usual regarding

European security but also that the collective response reflects the lowest

common denominator on the three major issues.

they disagree basically on the harshness of sanctions against Russia and

whether they should serve as punitive measures (Poland) or as a platform for

a new east-West dialogue (Germany).

They disagree on the timing in providing financial support to Ukraine and the

wisdom in the longer term of Ukraine becoming either an associated or a full

eU member.

they agree on the need to reinforce NAto guarantees, but disagree on the

nature and extent of a military build-up in eastern europe and over whether

to provide military assistance to Ukraine.

the different great-power approaches must be assessed against their

effectiveness in restoring stable security relations with Russia and the strategic

objective of ensuring a european continent in which countries are free to choose

their political and economic associations.

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Countering Russia

The European powers, with the possible exception of

Poland, have not been willing to gamble their eco-

nomic dependence on Russia (whether shipyards,

financial interests, or energy imports) to engage in a

strategy of open confrontation. They have said,

however, that this would be the case if Russia were to

annex more territories in the eastern Ukraine. The

United States, from its position of economic independ-

ence, could impose tougher sanctions, but still with

the limited purpose of driving wedges between

Russia’s political leadership and its big businesses

and the population at large (Trenin, 2014). It was only

after the downing of the MH17 Malaysia airplane over

Ukraine that the EU proceeded to new measures

hitting Russia’s banks, oil industry and military and

withholding technology. The United States followed up

by announcing similar sanctions against Russian

banks as well as the energy, arms and shipping

sectors (Wall Street Journal, 2014f).

Some disagreement among allies was observed, such

as the United States and Poland over the French arms

trade or Poland over Germany’s energy dependence.

The Western response never came to an open

confrontation with Russia similar to the example of

Iran, in which consistent pressure was exerted for the

country to give up its nuclear program (Alcaro, 2014).

Instead, incrementalism prevailed for reasons related

to national interests or historical bonds with the

post-Soviet region as shown above, which in most

cases translated into a more downbeat assessment of

what sanctions could achieve. Sanctions were, after

all, limited mostly to travel bans and asset freezes.

Practical military and civilian cooperation in the

NATO–Russia Council was frozen, although the

possibility of dialogue was kept open, and cooperation

over, for instance, Afghanistan remained intact.

Most western states preferred rather symbolic

sanctions paralleled by a simultaneous diplomatic

dialogue with Moscow. The G-8 format was suspen-

ded, but one can question in this connection whether

the disruption of such an important great-power

In terms of efficiency, on the other hand, the incre-

mental approach to imposing sanctions on Russia has

proved its merits for the indirect damage it has caused

and continues to cause to the Russian economy. The

sanctions imposed in terms of exclusion from

international forums as such constituted a small

countermove to Moscow’s self-perceived interests in

Ukraine, with which it enjoys deep historical and

cultural ties. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov scoffed

at EU and US blacklists of Russian officials, saying,

‘We find little joy in that, but there are no painful

sensations. We have lived through tougher times’

(EUobserver, 2014b). The reality is, however, that

western sanctions scare investors and that market

reactions therefore have been grim for Russia.

forum was helpful in reality in pressuring Russia on

the Crimean and Ukrainian issues. As Wolfgang

Ischinger, German top diplomat and Chairman of the

Munich Security Conference, argued, subsequent bilat-

eral meetings between the G-7 and Russia were likely

to create conflicting messages about the situation in

Ukraine, and that it would therefore have been better

to keep the G-8 in place, with Crimea as the single

item on the agenda (Voice of Russia, 2014).

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

The International Monetary Fund predicts that the

combined impact of western sanctions and lost

market confidence will ruin all growth in Russia this

year and seriously affect the next (Wall Street Journal,

2014d). In the first place, Russian companies relying

heavily on western banks are affected by the decline of

the ruble because it pushes up their debt servicing and

refinancing costs for foreign currency-denominated

debt (Schwarzer and Stelzenmüller, 2014: 11). The

main problem, however, is not primarily the loss of

prestige connected to the plunge in the value of the

ruble or the Russian stock market, but more the fact

that raising money on the international markets has

become more costly and that investors are now

moving assets out of or refraining from entering

Russian markets (Trenin, 2014). The very threat of a

‘third wave’ of economic sanctions has been a

powerful impetus for investors to keep out of Russia.

The asymmetrical nature of the international financial

system allows the imposition of significant long-term

costs to Russia, with little costs to Europe itself.

Secondly, it remains questionable how the United

States as a net gas importer today would be able to

drive Russia out of the market by increasing its energy

exports to Europe (David and Leggett, 2014).

Thus, the threat of future sanctions will happen within

the climate of a mutual interdependence of energy

imports and export revenues. On the other hand,

dealing with Russia cannot be ascribed solely to

energy but reflects a broader issue of European (dis-)

unity (Tsafos, 2014). The great-power reaction pattern

shows a preference for de-escalation and a lack of

agreement on punitive sanctions, though with

agreement on the threat of a concerted third wave of

sanctions in vital sectors if Russia proceeds to further

incursions. The long-term goal of sanctions must

recognize that the recovery of Crimea is unattainable

but that Russia’s standing among international

investors, and thus its ability to generate growth other

than the extraction and export of energy sources, is

strongly vulnerable to western pressures. Moscow is

not in a favorable position in a war of competing

sanctions. Critics of the inability of western govern-

the asymmetrical nature of the international

financial system allows the imposition of

significant long-term costs to Russia, with

little costs to europe itself

ments to agree on effective sanctions do not seem to

fully appreciate the punitive power inherent in discred-

iting Russia as a reliable partner in the international

investment environment and the impact this has on

the Kremlin’s long-term cost-benefit calculi.

Russia’s pivot to China shows in practice how

sanctions can stimulate new geo-economic alliances.

In May Gazprom and the China National Petroleum

Corporation signed a thirty-year, $400 billion deal for

Russian gas sales to China starting in 2018. Although

Russia may have lost tactically on the price issue, it is

likely to be compensated by a strategic gain in the

diversification of Gazprom’s customer base and the

strengthening of Sino-Russian economic relations.

Within any foreseeable future, however, Europe will

remain Russia’s main energy market for at least two

reasons. First, the so-called shale-gas revolution is

better described as an evolution that will not reduce

but only stabilize Europe’s import dependency.

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Assisting Ukraine

The European countries (backed by the United States),

rather than punishing Russia to give in, are better

positioned to assist Ukraine in its declared ambition of

seeking closer ties with the EU. Newly elected Presid-

ent Poroshenko in June signed the Deep and Compre-

hensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU

under the Association Agreement (AA) and, moreover,

has called for parliamentary elections in Ukraine

before the end of 2014 to ensure national unity on the

new reform progress. Any effort intended to assist

Ukraine must start with the basic premise that caused

the crisis in the first place, namely the powerful

external structures that forced Ukraine to choose

which economic bloc to align with, Europe or Eurasia.

Fragility and domestic mismanagement have been

Ukraine’s main problems since its post-Soviet

independence. Despite possessing a skilled and

educated workforce and important natural resources,

Ukraine’s economy continues to struggle to sustain

economic growth. Corruption and institutional

inefficiency remain major problems hampering the

development of a responsive state. Neither the Orange

coalition in 2005 nor the rise of Yanukovich in 2010

resulted in the necessary economic and institutional

reforms that could ensure Ukraine’s coherence as an

independent country or give it a better investment

climate (World Economic Forum, 2014: 5). Ukraine’s

number one problem remains its inability to sustain

itself, leaving it in an uncomfortable situation depend-

ent on external support, with severe domestic reper-

cussions along ethno-linguistic lines.

The AA is undoubtedly the most effective carrot

beyond the EU’s mere provision of a financial bailout,

offering at least two important advantages conducive

to wider domestic reform that Ukraine needs. First, the

gradual adoption of EU laws and regulations (the

acquis communautaire) holds out the long-term

prospect of more transparent and effective national

institutions. The agreement can potentially help

Ukraine in reducing its widespread corruption, which

has made it difficult or impossible for successive

Implementation of the DCFTA is sensitive in the short

run because it will be harmful to sectors in Ukraine

that are currently protected from free market competi-

tion. Moreover, it entails painful demands for legislat-

ive compliance and institutional reform. Ukrainian

agricultural products will benefit most from the cuts in

duties, the expectation being that this will stimulate

modernization. The DCFTA offers the opening of

markets via a progressive removal of custom tariffs

and quotas and extensive harmonization of laws and

regulations with the acquis in both the service and

non-service sectors (DG Trade, 2013). The long-term

expectation is that capital accumulation and the

facilitation of cross-border production will improve

conditions for deeper integration both among the

governments to implement well-intended reforms.

Secondly, the expectation is that the DCFTA will attract

global investments to a country in which the invest-

ment to GDP ratio remains very low. The accreditation

of EU quality standards to Ukrainian goods constitutes

a sign of trust for global markets, which is conducive

to exports on global markets and the inflow of crucial

foreign investments. Regulatory reform, elimination of

import tariffs, opening up service sectors and im-

provement in business climate create better invest-

ment conditions (Manoli, 2013: 63).

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

pre-accession, which, although it may not lead

automatically to accession, constitutes a step in this

direction. The Enlargement Commissioner, Stefan Füle,

has openly said that the prospect of EU membership

should be held out (Eastern Partnership Civil Society

Forum, 2014). Moreover, the language of the final

declaration of the Vilnius Summit (November 2013) is

sufficiently vague to allow the Eastern Partnership

countries to find support for their wish to move

beyond neighborhood status (Blockmans and Kostan-

yan, 2013). On the other hand, the completion of the

DCFTA encounters at least two major obstacles: the

poor record of domestic progress in the candidate

countries, and the geopolitical costs of an alienated

Russia.

First, Ukraine has suffered from the absence of real

political and economic reform since independence,

with wealth concentrated in the hands of government

Eastern Partnership economies and with the EU

market itself, which has remained at low levels. The

DCFTA attributes an important role to business

communities and non-state actors to strengthen or

create new market ties from the bottom up (Manoli,

2013: 63). Altogether, the DCFTA constitutes an

attractive model for aligning key economic sectors in

Ukraine with EU standards.

officials and their oligarchic allies (Charap and Darden,

2013). Its democratic standards deteriorated under

Yanukovich, although this tendency may now reverse.

If the memory of Romania and Bulgaria’s EU acces-

sion stands out as cases of insufficient reform, the EU

is navigating in an even more delicate climate when it

comes to the transition to democratic rule in Ukraine.

The fundamental question is whether Poroshenko can

obtain Parliament’s consent in delivering broad

structural change: punishing corrupt elites, decentral-

Much of the discussion on the AA/DCFtA

between the eU and its eastern partners

concerns its geopolitical implications rather

than estimates purely of welfare

izing power to the regions, and giving small busi-

nesses especially an environment in which they can

flourish for the benefit of the national economy.

Ukraine must avoid the repetition of the rivalries that

hampered the earlier Orange coalition (Freizer, 2014).

It is important to realize, as Minoli has argued (2013:

63), that much of the discussion on the AA/DCFTA

between the EU and its eastern partners concerns its

geopolitical implications rather than estimates purely

of welfare. Europeanization has a high degree of

political significance, if only symbolically, beyond the

mere integration of economies because most trade is

already liberalized and tariffs have already been greatly

reduced as a consequence of Ukraine’s WTO member-

ship. In reality the AA/DCFTA signifies the most

advanced phase of political association, that before

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

According to political scientist Pippa Norris, Ukraini-

ans’ approval ratings of ‘strong man’ leadership

amount to around seventy percent, with very little

difference between Ukrainian and Russian speakers

on this issue. In eastern Europe, the spectrum of

division runs from approval ratings for Poles of 22

percent and for Russians of 75 percent (Washington

Post, 2014b). The EU should acknowledge the

economic and cultural attraction that Russia enjoys in

Ukraine’s southern and eastern regions, as highlighted

at the beginning of this report. Surveys in eastern

Ukraine have shown that a majority there does not

want to be absorbed by Russia as Crimea was, but

also that it does not want to antagonize the big

eastern neighbor but rather maintain close cultural

and economic ties with it (Merry, 2014). Surveys also

show increased polarization in the Ukrainian popula-

tion on the AA issue after the Maidan protests

(International Republican Institute, 2014).

Secondly, the EU needs to take fully into account the

fact that Russia does not perceive it as an a priori

benign actor. The AA/DCFTA runs counter to its

alternative Eurasian Customs Union integration

project. The EU and Russia are competing for influ-

ence in the sense that Ukraine cannot meaningfully

participate in both the DCFTA and the Russia-led

Customs Union, which constitutes the essence of the

Ukrainian conflict. Russia’s economic presence in the

Eastern Partnership republics has declined steadily in

recent years, and the conclusion of AAs/DCFTAs

would further isolate Russia from countries where it

has significant capital interests (banking and energy

sectors) and to which it exports competitive goods.

The EU is therefore faced with significant geopolitical

costs in terms of instability as a consequence of

Russian political and economic pressures in the

common neighborhood (Charap and Troitskiy, 2013:

53; Minoli, 2013: 66-68).

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Ukraine’s economic choice developed into an interna-

tional crisis in great part because Russia interpreted

the question using a strategic zero-sum logic.

However, any nuanced assessment must recognize as

well that the EU contributed to the intensification of

the conflict. On the domestic level, EU officials quickly

embraced the new Ukrainian interim government,

which had ties to extremist and fascist factions. On

the international level, the EU initially refusing trilateral

talks with Ukraine and Russia on the practical implica-

tions of the implementation of AA/DCFTA and by

balancing the David and Goliath economic relationship

between Kiev and Moscow, in turn producing uncer-

tainty about the outcome of the entire process.

Moreover, the AA states that economic integration and

political association are complementary processes.

Gone are the days when the general perception of the

EU was that of an ‘innocent’ international actor

engaged in low politics such as good governance (in

contrast to hard security through NATO expansion).

The EU, and in particular the Commission, needs to

acknowledge that its bureaucratic procedures in

dealing with Russia have strategic repercussions and

that Moscow does not buy into the free trade jargon.

At the end of the day, the recalibration of the EU’s

relations with Ukraine and the other Eastern Partner-

ship countries, especially Georgia and Moldova, boils

down to the political willingness of EU members to

incur these risks. That is why it is necessary to turn to

the predominant great-power interests in or historical

grievances about Ukraine’s position in the Euro-At-

lantic security architecture. The overwhelming

question is, of course, the EU membership perspective.

As described above, behind the scenes French officials

were reluctant to extend assistance to the interim

government before the scheduled May elections

because the EU would be bound to end up as a party

in the conflict with Russia. France has consistently

been opposed to the prospect of Ukrainian EU

membership, indeed has wanted to exclude it alto-

gether, putting it at odds with Poland especially on the

issue. Germany occupies a middle position between

the two extremes, stating that the AA/DCFTA is not the

final goal in EU–Ukraine relations (EUobserver, 2014f).

German leadership will be key to common European

political adjustments to future challenges and

instability in the eastern neighborhood. The United

States, by contrast, must accept its role as a bilateral

supporter of pro-European integration. Ukraine has

testified how support of a magnitude that was hardly

imaginable before the crisis can suddenly be mobil-

ized. In any case, the time is not ripe for discussions

about the possibilities for Ukraine’s eventual EU

membership because it can only nourish unrealistic-

ally high expectations among the new political

leadership in the country. Proponents of EU member-

ship are seldom proponents of the likely parallel

scenario, namely a further partitioning of Ukraine

between Russian and Ukrainian speakers. Moreover,

such a step will almost certainly lead to Russian

perceptions that it has been cheated (again) by the

West and, thus, to new escalatory steps. The AA/

DCFTA has the obvious advantage of exporting parts

of the acquis without explicitly giving membership

commitments.

NATO, EU ANd RUssiA AfTER 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Reinforcing NAto

Russia’s annexation of Crimea begs the final question

about NATO’s future posture towards Russia. NATO

this year is ending its most demanding operation ever,

Afghanistan, leaving the Alliance overwhelmed with

grand social engineering projects and ‘out-of-area’

stabilization missions. The unfolding of realpolitik in

the eastern neighborhood certainly gives NATO back

some its original raison d’être (defense and de-

terrence), but the question now is by what means

Article 5 should be reaffirmed, as well as the nature of

the new relationship with Kiev.

NATO has the option of openly confronting Russia

through a strategy unfolding on multiple levels. In this

case, NATO would recalibrate itself as an anti-Russian

alliance. It would suspend cooperation with Russia

and boost its contingency plans for a Russian attack

in the Baltic area and Poland with a solid military

footprint in the region. It would transfer armaments to

countries under the threat of Russian-sponsored

separatism or invasion, increase its political-military

cooperation with these countries, and perhaps

unfreeze Georgia’s membership perspective (Alcaro,

2014). However, assistance altering the military

balance of power in Russia’s disfavor may risk

escalating the crisis and absorb NATO countries into

commitments they are not willing to honor in the case

of an actual confrontation. The Russo-Georgian war of

2008 should serve as an example of precipitate action

that proved counterproductive and, in many ways,

appeared to be a bluff. A radical recalibration of the

NATO alliance would fail to recognize that Russia acts

from a position of weakness rather than of strength

and, moreover, that the political realities among NATO

members only allow military fine-tuning.

Such measures should have in-built flexibility, allowing

for the possibility of de-escalation, and thus giving

Russia an incentive to change its policies towards

Ukraine and the post-Soviet countries more generally.

Thus, ‘wall-building’ and ‘bridge-building’ should be

seen as complementary security strategies similar to

earlier periods in NATO’s history when the alliance

employed the dual tracks of military build-up and

political dialogue with Moscow. However, NATO has

not been able to agree on such measures because

France and Germany do not want to breach the 1997

NATO’s unity must be strengthened and its major

members, especially the United States, demonstrate

their commitment to collective defense along NATO’s

eastern borders more than through rhetorical reasser-

tion. As short-term measures NATO has deployed

fighter and early-warning aircrafts to Romania, the

Baltic States, and Poland and boosted its naval

presence in the Baltic Sea. NATO must be prepared for

a scenario in which Russia combines political and

economic pressure against a member state with cyber

attacks, support of proxy militias, infiltration, and

propaganda aimed at Russian minorities. The deploy-

ment of 600 US troops to the Baltic States and Poland

is an important demonstration of a commitment to

collective defense, but it would arguably have been a

clearer signal if it had been a multilateral NATO

deployment. NATO could claim that Russia’s invasion

and annexation of Crimea in violation of its interna-

tional obligations and the 1994 Budapest Memor-

andum guaranteeing Ukraine’s territorial integrity is a

justification now giving it the right to station troops

(permanently) in eastern Europe.

‘Wall-building’ and ‘bridge-building’ should be

seen as complementary security strategies

similar to earlier periods in NAto’s history

nato, Eu and russia aftEr 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

NATO–Russia accords that pledged no additional

permanent stationing of ‘substantial combat forces’ in

the region. Poland and the Baltic States, conversely,

have insisted that Russia’s expansionism will stop

only if it is shown unmistakable red lines. Should the

Ukrainian crisis escalate at a later stage, however,

such unity will move much closer across all NATO

members and demonstrate the need for a radical

reshuffling of the European security architecture.

NATO now can, and should, offer its core expertise –

security sector assistance – to the government in

Ukraine, which needs its armed forces to be profes-

sionalized. The ongoing struggle against separatist

militias in the eastern regions and the initial military

setbacks that Kiev has experienced against the rebels

underlines this point. However, Kiev should be praised

for having been cautious in not resorting to a large-

scale counter-attack against separatists in the east,

especially in the early stages of the crisis, with the

looming threat of further Russian military incursions

similar to the situation in Georgia in 2008, when Tbilisi

was tempted into a disastrous military move. NATO,

partnering with the EU’s significant civilian assets,

should engage in mentoring the Ukrainian security

forces in counterinsurgency or riot control. It can

enable Kiev to regain and maintain control over its

eastern provinces but should avoid causing Moscow

to doubt whether it is arming or emboldening Kiev

militarily. On June 25 NATO foreign ministers endorsed

a package of defense capacity-building in Ukraine,

including areas such as logistics, command and

control, and cyber defense (NATO, 2014), and agreed

on plans to develop an Alliance Readiness Action Plan

for the NATO Summit in Wales in September to be

approved by NATO leaders.

Most diplomacy will not happen through NATO, despite

the existence of the NATO–Russia Council, which is

supposed to serve both as a forum for political

dialogue and as a crisis management tool. Great-

power arrangements similar to the Geneva talks are

likely to drive compromises forward (mediated by the

OSCE or small state diplomacy). Russia nourishes big

distrust of NATO, which calls for the Alliance to adopt a

higher degree of strategic empathy, acknowledging

Russia’s concerns about an expanding defense

alliance on its borders. It will be especially difficult to

convince Poland about the wisdom of a dormant

NATO enlargement process. NATO now should focus

on strategic credibility, enhancing the collective

negotiating power of its members in insisting that

Ukraine is free is to choose its political and economic

associations, but avoiding a direct confrontation with

Moscow over winning or losing Ukraine.

In sum, a recalibration of relations with Russia is

possible along three main dimensions: let market

reactions punish Russia, given its economic vulnerab-

ility to international investors; let the EU be at the

forefront, using the AA already in place to assist

Ukraine in committing to painful but needed reforms;

and let NATO station brigade-size units on its eastern

borders to incentivize de-escalation. Domestic and

international reconciliation on the current Ukrainian

issue must be recognized as a critical historical

juncture for the settlement of Euro-Atlantic principles

and a development towards convergent security

narratives. The annexation of Crimea has pushed the

possibility of East-West negotiations or concessions

in the strategic-military realm far off the horizon. This

calls instead for the exploration of compromise or

dialogue in the economic realm (inter-regional trade

and investment) mitigating the scenario of a highly

volatile Ukraine on the verge between two antagonistic

blocs. The ideal outcome must be that from now on

Ukraine serves as an entity that links rather than

divides Europe and Russia, building trust to promote

productive negotiations on this and other security

issues pertinent to the development of a cooperative

and inclusive Euro-Atlantic space.

nato, Eu and russia aftEr 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Bibliography

Alcaro, R., 2014.

‘the Case for Gradualism Against Russia’,

National Interest, April 7.

Available from: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-case-gradualism-against-russia-10199 [accessed June 2, 2014].

Atlantic, 2014.

‘Ukraine Crisis Exposes Gaps Between Germany and NATO’,

April 7.

Available from: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/ukraine-crisis-exposes-gaps-between-germany-and-nato

[accessed April 2, 2014].

BBC, 2014a.

‘Crimea crisis: Merkel warns Russia faces escalating sanctions’,

March 20.

Available from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26659578 [accessed April 2, 2014].

BBC, 2014b.

‘Ukraine crisis: Transcript of leaked Nuland-Pyatt call’,

February 7.

Available from: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957 [accessed April 22, 2014].

Biden, J.R., 2009.

‘Speech at the 45th Munich Security Conference’,

February 7.

Available from: https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/02/07/8375/ [accessed April 30, 2014].

Blockmans, S. and Kostanyan, H., 2013.

‘A post-mortem of the Vilnius Summit: Not yet a ‘Thessaloniki moment’

for the Eastern Partnership’,

Brussels, Belgium: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS).

Available from: http://www.ceps.be/book/post-mortem-vilnius-summit-not-yet-‘thessaloniki-moment’-eastern-partnership

[accessed April 30, 2014].

Boston Globe, 2014.

‘Putin agrees to ‘contact group’ to talk about Ukraine, Germany says’,

March 2.

Available from: http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2014/03/02/putin-agrees-contact-group-talk-about-ukraine-ger-

many-says/r9kuiZWpsWVHWq6LxO8HtO/story.html [accessed April 22, 2014].

Brookings, 2014.

‘France in an Age of Geopolitical Upheaval: A Statesman’s Forum with Laurent Fabius,

Foreign Minister of France’,

May 13.

Available from: http://www.brookings.edu/events/2014/05/13-france-foreign-minister-upheaval [accessed May 18, 2014].

Bundestag, 2014.

‘Kanzlerin Merkel droht Russland mit Sanktionen’

[Chancellor Merkel Threatens Russia with Sanctions], Berlin:

Deutscher Bundestag, March 13.

Available from: http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2014/49865952_kw11_de_regierungserklaerung_ukraine/index.

html [accessed April 2, 2014].

Charap, S. and Darden, K. (2013),

Kiev Isn’t Ready for Europe,

New York Times, 20 December.

Charap, S. and Troitskiy, M., 2013.

‘Russia, the West and the Integration Dilemma’,

Survival, vol. 55 (6), pp. 49-62.

Chivvis, C.S. and Rid, T., 2009.

‘The Roots of Germany’s Russia Policy’,

Survival, vol. 51 (2), pp. 105-22.

CNN, 2014.

‘Radek Sikorski: Russia is leaving the European Council ‘no choice on Monday’’,

March 16.

Available from: http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2014/03/16/radek-sikorski-russia-is-leaving-the-european-council-no-

choice-on-monday/ [accessed April 22, 2014].

David, D.L. and Leggett, J., 2014.

‘The Oil and Gas Weapon Won’t Work’,

National Interest, March 13.

Available from: http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-oil-gas-weapon-wont-work-10041 [accessed May 16, 2014].

DG Trade, 2013.

‘EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area’.

Available from: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_150981.pdf [accessed May 16, 2014].

Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, 2014.

‘DCFTAs with Armenia, Georgia and Moldova to be finalized before Vilnius?’.

Available from: http://www.eap-csf.eu/en/news-events/news/dcftas-with-armenia-georgia-and-moldova-to-be-finalized-be-

fore-vilnius/ [accessed May 16, 2014].

Economist, 2014.

‘Mistral Blows’,

May 17.

Available from: http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21602291-why-france-insists-going-ahead-selling-warships-russia-

mistral-blows [accessed May 16, 2014].

EUobserver, 2014a.

‘EU and US impose first round of Russia blacklists’,

March 17.

Available from: http://euobserver.com/foreign/123506 [accessed April 2, 2014].

nato, Eu and russia aftEr 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

EUobserver, 2014b.

‘Germany ready to reinforce NATO-Russia borders’,

March 31.

Available from: http://euobserver.com/foreign/123685 [accessed April 2, 2014].

EUobserver, 2014c.

‘Steinmeier disagrees with German business chiefs on Russia’,

April 10.

Available from: http://euobserver.com/foreign/123809 [accessed April 13, 2014].

EUobserver, 2014d.

‘Germany’s dependence on Russian gas poses risks for Europe - Polish PM’,

March 10.

Available from: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/10/poland-germany-ukraine-idUKL6N0M71JA20140310 [accessed April

22, 2014].

EUobserver, 2014e.

‘Poland’s Tusk says must stop Crimea crisis expanding to regional conflict’,

March 2.

Available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/02/us-ukraine-crisis-poland-idUSBREA210KY20140302 [accessed April

22, 2014].

EUobserver, 2014f.

‘Centre-right leaders give Ukraine hope of EU membership’,

March 7.

Available from: http://euobserver.com/foreign/123396 [accessed April 22, 2014].

Euronews, 2014.

‘German FM Steinmeier warns Crimea crisis could spread in Ukraine’,

March 23.

Available from: http://www.euronews.com/2014/03/23/german-fm-steinmeier-warns-crimea-crisis-could-spread-in-ukraine/

[accessed April 2, 2014].

Fikenscher, S.-E., 2014.

‘Blowback: Why Getting Tough on Russia over Ukraine Might Backfire’,

National Interest, May 16.

Available from: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/blowback-why-getting-tough-russia-over-ukraine-might-10474 [accessed

June 2, 2014].

Financial Times, 2014.

‘Poland calls for NATO troop deployment’,

April 1.

Foreign Affairs, 2013.

‘The Polish Model: A Conversation with Radek Sikorski’,

Foreign Affairs, vol. 92 (3).

Available from: http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/136526 [accessed April 22, 2014].

France24, 2014.

‘EU, US sanctions against Russia target Putin cronies’,

April 29.

Available from: http://www.france24.com/en/20140428-us-eu-g7-new-sanctions-russia-ukraine/ [accessed May 1, 2014].

Freizer, S., 2014.

‘Ukraine’s New President Must Begin Reforms Immediately. Poroshenko Must Partner With Prime Minister

Yatsenyuk to Make Progress’,

Atlantic Council, June 9.

Available from: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/ukraine-s-new-president-must-begin-reforms-immedi-

ately#.U5d-1sk00r0.facebook [accessed June 12, 2014].

Guardian, 2014a.

‘Crimea crisis: David Cameron dares to poke the Russian bear’,

March 21.

Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/21/david-cameron-dares-poke-russian-bear-ukraine-crimea

[accessed May 19, 2014].

Guardian, 2014b.

‘UK to review arms sales to Russia’,

March 10.

Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/world/defence-and-security-blog/2014/mar/10/arms-russia-ukraine [accessed

May 19, 2014].

Guardian, 2014c.

‘NATO plans stronger military ties to ex-Soviet states south of Russia’,

April 1. Available from: http://www.

theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nato-plans-stronger-military-ties-armenia-azerbaijan-moldova [accessed May 19, 2014].

Guriev, S., 2014.

‘Corruption has laid waste to the Russian economy’,

Financial Times, April 3.

International Republican Institute, 2014.

‘Public Opinion Survey Residents of Ukraine, March 14 –26, 2014’.

Available from: http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20April%205%20IRI%20Public%20Opinion%20Survey%20of%20

Ukraine,%20March%2014-26,%202014.pdf [accessed June 10, 2014].

Krause, J., 2004.

‘Multilateralism: behind European views’,

The Washington Quarterly, vol. 27 (2), pp. 43-59.

KyivPost, 2013.

‘Polish Sejm calls Ukrainian authorities, protesters to sit down to talk’,

December 3.

Available from: http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/polish-sejm-calls-ukrainian-authorities-protesters-to-sit-down-to-

talk-332955.html [accessed April 2, 2014].

Lasas, A., 2010.

‘European Union and NATO Expansion: Central and Eastern Europe’,

New York, US: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lehne, S., 2014.

‘Time to Reset the European Neighborhood Policy’,

Brussels, Belgium: Carnegie Europe.

Available from: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/time_reset_enp.pdf [accessed April 22, 2014].

nato, Eu and russia aftEr 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Manoli, P., 2013.

‘Political Economy Aspects of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements’,

Eastern Journal of European

Studies, vol. 4 (2), pp. 51-73.

Merry, 2014.

‘How to Start a Civil War in Ukraine (and How to Avoid One)’,

National Interest, May 30.

Available from: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-start-civil-war-ukraine-how-avoid-one-10567 [accessed June 2, 2014].

Ministere de la Défense, 2013.

‘Livre blanc sur la Défense et la Securité Nationale’

[The White book on National Defence and

Security].

Available from: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/livre-blanc-2013 [accessed 5 May 2014].

Mirror, 2014.

‘Ukraine situation is the ‘biggest crisis’ facing Europe this century, William Hague warns’,

March 3.

Available from: http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/ukraine-conflict-william-hague-warns-3202222#ixzz32CldSotL

[accessed 15 May 2014].

NATO, 2014.

‘NATO Foreign Ministers agree on Readiness Plan, endorse support package for Ukraine’,

June 25.

Available from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_111259.htm?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=smc&utm_cam-

paign=140625+formin+ukraine [accessed 25 June 2014].

Newvision, 2014.

‘Britain, France deploy fighter jets for NATO Baltic patrols’,

April 28.

Available from: http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/654992-britain-france-deploy-fighter-jets-for-nato-baltic-patrols.html

[accessed 15 May 2014].

Nünlist, C., 2014.

‘More Responsibility? German Foreign Policy in 2014’,

Zurich, Switzerland: Center for Security Studies (CSS).

Available from: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CSSAnalyse149-EN.pdf [accessed April 2, 2014].

Ostausschuss, 2014.

‘Ost-Ausschuss warnt vor Wirtschaftskonflikt’

[Eastern Committee warns of economic conflict’].

Available from: http://www.ost-ausschuss.de/ost-ausschuss-warnt-vor-wirtschaftskonflikt [accessed April 22, 2014].

Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014a.

‘Sikorski: Ukraine does not have to sacrifice Crimea to save itself’,

March 8.

Available from: http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/they_wrote_about_us/sikorski__ukraine_does_not_have_to_sacrifice_crimea_to_

save_itself__pap_08_03_2014;jsessionid=3B6E85BC32F3BC76CE52789C8ACDCC34.cmsap1p [accessed April 22, 2014].

Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014b. ‘European Union to send security mission to Ukraine’, April 14.

Available from: http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/news/european_union_to_send_security_mission_to_ukraine;jsessionid=B1566395FD-

9984688AF12395AAA976D9.cmsap2p [accessed April 22, 2014].

Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014c.

‘Sikorski: The West won’t sell Ukraine at Geneva meeting’,

April 16.

Available from: http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/news/they_wrote_about_us/sikorski__the_west_won_t_sell_ukraine_at_geneva_meet-

ing__pap_dispatch__april_16th_2014;jsessionid=0F861FC59FF2685ECD1AD59C82A29C23.cmsap1p [accessed April 22, 2014].

Polskie Radio dla Zagranicy, 2014.

‘Russia ‘financing subversion in Ukraine’’,

April 9.

Available from: http://www.thenews.pl/1/10/Artykul/167731,Russia-financing-subversion-in-Ukraine [accessed April 22, 2014].

Radio Free Europe, 2014.

‘Germany’s Steinmeier Warns Against New Divisions of Europe’,

March 22.

Available from: http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-russia-denounces-sanctions/25305841.html [accessed April 2, 2014].

Ratner, M., Belkin P., Nichol J., and Woehrel S., 2013.

‘Europe’s Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply

Diversification’,

Washington, D.C.: CRS Report for Congress.

Available from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42405.pdf [accessed April 22, 2014].

Reuters, 2014a.

‘NATO suspends cooperation with Russia over Ukraine crisis’,

April 1.

Available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/01/us-ukraine-crisis-nato-idUSBREA2U1UF20140401 [accessed April

22, 2014].

Reuters, 2014b.

‘Kerry condemns Russia’s ‘incredible act of aggression’ in Ukraine’,

March 2.

Available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/02/us-ukraine-crisis-usa-kerry-idUSBREA210DG20140302 [accessed

April 22, 2014].

Reuters, 2014c.

‘France puts off defence, foreign ministers’ visit to Moscow’,

March 17.

Available from: http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/03/17/uk-ukraine-crisis-russia-france-idUKBREA2G1NQ20140317 [accessed

May 18, 2014].

RFI, 2014.

‘France calls for Ukraine’s integrity to be respected as Crimea crisis deepens’,

March 1.

Available from: http://www.english.rfi.fr/europe/20140301-france-calls-ukraines-integrity-be-respected-crimea-crisis-deepens

[accessed April 22, 2014].

nato, Eu and russia aftEr 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Schwarzer, D. and Stelzenmüller, C., 2014.

‘What is at Stake in Ukraine: Europe and the United States Need to Do What It Takes

to Protect the Right of the Eastern Partnership Countries to Choose their Future’,

Washington, D.C.: German Marshall Fund of

the United States.

Spiegel, 2014a.

‘Ukraine-Krise: Schäuble vergleicht Putins Krim-Pläne mit Hitlers Politik’

[Ukraine Crisis: Schäuble Compares

Putin’s Crimea Plans to Hitler’s policy], March 31. Available from: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/ukraine-krise-schaeuble-

vergleicht-putins-krim-plaene-mit-hitlers-politik-a-961680.html [accessed April 2, 2014].

Spiegel, 2014b.

‘NATO in Osteuropa: Solidarität und Säbelrasseln’

[NATO in Eastern Europe: Solidarity and Saber-rattling], March 30.

Available from: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/nato-hilfe-fuer-osteuropa-sorgt-fuer-unbehagen-in-koalition-a-961542.

html [accessed April 2, 2014].

Spiegel, 2014c.

‘Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski: ‘Moscow Needs Our Money’’,

March 10.

Available from: http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/polish-foreign-minister-discusses-weak-eu-position-in-ukraine-

crisis-a-957812.html [accessed April 22, 2014].

Stelzenmüller, C., 2009.

‘Germany’s Russia question: a new Ostpolitik for Europe’,

Foreign Affairs, vol. 88 (2), pp. 89-100.

Telegraph, 2014a.

‘Ukraine protest leaders warned: ‘Sign deal or you will all die’’,

February 21.

Available from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10654239/Polish-foreign-minister-warns-Ukraine-

protest-leaders-Sign-deal-or-you-will-all-die.html [accessed April 2, 2014].

Telegraph, 2014b.

‘‘We cannot let Putin get away with this’, says Polish minister’,

March 10.

Available from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10686706/We-cannot-let-Putin-get-away-with-

this-says-Polish-minister.html [accessed April 22, 2014].

Telegraph, 2014c.

‘Germany halts weapons exports to Russia’,

April 24.

Available from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/10785658/Germany-halts-weapons-exports-to-

Russia.html [accessed May 22, 2014].

Telegraph, 2014d.

‘Russia faces global isolation – again’,

March 22.

Available from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10716194/Russia-faces-global-isolation-again.html

[accessed May 22, 2014].

TF1, 2014.

‘Fabius sur TF1 : ‘La crise en Crimée est la plus sérieuse depuis la Guerre froide”

[Fabius on TF1: the crisis in Crimea

is the most serious one since the end of the Cold War], March 17 [accessed April 22, 2014].

Trenin, D., 2014.

‘The Sanctions Crossroads’,

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2.

Available from: http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=55759 [accessed May 2, 2014].

Tsafos, N., 2014.

‘Europe’s Never-Ending Natural-Gas Obsession’,

June 12.

Available from: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/europe’s-never-ending-natural-gas-obsession-10645 [accessed June 12,

2014].

UK Ministry of Defence, 2010.

‘Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review’,

London:

Cabinet Office.

Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61936/national-secur-

ity-strategy.pdf [accessed April 2, 2014].

US Department of Defense (2014).

‘US Troops to Arrive in Baltic Region for Exercises’,

April 22.

Available from: http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122103 [accessed April 30, 2014].

Voice of America, 2014.

‘US Congress Approves Ukraine Aid; Final Action Pending’,

March 27.

Available from: http://www.voanews.com/content/us-congress-approves-ukraine-aid-final-action-pending/1880705.html

[accessed April 22, 2014].

Voice of Russia, 2014.

‘Russia should not be excluded from G8 – chairman of Munich Conference’

June 7.

Available from: http://voiceofrussia.com/news/2014_06_07/Russia-should-not-be-excluded-from-G8-chairman-of-Munich-

Conference-6870/ [accessed June 22, 2014].

nato, Eu and russia aftEr 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Wall Street Journal, 2014a.

‘EU Pledges to Move Quickly to Help Ukraine’,

February 26.

Available from: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304071004579406973282279760 [accessed April 22,

2014].

Wall Street Journal, 2014b. ‘An American Ally in Putin’s Line of Fire’, April 4.

Wall Street Journal, 2014c.

‘France Not Weighing Military Options’,

March 2.

Available from: http://stream.wsj.com/story/deadly-clashes-in-ukraine/SS-2-457850/SS-2-469354/ [accessed May 19, 2014].

Wall Street Journal, 2014d.

‘Western Sanctions Likely to Push Russia Toward Increased Self-Reliance’,

July 1. Available from:

http://online.wsj.com/articles/western-sanctions-likely-to-push-russia-toward-increased-self-reliance-1404223202 [accessed July

10].

Wall Street Journal, 2014e.

‘In Germany, Anti-American Sentiment Fuels Push to Tread Softly on Ukraine’,

June 10. Available

from: http://online.wsj.com/articles/in-germany-anti-american-sentiment-fuels-push-to-tread-softly-on-ukraine-1402443505

[accessed July 10].

Washington Post, 2014a.

‘Talking with Poland’s foreign minister about the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s next moves’,

April 18.

Available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/talking-with-polands-foreign-minister-about-the-ukraine-crisis-and-

russias-next-moves/2014/04/17/f1811e84-c5ad-11e3-bf7a-be01a9b69cf1_story.html

Washington Post, 2014b.

‘Ukrainians are not that divided in their views of democracy’,

March 3.

Available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/03/ukrainians-are-not-that-divided-in-their-

views-of-democracy/ [accessed April 22, 2014].

White House, 2014a.

‘Remarks to the Press by Vice President Joe Biden, President Dalia Grybauskaite of Lithuania, and

President Andris Berzins of Latvia’,

March 19.

Available from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/19/remarks-press-vice-president-joe-biden-president-

dalia-grybauskaite-lith [accessed April 22, 2014].

White House, 2014b.

‘FACT SHEET: US Efforts in Support of NATO Allies and Partners’,

March 26.

Available from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/26/fact-sheet-us-efforts-support-nato-allies-and-part-

ners [accessed April 22, 2014].

White House, 2014c.

‘Press Conference with President Obama and Prime Minister Rutte of the Netherlands’,

March 25.

Available from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/25/press-conference-president-obama-and-prime-min-

ister-rutte-netherlands [accessed April 22, 2014].

White House, 2014d.

‘Remarks by the President in Address to European Youth’,

March 26.

Available from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/26/remarks-president-address-european-youth [accessed

April 22, 2014].

World Economic Forum, 2014.

‘Scenarios for Ukraine: reforming Institutions, strengthening the economy after the crisis’,

World

Scenario Series.

Available from: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ScenariosSeries_Ukraine_Report_2014.pdf [accessed June 22, 2014].

Zarate, J.C., 2014.

‘Making Russia pay for its actions in Ukraine’,

Washington Post, March 7.

Available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/making-russia-pay-for-its-actions-in-ukraine/2014/03/06/f047a022-

a48f-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html [accessed April 22, 2014].

nato, Eu and russia aftEr 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

Photolist

Frontpage:

Page 4-5:

Page 6:

Page 8-9:

Page 10:

Page 14:

Page 20:

Page 23:

Page 24.

Page 26:

Page 28:

Photo by Brendon Thorne

Page 32:

Page 36:

nato, Eu and russia aftEr 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

nato, Eu and russia aftEr 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DIIS . Danish Institute for International Studies

The Danish Institute for International Studies is a leading public institute for independent research and ana-

lysis of international affairs. We carry out research of high international standard on globalization, security,

development and foreign policy. DIIS aims to use our research results to influence the agenda in research,

policy and public debate, and we put great effort into informing policymakers and the public of our results and

their possible applications.

Defence and Security Studies at DIIS

This publication is part of the Defence and Security Studies that DIIS carries out for the Danish Ministry of

Defence. The aim of these studies is to provide multidisciplinary in-depth knowledge on topics that are central

for Danish defence and security policy, both currently and in the long term.

The design and the conclusions of the research are entirely independent. Conclusions do not reflect the views

of the ministries involved or any other government agency, nor do they constitute an official DIIS position.

Additional information about DIIS and our Defence and Security Studies can be found at www.diis.dk

nato, Eu and russia aftEr 2014

PDF to HTML - Convert PDF files to HTML files

DIIS· DanISh InStItute for InternatIonal StuDIeS

Østbanegade 117 DK-2100 Copenhagen www.diis.dk