EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 531: Materialer og program fra temamøde i Europaudvalget om skatteunddragelse 8/4-16

Europaudvalget 2015-16
EUU Alm.del Bilag 531
Offentligt

Why Public Country-by-Country

Reporting for Large

Multinationals is a Must

Questions and Answers

24/02/2016

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 531: Materialer og program fra temamøde i Europaudvalget om skatteunddragelse 8/4-16

Questions & Answers

Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 3

10.

11.

Is this only important for tax transparency?......................................................................................... 4

Is this only relevant to tax administrations? ......................................................................................... 5

Will transnational enterprises incur an undue cost burden? ............................................................... 6

Will trade secrets be disclosed?............................................................................................................ 8

Will transnational enterprises become less competitive?.................................................................... 9

Are transnational enterprises too complex for public CBCR? ............................................................ 10

Will more information create confusion and instability? ................................................................... 10

Is public CBCR important for only the EU governments? ................................................................... 12

Can the European Union go further than the OECD? ......................................................................... 13

Can we rely on information exchange between governments? ..................................................... 14

Has the US ruled this to be ‘unconstitutional’? .............................................................................. 15

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 531: Materialer og program fra temamøde i Europaudvalget om skatteunddragelse 8/4-16

Introduction

Abusive tax planning by transnational enterprises is a global problem. A major part of global cross-border

trade happens between related parties in a transnational enterprise and almost 1/3 of global corporate

investment stocks passes through offshore investment hubs.

This type of trade is susceptible to abusive

exploitation of gaps and loopholes in domestic and international tax law that allow for ‘profit shifting’

from country to country, with the intention of reducing the taxes paid on profits.

A lack of transparency makes this kind of tax planning difficult to quantify. Enhancing transparency in the

way transnational enterprises report and publish their accounts, would help tackle tax avoidance at very

low cost.

Despite publishing their accounts as if they are unified entities, transnational enterprises are not taxed in

this way. Each business entity within the transnational enterprise is taxed individually, making it difficult

to establish an overview of what is happening within a group of companies for tax purposes. This would

be different if reporting was done on a ‘country-by-country’ basis.

Since 2015 the European Union requires large financial institutions to do so, which has led to a barrage of

media reports of banks that get away with paying very little tax.

It also has allowed investigators to

compare banks in terms of their attitudes to using low- or no-tax jurisdictions in their corporate structures.

Based on these experiences the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly in favour of a proposal for

the Shareholders Rights Directive (SRD) that would extend similar country by country reporting (CBCR)

obligations to all sectors of the economy. This measure would require companies that qualify under

certain criteria to report yearly and on a consolidated basis on the following items, among others: 1. the

name(s) and nature of their activities in each jurisdiction where they operate, 2. the turnover, 3. profit or

loss before tax, 4. tax on profit or loss, 5. number of employees and 6. public subsidies received.

In addition to the current requirements for financial institutions another three reporting items were

proposed by the EP, namely 7. value of assets and costs of maintaining those assets, 8. sales and

purchases, and 9. a list of all subsidiaries operating in each EU Member State or third country alongside

the relevant data.

If agreed in the ongoing SRD trilogue negotiations between the European Parliament, Commission and

Council, this measure would give access to information on corporate tax-related information to tax

authorities, investors, journalists and concerned citizens around the world and shed light on world trade

flows, corporate governance, tax payments and even corrupt practices of transnational enterprises.

However, the political debate on this issue has made it clear that there are a number of frequently asked

questions. We address a range of those in this briefing.

http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/FDI%2C%20Tax%20and%20Development.pdf

E.g.

http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-britain-banks-tax-exclusive-idUKKBN0U51XH20151222.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 531: Materialer og program fra temamøde i Europaudvalget om skatteunddragelse 8/4-16

1. Is this only important for tax transparency?

Short answer: No, the information that large transnational enterprises are asked to produce is the bare

minimum to be able to conduct a meaningful risk assessment in terms of tax contributions owed in the

different jurisdictions of operation. There is, however, a range of other benefits.

Long answer:

Fully public country by country reporting (CBCR) would serve a number of functions beyond

being a risk identifier for tax dodging.

Firstly, it would make transparent data that is useful to assess the impact of governments’ tax policies. By

seeing how company performance changes over time, we would be in a better position to assess the

efficacy of government policies, in taxation and other areas. Whilst some government data can be used

for such analysis, it is only by seeing corporate data over time that we can really see where the choices

for investment, divestment, etc. have been made

and how governments’ decisions affect corporate

IN 2014, THE LUXLEAKS SCANDAL ONCE AGAIN SHOWED

actions. The upshot should be more effective

THE PUBLIC’S LACK OF TOLERANCE FOR TRANSNATIONAL

policy-making by governments, as well as more

ENTERPRISES’ AGGRESSIVE TAX AVOIDANCE. FULLY

informed civil society.

PUBLIC CBCR WOULD MEAN THAT TRANSNATIONAL

Fully public CBCR could also be an important tool

ENTERPRISES HAVE TO BE ABLE TO PUBLICLY DEFEND

to increase governments’ accountability. By

THEIR TAX PLANNING PRACTICES. MAKING THE

creating transparency on all the tax payments of

REPORTABLE INFORMATION ONLY AVAILABLE TO TAX

transnational enterprises (not only for corporate

ADMINISTRATIONS WOULD MEAN THAT THEY ARE ONLY

income tax), it would allow citizens to keep their

LIKELY TO NEED TO DEFEND THEIR MOST BLATANT

governments accountable for the funds they

SCHEMES. CLEARLY, THE DETERRENT EFFECT AGAINST

receive from companies. This information is

ENGAGING IN AGGRESSIVE TAX AVOIDANCE IS MORE

particularly relevant in countries where

POWERFUL WHEN THERE IS PUBLIC SCRUTINY.

misappropriation of public funds is a major

problem. Public CBCR can help to flag up

corruption risks by shedding light on any special arrangements between companies and governments. It

can also improve the oversight exercised by authorities. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

(EITI) has clearly shown the demand and usefulness of such information for the extractives sector, and

there seems to be no reason why other sectors would be wholly different

CBCR could also include a requirement for transnational enterprises to publish the public subsidies they

receive – as is currently the case in the EU for large resource extracting companies and for financial

institutions. The aims would be to give citizens the information they need for balanced debate on the

contributions of transnational enterprises, and to re-establish public trust that sufficient transparency

exists in the wake of massive bank bailouts since the financial crisis resulting in sweeping austerity

measures for workers, unemployed persons, pensioners and voters to endure.

The CBCR requirements currently cover a bare minimum of data needed to assess a company’s tax

payments. If a single element is left out, the full scope of a company’s operations can be easily distorted.

The prime concern should be to make sure that the information needed to see the whole picture is

published. Disclosing anything less than the minimum CBCR requirements set out in our proposal will not

achieve this.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 531: Materialer og program fra temamøde i Europaudvalget om skatteunddragelse 8/4-16

2. Is this only relevant to tax administrations?

Short answer: No, CBCR serves many functions, which is also why it should not be put in the hands of

tax administrations only.

Long answer:

Given that the EU as a bloc is moving forward with the model for confidential CBCR,

authorities only, one might be led to conclude that tax avoidance by TNCs is therefore a thing of the past.

While tax administrations often have highly competent staff when it comes to assessing the tax payments

of transnational enterprises, the number of such staff is limited. For example, according to the OECD the

Irish tax authority has 201 members of staff in its office for Large Taxpayers, which covers more than

12,000 companies of both domestic and foreign origin.

Among these companies, almost 1,000 are foreign

transnational enterprises.

Even with the best of systems and procedures, it seems unlikely that 201 staff

members will be able to effectively scrutinize and

assure the accuracy of these companies’ tax

returns.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONSORTIUM OF INVESTIGATIVE

JOURNALISTS (ICIJ), AND A HOST OF INTERNATIONAL

MEDIA ORGANISATIONS FROM LE MONDE AND THE

INDIAN EXPRESS TO THE BBC AND CBS BROKE PUBLICLY A

LEAK OF DOCUMENTS FROM HSBC’S SWISS BANK,

DATING TO 2005-2007.

THE LEAKED ‘SWISSLEAKS’ DATA PROVIDED PRIVATELY

TO (MAINLY EUROPEAN) GOVERNMENTS IN OR AROUND

2010 SIMPLY FAILED, IN DIFFERENT WAYS, TO DELIVER

ACCOUNTABLE AND EFFECTIVE TAXATION SYSTEM

RESPONSES. SINCE RECEIVING DETAILS OF MORE THAN

1,000 CASES IN 2010, THE UK HAS UNDERTAKEN 1

PROSECUTION.

What is more, the threshold for OECD-style CBCR

is very high: only corporate groups with a

turnover of more than 750 million euro are

covered. The OECD itself estimates that this

excludes 85-90% of all TNCs from reporting.

Only

a very limited amount of corporations will,

therefore, be covered. This raises questions with

regard to ensuring fair competition between all

companies and providing an adequate level-

playing field for them. A further risk is that

corporations may start splitting in order to

artificially stay below this very high threshold and

avoid the reporting requirement.

Meanwhile, the European Commission has conducted an impact assessment on fully public CBCR (similar

to what is proposed for the SRD) where companies themselves publish the required financial information

(and would therefore not come with the cumbersome confidentiality conditions that characterise the

OECD CBCR model). When asked by the Commission, over 66% of those respondents who agreed to

publicly disclose their answers indicated they feel more action is needed from the EU to increase the fiscal

transparency of large corporate taxpayers.

This is in line with the democratic majority in the European

Parliament.

We understand why. Making the CBCR reports public would ensure that more sets of eyes, across different

stakeholder groups, could help digest the mass of data filed by companies and flag any indicators of risk

http://www.oecd.org/site/ctpfta/taxadministrationdatabase.htm

- Large taxpayers in Ireland refers to companies

with a turnover that exceeds €162 million or tax payments above €16 million

http://connectireland.com/reasons.aspx

http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-action-13-guidance-implementation-tp-documentation-cbc-reporting.pdf

https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/publication/further-corporate-tax-transparency-2015?surveylanguage=en#

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 531: Materialer og program fra temamøde i Europaudvalget om skatteunddragelse 8/4-16

to appropriate tax authorities. This advantage would be most keenly felt in countries that have weak

capacity in their tax administrations, including developing countries.

Public CBCR would also have an important deterrent effect as presenting questionable numbers carries a

reputational risk for companies. Furthermore, tax administrations can pursue action against transnational

enterprises if they suspect that a company has dodged its tax obligations but because winning a case

against a transnational enterprise can be a long and highly complicated matter, tax administrations prefer

to pursue a limited number of cases that they consider they are very likely to win.

Given that the earliest possible occasion to agree on legally binding, public CBCR will be in the framework

of the Shareholder Rights Directive, it is also important to highlight the importance of this measure to

investors. Whereas some have argued that investors could be put off by legal requirements they feel rest

on ill-defined and changeable concepts like “fairness” that could affect after tax returns, we actually

believe many investors are longing for more information on the soundness of a TNCs corporate structure

and taxation strategy.

And indeed, we find the sustainable investors’ community on our side, like for instance Eurosif, who

published this on risk mitigation: “1. Aggressive tax practices can undermine the sustainability strategies

that companies have adopted and corporate commitments to economic development projects; 2. Short-

term financial gains from an aggressive tax positions may be offset by medium- to long-term repercussions

related to reputational risks; and 3. Risks are derived from both actual tax practices and related lack of

transparency. Failing to disclose one’s tax position constitutes as much of a risk as the aggressive tax

practices themselves.”

Furthermore the Dutch institutional investors' representative Eumedion published the following earlier

this year:

“Investors will benefit from increased public transparency on where taxes are paid (‘country-by-country

reporting’) since it increases overall transparency and allows for a more detailed analysis by investors. It

will also offer shareholders the opportunity to have a dialogue with the board of the company on this

topic.”

CBCR therefore is of great interest to the investor community, and if their experience is anything to go by,

also for the economic stability of the countries in which they operate.

3. Will transnational enterprises incur an undue cost burden?

Short answer: No, the costs associated with making CBCR public are “negligible”. Moreover,

publishing CBCR reports is most likely cost-beneficial for both transnational enterprises and tax

administrations.

Long answer:

It is inevitable that there will be some modest costs incurred by transnational

enterprises to prepare data for CBCR, but this should not be overstated.

Her Majesty’s Revenues & Customs (HMRC) in the United Kingdom did an assessment of the

implementation costs for businesses of CBCR and found that “one-off

costs are estimated as

http://www.eurosif.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/2015-07-15_Eurosif-CBCR-Position-FINAL.pdf

http://www.eumedion.nl/en/public/knowledgenetwork/position-papers/2016-01-srd---statement-triloog.pdf

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 531: Materialer og program fra temamøde i Europaudvalget om skatteunddragelse 8/4-16

negligible, with annual costs to businesses affected by the measure of £0.2million”.

These are not

significant costs for most transnational enterprises and rate as insignificant when compared to the

likely benefits of increased transparency.

The low costs reflect the reality that any competent tax director of a transnational enterprise should

already have the information required for public CBCR readily available. It is almost inconceivable

that tax directors, and therefore the companies that employ them, do not know their sales (both

source and destination), employee headcounts and costs, profits, tax provision and tax paid, assets

employed and intra-group transactions by state.

Recording and compiling such data is essential to company tax directors fulfilling their duties to their

companies and, crucially, to ensuring that all necessary books and records are available to companies

to ensure tax liabilities are capable of being fairly recorded at any point in time, which should be the

requirement of all statutory demands for internal control systems (e.g. under the US Sarbanes-Oxley

Act). Any additional cost would relate to the preparation of data for presentation purposes, which is

unlikely to impose a significant cost burden on any transnational enterprise.

Moreover, given that the EU is going ahead with the OECD-model for CBCR, the largest firms – those

with a revenue greater than 750 million – will already compile a much more detailed CBCR report.

For these firms a disclosure rule for only part of that data should not be much of a problem.

If TNCs were to publish, file, and record the location of the information in the online, machine-

readable register

rather than sending data privately to individual contacts at the tax authorities of

each country in which the transnational enterprise operates (or sending to a ‘home’ tax authority and

requiring them to pass it on to the relevant others). This would almost certainly reduce costs for each

transnational enterprise in terms of employee time.

A recent (2014) poll by PWC of business leaders

found 59% in favour of publication

, suggesting that there is limited concern about non-trivial

additional costs to business.

Public CBCR would also save time and resources of tax authorities (which would have no role in

passing on data) by allowing for a simple query of the data instantly via the register, rather than their

having to record and compile different sets of files sent by various transnational enterprises and other

tax authorities.

Finally, some trade associations have made it clear they expect a barrage of so-called ‘double

taxation’ cases if and when companies are required to give country-level data on their activities. It

might be good to bear in mind that the discussion about fair corporate taxation has largely started

after overwhelming evidence was leaked about TNCs’ very low tax payments, in some cases even

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/385161/TIIN_2150.pdf

http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/volume1.pdf,

p.168.

By way of example, IATI uses the CKAN platform for aid donors to publish their data, which is also used by the UK

government for its data.gov.uk website, among others.

http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/iff_assessment_-_cobham_0.pdf,

p. 25.

http://andrewgoodallcta.com/2014/04/24/is-pwcs-survey-a-turning-point-in-the-tax-transparency-debate/

http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/iff_assessment_-_cobham_0.pdf,

p. 25.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 531: Materialer og program fra temamøde i Europaudvalget om skatteunddragelse 8/4-16

lower than 1%, so the question is more how double non-taxation (where TNCs avoid paying by using

legal loopholes and asymmetries) can be avoided. To reach this objective, more information is key.

Also, until now TNCs that do fall under existing CBCR disclosure rules have not reported any such

double taxation claims. Indeed, representatives of HSBC and Barclays banks have furthermore voiced

support for public CBCR in their testimonies for the European Parliament TAXE committee, indicating

that they do not fear unjustified tax claims.

4. Will trade secrets be disclosed?

Short answer: No, public disclosure will level the playing field and discourage unhealthy tax competition

without revealing trade secrets.

Long answer:

While it may affect a company’s ability to outcompete others, tax planning could only be

considered a trade secret if tax is considered a business cost and that it is fair game to compete on

reducing that. However, tax is not a cost and should not be seen as a competition parameter. In the words

of the Tax Justice Network:

“One of the great strengths of market capitalism and market competition is that it puts

pressure on directors to innovate and improve the efficiency of production, including by

bringing down costs and improving the quality of the goods or services they produce. But tax

is entirely different: it is about overall profitability, not about production costs. A company

that uses a tax loophole may be able to use that to bring down its prices and steal a march

on its competitors - but in the process it has done absolutely nothing to improve its efficiency

or the quality of what it provides. The company has cut its tax bill, but the economy overall

has seen no net gain in efficiency or productivity. The company has more profits, but that is

offset by what the country loses in terms of fewer teachers or whatnot.”

Competition on the base of tax planning distorts the functioning of the market and breeds complex and

opaque business structure. Making CBCR public would ensure that competition once again centers on the

delivery of the best product at the best price, rather than who can hire the most tax planners and think

up the most complex structures of shell companies. In fact, discouraging aggressive tax avoidance and

evasion is one of the main arguments for making CBCR public.

Companies that only operate in one country already disclose similar information to what is included in

the CBCR format. This indicates that the type of information is not sensitive and that public CBCR will level

the playing field in terms of reporting requirements between transnational enterprises and purely

national companies.

However, financial reporting by large enterprises on a country-by-country basis is likely to be strongly

indicative of the most aggressive type of tax planning techniques that transnational enterprises use to

drive down their tax liabilities. These structures may become more risky for corporations to use if they

are made public. For those transnational enterprises that have built their business success substantially

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20151110IPR01911/Special-Committee-on-Tax-Rulings-

and-Other-Measures-Similar-in-Nature-or-Effect

http://taxjustice.blogspot.be/2007/11/is-tax-cost.html

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 531: Materialer og program fra temamøde i Europaudvalget om skatteunddragelse 8/4-16

on aggressive tax planning rather than better products or lower cost structures, public CBCR may affect

their business models.

5. Will transnational enterprises become less competitive?

Short answer: No. On the contrary, public CBCR will increase competition in the marketplace.

Long answer:

Transnational enterprises have an advantage over national companies. This is not a

competitive advantage; it is an artificial one. Public CBCR would serve to level the playing field between

transnational enterprises and national companies, who often are already obliged to make publicly

available the type of information required for CBCR. As such, small and medium sized enterprises will be

in a better position to compete.

Upon close analysis, we consider that nothing in the public CBCR proposal for large enterprises can be

considered to reveal trade secret, so that public disclosure will not put European transnational enterprises

in a worse position than non-EU competitors. Since the costs of preparing CBCR are negligible, neither do

they present any significant effect on the cost structure of a company. On both counts, it is evident that

public CBCR will not affect a European transnational enterprise’s ability to compete.

The results of the European Commission’s 2014 impact assessment of public CBCR for large financial

institutions that fall under the Capital Requirements Directive supports this view. Indeed, it even highlights

positive economic effects when it states that making CBCR public for banks “is

not expected to have

significant negative economic impact, in particular on competitiveness, investment, credit availability or

the stability of the financial system. On the contrary, it seems that there could be some limited positive

impact”.

The positive effects for a European company of public CBCR could include attracting more

investment, since the risk profile of the company would be lowered with the release of more information

compared to competitors not engaged in public CBCR.

In the meantime, due to the abovementioned legislation, large financial institutions in the EU have started

disclosing CBCR information over the last years. This seemingly has not put these firms at a competitive

disadvantage with their non-EU competitors, in fact, most banks are reporting they are moving back into

profits.

Currently, most small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in the EU are placed at a competitive disadvantage

vis-à-vis TNCs since most of the time the former are only functioning within borders of one country. These

single entity companies are already disclosing the information that TNCs would have to disclose if

legislation on public CBCR was adopted. Moreover, in most member states the disclosed annual accounts

are publicly available through national registries.

While single entity companies do not reroute their

business activities through foreign subsidiaries, they have fewer opportunities to decrease their effective

tax rates with artificial tax arrangements, unlike practices used by some TNCs.

For a truly level playing fields for companies in and out of the EU, it would however be important that the

scope of the CBCR disclosure requirement is wide enough to capture all TNCs that meet the threshold,

regardless of where their headquarters are located. This would also pre-empt the threat of companies

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/141030-country by countryr-crd-report_en.pdf

In many of the registries a small fee is required in order to access the accounts. This is the case e.g. in the UK’s

Company House register.

E.g. the cases of Fiat and Starbucks:

http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5880_en.htm.

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 531: Materialer og program fra temamøde i Europaudvalget om skatteunddragelse 8/4-16

relocating outside of the EU if they are forced to report on a country by country basis. That is, if trading in

the European internal market is dear to them, but given that it is one of the biggest consumer markets on

earth, one can only assume it is.

The case of India shows that greater tax transparency does not automatically translate in lost

competitiveness; there legislation on corporate disclosure of financial information on a subsidiary-by-

subsidiary basis has been in place for a long time. This has not had a negative impact on the

competitiveness of Indian corporations. On the contrary, India is considered one of the strongest

emerging markets worldwide.

6. Are transnational enterprises too complex for public CBCR?

Short answer: No, the biggest transnational enterprises are going to prepare country by country reports

from this year on. The question is: will the information that emerges be fully utilized?

Long answer:

Many transnational enterprises will start reporting on a country by country basis starting

from the fiscal year 2016, as part of the OECD BEPS requirements. This means that companies will collect

and report the data to tax administrations, so making this information public should be relatively

straightforward. Some companies have already started the public reporting process in response to

growing demand from citizens, consumers and other stakeholders for open and transparent business

practice.

In recent years, some sectors of the economy have already started to publicly disclose country by country

reports. As a result of the fourth European Capital Requirements Directive and the Accounting and

Transparency Directives, large financial institutions (banks) and resource extracting companies are obliged

to provide a yearly overview of their operations, specified per jurisdiction. Although the reporting

requirements are different for these two sectors, the existing financial reporting requirements prove that

the standards are workable and beneficial.

Lastly, the high degree of complexity in some transnational enterprises is, in some cases, the result of

companies’ own strategies to aggressively reduce their tax liabilities. The establishment and maintenance

of these complex structures is resource intensive, with additional accounting, legal, and advisory costs.

Public CBCR is likely to serve as a disincentive for firms to engage in establishing overly- complicated group

structures.

7. Will more information create confusion and instability?

Short answer: No, quite the contrary. The current lack of information is a source of confusion and all

too often leads to instability due to sudden releases of big datasets through leaks.

The subsidiary-by-subsidiary reporting requirement in Indian law obliges Indian TNCs to publicly disclose key

financial information, such as revenues, pre-tax profits and tax on profits, for all their subsidiaries. For more

information see:

http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/transparency_in_corporate_reporting_assessing_emerging_

market_multinational

BEPS Monitoring Group,

https://bepsmonitoringgroup.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/bmg-cbc-response1.pdf,

p.9

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 531: Materialer og program fra temamøde i Europaudvalget om skatteunddragelse 8/4-16

Long answer:

Public CBCR offers a basis for better understanding of transnational enterprises, and the

prospect that controversies and misunderstandings arising from patchy information can be avoided.

Irrespective of whether or not financial information is made publicly available, the debate about

transnational enterprises’ tax payments is likely to continue in years to come. Greater disclosure can

actually be beneficial for companies to avoid misunderstanding and speculation.

Having only partial access to

information – related to a company’s

presence in jurisdictions with no or very

low tax, for example – may lead to

public confusion and accusations of tax

dodging if other matters, like a

company’s profitability, tax credits,

costs and other factors relevant to the

assessment of its taxable base, are not

taken into account.

In a recent survey of business

executives, KPMG found that the tax

profiles of 25 percent of the companies

surveyed had been the subject of a

news media or press report within the

previous 12 months. For the largest

companies (revenue of more than $10

billion), that figure rose to 40 percent.

Debates on corporate tax liabilities,

payments and avoidance often revolve

around speculation and qualified

guesses as things stand. This neither

serves the interest of business nor the

general public.

ONE OF DENMARK’S LARGEST MOBILE PHONE NETWORK

PROVIDERS WAS RECENTLY ACCUSED OF DODGING ITS TAX

RESPONSIBILITIES THROUGH THE USE OF A SUBSIDIARY IN

LUXEMBOURG. A PROMINENT DANISH NEWSPAPER REPORTED

THAT THE COMPANY PAID NO INCOME TAX DESPITE MAKING AN

APPROXIMATE PROFIT OF $200 MILLION OVER A FIVE-YEAR

PERIOD AND SPECULATED THAT THE PROFIT COULD HAVE BEEN

SHIFTED TO LUXEMBOURG.

FOLLOWING THE PUBLICATION OF THE ACCUSATION, THE

COMPANY REVEALED THAT THE ABSENCE OF TAX PAYMENTS WAS

THE RESULT OF AN ACCRUED TAX CREDIT FROM MASSIVE

INVESTMENTS IN TELE-INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE EARLY 2000S, SO

THAT ITS PROFITS WERE NOT LEGALLY TAXABLE YET. THE DAMAGE

WAS ALREADY DONE, HOWEVER, AS THE STORY MADE HEADLINES

ON NATIONAL NEWS AND MOST MEDIA PLATFORMS, LEADING TO

A CONSUMER CAMPAIGN TO BOYCOTT THE COMPANY. AN

ANALYST ESTIMATES THE LOSS FOR THE COMPANY FROM THE BAD

PUBLICITY AT UP TO €400,000

HAD THE COMPANY PROVIDED FOR

PUBLIC

COUNTRY

REPORT,

THE

MISUNDERSTANDING COULD EASILY HAVE BEEN AVOIDED, AND

THE STORY WOULD MOST LIKELY HAVE BEEN DISCARDED IN THE

EDITORIAL NEWSROOM.

Even though CBCR is technical, its value

lies in providing information that can contribute to a more informed debate. This is not only the case for

politicians, journalists and citizen groups, but also for investors and shareholders. By having access to

more information and a better risk profile, shareholders will be better equipped to make informed

investments, avoiding panicky inflows or outflows of capital based on scandals and the lack of

transparency. By facilitating this transparency and risk management, public CBCR can help to increase

investments, FDI, and growth.

Also worth remembering is that transnational enterprises already put out public reports with very

technical information about their accounts. For example, Royal Dutch Shell’s annual report for 2013, freely

http://www.kpmg-institutes.com/content/dam/kpmg/taxwatch/pdf/2014/kpmg-tax-transparency-survey-

report-2014.pdf

Richard Murphy,

http://www.taxresearch.org.uk/Documents/CBC2012.pdf,

p.4

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 531: Materialer og program fra temamøde i Europaudvalget om skatteunddragelse 8/4-16

available online, is 200 pages long, with more than 70 pages of financial reporting.

No one argues that

Shell should not put out 70 pages of financial reports in case it confuses the public.

In short, any claims that public CBCR will confuse citizens are disingenuous as well as incorrectly implying

that existing company reporting is simple. The reports are already complex. Public CBCR would not change

whether big transnational enterprises release complex company reports: instead, it would ensure the

presentation of a true picture of companies’ operations.

8. Is public CBCR only important for EU governments?

Short answer: No. In relative numbers, tax avoidance could be an even bigger problem to developing

countries and public CBCR would help curtailing it.

Long answer:

Having smaller economies than the EU internal market, developing countries suffer more

from aggressive tax planning schemes; according to the IMF the effects of base erosion and profit shifting

“may be noticeably stronger for non-OECD countries than for OECD countries, and statistically more

significant”.

Even though the absolute numbers of corporate tax avoidance would suggest that the

problem is biggest in the EU/OECD countries, the relative numbers paint a different picture.

But even the absolute numbers are staggering; according to the latest GFI report on illicit financial flows

(IFFs), more than $1 trillion outflows illicitly from the developing countries every year.

GFI estimates that

83% of this number is caused by trade misinvoicing. Public CBCR would offer valuable insight to the tax

and internal trade practices of TNCs, giving the governments of developing countries more tools to curtail

illicit flows from their jurisdictions.

The excessive threshold of

€750

million proposed by the OECD seems even higher when seen in from the

perspective of developing countries, where smaller multinational companies can easily be the country’s

largest foreign direct investors. For example the case of Paladin in Malawi shows that a company having

drastically smaller turnover than

€750

million (in this case

€183m)

can effectively use the current

international tax architecture to decrease its effective tax rates and thus have significant impact on the

overall tax revenues of a developing country.

This kind of practices would remain unreported if the

threshold is set as high as the OECD proposes.

No form of Official Development Assistance (ODA) is as cost-effective in supporting developing countries’

capabilities in fostering sustainable development within their borders. Unfortunately, with the OECD

model most developing countries would be left without the CBCR disclosed to tax authorities in rich

countries, and a tremendous opportunity would be lost. The decision to make CBCR reciprocal and

secretive goes against policy coherence for development, as enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty

, an objective

that is also promoted by the OECD.

http://reports.shell.com/annual-report/2013/servicepages/downloads/files/entire_shell_ar13.pdf

https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15118.pdf,

p. 23.

http://financialtransparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/IFF-Update_2015-Final.pdf

http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/malawi_tax_report_updated_table_16_june.pdf

http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/treaty-on-the-functioning-of-the-european-union-and-

comments/part-5-external-action-by-the-union/title-3-cooperation-with-third-countries-and-humantarian-

aid/chapter-1-development-cooperation/496-article-208.html

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 531: Materialer og program fra temamøde i Europaudvalget om skatteunddragelse 8/4-16

The above mentioned mismatch of objectives was also noted in the context of Africa in the Mbeki report

from 2013, which states the following: “Policy coherence is another victim of Illicit IFFs. It is somewhat

contradictory for developed countries to continue to provide technical assistance and development aid

(though at lower levels) to Africa while at the same time maintaining tax rules that enable the bleeding of

the continent’s resources through illicit financial outflows.”

Making CBCR public would be the first step

in getting rid of these contradictions in the policies of the EU countries. Moreover, EU countries have

pledged to enhance transparency in tax matters as part of their efforts to increase financing for

development in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda.

9. Can the European Union go further than the OECD?

Short answer: Yes, the OECD recommendations are guidelines, and the EU already has gone beyond

some OECD recommendations on taxation.

Long answer:

In 2015, the OECD finalized its reform of international taxation through the Base Erosion

and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project. The OECD’s recommendations are non-binding and includes confidential

(for tax administrators’ eyes only) reporting on a country by country basis for transnational enterprises

that have a turnover that exceeds 750 million. Crucially, the OECD considers that tax administrations are

the relevant users of the information, not politicians, academics, the media or the wider public. On 28

January 2016 the European Commission presented proposals that aim at EU-wide adoption of part of the

OECD Action Plan, including the OECD model for confidential CBCR.

As the OECD’s plans are voluntary, there is nothing that prevents the EU from going further than the BEPS

proposals. The European Commission has acknowledged this in its March 2015 tax transparency package,

in which it set more ambitious transparency requirements on the exchange of tax rulings than those

recommended under BEPS. The Commission noted on that occasion that, while BEPS has brought

progress,

“further measures are needed”.

In the aforementioned public consultation that the

Commission organized during the summer months of 2015, more than 66% of respondents who publicized

their answers agreed with this position.

In fact, in terms of country by country reporting, the EU already has regulation that goes beyond BEPS

requirements in some cases. For example, the Capital Requirements Directive IV makes country by

country reports for the banking sector public and includes reporting on categories that beyond the scope

of the BEPS proposal.

Moreover, there seems to be strong support within the College of Commissioners for the EU going further

than voluntary OECD requirements –Commissioners Moscovici and Vestager have stated that they are

personally in favour of public full disclosure, and recently media reports also mention support of

Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker – and the European Parliament has supported the need to

move to public country by country reporting four times in 2015.

http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf,

p. 60.

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/313,

point 23.

http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/transparency/com_2015_1

36_en.pdf

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 531: Materialer og program fra temamøde i Europaudvalget om skatteunddragelse 8/4-16

10. Can we rely on information exchange between governments?

Short answer: while automatic information exchange between EU member states might be in the

works, seen from a developing country perspective it is bound to exclude many governments as it is

currently construed. Besides, public CBCR would allow for more scrutiny and increase incentives for

companies to disengage from aggressive tax planning.

Long answer:

Because the OECD has recommended that country by country reports need only be sent to

the country where the transnational enterprise is headquartered, a proposal that is now also on the table

for new EU legislation as part of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Package, a key question is how other countries

will access the reports if they are not in the public domain. The OECD proposal is to have reports shared

through the existing system by which tax administrations exchange tax information automatically,

meaning without exception at set intervals. There have been considerable developments in international

automatic exchange of financial information and the OECD’s corresponding legal framework. The

organisation’s Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement (MCAA) was signed by 30 countries in

January 2016.

As argued in the chapters 2 and 8, this reporting obligation would only be for the largest of TNCs, namely

those with a turnover of 750 million or more. This would exclude between 85 and 90 percent of TNCs,

who might just as their even larger counterparts be practicing profit shifting with an aim of reducing their

tax bill.

In the EU, the Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC) is proposed to be the legal vehicle, which

also serves for the OECD’s common reporting standard – which aims at exchanging information on

individual bank accounts between the country of residence and the country where the bank account is –

and the exchange of so-called tax rulings that EU member states conclude with TNCs.

In the guidelines to country-by-country (CbC) reporting that the OECD issued last year there is mention of

a secondary mechanism where there is not an information exchange agreement in place, which would

move ‘the obligation for requiring the filing of the CbC Reports and automatically exchanging these

reports to the next tier parent country’. The MCAA therefore also permits the exchange of CbC Reports

by a secondary filer, provided that the legislation of the sending jurisdiction foresees secondary filing and

that there is a treaty in place between those countries that enables this.

Given that EU member states between them have treaties with most developing countries, and either the

headquarters or subsidiaries of all TNCs that will be preparing CbCR reports under the OECD threshold,

they could set up a system to guarantee developing countries access to the CbC reports. If this is however

not something that is envisaged, and there does not seem to be much effort being undertaken to make

this happen at the moment, then we cannot assume that these barriers to automatic exchange will be

overcome any time soon. This risks leaving a whole host of countries in the dark.

If this problem is not resolved, the majority of the world’s countries are at risk of being left out of this

system of information exchange, even though the information that is available might concerns them, and

be of direct impact on their ability to levy taxes that would be rightfully theirs.

Another problem with the way in which automatic information exchange is currently set up, concerns the

timing. TNCs have to file their report no later than 12 months after the end of the fiscal year. For the EU

it is proposed that the exchange between EU members happens within the 3 months that follow. This

EUU, Alm.del - 2015-16 - Bilag 531: Materialer og program fra temamøde i Europaudvalget om skatteunddragelse 8/4-16

means that at the latest, governments will receive the information 15 after the fiscal year has ended.

Although tax-collectors have the legal power to re-open back accounts, this is a cumbersome, resource-

intensive process and in practice.

If, on the other hand, the financial reporting of large enterprises was to be made public in an online

system, the country by country details could be exchanged almost instantaneously – including among

developing countries – with a minimum of red tape.

11. Has the US ruled this to be ‘unconstitutional’?

Short answer: No, the country by country reporting element in the Dodd-Frank Act has never been

overturned on constitutional grounds. In fact, the US intends to adopt CBCR with a wider scope through

the agency rulemaking process, following the model set in the OECD BEPS.

Long answer:

Section 1504 (extractive industries payment transparency) or the Cardin-Lugar Amendment

of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires any oil, gas, or mining

company filing an annual report to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US to disclose

their country and project-level payments to host governments each year.

The American Petroleum Institute, the US Chamber of Commerce, and two other trade associations sued

the SEC claiming that it had made a number of procedural errors in promulgating the rules, as well as that

Section 1504 violates oil companies’ First Amendment free speech rights. The DC District Court declined

to rule on the First Amendment challenge noting that the ruling could change upon SEC review.

However, the court did decide to vacate (set aside) the SEC rule on narrow procedural grounds, so the

SEC is in the process of rewriting the rule. At the end of 2015, the SEC published a new draft rule providing

a more thorough justification, as required under a US law called the Administrative Procedure Act. In

response to a lawsuit by Oxfam America, the SEC has promised to complete the new rulemaking by the

end of June 2016.

This case should not be confused with another court case on

section

1502 (the conflict minerals provision),

of which a provision that requires companies to say if they are "DRC conflict free" was struck down in

2014 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit as violating companies' First

Amendment constitutional rights. Although the bases and implications of this decision are still unclear, it

does not apply on its face to country by country financial reporting, and is based largely on a concern that

companies are being forced to brand themselves as contributors to the Congolese civil war. Most of the

reporting requirements of the conflict minerals provision were upheld as being completely constitutional.

The Section 1502 law is currently being implemented and companies submitted their first reports this

year.

Moreover, even amongst these court cases the US Treasury went forward with proposing reporting

requirements that are based on the OECD’s CBCR template. The U.S. Treasury published its proposed rule

for implementation of the OECD's CBCR template in December of 2015, which is the subject of public

consultation until March 2016.

We expect that the U.S. will publish its final rule implementing the OECD

standard later in 2016.

http://s127054.gridserver.com/sites/default/files/PWYP_Fact_Sheet_District_Court_Decision_Sept2013.pdf

https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2015/12/23/2015-32145/country-by-country-reporting