Europaudvalget 2015-16
EUU Alm.del Bilag 329
Offentligt
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Jonathan Hill
Commissioner for Financial Stability,
Financial Services and Capital Markets Union
European Commission
MINISTER FOR BUSINESS AND
GROWTH
Slotsholmsgade 10-12
1015 Copenhagen K
Denmark
Dear Commissioner Hill,
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the consultation on the cumu-
lative effects of financial regulation adopted as a follow-up to the finan-
cial crisis.
Following the financial crisis, rulemaking within financial services has
been conducted at a rapid pace with significant reforms being passed in
all key areas. Denmark has been and continues to be a strong supporter of
these reforms which ensure that we now have a more resilient EU finan-
cial sector.
That being said, I believe it is important that EU legislation strikes the
right balance between risk reduction and enabling growth. Therefore, I
am very supportive of the Commission's review of the cumulative effects
of this regulation which should identify potential unintended consequenc-
es, overlaps and excessive administrative burdens.
In addition to our responses to the specific questions, which you will find
in Annex 1, I should like to point to a few issues of a more general nature.
First, I see a risk that very detailed rules without sufficient room for the
specificities of different banking models might impede the diversity of the
banking models in Europe. A “one-size-fits-all” approach risks undermin-
ing well-functioning national models such as the Danish mortgage credit
system. To this effect, appropriate discretion and national options should
be upheld in the regulation in order to retain the necessary flexibility for
Member States to respond effectively to country-specific circumstances.
Secondly, I firmly believe that unnecessary regulatory burdens should be
avoided. The rules should fit to the relevant financial institutions thus
avoiding e.g. reporting obligations which are not proportionate compared
to the risk profile. Reporting requirements should be limited to need-to-
have instead of nice-to-have and there should be sufficient time for finan-
cial actors to implement new systems.
3 February 2016
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Thirdly, in regard to rules affecting the financing of the economy and
supporting growth, it seems that both existing rules and the expectation
among financial actors of rules to come have an effect on market liquidi-
ty. As banks adapt to new and potential future rules such as the liquidity
coverage ratio (LCR), the leverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio
(NSFR), there is a risk that market liquidity has been and further will be
reduced. The impact on market functioning is important to keep in mind
when assessing the legislation put in place. This aspect needs to be con-
tinuously monitored.
Fourthly, high levels of investor and consumer protection should continue
to be sought. At the same time, however, I would urge that various infor-
mation requirements vis-á-vis consumers are carefully calibrated to fulfil
their purpose of informing consumers succinctly while avoiding infor-
mation overload or disproportionate requirements. Consumer testing of
future rules should be an integral part of the process.
Finally, looking ahead, some of the proposals which the Commission has
indicated will be proposed in the near future should have a clear rationale
and bring added value. New rules should be carefully assessed and should
contribute to financial stability, employment and growth. A large part of
the new regulatory regime has not been fully implemented and we have
yet to see and assess its full effects. We acknowledge that there might be
a need for further risk reduction as will be discussed in the newly estab-
lished Council Ad Hoc Working Group on Strengthening of the Banking
Union. However, the need for new legislative initiatives should be as-
sessed in light of experiences with the current regulatory regime.
As you are aware, and as we discussed when we last met, the Danish gov-
ernment has particular concerns with regard to the Basel standards. The
leverage ratio – if set too high – risks affecting low-risk business models.
It would imply a movement away from risk based capital requirements to
non-risk based. Equally, the NSFR, if not implemented in the right way,
risks not taking into account the low risk embedded in the Danish system.
Also, a revised standardised approach for credit risk and new capital
floors based on the standardised approach risk having a negative effect on
low risk business models. More generally, proposals to implement global
standards in the EU should continue to take into account European speci-
ficities, including well-functioning national business models.
In terms of process, I would stress that rules and requirements to the larg-
est degree possible should be agreed in the text negotiated between the
Council, the Parliament and the Commission (level 1). Only non-essential
issues of technical nature should be delegated to the Commission or the
European Supervisory Authorities (level 2 and 3) in order for the Council
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and the European Parliament to carry out its policy-making and coordi-
nating functions as laid down in the Treaties. The desire for rapid finalisa-
tion of negotiations should not be at the expense of thorough level 1-
regulation
Simultaneously, it is important to take into account that level 2 acts di-
rectly affect implementation of the primary legislation (level 1) and there-
fore enough time should be left for implementation of the primary legisla-
tion to take into account the subsequent level 2 acts. This should be seen
as an important component of the Commission’s better regulation agenda.
I would suggest that this exercise of reviewing the post-crisis regulation
should be followed up in a few years’ time when all rules have been im-
plemented and we have an even clearer picture of their effect. It will be a
continuous work to ensure that we have a set of rules, which support
sound risk taking and best support financial stability, economic growth,
job creation and the Single Market.
As always, I am at your disposal for any questions or comments that you
might have. I look forward to a continuous fruitful dialogue on these is-
sues.
Best regards,
Troels Lund Poulsen
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Annex 1
The text below follows the structure of the Commission consultation with
answers being provided to the questions posed under the various head-
ings of the consultation where relevant from a Danish point of view.
I
SSUE
1 – U
NNECESSARY REGULATORY CONSTRAINTS ON FINANCING
Example 1: Ensuring financing to small and medium-sized enterpris-
es SMEs
To which Directive(s)/Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
CRR
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
SMEs represent a large part of European businesses and thus play a cru-
cial role in supporting growth and job creation in the EU. When SMEs
experience difficulties accessing finance it has an impact on the European
economy as such. Therefore, it is important that the Commission in cur-
rent and future financial regulation considers the impact on SMEs.
The capital requirements deduction introduced in CRR, Article 501, is
currently under review with an upcoming report from EBA followed by a
report by the Commission before June 28 2016. From a Danish perspec-
tive these analysis on both the evolution of the lending trends and condi-
tions for SMEs as well as the effective riskiness of SME lending is much
welcomed in order to progress the discussion on SME financing.
I
SSUE
2 – M
ARKET LIQUIDITY
Example 1: Impact on market liquidity of current and new regulation
To which Directive(s)/Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
CRR/CRD IV
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
The introduction of new regulatory measures developed to strengthen the
banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and eco-
nomic stress could possibly affect market liquidity.
It is important to stress that the new rules have been introduced in order to
enhance the resilience of banks. Greater resilience at the individual bank
level reduces the risk of system wide shocks and increases financial sta-
bility. All together this leads to better functioning financial markets.
However, the impact on market functioning is important to keep in mind
when assessing the consequences of the new regulation.
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A wide range of regulatory measures can influence market liquidity. Ac-
cording to the financial industry there are signs in the market that the ex-
isting LCR requirement and the adjustment to the expected future lever-
age ratio are reducing market liquidity. There is still no firm evidence
regarding causality, but the first indications seem to point in the direction
that both existing and future rules lead to portfolio shifts and changes in
risk taking. Especially for large banks with many different types of finan-
cial transactions these adjustments are substantial. As banks adapt to the
new rules there is a concern that it may have a negative impact on some
markets where liquidity could be reduced.
For example, the new LCR requirement aims to reduce the liquidity risks
of banks. Therefore, it differentiates between asset classes as some types
of assets are regarded as being more liquid than others. Banks are re-
quired to hold a liquidity buffer and the composition of this should fulfill
specific requirements. As a consequence, banks increasingly prefer hold-
ing assets that have the most favorable treatment in relation to the LCR
requirement and therefore they tend to buy and hold these assets, which in
turn could reduce market liquidity in other assets.
The LCR could also affect the liquidity in the repo market, ie. example 2
below.
Furthermore, the costs of holding inventories in relation to repo activities
might rise due to the leverage ratio requirement being priced in. This is
due to the fact that holding inventories leads to an increase in total assets
which in turn increase the costs associated with the leverage ratio re-
quirement correspondingly. The leverage ratio is calculated by dividing
the Tier 1 capital by total consolidated assets and since size of the repo
book affects the total consolidated assets it therefore affects the required
amount of Tier 1 capital.
A balance between financial stability and market functioning is important
to keep in mind when assessing the consequences of new rules. For a
transitional period some volatility in market liquidity is expected as banks
and financial markets adapt to new requirements. However, when newly
adopted rules are reviewed and new rules considered it should be moni-
tored that they do not have a disproportionately negative impact on finan-
cial markets in the longer term.
Example 2: LCR repo adjustment of the liquidity buffer
To which Directive(s)/ Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
CRR/CRD IV
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Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
The LCR has introduced a liquidity buffer in order to ensure that a credit
institution has an adequate stock of unencumbered liquid assets. The LCR
requires the liquidity buffer to be diversified by setting limits on the pro-
portion of different classes of asset which may be included herein. When
calculating these limits, an institution’s current holdings of liquid assets
are adjusted to take into account any changes of asset holdings that will
occur over the coming 30 days, due to already known contractual com-
mitments in the form of secured funding transaction. This is primarily
done to ensure, that institutions cannot circumvent the limits to particular
classes of assets set in the LCR, by entering into short term secured fund-
ing contracts, giving them cash or government bonds in exchange for as-
sets from lower liquidity categories in the LCR. Hence, any assets re-
ceived in secured funding transactions with a maturity of less than 30
days, are removed from the current asset holdings, when the limits to
classes of assets or caps are calculated.
In this calculation, it is implicitly assumed that any cash funds, which an
institution receives from these short term secured funding transactions,
are all placed in the liquidity buffer as cash. Hence when the limits to
classes of assets are set, an amount equivalent to the sum of the cash that
is part of the short term secured funding transactions, which the institu-
tion has entered into, is subtracted from the current holdings of level 1
assets. This is regardless of whether the cash received has actually been
placed in the liquidity buffer as cash.
The different classes of assets, which the short term secured funding
transactions are based on, are however not treated equally. For secured
funding transactions where the collateral exchanged is a level 1 non-
covered bond asset, for example a government bond, the net effect of this
adjustment is zero. This is because these assets are placed in the same
asset class as cash in the LCR buffer, hence both parts of the transaction
are corrected for in the same asset class resulting in a net zero impact.
However, for secured funding transactions based on all other classes of
assets, the effect is negative since the subtraction of cash is not equaled
by the addition of assets in the same class of assets in the liquidity buffer.
Here the collateral is instead added to one of the other asset classes in the
liquidity buffer, or kept out entirely, if the collateral is a not defined as a
liquid asset in the LCR. This calculation means that repo transactions
with level 1 covered bonds and level 1 government bonds are not treated
equally. Hence the short term repo trading with level 1 covered bond col-
lateral is disincentivized. The calculation favors repo markets based pri-
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marily on government bonds over repo markets based primarily on cov-
ered bonds.
In Denmark specifically, covered bonds are used more frequently as repo
collateral than government bonds due to the large and liquid Danish cov-
ered bond market. Moreover, the repo market enhances the market liquid-
ity of the Danish covered bond market by allowing market participants to
not only trade covered bonds outright, but also use these as collateral in
secured financing transactions. Therefore, the adjustment made to the
liquid assets holdings in the LCR for short term repos based on covered
bonds can have a very significant impact on the liquidity buffer of Danish
credit institutions and hence their LCR. As a consequence repos will not
contribute to market liquidity to the same extent as they did before the
implementation of the LCR
If you have suggestions to remedy the issue(s) raised in your example,
please make them here:
To avoid this unintended effect, we suggest that:
The calculation of the repo adjustment as defined in article 17 of the
LCR regulation is changed such that only assets, which are actually
placed in the institution’s liquidity buffer, are subtracted if acquired
through short term repo financing.
Example 3 Transparency and quoting obligations MiFIR
To which Directive(s)/ Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
MiFIR
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
Too extensive transparency and quoting obligations in MiFIR risk ham-
pering the secondary markets. As a consequence of MiFIR, market mak-
ers are requested to make their deals public together with the prices they
are willing to pay. In other words, market makers are obliged to expose
their trading interests and positions to such an extent that their market
making activities become unprofitable.
Market makers serve a critical role in financial markets by providing li-
quidity to facilitate market efficiency and ensuring that both sides of the
financing market are able to meet. This is not least the case in smaller
financial markets such as the Danish. Disincentivising market making,
thus, goes against the ambition of increased use of capital markets as a
source of funding.
It is therefore important to ensure that the quoting obligations and pre-
and post-trade transparency requirements for market makers are below
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order and transaction sizes that will expose their trading interests and po-
sitions to a point where their market making activities become unprofita-
ble. Also, market makers should be given enough deferral time to manage
the risks following from their market making activities before the publica-
tion of the relevant transactions.
If you have suggestions to remedy the issue(s) raised in your example,
please make them here:
To ensure that market liquidity is not hampered, we suggest that:
The thresholds for quoting obligations and pre- and post-trade trans-
parency requirements set in the regulatory technical standard regard-
ing non-equity transparency which is not yet adopted by the Commis-
sion should be lower than those proposed by ESMA in the draft regu-
latory technical standard with the possibility to raise the thresholds on
the basis of annual reviews by ESMA.
The deferral period determined in the regulatory technical standard
regarding the non-equity transparency shall be revised so as to allow
market makers to manage risk better.
I
SSUE
3 – I
NVESTOR AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
Example 1: Secure relevant information to consumers and retail in-
vestors
To which Directive(s)/ Regulation(s) do you refer in you example?
All directives and regulations obliging financial institutions to disclose
specific information to consumers and retail investors, including the
Packaged Retail Investment and Insurance-based Investment Products
(PRIIPs) regulation, Mortgage Credit Directive (MCD) and UCITS.
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
Regulations and directives in the financial area often contain obligations
for financial institutions to disclose specified information to consumers
and investors. MCD, UCITS and PRIIPs are examples of pieces of EU
legislation, which contain such information requirements for consumers
(MCD) and retail investors (PRIIPs/UCITS).
MCD obliges creditors to provide consumers with a standardized infor-
mation sheet (ESIS). The purpose is to give consumers a standardized
document for comparing different loan offers. The form of the ESIS has a
fixed structure with mandatory text and required information in order for
the consumers to compare different products – also across borders.
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PRIIPs requires a person that provides advice on, or sells, a packaged
retail investment and insurance-based investment products (PRIIP) to
provide retail investors with a key information document (KID). This
document is a standardized information sheet with the purpose of ena-
bling retail investors to understand and compare the key features and risks
of the PRIIP. Equally, UCITS contains an obligation for UCITS-
investment funds to provide a key investor information document (KIID)
with the same aim of ensuring a better understanding of the content of the
products and facilitate comparisons between products.
Information requirements according to European legislation have grown
over the last decade. To ensure the best possible consumer protection, it is
important to constantly ensure that rules entitle consumers to get exactly
the information they need. A high level of consumer protection requires
that consumers are well informed in order to enable them to make rational
choices.
However, it is equally important to find the right balance between provid-
ing relevant information to consumers and retail investors while avoid
creating an information overload. Information overload will risk having
the exact opposite effect than the intended, because consumers will ignore
the information in the first place and not try to understand it at all. Regu-
lations and directives with disclosure requirements also place large ad-
ministrative burdens on financial institutions. It is therefore of the utmost
importance that the information requirements in fact meet the needs of
consumers and are used by consumers.
Also, it is important that the documents are not unnecessarily comprehen-
sive. The ESIS e.g. constitutes around 11 pages. Such an excessive and
complicated document might in fact be an obstacle to many consumers.
Finally, it is important that the documents are to the largest degree possi-
ble aligned in order to ensure both the best possible overview and ability
to compare products for retail investors as well as to reduce administra-
tive burdens for issuers (in cases where they overlap). As both the KIID,
the KID as well as the prospectus summary (currently under review in the
Prospect Regulation proposal) serves the same basic purpose, issuers and
investors would benefit from a higher degree of alignment. Such an
alignment should naturally respect the specificity of the different products
and thus the different information needs retail investors might have.
If you have suggestions to remedy the issue(s) raised in your example,
please make them here:
In order to ensure relevant information to consumers and retail investors
and avoid unnecessary administrative burdens, we suggest that any forth-
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coming revisions or new regulations in consumer and retail investor relat-
ed legislation should:
Include consumer and retail investor testing to ensure that all infor-
mation requirements are fitted to fulfill their purpose, e.g. whether
consumers and retail investors do in fact read the required infor-
mation or only part of it and whether all of the existing information
requirements are needed.
Take into consideration whether the information provided for the
consumer and retail investors could be fully digitized whereby skip-
ping the obligation to provide paper copies.
Evaluate the current information sheets required in accordance with
PRIIPs, UCITS and the upcoming Prospectus Regulation in order to
ensure a greater alignment between these.
As for MCD specifically, we suggest that:
The use of ESIS should be taken into careful examination in order to
review whether the structure and/or content of ESIS provide consum-
ers with optimal information relevant to them or whether improve-
ments to ESIS can be made.
I
SSUE
4 – P
ROPORTIONALITY
/
PRESERVING DIVERSITY IN THE
EU
FINANCIAL SECTOR
Example 1: New rules should take into account diversity in business
models
To which Directive(s)/ Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
CRR/ CRD IV
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
From the Commission Communication from 24 November 2015 it is clear
that the Commission is intending to introduce the NSFR, the leverage
ratio and the TLAC in the EU legislative framework. Also, we understand
that a revised standardised approach, new capital floors and a fundamen-
tal review of the trading book might be included in the revision of
CRR/CRD IV as well.
From a Danish perspective, the main priority is to ensure that the initia-
tives on which we have already agreed work. Furthermore, we should not
introduce more legislation before it has been thoroughly analyzed whether
it is needed and if we achieve the right policy mix regarding financial
stability and growth and job creation.
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Furthermore, we cannot commit to implementing Basel Committee pro-
posals such as TLAC, NSFR, leverage ratio, capital floors and review of
the trading book before a proper discussion at EU-level has taken place. It
is important that these issues are discussed through the ordinary EU legis-
lative process in order to get the right calibration of the initiatives. Special
care needs to be taken in regard to European specificities.
In this regard, several of the proposed initiatives from the Basel Commit-
tee can have a severe negative impact on the Danish mortgage credit insti-
tutions.
For an example, the NSFR in the Basel committee’s definition will have
some undesired consequences on specialised business models like Danish
mortgage credit institutions. Following this, we stress the importance of
acknowledging that bonds with embedded extension triggers – such as the
Danish mortgage bonds with a soft bullet structure – are stable funding in
an NSFR perspective. The soft bullet structure of Danish mortgage bonds
ensures funding of the assets for its entire term as the bond will be ex-
tended if it cannot be refinanced under ordinary terms. Therefore we be-
lieve that these bonds are qualified as stable funding as defined in the
Basel NSFR.
In the same vein, as a potential leverage ratio per definition would not
take into account risk, low-risk business models are more likely to be
bound by a leverage ratio if the ratio is set too high. This would entail that
Danish mortgage credit institutions are more likely to be restricted by a
leverage requirement as these institutions have primarily low-risk assets
on their balance sheet. The same problem occurs with the new capital
floors. Depending on the exact implementation of TLAC in EU law, the
TLAC might pose difficulties for Danish mortgage credit institutions as
well, as these institutions are exempted from the MREL in the BRRD.
When discussing these new initiatives at EU level it is important that the
business model of specialised institutions is carefully taken into account.
Example 2: Maintaining different approaches to asset encumbrance
To which Directive(s)/Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
CRR and BRRD within
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
Asset encumbrance is defined differently in various parts of the new
rules. One definition is used in the LCR calculation, while the asset en-
cumbrance reporting (ie. CRR, article 100 and the related implementing
act, (EU) 2015/79) and the BRDD define it in another way.
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Going forward, it is important to maintain the different approaches, which
recognize that different forms of asset encumbrance are relevant in differ-
ent contexts. An asset, which is encumbered in the very broad sense de-
fined in the asset encumbrance reporting framework, is not necessarily
encumbered in a manner that inhibits it from being used to generate li-
quidity, which is the concern of the LCR.
Furthermore, if the Commission should decide to create a requirement
limiting the level of asset encumbrance in credit institutions based on a
very broad definition of encumbrance, it is important to recognize that the
high levels of encumbrance of Danish mortgage credit institutions do not
lead to structural subordination of simple creditors such as depositors, and
hence a limit on asset encumbrance in these cases is not relevant. Danish
mortgage banks use a direct pass through model in financing the mort-
gage loans as they do not take deposits.
I
SSUE
5 – E
XCESSIVE COMPLIANCE COSTS AND COMPLEXITY
Example 1: Proportional prudential requirements for investment
firms
To which Directive(s)/ Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
CRR/CRD IV
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
There is currently work ongoing in EBA and the Commission assessing
whether the current prudential requirements applicable to investment
firms laid down in CRR/CRD IV are appropriate or whether they should
be modified and if so, how.
The first report has been sent from EBA to the Commission with a rec-
ommendation to simplify the prudential regime for investment firms and
to develop a more proportionate and risk-based regime. Denmark sup-
ports this approach due to the significant differences among investment
firms. This includes size (from 2 employees to a large number of employ-
ees), level of risk exposures the investment firms have (regarding for ex-
ample market and credit risk) and the type of clients (retail clients or more
professional clients).
It is necessary to make a distinction between investment firms, for which
prudential requirements equivalent to the ones in force for credit institu-
tions are necessary (the systemic and “bank-like” investment firms), and
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investment firms, which are neither systemic nor “bank-like”, for which
specific requirements that are more relevant could be developed.
If you have suggestions to remedy the issue(s) raised in your example,
please make them here:
In order to ensure proportionality, we suggest:
Developing a lighter regime for smaller investment firms including
fewer reporting requirements. Such a regime for smaller investment
firms could amongst other things consist of e.g.:
-
an exemption from the requirements regarding liquidity in part
six of the CRR,
-
an exemption for smaller investment firms regarding inclusion of
interim or year-end profits in Common Equity Tier 1 capital
without the prior permission of the competent authority.
Example 2: Proportional reporting obligations
To which Directive(s)/ Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
EMIR
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
EMIR requires that all counterparties, active and inactive, that are in-
volved in a derivative transaction, which has not yet matured, have to
report the details of the transaction to a trade repository in order to allow
for a comprehensive overview of the market and assessing systemic risk
in regard to both CCP-cleared and non-CCP-cleared derivative contracts.
The reporting obligations entail several types of costs. This includes costs
to the Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) -distributor (both a one-time amount
and an ongoing subscription), costs to the entity which performs the re-
porting on behalf of the non-financial counterparty and costs to legal and
economic advice.
For a small non-financial counterparty that has entered into a single con-
tract for hedge reasons and has made this contract before EMIR went into
force and which is not active on the market nor will be active on the mar-
ket (“inactive” non-financial counterparties), the reporting obligation
seems inappropriately burdensome and expensive.
If you have suggestions to remedy the issue(s) raised in your example,
please make them here:
In order to ensure reporting obligations are not excessive, we suggest that:
The reporting obligations for “inactive” non-financial counterparties
should be optional, as long as the derivative contract is entered into
before EMIR. If the counterparty decides to become active again,
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hence become active after the implementation of EMIR, the counter-
party should be covered by the reporting obligations in EMIR.
Example 3: Requirements should be relevant
To which Directive(s)/Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
Solvency II
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
Parts of Solvency II is unnecessarily complex, and in some areas there is
a mismatch between the stipulated requirements and the ensuing supervi-
sion vis-à-vis the companies and the value added in respect of policyhold-
er protection.
Solvency II contains a revision clause. The focus of such a revision
should be on ensuring the potential of achieving the objectives of the reg-
ulation in a less burdensome way. This could e.g. be done by introducing
opportunities to make use of eased or simpler ways to fulfill require-
ments, e.g. in relation to small or less complex companies. An evaluation
of the administrative burdens for the financial companies would be useful
with a view to the revision.
To this end, we would highlight a few examples: The SCR standard for-
mula as well as the discount rate curve for calculating the technical provi-
sions are unnecessarily complex and a less complex formula and curve
should be considered. The requirements on e.g. internal audit cause diffi-
culties and heavy burdens to small companies and a possibility to make
exemptions based on proportionality could be considered. Finally, report-
ing requirements cause heavy burdens to especially small companies and
a possibility to make exemptions based on proportionality could be con-
sidered
If you have suggestions to remedy the issue(s) raised in your example,
please make them here:
In order to avoid excessive compliance requirements and unnecessary
complexity, we suggest an evaluation of at least the following:
The SCR standard formula,
The discount rate curve for calculating the technical provisions,
The requirements on internal audit,
The reporting requirements.
I
SSUE
6 – R
EPORTING AND DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS
Example 1: Clarity of relevance regarding reporting is needed
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To which Directive(s)/ Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
AIFMD
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
According to AIFMD, alternative investment fund managers (AIFMs)
shall regularly report to the competent authorities of their home Member
State. The reporting frequency and the information to be provided are set
out in Annex IV of Regulation 231/2013. The competent authority of the
home Member State shall ensure that the Annex IV reporting is made
available to competent authorities in other relevant Member States, ES-
MA and the ESRB.
Many AIFMs have been struggling with the reporting obligations set out
in Annex IV and how to interpret the specific reporting criteria.
ESMA has provided guidelines regarding the reporting obligations, but
they are not nearly specific enough and do not explain in detail which
information should be reported. Experience shows that without proper
guidelines, the AIFMs find the reporting requirements unclear. This re-
sults in incorrect reporting or simply lack of reporting due to misinterpre-
tation. It is a burden to the AIFMs to achieve the necessary level of un-
derstanding in order to report the correct information to the competent
authorities. This undermines the quality of the reported data and makes it
less useful for analysis of market developments.
AIFMs subject to article 3(d) of AIFMD (sub-threshold AIFMs) are also
subject to reporting obligations set out in Annex IV, although these
AIFMs are not subject to supervision. It seems unnecessarily burdensome
for the sub-threshold AIFMs to be subject to extensive reporting require-
ments since these are not used in any supervisory process.
If you have suggestions to remedy the issue(s) raised in your example,
please make them here:
In order to use the reported information for analysis, we suggest that:
More specific guidelines regarding the Annex IV-reporting require-
ments are required, so that the AIFMs easily and efficiently can
achieve and file the correct information.
The reporting obligations for sub-threshold AIFM’s should be recon-
sidered and more specific information regarding use of these report-
ing should be available.
Example 2: Better framing of reporting obligations
To which Directive(s)/Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
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EMIR and MiFIR
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
EMIR requires that all counterparties involved in a derivative transaction
have to report the details of the transaction to a trade repository. The re-
porting includes 59 fields of information about the trade. Several of these
fields may be interpreted differently by the different counterparties.
The trade repositories reporting system for EMIR is perceived extensive
and complex. The different interpretations and the extent of the data to be
reported lead to a high degree of unmatched reports from counterparties.
The quality and usability of the received data for the competent authority
is therefore questionable. Consequently, care must be taken to ensure that
future reporting requirements are well framed. This is in particular the
case in relation to MiFID II and MiFIR with regard to the transaction re-
porting and data collection obligations (data related to transparency and
best execution).
If you have suggestions to remedy the issue(s) raised in your example,
please make them here:
In order to ensure more proportionate reporting obligations, we suggest
that:
The fields to be reported in EMIR, article 9, and MIFIR, article 22,
26 and 27 should not be too comprehensive and have a clear defini-
tion, both regarding the reporting format and which details to be re-
ported, so it is possible to harmonize and aggregate data.
The competent authorities and ESMA should develop systems that
can receive the data, and the industry should have time to test against
this system.
Example 3: Streamlining, and ensuring the relevance of reporting
requirements
To which Directive(s)/ Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
EMIR and MiFIR/MiFID II
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
Under EMIR, the set-up and specification of trade reporting have in many
cases been finalised late in the law making process leaving a limited
amount of time for the industry to implement the changes needed. Also,
the guidance provided to understand the trade reporting regime and tech-
nical details on how to fill in different fields have been accompanied by
frequent changes and additions. For the industry, besides the initial cost of
introducing a new reporting system, there is an extra cost incurred by fre-
quent changes to the system.
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There is a risk that similar problems will arise under MiFIR/MiFID II
with regard to the collection of data for the purposes of transaction report-
ing, transparency and best execution. The amount of fields to be reported
are very extensive and the time available for the industry to implement
the changes short. Also, ESMA and the competent authorities have to
develop complex systems that can receive the data and these systems have
to be tested. This could lead to challenges similar to the ones under EMIR
with frequent changes and short deadlines to be met and expensive and
complex systems where the quality and usability of the received data are
questionable.
If you have suggestions to remedy the issue(s) raised in your example,
please make them here:
In order ensure that reporting requirements are relevant and proportionate,
we suggest that as any new rules and legislation should be led by the fol-
lowing guidance principles:
The reporting requirements for the relevant financial actors in the EU
should be limited to need-to-have instead of nice-to-have (at level 1, 2
and 3),
The reporting requirements should be less burdensome with fewer and
less complex data points to fill in,
The industry should be given sufficient time for the implementation
process,
There should be a quality and relevance check of the proposed fields
by the industry and authorities in order to reduce the number of sub-
sequent changes/additions.
Example 4: Avoiding excessive reporting requirements on remunera-
tion
To which Directive(s)/ Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
CRR/CRD IV
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
CRD IV introduced a new remuneration regime which included compre-
hensive reporting requirements. At this point it is still too early to assess
the impacts, costs and benefits of the provisions.
We have not yet seen the full potential and consequences of the provi-
sions provided by the directive. Consequently the Commission consulta-
tion on the remuneration rules recently finalised were perhaps premature.
That being said, we generally believe that the level of detail in the remu-
neration provisions causes great administrative challenges for the sector.
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Any alterations should therefore be focused on simplifying the regulation
thus making it less administrative burdensome.
If you have suggestions to remedy the issue(s) raised in your example,
please make them here:
In order to ensure that reporting requirements are relevant and propor-
tionate, we suggest that:
The Commission initiates another review of the effectiveness of the
remuneration rules once they have been in force for a longer period of
time with an emphasis on reduction of burdens.
I
SSUE
10 – L
INKS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL RULES AND OVERALL CUMULATIVE IMPACT
Example 1: Rules of CCR applicable to UCITS management compa-
nies and alternative investment fund managers
To which Directive(s)/ Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
CRR, UCITS and AIFMD
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
It follows from references in UCITS and AIFMD that the rules in articles
25-88 of CRR regarding the elements of own funds are applicable to
UCITS management companies and alternative investment fund managers
(fund management companies).
The rules are designed to mitigate the risks connected with the activities
carried out by credit institutions and investment firms. Fund management
is the main activity of fund management companies. Such activities may
not be carried out by credit institutions or investment firms, cf. UCITS
and AIFMD.
The risks connected to fund management activities are not the same as the
risks connected to the business of credit institutions and investment firms,
and the activities of the fund management companies are not as complex
as those of credit institutions or investment firms. The different risk expo-
sure of fund management companies is also underlined by the fact that
UCITS and AIFMD set out capital requirements which have been tailored
to fit the risk exposure of fund management companies.
Accordingly, the application of the own funds rules (Articles 25-88 of
CRR) for fund management companies seems to be unnecessarily burden-
some and should be reviewed so they are proportionate related to the risks
concerned UCITS and AIFMD.
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If you have suggestions to remedy the issue(s) raised in your example,
please make them here:
In order to avoid unnecessary administrative burdens, we suggest that:
A revision of articles 25-88 of CRR so for fund management compa-
nies so as to ensure a better alignment with UCTIS and AIFM.
The references in questions from UCITS and AIFMD to CRR can be
found in articles 2(1)(k), 2(1)(l) and 2(6) of UCITS and articles 4(1)(s),
4(1)(ad) and 4(2) of AIFM.
Example 2: Exemption for non-financial counterparties regarding
fully backed bank guarantee
To which Directive(s)/Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
EMIR
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
In accordance with Article 46 paragraph 1 of EMIR a CCP may accept
bank guarantees as collateral when the guarantee is issued on behalf of a
non-financial counterparty.
The conditions under which commercial bank guarantees may be accept-
ed as collateral is specified in the Commission delegated regulation
153/2013. One of the requirements is that a bank guarantee must be fully
backed by highly liquid collateral. The requirement for a guarantee to be
fully backed by collateral in the delegated regulation makes it more or
less impossible to actually use bank guarantees as collateral. And in our
view the wording goes beyond the wording of Article 46 in EMIR.
A temporary exemption is allowed for clearing of power and gas deriva-
tives (Article 62). This exemption will however end on the 15 March
2016. When the exemption ends, non-financial clearing members will be
required to use cash, highly liquid securities or fully backed bank guaran-
tees as collateral for CCP clearing of power and gas derivatives.
If the current exemption is allowed to expire, clearing of power and gas
derivatives contracts will become more expensive for non-financial mar-
ket participants when this specific requirement enters into force. We fear
that, as a consequence of higher costs of clearing, market participants will
turn to less transparent non-cleared OTC trading. Non-financial counter-
parties that are managing risks directly related to their commercial activi-
ty will not be subject to mandatory clearing under EMIR. Hence, it is ex-
pected that they will be sensitive to economic incentives. In other words,
this will – contrary to the purpose of EMIR - increase counterparty risks
and reduce transparency in the market.
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The reason behind the political agreement to allow the use of bank guar-
antees as collateral from non-financial counterparties was to avoid forcing
the transparent energy markets into a less transparent market where deriv-
ative contracts will not be cleared through a CCP. This should be clari-
fied.
If you have suggestions to remedy the issue(s) raised in your example,
please make them here:
In order avoid any disruption to the market stability, we suggest that:
It is clarified - either in EMIR or in delegated regulation 153/2013 -
that the use of bank guarantees as collateral from non-financial coun-
terparties should be possible on more appropriate terms by clarifying
that the aim behind this possibility was to avoid forcing the transpar-
ent energy markets into a less transparent market where derivative
contracts will not be cleared through a CCP.
I
SSUE
14 – D
EFINITIONS
Example 1: A new two-tier definition of covered bonds
To which Directive(s)/ Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
Solvency II, CRR and UCITS
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
Covered bonds are treated and defined differently in Solvency II and
CRR.
In Solvency II covered bonds are defined in terms of UCITS 52(4) and
have preferential capital requirements when covered bonds have an exter-
nal credit rating of at least AA-.
In CRR/CRD IV covered bonds are defined in article 129 and get a pref-
erential treatment when they comply with UCITS 52(4), have an external
rating of at least AA- and if extra collateral is added when loan-to-value
(LTV) exceeds certain limits.
As mentioned in the Danish response to the covered bonds consultation,
having a new single legal definition of covered bonds could be a useful
element in ensuring the “covered bonds brand” while at the same time
ensuring the role of covered bonds as e.g. instruments to place funds or
handling liquidity risks. Such a definition would set out common stand-
ards where only covered bonds meeting the requirements in the given
definition could make use of the term covered bonds.
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When deciding on the specific elements of a covered bonds definition,
Denmark would favour of a two-tier definition. This would include a
broad basic definition of covered bonds plus an additional set of criteria
giving the latter some more preferential treatment than covered bonds
which only comply with the broad definition. Such a two-tier definition is
already the case today with a broad basic definition of covered bonds as
set out in article 52 (4) of the UCITS Directive plus an additional set of
criteria as set out in article 129 of the CRR giving the latter some more
preferential treatment than covered bonds which are only UCITS-
compliant.
The LTV limit requirement in CRR (not present in UCITS) means that
specialised institutions are required to fund additional cover assets (typi-
cally government bonds or other non-mortgage CRR eligible assets) when
property prices are decreasing to the extent that the LTV-limits are ex-
ceeded.
If we take Denmark as a case, this would mean that in certain very
stressed scenarios - although such a situation has never materialized in
Denmark - it may turn impossible for the Danish mortgage credit institu-
tions to continue to fund additional cover assets and it is in this situation
imperative that the issued covered bonds remain UCITS-compliant as
well as the institutions can continue to fund the real economy with only-
UCITS-compliant covered bonds.
Therefore, a two-tier definition is preferred.
If you have suggestions to remedy the issue(s) raised in your example,
please make them here:
In order to ensure the role of covered bonds as e.g. instruments to place
funds or handle liquidity, we suggest that:
There should be a new two-tiered legal definition of covered bonds
with a broad basic definition of covered bonds (UCITS) plus an addi-
tional set of criteria (CRR) giving the latter a more preferential treat-
ment.
Example 2: Alignment of definitions of short sale
To which Directive(s)/ Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
Short selling regulation (SSR) and MiFIR
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
The definitions of short selling in SSR and MiFIR differ. According to
SSR, the relevant time to calculate short selling is at midnight at the end
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of trading day. In MiFIR, short selling is calculated at the time of execu-
tion of the transaction.
The difference in definitions might pose problems for the market partici-
pants. As an example, if there is a first sale of a government bond and
immediately after a similar-sized buy of the same instrument, this would
result in a short sale reporting according to MiFIR, but would not be cal-
culated as a short sale according to the short selling regulation.
If you have suggestions to remedy the issue(s) raised in your example,
please make them here:
In order to enforce clarity and reduce administrative burdens, we suggest
that:
The definition of short sale should be the same in both the short selling
regulation and in MiFIR.
I
SSUE
14 – R
ISK
Example 1: Technical solutions for CCP’s
To which Directive(s)/Regulation(s) do you refer in your example?
EMIR
Please provide us with an executive summary of your example:
EMIR introduces the obligation to clear certain classes of OTC deriva-
tives in CCPs that have been authorized (European CCPs) or recognized
(non-EU CCPs) under the EMIR framework. EMIR gives rise to some
practical complications and unintentional discrepancies for e.g. insurance
companies using derivatives when mitigating investment risks.
One of these is the fact that insurance companies encounter difficulties in
meeting variation margin requirements of central counterparties in respect
of transactions subject to mandatory clearing under EMIR because CCPs
- for now - only accept cash. Insurance companies offering life insurance
have to invest in the best interest of the insured. Since investing in cash is
not in the best interest of the insured, insurance companies do not hold
much cash and would therefore have to make use of e.g. the repo market
in order to fulfill their variation margins in cash.
Another issue arising from the EMIR regulation is the fact that the con-
tracts, which insurance companies enter into with CCPs, have shown to
include terms that allow for the CCP to terminate the contract. This leaves
insurance companies with very little incentive to actually reduce risks
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through OTC derivatives since the uncertainty related to the possible ter-
mination is inconsistent with the need to reduce investment risks.
It is important that the OTC derivatives are handled in a proper manner
e.g. by requiring central clearing in order to make the over the counter
market on OTC derivatives safe and sound. However, it is equally im-
portant to have a proper balance between rules and a well-functioning
market in mind when accessing consequences of new rules. It seems that
the rules on clearing obligations for OTC derivatives have led to the be-
fore mentioned unintentional discrepancies on companies e.g. insurance
companies that have to enter into agreements with CCP’s on central clear-
ing. As described above this poses a potential problem. Therefore, it
needs to be closely monitored if the possibility of termination is used and
if so, this possibility should be deleted in order to maintain the investment
in OTC derivatives.
If you have suggestions to remedy the issue(s) raised in your example,
please make them here:
In order to ensure the proper level of risk aversion, we suggest that:
The CCPs should be obliged to develop technical solutions for the
transfer by pension scheme arrangements of non-cash collateral as
variation margins under EMIR even after 2017. Furthermore, if the
CCP’s do not take the required steps, the exemption under article
89(1) should be made permanent in order to avoid the adverse effect
of centrally clearing derivative contracts on the retirement benefits of
future pensioners.
More certainty related to the timeframe and the assurance of the con-
tract entered into with the CCP is needed. It should be followed close-
ly if the possibility of termination is used and if so, it should no long-
er be possible to delete in order to maintain the investment in OTC
derivatives.