EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Europaudvalget 2016-17
EUU Alm.del Bilag 3
Offentligt

OCTOBER 2016

N°

European Court

of Auditors

Journal

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Past editions of the Journal can be found on:

ECA’s website: http://eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/Journal.aspx

PRODUCTION

Rédacteur en chef / Editor in Chief : Rosmarie Carotti

Tél. / tel.: 00352 4398 - 45506 - e-mail : [email protected]

Mise en page, diffusion / Layout, distribution : Direction de la Présidence - Directorate of the Presidency

Photos : Reproduction interdite / Reproduction prohibited

The contents of the interviews and the articles are the sole responsibility of the interviewees and

authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the European Court of Auditors

Cover photos:

- Vítor Manuel Caldeira, leaving ECA President

- Dr Louis Galea, leaving ECA Member

-Klaus-Heiner Lehne, new ECA President

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

ANNOUNCEMENT

2015 EU AUDIT

We are pleased to announce that our annual reports on the

implementation of the 2015 EU budget and the European

Development Funds will be published on

13 October 2016.

This is around one month earlier than previously, thanks

to cooperation with the European Commission and after

consultation with the Committee on Budgetary Control of

the European Parliament.

In the reports we will provide assurance on how EU funds

were used during the year, and highlight where they were

most at risk of being misspent. We will also analyse why

errors occur and provide recommendations on how to

improve financial management. Our main aim is to assist

the European Parliament and the Council in scrutinising EU

financial management as part of the discharge procedure on

the EU budget.

Our annual reports in full, together with accompanying

material will be available from 9.00 am on 13 October on our

website:

eca.europa.eu

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The most challenging aspect was to move the institution forward

Interview with Vítor Manuel Caldeira, leaving ECA President

Vítor Manuel Caldeira served from March 2000 as a Member and from 2008 as the ECA’s 10th President.

By Rosmarie Carotti

As I see it, I have three key tasks: to implement the reform of the ECA, to reform our

products, and to boost the ECA’s external impact

Interview with Klaus-Heiner Lehne, the newly appointed ECA President

By Rosmarie Carotti

Reflections on my experience at the European Court of Auditors

By Louis Galea, leaving ECA Member (2010 – 2016)

The ECA and the NAO: Exchanging knowledge and people

On 19 July, John Thorpe, Executive Leader of the National Audit Office (NAO) and Simon Helps,

a NAO director, visited the ECA hosted by Phil Wynn Owen, ECA Member

By Katharina Bryan, private office of Wynn Owen, and Rosmarie Carotti

44th EUROSAI Governing Board Meeting at the European Court of Auditors

On 13-14 June 2016, the European Court of Auditors hosted this year’s annual meeting of the EUROSAI

Governing Board, under the Presidency of the supreme audit institution of the Netherlands

By Daniel Tibor, assistant to the Liaison Officer

In Memoriam of Sir David Bostock, former ECA Member

By former staff of his private office

FOCUS

- Special reports No 13, 20, 21, 22, 23/ 2016

EU COHESION POLICY CONFERENCE

“Past Evidence, Current Experience and Future Perspectives”

Bratislava, 15 and 16 September 2016

- Performance and result orientation of the European Structural and

Investment Funds (ESIF)

By Ladislav Balko, ECA Member

Further simplification of Cohesion policy and the future perspectives

By Martin Weber, ECA Director

Performance audit of large infrastructure investment

This article focuses on transport investments, using some of the lessons learned from recent ECA

performance audits in the transport field. The main lessons and principles can however be transposed

to any other large infrastructure investment supported by EU co-funding

By Luc T'Joen, senior administrator in Chamber II

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

The most challenging aspect was to move

the institution forward

Interview with Vítor Manuel Caldeira, leaving ECA President

By Rosmarie Carotti

Vítor Manuel Caldeira served from March 2000 as a Member and from 2008 as the ECA’s 10

President.

His mandate was renewed in January 2011 for a second term, and in January 2014 for a third term.

R. C.: Is there something that did not work the

way you had wanted?

Vítor Manuel Caldeira:

I am sure there are many

things we could have done or done better. The ECA

certainly has room to do more work that is directly

relevant to citizens. The role of the ECA is as a

facilitator. We help build trust in the EU institutions.

And to do that we will also need to foster closer

links with European citizens.

That said, we have already made enormous

efforts to improve communication. Our topics are

increasingly on target and there are encouraging

signs that our messages are hitting home. Precisely

because these are difficult times for the European

Union, the ECA should - in my view - continue to put

serving European values and the Union’s citizens at

the heart of its strategy and work programme.

We now work more closely with the European

Parliament than we used to in order to identify

topics relevant to citizens. We also work more

closely with national parliaments and our reports

are increasingly drafted with national parliaments in

mind.

We could also do more to make our reports

attractive, user-friendly and accessible, for example

developing a clear and concise reporting style and

exploring new ways of publishing our results.

R. C.: In terms of audit, is the ECA shifting accent

to economic governance?

Vítor Manuel Caldeira:

Auditing EU economic

governance has certainly become a priority for

the ECA in recent years. That is because the EU has

considerably developed its policies and structures

in this area since the 2008 financial crisis.

Since then, the ECA has been given new audit

responsibilities, for example with respect to the

audits of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the

Vítor Manuel Caldeira, leaving ECA President

R. C.: Sir, the ECA President is primus inter pares

among the ECA Members. However, what was

your personal vision for the ECA and how did

you try and achieve that vision?

Vítor Manuel Caldeira:

My aim was always to help

the institution to develop a vision and then adopt

the right strategy to achieve that vision. Developing

a vision for the ECA is not solely the work of the

President; it should – in my view – be a collective

endeavour involving all Members and the staff as

well as stakeholders. If you recall, we organised peer

reviews, we consulted external stakeholders and we

set up internal working groups to identify where we

could improve. We developed the first ECA strategy

for the period 2009 to 2012 and then adopted

the strategy for 2013 to 2017, which has led to a

number of important organisational reforms that

are now bearing fruit. We succeeded in improving

the quality and the range of our outputs: reports,

opinions and the new landscape reviews. And we

also succeeded in strengthening the relations with

our stakeholders who make use of our work. All this

contributed positively to the ECA’s development as

an independent, professional institution.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

The most challenging aspect was to move the institution forward

continued

Single Resolution Fund and the Single Resolution

Board, as well as the new agencies that were set

up to regulate the financial sector. We are also

started to do performance audits in this area. A

good example is the task we have ongoing on the

“European Semester” which was introduced to help

coordinate the Member States’ macro-economic

and fiscal policies.

The importance of EU economic governance is also

reflected now in the ECA’s organisational structure,

with Chamber IV taking the lead on work in this

area.

R. C.: Are there changes you would wish to be

introduced in the audit work of the ECA for

example in single audit ?

Vítor Manuel Caldeira:

The concept of “single

audit” in the EU goes back a long way. I remember

being the reporting Member for the ECA’s opinion

on this matter in 2002. What we said then still holds

true now.

To be effective, a single audit system of the

EU budget requires effective internal control

to be exercised first by the Commission and

national authorities. At that time we advocated

an integrated internal control system. And the

Commission took important steps in that direction.

However, considerable differences still remain

at national level in Member States systems for

managing and controlling how EU funds are spent.

The ECA has been encouraging further progress

in this regard. At the same time, we have been

working with the SAIs of the Member States in

the Contact Committee, to promote cooperation

between SAIs in the audit of EU funds.

The fact that there is a now a full set of international

public audit standards for SAIs means we have a

good basis on which to develop common audit

methods.

R. C.: As President of the Portuguese Court

of Audit what will you try to bring into the

meetings of the Supreme Audit Institutions?

Vítor Manuel Caldeira:

I hope to be able to

continue to make good use of the experience

I gained at the ECA. There are many important

ongoing developments within the community of

SAIs. And there are many areas where EU SAIs, in

particular, are developing common approaches, for

example in the audit of EU structural funds and the

fiscal policies in the Member States. And at the next

Contact Committee meeting of the EU SAIs and

the ECA we will be discussing the audit of energy

and climate policy. That is a policy area which is

important not only for EU SAIs but also for SAIs the

world-over.

R. C.: Energy and climate are only a small part

of the sustainable development goals. What

else can the ECA do? I think of contributing, for

example, to combating corruption.

Vítor Manuel Caldeira:

We should be ambitious

but we also need to be realistic and see what we

can achieve in a sustainable way, step by step. There

the Contact Committee is seeing some progress

in concrete areas, such as in the supervision of the

financial sector. The issue of corruption and fraud is

important as the auditor must disclose instances of

suspected fraud and corruption.

It is also essential to identify the major risks of

corruption and fraud at each stage of the process:

when legislation is being adopted; when policies

are being implemented; and when public funds are

being spent. If you do not focus on taking measures

to minimise or eradicate the risk of corruption and

fraud, then you are always running behind. SAIs

can share their experience and develop tools for

mapping the major risks, which would help ensure

the risks get addressed.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

As President of the Portuguese Court of Auditors,

I will also chair Portugal’s national council for

preventing corruption. So it is a topic that will be

high on my agenda.

I think that the Portuguese Court of Auditors has

already done good work in this field alongside the

European Court of Auditors. We worked together on

a EUROSAI project to develop the audit of ethical

issues. The audit of ethical issues goes wider than

corruption, covering also how conflicts of interest

are dealt with and how managers should behave.

This work is still ongoing at the level of EUROSAI

and I hope it will eventually result in the adoption of

auditing principles at the level of INTOSAI.

The ECA has already carried out audit work on the

risk of conflicts of interest in EU agencies.” Ethics”

is an area of audit that I expect will develop. It may

well come to be considered as a new “E” alongside

the traditional “3 E’s” of economy, efficiency,

effectiveness, as perhaps will “Equity”. I think these

concepts will become increasingly relevant in the

future within the SAI community.

R. C.: When you look back at your years as

President, what was the most difficult challenge

you faced?

Vítor Manuel Caldeira:

The greatest challenge

was to bring the College together, to achieve

consensus about the direction in which to develop

our institution. It is good to start with a diversity

of viewpoints and important to engage in healthy

arguments but in the end you need to build

consensus on how to move forward. That what I

strived to do throughout my time as President. It

required patience and an ability to draw reasonable

conclusions from discussions that reconciled often

very different points of view.

Let me add a few final words of thanks to

everyone, here in the ECA and also outside, to

the Luxembourgish authorities, the supreme

audit institutions, and all those who have made

it possible for us to succeed in moving forward

as a European institution. Thank you for all your

excellent support and cooperation.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

As I see it, I have three key tasks: to

implement the reform of the ECA, to

reform our products, and to boost the

ECA’s external impact

Interview with Klaus-Heiner Lehne, the newly appointed ECA President

By Rosmarie Carotti

On 13 September 2016 the ECA Members elected Klaus-Heiner Lehne, the German Member, to

serve as President for a three-year term. He takes up his post on 1 October 2016.

Initially, I didn’t rate my chances particularly highly

when considering perhaps standing for President

at the beginning of next year. And then came

our President’s unexpected decision to return to

Portugal earlier, on 1 October 2016, and to schedule

the election in September. Before the summer

holidays I discussed it with many people at the

ECA and was given the impression that I had their

support and backing. Of course, I also discussed this

move with my family.

R. C.: You have already touched on this issue, but

what else would you like to achieve?

Klaus-Heiner Lehne, ECA President

R.C.: Dear Mr Lehne, Mr President, as you will

be taking up your duties in a few days’ time,

may I offer my sincerest congratulations on

your appointment. A Member of the Court of

Auditors since 2014, you have previously served

as a Member of the European and German

Parliaments and worked as a business lawyer.

What was it that prompted you to put yourself

forward as a candidate for the Presidency of the

European Court of Auditors?

Klaus-Heiner Lehne:

When you assume a role

such as this, then of course you hope to make a

difference and be in a position to exert influence,

introduce changes and shape the future.

I sometimes feel that the ECA is something of a

“hidden champion”, that we can do more. I believe

that the reforms made in recent years have indeed

been crucial and were a step in the right direction

in terms of reforming internal structures and, by

extension, improving the performance of the ECA

as a whole. But now we need to focus on reforming

our products. In particular, we need to better tailor

the annual report to match stakeholder needs and

increase its relevance on performance issues.

Klaus-Heiner Lehne:

I also think that there is still

room to improve public perception. The problem

lies with the impact of our work. My goal is to be

able to say at the end of these three years that we

have made progress and improved performance in

key fields. This concerns not only public perception,

but also support for future legislation. Of course,

since we are not legislators, we can only do the

latter indirectly, by specifically pointing out where

the problems lie and providing assistance.

R. C.: If I think of the new areas in which the ECA

now finds itself working, particularly in relation

to economic governance, I wonder how we might

increase our visibility here?

Klaus-Heiner Lehne:

This is a new area of

responsibility for the EU, which emerged as a result

of the 2008 financial crisis. Naturally, we need to

respond to this, particularly as regards performance.

There is a whole series of reports dealing with this

area currently being prepared. Previously such

activities were based in Chamber IV, which dealt

with the area alongside auditing the institutions.

We now have a fifth Chamber, which has taken over

auditing the institutions. Chamber IV now focuses

more on economic governance. The credibility of

the entire European project essentially depends on

these governance processes working.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Around 50% of the EU’s GDP is made up of public

sector spending. Only 1% of this money is spent

by the EU, and the rest by the Member States. And

this is not set to change. It would be unrealistic to

assume that a significantly larger percentage of

public money will end up with, and then be spent

by, the EU. It will always be the case that most

activities will remain at Member State level. Yet

this requires coordination. That is why economic

governance is so crucial.

R. C.: Does your appointment signal an increase

in Germany’s influence in the EU?

Klaus-Heiner Lehne:

From an outsider’s

perspective, this may appear to be the case.

This is honestly not how I see things. However

ECA Members think as Europeans. I do not

represent my government, but am an independent

Member of this Court and have to act and think like

a European. This was my approach in the European

Parliament too. My appointment doesn’t enhance

Germany’s direct influence.

R. C.: Will the administrative reform recently

implemented at the ECA alter the collegial

system, or the relationship between the ECA

President and the other Members or between

the Members?

Klaus-Heiner Lehne:

The Chambers were created

upon my predecessor’s initiative. The system has

proved its worth, but has also resulted in the

Chambers operating very independently. This

means that the overall interest of the ECA was not

always the top priority when the work programme

was drawn up. The reform that I have seen taking

place here over the past two years is aimed

precisely at reinforcing once again the ECA’s overall

interest.

The latest reform affecting the way in which the

Chambers work, their responsibilities and how

resources are used, is specifically designed to

further reinforce the ECA’s capacity to plan and

devise strategy more centrally. The Chambers

decide on the substance, but, under the new rules,

it is primarily down to the College to decide which

audits are carried out and by whom.

Reform is one thing, but culture is another. We now

need to see that our culture also evolves as the

reform is implemented. That process will surely take

several years. As I see it, I have three key tasks over

the next three years: firstly, to implement the reform

while reshaping our internal culture; secondly, to

reform our products, particularly the annual report,

but also to have more landscape reviews and quick

special audits; thirdly, to boost the ECA’s external

impact.

R. C.: Will Brexit alter our audit culture or the way

we work at the ECA?

Klaus-Heiner Lehne:

It is far too early to say. The

British Government has not yet triggered Article 50.

We are talking about a period that could probably

lie beyond 2019.

In any case, as the smallest institution we will have

a relatively small role to play in the proceedings.

The Commission is preparing the negotiations,

the European Council will issue the mandate for

negotiations and the European Parliament must

agree at the end.

An interinstitutional working group was set up long

ago to deal with staffing matters. On the subject of

English as a working language, all I can say is that

it is very difficult to change an internal linguistic

culture. That goes for us just as much as for the

European Court of Justice, where cases are heard

in French. English will therefore remain a main

language.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Interview with Klaus-Heiner Lehne

continued

R. C. What aspect of your current post will you

miss most as President?

Klaus-Heiner Lehne:

Strange as it may sound

coming from someone from the Parliament who

has never actually worked as an auditor, I will miss

auditing, for the simple reason that I have learnt a

lot during my two and a half years at the ECA. I have

worked on things with which I had never before had

any dealings. Whereas previously I was primarily

legislating for the European internal market, I have

had to work in a field in Chamber III — and have

enjoyed doing so — that was previously a complete

unknown for me: development aid.

To suddenly look at things from a global

perspective, rather than solely from a national

or European perspective, opened up an entirely

different way of viewing the world’s problems;

things that are hotly debated in the media

suddenly became banal. That was a very important

experience in my life.

R. C.: “Global economy” is a buzzword. Is this

worth pursuing?

Klaus-Heiner Lehne:

In principle, I believe that,

yes, it is worth seeking to eliminate boundaries

to trade, since this ultimately leads to more jobs

and a better economy. Of course this needs to

happen in a balanced manner. I think that the two

large economic blocks, namely North America and

Europe, should, as far as possible, remember as they

work together that today’s decisions will continue

to influence the world’s standards in 50, 60 or 100

years’ time. If the two large economic blocks, whose

significance, if we look at global developments, is

fading in terms of population size, fail to cooperate

more closely, then there is a grave danger that we

will no longer have a say in shaping these standards

in the next generation or the generation after that.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Reflections on my experience at the

European Court of Auditors

By Louis Galea, ECA Member (2010 – 2016)

Developing the ECA’s strategy: new challenges,

new opportunities

In 2011 the ECA started developing the strategy for

the period 2013-2017. Since the previous strategy

(2009-2012) was set, significant changes had

occurred in the EU landscape such as the shifts in

institutional balance brought about by the Lisbon

Treaty, the launch of the Europe 2020 strategy, as

well as the new EU responses to the global financial

and economic crisis particularly in the banking

supervision, financial support to Member States in

difficulty and fiscal and economic coordination. The

ECA needed to position itself in this new scenario.

During this time, I had the opportunity to contribute

to the strategy as part of the Strategy Reflection

Group. Under the chairmanship of President

Caldeira we started to analyse challenges and

opportunities that the ECA was facing and how the

it could respond to them.

The Reflection Group took into account feedback

received from the Members in particular the

exchanges made during the Members’ Seminar

in Talinn, the results of the staff consultation, the

European Parliament and its Committees, the

Council, as well as the feedback of the 2008 peer

review and external evaluators. This was truly an

open and constructive dialogue.

The conclusion was that the ECA, faced with

changing realities and new developments, needed

to respond to such changes and to adapt more

proactively, building stronger strategic partnerships

and organising itself in a more flexible and efficient

manner.

This led to the development of a number of key

actions which have already started to bear fruit.

For instance, the thrust to deliver new products

has resulted in two landscape reviews, one on

EU accountability and audit gaps and one on EU

financial management risks, both of which have

been extremely well received by stakeholders. More

landscape reviews are in the pipeline.

Similarly, new work programming procedures

reflecting priorities agreed at ECA level enable

focused responses and more coordinated direction

of its work. In terms of strengthening the ECA’s

relation with partners, the assignment of a

Dr Louis Galea, ECA Member

My journey at the ECA started on 7 May 2010. I

arrived with a lifetime of experiences gained over

many years of working in politics and serving as

Minister, and then Speaker, in Malta. After six years

serving in the ECA, I leave with a much deeper

insight of the EU and its internal functioning, filled

with positive memories, enriched by relationships

with many hardworking and professional

people, with valuable knowledge gained and a

strengthening of my identity as an EU citizen.

My early days at the ECA

My first two years at

the ECA were spent in Chamber IV, which at the

time dealt with revenue, research and internal

policies, and Institutions and bodies of the EU.

I was responsible for the financial audit of the

EU administrative expenditure which equates to

around €10 billion (annually equivalent to around

6 % of the annual EU budget). Few errors are

reported in this area indicating that in general EU

institutions and bodies implement the budget

in line with the rules. I was also responsible for a

number of performance audits on EU institutions

and bodies, including a follow-up report on the

management of OLAF; the effectiveness of staff

development in the Commission; the reliability

and credibility of statistics produced by the

Commission and Eurostat; budget savings from the

centralisation of the Parliament’s operations; the

effectiveness of the External Borders Fund; grant

management in agencies, as well as numerous

opinions.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Reflections on my experience at the European Court of Auditors

continued

dedicated Member in charge of inter-institutional

relations and the improved targeting of audiences

at national and EU level through visits to Member

States, thematic conferences and a new stakeholder

management system are all measures intended

to increase its visibility and relevance. In audit,

the move towards a task-based organisation, the

adoption of new roles and responsibilities, as well

as the streamlining of audit and reporting processes

enabled the ECA to increase its flexibility and

efficiency.

Deanship and the establishment of the FEG

project team

I was elected Dean of Chamber IV in March 2012

for a term of two years. My experience as Dean was

very positive. With the Members and the Director

we managed to strengthen and streamline the

organisation of the Chamber. One of the key actions

was to create a dedicated unit for performance

audit to ensure that the production of special

reports is not disrupted by work on the annual

report chapters assigned to the Chamber.

In 2013 an important development was the

establishment of the Financial and Economic

Governance (FEG) project team. In response to

the financial crisis the EU undertook a broad

range of initiatives collectively aimed at detecting,

preventing and correcting negative economic

trends. These included: enhanced surveillance

of Member States’ fiscal and macroeconomic

policies and structural reforms by the European

Commission in the form of the European Semester;

new instruments such as the European Stability

Mechanism and the Balance of Payments to assist

Member States in financial difficulty; setting up the

European system for Financial Supervision with

new entities such as the European Securities and

Markets Authority, the European Banking Authority

and the European Insurance and Occupational

Pensions Authority responsible for micro-prudential

financial supervision and assigned new macro-

prudential oversight tasks such as the Single

Supervisory Mechanism to the European Central

Bank. These fell within the policy responsibilities of

Chamber IV, which was quick to realise the potential

risks that failure of different EU level entities to

perform their new and extended roles could

have on the EU and Member States. The Chamber

recognised the need to build specialist audit

capacity within ECA to focus on these risks.

The work of the Director of the Chamber and the

Director of HR, Finance and General Services served

to set up a dedicated team within Chamber IV and

to start addressing the EU’s response to the financial

crisis. The way the team was brought together was

a demonstration of pragmatic management: an

internal call for expression of interest to ECA staff

was made to fill up most of the team, an intensive

specialized training programme with experts

from outside was put in place and experts were

contracted to support our work in this new areas.

In 2015 the ECA published its first reports on this

domain. The FEG project team is an excellent

example of the ability of this EU institution to adjust

flexibly to evolving scenarios and the ability of our

staff to take on new challenges and deliver high

quality products.

The audit of Agencies and Joint Undertakings

During the last two years of my term, I was

responsible for the annual financial and compliance

audit of the agencies and joint undertakings of the

EU. Presently there are around 50 such bodies, for

which the ECA delivers an opinion on the reliability

of their accounts and the legality and regularity of

their underlying transactions. Notwithstanding that

their budget is around € 4 billion (approx. 3% of

2014 EU Budget), agencies and joint undertakings

play an increasingly important role in implementing

EU policies and the EU Research Strategy,

respectively. They also reinforce cooperation

between the EU, national governments and

industry and increase the visibility of the EU.

I was involved throughout the discussions

concerning the arrangements related to the

financial audit of these bodies and our approach

to take the work done by third party auditors into

consideration in its work and final audit opinions.

With the assistance of our principal managers and

heads of task, we cooperated with the appointed

private audit firms, and have seen the first two years

run relatively smoothly. On joint undertakings, the

good work of principal managers and the heads of

task has led to excellent results. These bodies will

face similar transitions towards the use of external

auditors as we have seen with the agencies.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

In recent years the ECA has published four special

reports on agencies including: SR 12/2016 on

the Agencies’ use of grants; SR 4/2016 on the

European Institute for Technology; SR 22/2015 on

the European Securities Market Authority; and SR

5/2014 on the European Banking Authority.

Time for consolidation

In 2015 under the chairmanship of the President I

participated in the Working Group on the reform

of Chamber’s Responsibilities. The aim was mainly

to complete the ECA’s governance arrangements

in the light of the changes brought about by the

strategy and reorganisation. The proposals made by

the working group and then taken on board by the

ECA, include streamlining of processes to prioritise

the ECA’s work, allocating tasks to Chambers in

a more flexible, balanced and efficient manner,

ensuring that Chambers are well resourced to

deliver the tasks assigned, and to support the ECA’s

overall relevance by enhancing our knowledge

management processes to enable it to capture and

assess the constantly changing environment within

and outside the EU.

This proposal eventually also led to the

establishment of a new Chamber V of which I

became a member in June 2016. In part, this

Chamber took over the responsibility of the former

CEAD Chamber for the coordination of the ECA’s

Annual Report. Although my time in this Chamber

will be short lived as I approach the end of my

term, I can anticipate exciting times ahead for this

Chamber too.

Conclusion

Six years at the ECA have gone by in no time and

I look back with a gratified sense of satisfaction. I

feel privileged to have worked with Vitor Caldeira

as its President. He was an excellent President and

an effective team builder. I enjoyed working with

and learned a lot from my colleague Members, the

directors, principal managers, heads of task and the

many auditors who were involved in my work. But

I could not have realized the positive results on my

own. I was especially assisted by my Cabinet team,

especially the head of office

Throughout my entire tenure, I have been engaged

in a continuous debate on ways in which the ECA

can improve the statement of assurance and the

annual report – its core product as required by the

Treaty itself. One of the key actions of the strategy

requires the ECA to adapt the annual report to

meet the needs of the discharge authorities –

Parliament and Council – in a more cost-effective

manner. I leave reassured that all my colleagues

are aware of both the need to continue improving

the communication of this report and its findings,

and also of the need for such a report to remain an

instrument which holds executive authorities to

account, based on objective criteria and credible

audit approaches which conform to the highest

international standards for public audit authorities.

My parting shot is that the ECA is heading in the

right direction, has embarked on a wholesome

reform agenda that will bear fruit if implemented

properly and if given the time to mature. I am sure

that the ECA will continue to consolidate its efforts

and deliver effectively its mission as the guardian of

the financial interests of the citizens of the Union.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

The ECA and the NAO: Exchanging

knowledge and people

By Katharina Bryan, private office of Wynn Owen, and Rosmarie Carotti

On 19 July, John Thorpe, Executive Leader of the National Audit Office (NAO) and Simon Helps,

a NAO director, visited the ECA hosted by Phil Wynn Owen, ECA Member.

Simon Helps,

a NAO director;

Phil Wynn Owen, ECA Member; John Thorpe, executive leader

of the NAO

Exchanging ideas: Visit of John Thorpe and

Simon Helps

John Thorpe explained how the NAO is responding

to a challenging environment by continuously

evolving in terms of organisation and output. His

presentation followed on from the insight into

the NAO’s change process which

the Comptroller

and Auditor General Sir Amyas Morse

discussed

during his visit to the ECA in April 2015 (See ECA

Journal No 5, May 2015).

Some 150 years after the office of Comptroller

and Auditor General was established, the NAO’s

primary role continues to be the scrutiny of public

spending to help Parliament hold government to

account and to improve public services. Challenges

in its environment, such as further reductions in

public spending, further devolution and localism

and changes in public services delivery models,

have required the NAO continuously to adapt and

innovate.

Three areas of innovation and current work were

highlighted by John Thorpe.

1) Increasing the flexibility and relevance of

value-for-money work.

Apart from “classic” value-for-money reports with

full conclusions, the NAO uses different approaches

depending on the circumstances, such as

programme implementation stage:

a) Landscape Reviews/Briefings

are “forward

looking” publications used to identify

areas of concern/risk and/or issue for

debate and future audit work. They do not

include value-for-money conclusions nor

recommendations.

b) Early stage/ Progress review type

reports

are carried out at the early stage of

programme implementation, and primarily

looking at inputs. These types of reports can

be used to establish a framework against

which programmes can be judged in future

value-for-money audits.

c) Comparative reviews

look at how different

departments manage similar programmes

with the aim of assessing effectiveness.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

d) Cross-Government Reviews

focus on

recurring issues found across government.

Their purpose is to draw general lessons,

make recommendations and can result in

“best practice guidance for departments”.

2) Increasing the use of investigations

Investigations are used to examine “what is

happening on the ground”. They can take the form

of a

retrospective examination,

establishing the

facts of a case with an average duration of 4-5

months, or larger

briefings on current issues.

Investigations cover only the establishing of key

facts – they do not include any conclusions or

recommendations. By developing such “non-

evaluative investigation reports” the NAO seeks

to produce reports quicker and at lower cost. The

impetus for investigations can be external, e.g.

individual MPs informing the NAO of suspected

misuse of funds.

3) Work on EU finances

One example of a

briefing

addressed to the UK

Parliament is the “Financial

Management of the

EU budget in 2014: a briefing for the Committee

of Public Accounts”

of February 2016. The Briefing

was subsequently the subject at a hearing at the

committee where, among others, Manfred Kraff,

Deputy Director General, Directorate-General for

Budget and Accounting Officer of the European

Commission and Phil Wynn Owen, ECA Member,

provided evidence.

The Public Account Committee’s report, the

NAO briefing and the transcript of the hearing

can be found here:

https://www.parliament.uk/

business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-

select/public-accounts-committee/inquiries/

parliament-2015/memorandum-financial-

management-eu-15-16/

During the discussion with the audience, the

comparative review “Error

and Fraud in Welfare

Programmes”

allowed the conference participants

to understand better the concepts and their use by

the ECA and NAO. The example of the review also

highlighted the importance of better use of data

since the NAO used a lot of “number-crunching”

to understand key risks in the welfare programme.

After the presentation, the NAO representatives met

with ECA colleagues from various Chambers of the

ECA.

Exchanging People

The presentation by John Thorpe was another

fruitful event in the cooperation between the two

Institutions; which this year has seen both this

high-level visit and the start of a staff exchange

programme. In the staff exchange programme

between the NAO and the ECA staff spend a year

working in each other’s institutions. Valeria Rota at

the ECA started work at the NAO in London in May

2016, and David Boothby started work at the ECA in

September 2016. Both institutions have agreed to

continue the programme in 2017.

Valeria Rota, auditor

David Boothby, auditor

John Thorpe, Executive Leader of the NAO

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

44th EUROSAI Governing Board Meeting at the

European Court of Auditors

By Daniel Tibor, assistant to the Liaison Officer

On 13-14 June 2016, the European Court of Auditors hosted this year’s annual meeting of the EUROSAI Governing

Board, under the Presidency of the supreme audit institution of the Netherlands.

Daniel Tibor,

assistant to the Liaison Officer

hold the next regular session of the Congress,

and the Secretary General of EUROSAI), and four

members elected by the Congress for a period of

six years

(two members renewable every three

years). The Heads of SAIs who are members of the

INTOSAI GB and are members of EUROSAI may be

represented at EUROSAI GB meetings as observers.

The President of EUROSAI also chairs the GB

meetings.

The Secretariat has a role in both internal and

external communication and budget issues.

It provides support to the EUROSAI members

concerning activities and procedures, hosts the

website, publishes the EUROSAI Magazine, and

disseminates EUROSAI outputs. The Secretariat is

held permanently by the SAI of Spain, which also

hosts EUROSAI’s headquarters.

Since the adoption of the Strategic Plan 2011-2017

by the VIII EUROSAI Congress in Lisbon (2011),

EUROSAI’s organisational structure comprises four

so-called Goal Teams, each mandated to implement

one of EUROSAI’s four strategic goals: Capacity

Building, Professional Standards, Knowledge

Sharing and Governance and Communication.

EUROSAI has, moreover, set up various working

groups, task forces and committees addressing

specific areas. Currently, there are three working

groups dealing with information technology,

environmental audit and the audit of funds

allocated to disaster and catastrophes, as well as

one task force on audit and ethics. In 2011, it was

also decided to establish a

Monitoring Committee

for setting up and operating the electronic data

base on good practices on audit quality.

44th EUROSAI Governing Board Meeting

The ECA hosted the 44

EUROSAI GB meeting

at its premises in Luxembourg on 13-14 June

2016. The meeting was attended by high-ranking

representatives of 18 SAIs. Currently, the GB

is composed of the SAIs of The Netherlands

(Presidency), Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Finland,

Moldova, Belgium and the ECA. The SAIs of

Austria (INTOSAI Secretariat), Norway (INTOSAI

Development Initiative), Poland and the Russian

2 The ECA became a member of the GB in 2011. Its mandate

finishes with the Congress in 2017.

EUROSAI – The European Organisation of

Supreme Audit Institutions

The European Organisation of Supreme Audit

Institutions (EUROSAI) is the most junior regional

group of the International Organisation of

Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI).

Since its

establishment in 1990, with the European Court of

Auditors (ECA) as one of the founding members,

EUROSAI membership has grown significantly from

initially 30 to currently 50 members. EUROSAI’s

organisational structure comprises three standing

bodies, i.e. the Congress, the Governing Board (GB)

and the Secretariat.

The Congress is EUROSAI’s supreme decision-

making body, which is composed of all Heads

of member SAIs, and meets in ordinary session

every three years. The Head of the SAI hosting

the Congress is elected by the Congress for a

three-year term as President and official external

representative of EUROSAI.

In between the Congress sessions, the GB meets

annually to oversee the implementation of

Congress decisions, take the necessary decisions

for the functioning of the organisation, and ensure

compliance with the EUROSAI statutes. It consists

of eight members: four full-fledged members (the

Heads of the SAIs that hosted the last two ordinary

sessions of the Congress, the Head of the SAI to

1 INTOSAI groups together the supreme audit institutions (SAIs)

of 192 full members and five associated members, and it is listed

as a support organization of the United Nations. Other regional

groups within INTOSAI are OLACEFS, AFROSAI, ARABOSAI,

ASOSAI, PASAI and CAROSAI.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Federation (INTOSAI GB members) form the current

group of observers. In addition to GB members

and observers, further delegations were invited

as guests representing the various EUROSAI goal

teams and working groups.

Most of the discussions at this year’s GB meeting

aimed at preparing the Congress, which will take

place next year in Turkey. Whereas the first session

focused on reporting by the chairs of the goal

teams and working groups, the second session

was mainly dedicated to points of principle such as

the future role of EUROSAI and relevant strategic

issues. It dealt with the evaluation of EUROSAI,

the role of the EUROSAI GB, the relation between

EUROSAI and INTOSAI, and the Strategic Plan of

EUROSAI for 2017-2023. The meeting fell into a

crucial period of time for EUROSAI, with the first

strategic plan drawing to an end, requiring not only

a careful assessment of its goals and achievements

but also an answer to the fundamental question of

what kind of organisation EUROSAI wants to be in

the future, and which goals it therefore needs to

address.

Self-assessment and independent evaluation

The evaluation of EUROSAI is designed as a two-

stage process including a self-assessment (phase

I) and an independent external evaluation (phase

II). Phase I started with a survey which aimed

at identifying the strengths and weaknesses

of the organisation and ways for improving its

functioning. Goal Team 4 presented the preliminary

findings of the survey to the GB, which would

indicate an overall satisfaction with EUROSAI’s

governance framework, i.e. Congress, Presidency,

GB, and Secretariat. The meeting participants

then discussed the implications of the survey

findings and the conclusions to be drawn from

the exercise. The discussion concentrated on the

implementation of the strategic goals and the

corresponding structure of EUROSAI Goal Teams.

There was a common understanding that EUROSAI

should facilitate the exchange of information,

promote and support ISSAI implementation, as well

as stimulate audit co-operation.

Notwithstanding the mostly positive feedback

from the self-assessment, GB members still saw

room for improvement and provided guidance for

the finalisation of the evaluation. They agreed to

President Caldeira’s suggestion of taking action

to tackle the identified weaknesses as soon as

the self-assessment is finalised. The findings and

recommendations should then also feed into the

process of drafting the strategic plan for 2017-2023.

GB members proposed that the external evaluation

by an independent evaluator might take the form

of a midterm review of the implementation of the

strategic plan for 2017-2023.

Strategic Plan 2017-2023

In order to prepare the strategic plan for 2017-

2023, the self-assessment survey included

questions concerning the mission, vision, values

and strategic goals as well as the future of

EUROSAI. Most respondents were satisfied with

the appropriateness and relevance of the mission,

vision and values of the organisation. Some

suggested however to redraft them to even better

fit the organisation. The debate mainly focused on

whether to maintain or reformulate the current

set of strategic goals, and on how to achieve a

more flexible organisation with lighter procedures.

President Caldeira highlighted the need for

enhanced ownership, leadership and inclusiveness,

which must be based on common values, interests,

and a clear vision, also providing for the justification

of EUROSAI as an international organisation.

The GB members supported the ECA’s proposal to

follow a three-step process for designing the new

strategy:

1. identification of goals which are relevant

and useful for the EUROSAI members;

2. definition of activities and initiatives to

achieve these goals effectively; and

3. setting out how EUROSAI should be

organised to best implement its strategic

plan.

Goal Team 4 was tasked to present a draft proposal

for the Strategic Plan 2017-2023 at an extraordinary

meeting of the EUROSAI GB to be held in Moldova

in spring 2017.

EUROSAI Governing Board

While discussing the role of the EUROSAI GB

and its relations with the EUROSAI community,

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

44th EUROSAI Governing Board Meeting at the European Court

of Auditors

continued

participants highlighted the importance of having

transparent, open and democratic processes for

EUROSAI in general, and the GB in particular. GB

members welcomed the expectations expressed

and advocated a new understanding of the GB’s

role, notably to show more leadership, improve

effectiveness by taking decisions in a timely and

pro-active way (agility), and focus more on the

needs and expectations of EUROSAI members.

The GB committed itself to continue building and

promoting a results-based organisation (including

appropriate and flexible structures) which should

respond to the needs of its members as well as the

changes in the global context in which they operate.

EUROSAI representation at INTOSAI level

The GB of INTOSAI is composed of 18 members. It

meets annually, as is the case with the EUROSAI GB.

To ensure a balanced representation of all member

countries, each regional organisation and the main

types of public auditing systems are represented.

EUROSAI is currently represented by the SAIs of the

Russian Federation and Poland.

Since the SAI of the Russian Federation is the

designated host of the 23rd INCOSAI (2019), and

thus changing its status from an elected EUROSAI

representative to a fully-fledged member, it needs

to be replaced by another EUROSAI member for the

remaining period of its term (2016 to 2019). Six SAIs

presented their candidacy. In a secret ballot, the

EUROSAI GB voted for the SAI of Portugal to replace

the SAI of the Russian Federation.

44th EUROSAI Governing Board Meeting

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

In Memoriam of Sir David Bostock,

former ECA Member

By former staff of his private office

Sir David Bostock (1948-2016), ECA Member from

1 January 2002 to 31 December 2013

It was with great sadness that the European Court

of Auditors (ECA) learned of the death of Sir David

Bostock on Saturday 3

September 2016. Born on

11 April 1948, Sir David served as the UK Member of

the ECA from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2013.

Before joining the ECA, David, a graduate of Balliol

College at Oxford University, had an illustrious

30 year career as a UK civil servant and diplomat,

including experience at the UK Treasury, Cabinet

Office and the permanent representation of the UK

to the EU. He was one of the UK’s most respected

and influential thinkers and policy-makers on the

EU.

As a Member of the ECA, David’s unique experience

and extensive knowledge of the EU enriched the

ECA’s work across all areas. He was dedicated to

the goal of improving the way the EU operates,

and, through his profound commitment to high

standards of public management, and his deep

engagement in and enthusiasm for all aspects of

his professional life, he inspired a generation of

ECA Members and staff alike. In his distinctive

way, David helped the ECA produce many reports

and opinions of substance that contributed to

real improvements to EU policies and spending

programmes. And as the member and Dean

responsible for audit development, he instituted

changes that led to the enduring improvement in

the quality of the ECA’s reporting.

As a colleague and friend to the ECA’s Members and

staff, David was a distinctive voice and colourful

presence. His passionate self-expression and

mastery of the language of Shakespeare was greatly

admired, and all enjoyed David’s penchant for

making historical allusions and his very British sense

of humour.

David is fondly remembered as someone who

wholeheartedly enjoyed the social life of the ECA in

Luxembourg. He was an active member of the ECA

choir, and regularly played the part of Santa Claus

at the children’s Christmas party – he would even

make sure he knew how to wish every child a happy

Christmas in their own language. And in 2008,

wearing the ECA’s team shirt, he also completed the

full marathon in Luxembourg, at the age of 60.

In his retirement, alongside devoting himself to

his family, David returned to university, taking a

Masters degree in South East Asian Studies at the

School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the

University of London. He was even part of the SOAS

team on the popular BBC TV quiz show University

Challenge.

David will be greatly missed.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

FOCUS

Focus

Special report

N°13/2016

EU assistance for strengthening the public administration in

Moldova

Moldova receives the highest amount of EU aid per inhabitant of all of the EU’s

eastern neighbours. We assessed whether EU aid had contributed effectively to

improving the country’s public administration.

We concluded that budget support had had a limited effect. The Commission

could have responded more quickly when risks materialised, and programmes

were not sufficiently aligned to Moldovan strategies. The Commission did not

make full use of its ability to set conditions for disbursement, and additional

incentive-based funds were not fully justified.

The projects we assessed were relevant, and had delivered the expected

outputs. However, they were not always well coordinated with budget support

programmes, and results were not always sustainable.

This report was published on1 September 2016 and is available on our website

www.eca.europa.eu.

Special Report

N°20/2016

Strengthening administrative capacity in Montenegro:

progress but better results needed in many key areas

In this report the Court examines whether the Commission’s support to

Montenegro has contributed effectively towards building up the administrative

capacity of the country to prepare it for membership of the EU. The Court

concludes that despite the slow progress noted in several key areas, EU pre-

accession assistance helped to strengthen administrative capacity during

the period audited (2007-2013). While EU financial and non-financial support

addressed important capacity-building needs, the Court notes cases where

weak commitment to reform by the national authorities meant outputs were

not used and planned impacts were not achieved. The Court recommends ways

in which the Commission could focus on improving results

This report was published on 6 September 2016 and is available on our website

www.eca.europa.eu.

Special Report

N°21/2016

EU pre-accession assistance for strengthening administrative

capacity in the Western Balkans: A meta-audit

The EU Western Balkan enlargement policy has dealt with six European

countries which have historically been affected by serious ethnic, political and

economic conflicts and aspire to join the EU.

The Court assessed whether the Commission’s management of the IPA in the

Western Balkans in the key areas of rule of law and public administration was

effective and whether it actually did strengthen administrative capacity in the

region. In addition, the Court examined the achievements of the EU-Western

Balkan political dialogue in strengthening administrative capacity.

This report was published on 13 September 2016 and is available on our website

www.eca.europa.eu.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

FOCUS

Focus

Special Report

N°22/2016

EU nuclear decommissioning assistance programmes in

Lithuania, Bulgaria and Slovakia: some progress made since

2011, but critical challenges ahead

The decommissioning of eight Soviet-designed nuclear reactors in Lithuania,

Bulgaria and Slovakia was a condition for the countries’ EU accession. We

found that the EU funding programmes set up to assist with meeting this

requirement have not created the right incentives for timely and cost-effective

decommissioning. While some progress has been made, key infrastructure

projects have experienced delays, and the critical challenges involved in

working in the controlled areas still lie ahead. By 2020, EU support should have

reached € 3.8 billion. The estimated total cost of decommissioning will be at

least € 5.7 billion. If the cost of final disposal of high level waste is included, this

total could double.

This report was published on 20 September 2016 and is available on our website

www.eca.europa.eu.

Special report

N°23/2016

Maritime transport in the EU: in troubled waters - much

ineffective and unsustainable investment

Seaports are a key part of the EU's trade network. Between 2000 and 2013, the

EU invested € 6.8 billion in ports. We found that the port development strategies

put in place by the Member States and the Commission did not provide enough

information to allow effective capacity planning to be carried out. This had

led to EU co-financed investments in port infrastructure being ineffective and

unsustainable, with a high risk of around € 400 million invested being wasted.

Road and rail connections to port hinterlands were often missing or inadequate,

meaning that further public funding will be needed to make the initial port

investments work well. We also found that the Commission had not taken the

necessary action in the area of state aid and customs procedures to allow ports

to compete on a level playing field.

This report was published on 23 September 2016 and is available on our website

www.eca.europa.eu.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

EU COHESION POLICY CONFERENCE

Bratislava, 15 and 16 September 2016

“Past Evidence, Current Experience and Future Perspectives”

On 15 and 16 September 2016, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic for Investment and

Informatisation Peter Pellegrini organised this international conference as the top informal event in the field of

Cohesion policy under the Slovak Presidency of the Council of the EU. The aim of the conference was to reflect

on the reform of the EU Cohesion policy under the 2014 - 2020 programme period, assess the contribution of its

new elements to the improvement of the policy, and identify its future perspectives. After the opening keynote

speeches by, among others, Peter Pellegrini and by Corina Creţu, Commissioner for Regional Policy, the first day

of the conference consisted of three successive panel discussions: Panel discussion 1: Performance and result

orientation of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF), Panel discussion 2: Links between Cohesion

policy and European economic governance, and Panel discussion 3: Further simplification of Cohesion policy and

the future perspectives. Ladislav Balko, Member of ECA, took part in Panel 1 and addressed the participants on

performance and the result orientation of the ESIF based on his experience as Member of Chamber II (We publish

his full contribution which in the conference had been shortened due to time constraints). Martin Weber, Director

of Chamber II, took part in Panel 3 and presented his views and ideas on the simplification of the Cohesion policy.

The second day of the conference was divided into three parallel workshops corresponding to the topics of the

previous day’s panels.

Performance and result orientation of the European Structural and

Investment Funds (ESIF)

By Ladislav Balko, ECA Member

little or no value due to its failure to achieve the

intended objectives. Objectives must be defined

in a way that allows measuring their achievement,

using SMART criteria, i.e. Specific, Measurable,

Achievable, Relevant and Timed. ‘Achievability’

needs to strike the right balance between ambition

and realism, i.e. the criteria need to be sufficiently

challenging.

Performance in the ECA’s work

In 2014 and 2015 – the first two years of the

Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 – the

vast majority of the EU Cohesion spending were

interim payments to Operational Programmes

of the 2007-2013 programme period, whose

eligibility period ended on 31 December 2015.

Therefore, despite the greater focus on results and

performance under the Cohesion policy regulations

for the current 2014-2020 programme period,

which is also acknowledged in the background

paper of the Slovak Presidency for this conference,

the ECA is not yet in possession of information as to

whether the various modifications, as being actually

implemented, indeed help reduce error rates or

improve performance. Nevertheless, I will share

with you some of the ECA’s findings concerning

performance which are of relevance also for the EU

Cohesion spending.

Ladislav Balko, ECA Member

The ECA

The ECA is the EU’s independent external auditor,

checking that EU funds are correctly accounted for,

raised and spent in accordance with the rules and

achieve value for money in accordance with the

principles of economy, effectiveness and efficiency,

or – taken together – sound financial management.

In view of our increased focus on performance,

since the financial year 2010, our Annual Report

includes besides information on regularity and

compliance also a chapter on performance. Also

expenditure which is legal and regular may bring

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Already in the performance chapter of the 2012

Annual Report, the ECA concluded that for many

areas the EU legislative framework was complex

and there was lack of focus on performance. We

also noted that the legislative proposals for the new

2014-2020 programme period risked remaining

fundamentally input-based (and thus expenditure

oriented) and therefore focused on compliance

rather than performance. In the 2013 Annual

Report, the ECA pointed to the problem that, for

Member States, the ‘use it or lose it’ syndrome

means that spending the available EU funds can

become of overriding importance when they select

projects for funding. In the 2014 Annual Report

(paragraph 3.59), we found that there was a weak

focus on results in the five partnership agreements

we examined: while all five did identify results, in

three of them over half of the expected results were

vague. Where results were identified, they were

usually expressed in qualitative terms, without

stating the magnitude of change.

In the performance chapters of both the 2013 and

2014 Annual Reports we dealt extensively also

with the mandatory performance reserve which is

the main incentive for Member States to focus on

performance in 2014-2020. Where performance is

deemed satisfactory, the Commission will release

the performance reserve. Where it is not, the

Member States will propose its reallocation to other

priorities. Where there is evidence that there has

been a ‘serious failure’ to meet milestones, in certain

circumstances the Commission may suspend

payment of the reserve. However, the ECA points

to the risks or design flaws of the performance

reserve: if programme priorities fail to reach the

relevant milestones, the funding represented by

the reserve is not lost to the Member State but can

be reallocated to other priorities that have reached

their milestones, which weakens the incentive

effect. Moreover, the financial sanctions open

to the Commission — suspension of payments

or financial corrections — cannot be based on

result indicators, which weakens the focus on

results. The ECA’s Special Reports have generally

not revealed significant problems with outputs

(i.e. the deliverables of a programme). Difficulties

occur at the level of results (i.e. the immediate

effects of a programme on direct addressees) and

impacts (long-term changes in society that are,

at least partly, attributable to the EU’s action).

Furthermore, the Commission’s ability to impose

financial corrections where targets have not been

achieved is limited by a number of conditions

and exceptions, such as proportionality, levels

of absorption, external factors, socioeconomic

factors, environmental factors, etc. The impact of

the introduction of the performance reserve is

therefore likely to be marginal as there are still no

real financial incentives or sanctions in the 2014-

2020 framework relating to the results achieved

with the EU funding, and despite the introduction

of the reserve there is a risk of a reversion to the

focus from performance to absorption. This would

mean a return to the 2007-2013 period mentality,

for which the ECA has found that in the selection

of projects the Member States had focused first on

the need to absorb the EU money available, second

on the need to comply with the rules, and only

thirdly and to a limited extent on projects’ expected

performance. What we say is that compliance

and performance should be given equal weight

throughout the project cycle.

EU added value

Further related concepts important in terms

of securing the best performance from the EU

funds are ‘EU added value’ and ‘deadweight’. In

our Briefing paper: Mid-term review of the MFF

2014-2020 we stated that making funds available

does not add per se EU added value, and that the

latter entails three main conditions: need of public

intervention, cost-effectiveness of budgetary

measures compared to non-budgetary measures

and demonstration that EU level spending can

secure better results than national budgets alone.

The ECA’s audits found that genuine EU added

value was often difficult to identify, particularly in

the context of shared management where most

of the budget is spent. The risk is that EU funding

is used as a substitute for national funds, thereby

releasing national resources for use elsewhere.

A linked concept, negatively affecting EU added

value, is deadweight, which refers to the extent to

which a beneficiary would have undertaken the

project even in the absence of the EU support. Our

audits noted projects which were authorised, or

even completed, before the EU funding had been

approved; this is a strong indication of deadweight.

We found examples of deadweight in our Special

Reports on the SME Guarantee Facility, on the 7th

Framework Programme for Research, and on the

Marco Polo programme to shift freight traffic off

the road. Although there was evidence that the EU

support benefited projects, the latter audit found

serious indications of deadweight: for example, 13

of the 16 beneficiaries audited confirmed that they

would have started and run the project also without

the EU subsidy. In another Special Report, on

Cohesion policy funds support to renewable energy

generation, we found that the Cohesion policy

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

EU cohesion policy conference

“Past Evidence, Current Experience and Future Perspectives”

continued

funds for renewable energy projects had a limited

EU added value and there had been a risk of public

funding replacement in some Member States which

simply used the EU funds to complement their

national grants, as well as a risk of deadweight.

Needs assessment and proper project selection

Further relevant issues are needs assessment and

proper project selection. We reported poor project

selection in our Special Report on EU-funded

airport infrastructure. We found that there was a

need for such investments only for around half

of the projects we audited. Around a third of the

airports audited was not profitable and ran the risk

of being closed without continuous public support.

Additionally, our audit on Seaport infrastructures

found several completely empty ports in 2011, as

well as ports which were not connected to their

hinterlands, highlighting that there was no need for

some of the projects funded and an urge to spend

money so as not to lose it.

Finally, in a new product – the Landscape review

on the risks to the financial management of the EU

budget from November 2014, we stated that lack

of information on what had actually been achieved

by funding can be one of the reasons behind poor

value for money.

Pilot assessments of performance

Next to the horizontal performance chapter, our

Annual Report 2014 for the first time contained

performance related information also in two vertical

spending chapters, namely Chapter 6 on “Economic,

social and territorial cohesion” and Chapter 7 on

“Natural Resources”, in the form of a pilot exercise

assessing performance of projects completed by

year end. In Chapter 6, we assessed whether and

to what extent the objectives of the ERDF/CF and

ESF projects specified in the project application,

grant agreement, contract and/or decision for

co-financing were in line with those set out in the

Operational Programmes; and whether projects

had achieved those objectives. Our analysis focused

on project outputs and, where possible, we also

assessed the extent to which longer-term results

were achieved. We found that almost half of the

projects reached (or even exceeded) all objectives

specified. For another 30 % of the projects one or

several performance indicators specified for the

project did not attain the intended target value.

There were also some projects where the time limit

for attaining the objectives had not yet lapsed for all

of the objectives by the time of the audit, where the

achievement of objectives could not be assessed

since no relevant data was provided or where the

objectives were not in line with those specified

for the OP and the relevant priority axis. In 2 % of

the projects, none of the project objectives was

attained. These projects do not add value because

the investments are either not used or cannot be

used, and unless rectified, will represent a waste of

EU funds. Furthermore, our pilot review has shown

that performance-based funding arrangements

are an exception rather than the rule: in most

cases, failure to achieve project objectives agreed

in grant agreements had no impact on the level

of EU funding received. In Chapter 7 on “Natural

resources”, we also tested whether there was a focus

on job creation in Rural Development projects. In

a majority of projects where it would have been

possible to include job creation as eligibility or

selection condition, such a condition had not been

included, and we found no case where jobs for

young people were to be created.

We repeated this performance review in these two

chapters also in the 2015 Annual Report which will

be published soon – on 13 October. Our analysis

was broader than in 2014 because we did not focus

only on outputs of projects but also on whether

indicators have been set at project level for results

with a view to measuring their contribution to

the objective of the respective OPs. Given that

for the current 2014-2020 programme period

there is no legal requirement in the Common

Provisions Regulation for Member States to define

result indicators at project level, the possibility

and opportunity for establishing such a legal

requirement could be one of the options to explore

when designing the post-2020 framework.

I would also like to draw your attention to an

interesting article by Luc T’Joen, ECA senior

administrator, in the September issue of the

ECA’s Journal, available on our website, which

outlines further ways of possible improvements

of the value for money implemented through

the EU budget. One of them is the suggestion

for an increased use of repayable instruments

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

(e.g. loans and guarantees), with fewer grants

which are often perceived by the beneficiaries

as ‘free money’. Furthermore, financial and

compliance audits at Member State level could

also collect more performance information from

the management systems and from projects, and

could include a focus on assessing the impact

of irregularities on performance rather than just

reporting irregularities. The article concludes

that as long as EU budget disbursements remain

largely disconnected from results and no active

efforts are made to implement real incentives

for effective spending and sanctions based on

negative performance (such as empty and unused

infrastructures), positive results will remain just a

‘noble aim’ of the EU budget.

In connection with the just mentioned possible

increased use of financial instruments, useful

lessons can be drawn also from our recent

Special Report on Implementing the EU budget

through financial instruments in the 2007-2013

programme period, in which we, among other

things, acknowledge improvements made for the

2014-2020 period for example as regards making

mandatory the performance-related management

fees and detailed ex-ante needs assessments.

Conclusion

I would conclude that, in order to ensure

achievement of real benefits of EU funding for

citizens, we must further enhance the performance

focus and culture at all levels of management. This

should start with good quality needs assessment,

defining SMART objectives for achieving results

down to project level, continue through reliable

measurement, reporting, evaluation and spreading

best practices, and end with a real threat of effective

loss of EU funding in case of failure to achieve

performance objectives.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

EU COHESION POLICY CONFERENCE

Bratislava, 15 and 16 September 2016

“Past Evidence, Current Experience and Future Perspectives”

Further simplification of Cohesion policy and the future perspectives

By Martin Weber, ECA Director

they so often fail: while individual proposals for

simplification can seem to be very promising,

when taken together, conflicting proposals on

how to change the regulations could well result in

additional complexity and new problems.

Moreover the political intentions of the legislators

(i.e. the European Parliament and the Council) and

the Commission have led to changes in the legal

framework which have added to the complexity of

implementing cohesion policy.

Martin Weber, ECA Director

Simplification efforts in the past

Simplification efforts in the past, both for the 2007-

2013 and 2014-2020 periods; are largely perceived

to have been a failure: most practitioners consider

the current programmes to be more difficult and

costly to implement than in the past.

Why is this so? And what do we need to do to

prevent this from happening again?

First, I believe that part of the problem may be that

we do not always understand the same thing when

talking about simplification.

- What exactly do we want to achieve? Lower

administrative costs? Easier access for

participants? Fewer errors?

- Which part of the policy cycle needs to be

simplified? Programming, implementation,

monitoring/evaluation, financial control/audit?

- Simplification for whom? Participants, national

administrations, the Commission?

Lack of clarity and political intentions of the

legislators

Lack of clarity about the ultimate intention of

simplification efforts may well be a reason why

One example of this is programming and

monitoring in our audit work. For example, in

our latest special reports on education and youth

employment, we have been able to see that the

2014-20 programmes are significantly better

aligned with EU policy objectives (such as Europe

2020) than previously. Moreover, the monitoring

obligations have been reinforced, not least with a

view to being in a better position to demonstrate

the added-value of cohesion spending to an

increasingly sceptical public in certain Member

States. It goes without saying, however, that such

changes are clearly not a simplification; they impose

a considerable administrative burden both on the

Member States and the Commission.

Eligibility conditions and the issue of ‘gold

plating’

I would like to focus on some other aspects

which we, as the European Court of Auditors, are

often confronted with when assessing whether

programmes are implemented according to the

regulations. These aspects include eligibility

conditions and the issue of ‘gold plating’.

Here, it should be recalled that simplification at EU

level does not necessarily imply simplification for

participants on the ground. Eligibility conditions are

set at national level and in many cases, difficulties

in implementing the ESI funds stem from provisions

in these national rules. These provisions are often

referred to as ‘gold plating’. However, in some

cases there is a good reason for setting out specific

conditions in the national eligibility rules: they

address specific risks that exist in a regional context

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

and aim at avoiding problems that ultimately could

result in net financial corrections for the Member

State. So in that sense, specific conditions that

deviate from those in other regions could also be an

attempt to protect the national or regional budget

from such a risk. This is not what I would consider to

be ‘gold plating’.

In my view the issue of ‘gold plating’ of eligibility

rules should be seen from another angle: we have

noted in our audits that specific conditions and

rules are sometimes found only in EU programmes,

but not in similar national programmes.

Setting out the main eligibility conditions in

national rules, introduced in the 2007-2013

period, was however meant to be a simplification

for participants because they would be familiar

with these rules and would know how to apply

them. Obviously, the intention was not to create a

separate set of (more stringent) national rules for

EU-funded programmes. This type of ‘gold plating’

should be reconsidered because it has countered

the intentions of the legislators to simplify the rules

and creates a reputational risk for EU funds.

Public procurement and state aid

Finally, there is public procurement and state

aid. Both are EU-wide policies which have a

considerable impact on cohesion spending, and

both are often portrayed as an impediment to

simplification:

- Procurement rules are national law (since the

EU Directives only set minimum standards),

and both public authorities and participants

are obliged to comply with these rules. So

again, if there is any need for simplification,

this applies across the board. In 2014, new EU

Directives were adopted by the EP and the

Council with the aim of producing simpler

and more flexible rules, and they will need

to be transposed into national law by 2016,

and as regards e-procurement, by 2018. In

our forthcoming annual report, we observe

that the transposition in 21 of the 28 Member

States is already delayed. Moreover, we

considered in our recent special report on

this subject that some of the well-intentioned

changes are, however, likely to result in

new and additional problems, for example

in relation to consideration of social and

environmental aspects during tendering.

- In relation to state aid rules, the picture is

somewhat brighter: the 2014 reform of the

General Block Exemption Rule (GBER) is likely

to result in a significant simplification. On the

other hand, national authorities now have

greater responsibility for the approval of aid

schemes. We also noted in our forthcoming

special report that the regional aid guidelines

are in some instances still significantly stricter

than the GBER rules.

Simpler rules also prevent errors from happening.

So far, our audits since 2009 have shown that the

level of error for the 2007-2013 programming

period is considerably lower than for the 2000-2006

programming period. However, at least in my view,

this can be attributed to more (and more effective)

checks and controls by national administrations

and the Commission rather than to simplification of

rules.

Several attempts at simplification have been made

in previous years, but these efforts generally have

only had a limited impact on the regularity of

transactions. The main exception has been the

introduction of simplified cost options, which

have been used in particular for the ESF. At the

same time, increased levels of control have caused

a significant administrative burden on national

administrations and beneficiaries. Through

reinforcing first level checks and audits, we have

become better at detecting and correcting errors,

but not necessarily at making fewer errors in the

first place.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

EU cohesion policy conference

Further simplification of Cohesion policy and the future

perspectives

continued

Simplification through ‘benchmarking’ and

alignment of national eligibility rules?

We have recommended to the Commission that it

make use of the experience acquired in the 2007-

13 period and carry out an analysis of the 2014-

2020 national eligibility rules. This analysis should

provide guidance to Member States on how to

simplify and avoid unnecessarily complex and/

or burdensome rules that do not add value with

respect to the results to be achieved by the policy,

in particular when they result in significant and/or

recurring errors.

In our view, this kind of ‘benchmarking’ analysis and

learning from others is currently not sufficiently

used.

- Simplification through different audit

arrangements?

Simplification at EU and national level can help

to address a significant proportion of errors

that can be attributed to misunderstanding

or misapplying the often complex rules and

regulations that govern cohesion policy. But

we need to accept that some errors will occur,

to be corrected only after detection. There are

no spending programmes with ‘zero errors’.

For many years the ECA has supported the

idea that one level of control can build and

rely (subject to some limited testing and

re-performance) on the previous level. This

concept of ‘single audit’ requires a common

set of rules for all levels. In cohesion, the

comprehensive system of checks set out in

the regulations has helped to bring down the

level of errors in the past. We should therefore

be very careful not to undo a system that has

demonstrated to work well.

Currently, one of the elements of this system

is that the Commission and the national audit

authorities use a 2% materiality threshold

to assess the regularity of spending. An

extrapolated error rate of more than 2% leads

to a qualified or adverse opinion.

In our 2004 opinion on ‘single audit’, we had

already indicated that the 2% level is not

necessarily the right benchmark for judging

the Commission’s management of risk in some

areas of the budget. We therefore called for

rates of ‘tolerable risk of error’ to be proposed

by the Commission and agreed upon at the

political level.

Materiality levels are also important for

simplification, since in statistical sampling

models a higher materiality level results in a

smaller number of operations to be audited.

Therefore, if a higher materiality threshold

were to be set out in the regulations, the

audit burden for national authorities and

participants would be significantly reduced.

We, as the external auditor of the EU, could then

also consider applying this higher materiality level

provided it reflects the political intention of the

budgetary authorities to accept a higher inherent

risk to the regularity of spending in cohesion policy.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Performance audit of large infrastructure

investment

By Luc T'Joen, senior administrator in Chamber II

This article focuses on transport investments, using some of the lessons

learned from recent ECA performance audits in the transport field. The

main lessons and principles can however be transposed to any other large

infrastructure investment supported by EU co-funding.

Introduction

Transport infrastructure investment is a cornerstone

of more general economic strategies primarily to

promote economic growth and create temporary

and permanent employment. Non-refundable EU

support for such investments is co-financed via two

funding streams:

- Directly managed (TEN-T and CEF

) expenditure

via grants: the European Commission is directly

responsible for the selection and management

of the projects via its Innovation and Networks

Executive Agency (INEA);

- “Shared management” expenditure via Cohesion

Fund (CF) and European Regional Development

Fund (ERDF) project funding (the cohesion

policy area). In this case, the Commission

transmits the amounts agreed upon through

Operational Programmes to the Member States,

whose authorities are responsible for all the

expenditure management steps (e.g. selection,

monitoring and payment).

investments. Recently, the EIB has been involved

with the Commission in the set-up of a new fund

(the European Fund for Strategic Investments, EFSI)

and innovative instruments. More information on

their products and services can be obtained via

their website.

Transport investments are believed to contribute to

economic convergence and are a widespread tool

to combat the effects of economic crises (“counter-

cyclical investments”). Politically, transport

infrastructure is desirable because the physical

results are very visible to the citizens (high electoral

power). From a management point of view, such

projects are relatively easy to manage because large

amounts of funding are spent quite quickly. From

an auditor's point of view, however, it is not always

easy to find a clear link between the EU element of

the public investment in the transport infrastructure

and its consequences, in terms of economic

performance at project level or at the higher macro-

economic level.

This article therefore tries to clarify the main issues

at stake by:

- identifying the main risks which should be

assessed when designing a performance audit;

- exploring ways of developing audit

methodologies;

- reporting on key issues such as investment

sustainability, deadweight and EU added value,

using the experience of recent ECA audits;

- establishing the connection between the

investments' inputs versus outputs, results and

impact.

Finally, this article also highlights the importance

of reaching tangible results which are worth

reporting to the stakeholders in the form of the

European Commission, Parliament and Council, and

the general public, and provides some personal

proposals for ways of influencing the quality of

EU spending through increased knowledge of

performance auditing.

Cohesion policy funding is usually provided to

bridge the economic gap (the difference in degree

of economic development) between the various

Member States, while the level of EU support is

calculated on the basis of the investment funding

gap, determined by using Cost-Benefit Analysis

(CBA) techniques.

In addition, the European Investment Bank (EIB)

is an important player, as the Bank also provides

significant amounts of investment support to large

transport infrastructures through a number of

different instruments, such as loans (refundable

instruments), guarantees, microfinance and equity

1 TEN-T = Trans-European Networks for Transport; CEF =

Connecting Europe Facility.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Performance audit of large infrastructure investment

continued

Main risks usually noted when designing

performance audits of transport

The first group of items which transport

infrastructure audits identify as causing problems

for the performance of the investment are as

follows:

(i) Weak long-term strategic planning of transport

infrastructure, leaving room for less essential

investments to take priority over other more

needed ones, sometimes caused by “political”

influences on priorities and the particular

choices made;

(ii) Limited capacity building within the

entities responsible for the management of

expenditure, although managing it involves a

very large number of diverse operations and

activities, with varying forms of assistance (from

“simple” grants to “innovative sophisticated

financial engineering” instruments);

(iii) Ineffective co-ordination between the

Commission's internal departments, between

the Commission and the Member State

Ministries, and between the national and

regional authorities, combined with limited

project monitoring and limited programme

supervision;

(iv) Very general, and sometimes loosely defined,

cohesion policy objectives formulated

within an unnecessarily complex regulatory

framework, where various authorities with

different levels of competence interact with

each other to apply both EU and national rules,

the latter for additional requirements;

(v) Low, or no, focus on results, impacts and

outcomes

at Commission, national and

regional level;

2 Definitions (from the Court’s

Performance Audit Manual):

Result:

the immediate changes that arise for direct addressees

at the end of their participation in an intervention (e.g. improved

accessibility to an area due to the construction of a road);

Impact:

the longer term socio-economic consequences that

can be observed after a certain period after the completion of

an intervention, which may affect either direct addressees of the

intervention or indirect addressees falling outside the boundary of

the intervention, who may be winners or losers;

Outcome:

the change that arises from the implementation of an

intervention and which normally relates to the objectives of this

intervention. Outcomes include results and impacts. Outcomes

may be expected or unexpected, positive or negative (e.g. a

(vi) A management largely focused on the

absorption of funds made available earlier.

These regularly repeated stumbling blocks,

highlighted by on-the-spot audits of EU co-funded

transport infrastructure investments, may be

partially explained by:

- the complex policy environment of shared

management involving many entities with

different roles and responsibilities;

- the need to spend money (“use it or lose it”)

focusing on legal and financial audit matters;

- the absence of clear guidelines;

- inadequate training and capacity building; and

- low management skills or lack of local

management and monitoring resources.

These shortcomings mainly hamper the potential

effectiveness of the EU funding amounts invested,

but they can also have an impact on efficiency and

economy

In order to decide what to audit each of the three

"e-words" above must be assessed carefully and

on a case-by-case basis, by analysing the risks in

a preliminary in-depth study: it is important to

get it right from the beginning as there will be no

second chance! In addition, the design of the audit

proposal should ensure that the audit evidence to

be provided is particularly robust and convincing

in order to, wherever possible, clearly link the EU-

funded investment with the final results and impact.

Therefore, when starting a preliminary study

to assess the usefulness and feasibility of a

performance audit, particularly in a new audit field,

one should

first analyse the overall picture

(who

is responsible for what?), assess any issues arising

from this, and collect evidence on the performance

of the management of the spending framework.

Possible indicators

which could be used in this

assessment are:

- Number of entities involved in the set-up of the

Economy:

requiring appropriate resources to be available at the

best price,

Efficiency:

requiring the best relationship between

resources employed and results,

Effectiveness:

achieving the

intended results compared to the objectives set initially to justify

expenditure.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

spending framework, their responsibilities, and

their roles looking basically at whether there is

a long-term, overall, well applied and regularly

revised strategy, or not, who does what; who

coordinates with whom, etc.;

- Amounts, degree (% of overall) and trend of

spending of the EU funding over time for the

particular field;

- Quality of the indicators for that spending trend

with respect to the results obtained (if any), and

regular revision of the indicators;

- Comparison with national spending trends on

similar infrastructures: same trend, or not? If not,

why not?

- Quality, regularity and transparency of both

the Commission's and the Member States'

monitoring, supervision and reporting of the

particular framework;

- Number of entities involved in the decision-

making process (Commission, Member States,

regional and local levels), and how well they

co-ordinated before and during the process (e.g.

number of permits and authorisations needed to

start building, delivered by whom, in what order,

and under what conditions);

- Time it takes on average, and over the years,

to come to a spending decision (basically

measuring bureaucracy);

- Number of officials involved in the project/

programme implementation, and their

background, competences and capacity

assessed through the general administrative,

IT and professional training provided (to be

compared to other regional/national bodies

doing exactly the same type of work);

- Number of incidents/reports indicating

problematic issues, particularly with regard to

results obtained and their actual handling. For

example, the total absence of any such reports

is a hint that projects are implemented to spend

money and nothing else!

...

audit task, and if you have the time to do this or

not. However, it can prove important because from

this more global view, one can understand the

exact circumstances of the spending, and this could

deliver a first set of general risks with respect to the

overall spending framework environment.

good example

of the importance of having a

long-term strategic development plan in place for

the construction of infrastructures, before spending

EU-money, is provided in the special report on

seaport infrastructures

. Because of the general

absence of a long-term strategic port development

plan (neither the Commission, nor any of the five

Member States visited had such a plan in place at

the time of the audit, in 2010):

- several port investments were not delivering

the expected results: only 18 % of 27 randomly-

selected projects, worth in total 726 million euro

of EU-money (total cost audited 1,7 billion euro),

were considered effective,

- half of the port investments co-funded needed

further funding to make them work (to finance

necessary connections to the network, complete

missing links), and public money to complete

the works in a future phase is scarce because of

the crisis and sovereign debt problems,

three ports were found to be completely

empty (there was no sound business case and no

project ownership), several were heavily delayed

and many were just starting a very limited number

of operations.

This is not an exhaustive list. Nor is this exercise

always necessary. It will depend on whether you

already know the area well before you start the

See Special report No 4/2012: “Using Structural and

Cohesion Funds to co finance transport infrastructures in

seaports an effective investment?”

The Eu co-funded this quay in the port Campamento in Spain

with € 16,6 million. A small part of the container terminal built

is currently used to do ship repairs, and the rest is lying idle

since 2004

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Performance audit of large infrastructure investment

continued

Further key issues to tackle when designing

performance audits in transport

A second “bloc” of major factors leading to a risk of

inffective spending is related to:

(i) Project sustainability,

(ii) Deadweight, and

(iii) EU added value.

Each of these notions will be explained in further

detail below with links as how to assess them, and

when.

Project sustainability

Sustainability is a key issue which needs to be

tackled up front by the beneficiary. Sustainability

can be defined as “the

ability of a project to

maintain its operations, services and benefits

during its projected life time, i.e. for a long period

after project completion”.

Legally speaking, the notion of ‘durability’

(considered equivalent to the concept of

sustainability, in the sense of producing long-

lasting results), has been a legal requirement for

cohesion policy since 2000

since

Regulation

No 1260/1999 (Article 30.4) for the programme

period

2000-2006

developed the durability

requirement by introducing a cumulative set

of conditions constituting an infringement and

also set a five-year time limit for maintaining an

investment. This notion was reinforced over time:

for the

2007-2013

period, the general provisions

regulation6 moved the starting point for the time

limit from the date of the decision on funding to

the date of completion of the operation, which

substantially lengthened the required period (a

reduced three-year time limit was allowed for SMEs

as an exception), and a penalty was introduced for

undertakings which had transferred a productive

activity within or between Member States;

for the ESIF

2014-2020,

the common provisions

regulation

tightened the starting point by setting

it to the date set in the State aid decision, and adds

the relocation of a productive activity to outside the

EU as another type of infringement.

The first reference to durability was in Regulation No

4253/1988 (Article 24) but non-compliance was not an

infringement and there were no minimum time limits for

maintaining an investment, and no reporting requirement

6 Regulation No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006, Article 57

To ensure sustainability, one can already define at

the planning stage exactly what the sustainable

component of a funded project would be. This can

be somewhat complex and could include not only

the continued provision of the goods, services

or facilities provided by the co-funded project to

achieve the expected project benefits, but also

– possibly- continued local action stimulated by

the project and the generation of new (successor)

services and initiatives as a result of the project

funded.

This implies that a

robust sustainability analysis

and a sustainability strategy,

incorporating the

various elements above,

are needed as early as the

design phase of a programme or project

in order

to be able to achieve long-lasting results.

Therefore, sustainability is a key concept that

should be included in the assessment of

effectiveness:

if the service engaged in as a result

of the EU-funding stops at the very moment (or

shortly after) the EU funding “well” dries up, there is

a serious effectiveness problem.

good example

which demonstrates that

sustainability can be at high risk if it is not properly

assessed initially comes from the performance audit

on airport infrastructure investments

, where 10 of

the 20 airports audited were found to be in deep

financial trouble. Some of the airports only had one

small plane flight per week and one airport audited

was not even expecting a single plane in the next

few months.

The EU co-funded the airport in Crotone (Calabria) in Italy with

€ 4,7 million (new terminal, increased apron space, investments

on the runway and taxiways, and a control tower). Because of a

change in national and regional planning, preference is given

to nearby airports. Therefore, this airport was not used at the

time of the audit visit, and there were no planes expected in the

following months.

7 Regulation No 1303/2013 of 20 December 2013, Article 71

8 See Special Report N° 21/2014, “EU-funded airport

infrastructures: poor value for money”

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Because of the very low number of passengers

attracted to the airports, and the very limited

number of aeroplanes landing, both of which

provide income to the airport authorities in

the form of passenger taxes and plane landing

fees, these airports will not become financially

sustainable in the long run (no chance of breaking

even). The sustainability of the EU-funding

invested is in the hands of the national or regional

authorities, who also usually have deficit problems

on their overall balance sheets. These authorities are

forced to continue to subsidise the airport accounts

with public funding, to pay the staff to keep the

airport open, and to ensure the maintenance of the

investments made. If they do not do so, the EU co-

funded investments will be revealed as useless.

Deadweight

Deadweight occurs where funding is provided to

support a beneficiary who would have made the

same choice in the absence of aid.

In such cases,

the outcome cannot be attributed to the policy, and

the aid paid to the beneficiary has had no impact.

Thus the share of expenditure which generates

deadweight is ineffective by definition,

because

it does not contribute to the achievement of the

objectives.

good example

of the phenomenon of

deadweight is taken from the performance audit of

the Marco Polo (MP) programmes

. This audit found

serious indications of deadweight because:

- 13 of the 16 beneficiaries audited confirmed that

they would have started and run the transport

service even without a subsidy;

- The programme evaluator indicated that “the

majority of the projects would also have started

without subsidy”;

- the Commission, as a manager of the

programme, indicated in its report to the

European Parliament and Council that “42 % of

beneficiaries stated that their projects would

definitely have gone ahead without MP funds”.

Thus, many transport services started up using the

Marco Polo EU funding support and once the three

years of start-up support were over the services

provided by the project funding stopped. This is

explained by the fact that:

- heavy goods are transported over long distances

by sea, rail or inland waterway for cost reasons in

any case, especially if shipments can be planned

in advance, and

- Marco Polo funding covers such a small part of

the total project cost that it cannot be seen as

a real incentive (in the 16 projects audited by

the ECA, the subsidy covered only 2,8 % of the

amount invested by the beneficiaries).

Another example was found in the ex post

evaluation of the 2007-2013 Cohesion policy

programmes giving support to large enterprises.

This report concluded that “in not less than 30 %

of cases analysed, the ERDF support has not

influenced the large firms’ investment decisions”.

Measuring deadweight is not always easy, as one

must find relevant and convincing evidence. In

the case of transport, especially in the case of rail

projects, this is relatively easy as operators need

to buy their slots on railway lines a long time in

advance, and so they will run the service, with or

without any EU funding which comes later. It is

acknowledged that this is not the case everywhere

but, given the importance of such findings, the

preliminary study should actively seek to assess

the possibilities in each field of finding convincing

evidence of possible deadweight, and determine

how to obtain this evidence.

EU added value

EU added value is another fundamental aspect to

the achievement of sound financial management.

The concept of EU added value is often used by the

Commission as a justification for EU expenditure.

The Commission has repeatedly stressed that EU

added value is a key test for justifying spending

financed by the EU Budget, and the importance of

this concept has been confirmed by the European

Parliament and the Council

. But without a clear

definition almost anything can be justified as worth

being EU co-funded.

When searching on the net, it is significant that not

many definitions are available. For example, the

10 See ECA Annual Report 2013, “Chapter 10: getting results

from the budget”.

See Special report N° 3/2013 “Have the Marco Polo

programmes been effective in shifting traffic off the road?”

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Performance audit of large infrastructure investment

continued

Commission, in its Health programme, defines EU

added value as “the value additional to the value

created by actions of individual Member States.

It is the result of EU support activities which are

additional to the value that would have resulted

from national or regional levels funding and can

concern coordination gains, legal certainty, greater

effectiveness or complementarities. It reflects the

broader European relevance and significance of

the action funded”.

The ECA Annual Report 2013 describes EU

added value as “the

value resulting from an EU

intervention which is additional to the value that

would have been otherwise created by Member

State action alone”

(a similar definition was

provided in Special Report No 6/2014).

In 2013, a Chamber II internal working party

developed a questionnaire to assess the notion of

EU added value. The questionnaire suggests that

EU added value can be considered present when

the EU funding support enables bigger, better

projects to be undertaken and/or implemented

sooner than would otherwise have been the case.

For example, the following questions need to be

tackled to assess the issue of EU added value:

- Is the project made possible purely through EU

funding?

- Has the EU funding been added to other

funding rather than replacing it?

- Is the project being undertaken more speedily

or on a larger scale because of the EU funding?

- Are there more beneficiaries because of the EU

funding?

- Does the EU funding produce higher project

quality?

- Does the EU funding support make it possible

to address critical issues at an early stage of the

project?

- Does the EU funding supply critical resources to

fill funding gaps?

- Does the EU funding allow other funds to be

leveraged (additional public and/or private

funds which would otherwise not have been

channelled to this project)?

…

Making funds available does not per se add EU

value. Three main conditions must be met to add EU

value: that public intervention is needed; that the

budgetary measures are cost-effective compared

to non-budgetary instruments (i.e. regulatory

measures); that EU level spending can demonstrably

secure better results than national budgets alone.

The ECA auditors should therefore try to focus on

these three particular criteria when including an EU

added value focus into their questionnaire.

A good

example

of an attempt to translate the

concept of EU added value into meaningful and

operational audit criteria, which could then be

used consistently and systematically in future

performance audits, was found in the Special Report

on renewable energy

. This report concluded that

Cohesion policy funds in this field had limited EU

added value, as the projects audited did not make

their full contribution to the EU’s energy objectives.

This somewhat vague conclusion already makes it

clear that meaningful and operational audit criteria

for assessing EU added value, compared to the eight

questions above, are not that easy to find and apply.

The main issue here is that, ideally, the EU

should manage a few EU projects (but of real EU

added value), rather than “a myriad of projects”

which make the Commission’s management a

virtual supervision of the Member States’ own

management of previously negotiated and

adopted programmes

“Results, or no results”, that’s the question for

the ECA (and not only in transport)

Performance audit at the ECA is about assessing

whether the money has been spent properly,

taking into account the principles of economy,

efficiency and effectiveness. There are two main

performance audit approaches, which are often

combined. The first is auditing performance directly

(assessing inputs, outputs, results, impacts and

11 See ECA Special Report N° 6/2014 “Cohesion policy funds

support to renewable energy generation — has it achieved good

results?”

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

their relationship), and the second is auditing the

management and control systems (e.g. analysing

the adequacy of the policies and procedures

implemented by managers for promoting,

monitoring and evaluating performance).

Every year the ECA launches up to 30 performance

audits as part of its annual rolling work plan,

in line with its multi-annual strategy, after a

specific priority-setting exercise. The ECA Special

Reports reporting on those audit tasks provide

independent information to the discharge

authorities (Parliament and Council), and to the

European public as a whole, on the execution of

the EU budget. Based on its findings, the ECA also

makes recommendations to improve the financial

management of the EU funds applied. These

recommendations might involve financial savings,

better working methods, avoidance of waste, and/

or more cost-efficient achievement of the expected

policy objectives.

With respect to results,

the most common

findings of performance audits in the transport

field were that:

- In many Member States and regions, there

was no proper overall long-term planning

of infrastructure development, involving all

the stakeholders (national, regional and local

public authorities dealing with transport and

environment, private operators, users). In

addition, there was often little or no analysis of

what was already available; forecasts on future

use were limited in their quality; and analysis of

the costs and benefits of investment was often

low quality or missing completely;

- The management of EU-funded projects in the

Member States has, in many instances, been low

quality. For example:

o the project objectives did not always reflect

the EU transport policy objectives;

o the project selection was not always

transparent, with the main problems being

in the selection and award criteria and

prioritisation;

o costs were underestimated and benefits

inflated at the planning stage, while during

project implementation, delays and cost

overruns were the rule rather than the

exception;

o project monitoring by Managing Authorities

was rather superficial because it only related

to physical outputs instead of assessing the

results achieved, and

o the Commission’s supervision was often

inadequate or too distant to ensure effective

spending, and supervision was not based

on relevant indicators (only output-related

indicators at project level).

- There is a lot of bureaucracy at national level

when implementing transport projects.

Numerous authorisations were needed, such as

building permits, cultural and archaeological

authorisations, and environmental impact

assessments. Bureaucratic hurdles include calls

for tenders ending in national courts and court

appeals on land expropriation decisions. In

many cases, this bureaucracy caused long delays

beyond the initial deadlines, and the loss of the

highly desirable project ownership resulting in

failure to implement highly desirable projects.

good example

was the seaports audit report

which was explicit on these facts: delays of

up to 22 years (in Greece) and 33 different

authorisations (in Italy) were noted as the worst

cases within the audited projects.

The main visual effect of this

is that a lot of

infrastructure

has been built (for example: port

quays, airport terminals, stretches of road...) which

at the time of the audit some years after is

either

unused, or severely underused.

While it is clear

that transport infrastructure usually needs some

time to be fully deployed and used, the EU co-

funded infrastructures were often the result of

inadequate needs assessments using optimistic

forecasts, unrealistic objectives, and an improper

balance of costs and benefits., In many instances

the investments were made with the main goal

of absorbing money allocated years before. Huge

delays, important cost overruns, and loss of project

ownership were some of the main reasons for many

of the cases of ineffective spending observed.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Performance audit of large infrastructure investment

continued

Even if the overall framework allows cost allocations

to be rescheduled within Operational Programmes,

the reality is that for many large infrastructure

projects receiving EU investment, the EU-funding is

neither effective, because the expected objectives

are not achieved, nor efficient, because the input/

output and result ratios are not good. Moreover,

nobody (not the Managing Authorities, or the

Commission) really felt accountable or responsible

for this disappointing result.

This, however, has an important “opportunity

cost”

because the same money could have been spent

on another more effective, operational or useful

project for the region (e.g. a school, a home, a

hospital etc. could have been built instead of, for

example, an empty port quay). This is detrimental

not only because the money itself is not used well,

but also negatively affects the image of the EU and

the support it gives to regions, since journalists and

anti-Europeans prefer to report on “bad” cases, and

do not focus on good ones, as there is “no story to

tell”.

Impact: what can be measured and assessed,

and what cannot?

With regard to impact, the usual reason for

requesting cohesion funding is “to create/boost

local employment” or, even worse, “to increase the

regional GDP/GNI”. Believe it or not, the latter was

actually found regularly in applications for EU co-

funding support.

One indicator for measuring the impact on GDP/

GNI at regional level could be to assess “Foreign

Direct Investments” (FDI) in the years after the

investments took place. Income of capital, increases

in tax revenue, innovation transfer and job creation

are all advantages of FDI. However, it is almost

impossible to find links at project level with an

improved situation at the more macro-economic

regional GDP/GNI level (unless the region is very

small, and the project is very big). Such links could

only be provided at ex post evaluation level, with

the necessary disclaimers and an appropriate

methodology to avoid biases. And even at that

level, it is uncertain whether the results can really

be attributed to the project(s) and to the EU co-

funding for these projects.

For example,

empirical evidence from 45

companies surveyed through the ex-post

evaluation of the Cohesion policy programmes

for large enterprises

concluded that the 2007-

2013 ERDF and CF support typically acted as a

pre-condition for investment by large enterprises

which created jobs, while the main influencing

factors were the long-term corporate strategy, the

local industry structure and the availability of good

transport infrastructure. Although the monitoring

data confirmed that the target of the number of

jobs created for large enterprises was achieved, the

positive outcome could only be partially attributed

to the EU programmes because of the “weak

causal link between the ERDF support and project

implementation”.

Similarly, the famous “leverage

effect”,

also known

as the “multiplier

effect”

is difficult to assess, as

the projects supported are usually very different in

size and complexity, and have input from various

sources. A recent study

indicated that:

- good institutional conditions appear to be a pre-

condition for well-targeted and economically

profitable investment in infrastructure;

- investment in small-scale projects enhancing

intra-regional connectivity is paying off,

especially in less advanced regions with effective

and accountable governments.

- ...

To sum up: assessing the impact of projects is not

an easy task in itself. Only a well-defined, strategic,

study with an appropriate methodology and

sampling can provide useful insights for future

reference.

Ex-post evaluation of Cohesion policy programmes 2007-

2013, Work Package 4. KPMG/Prognos, 2016

Government quality and the economic returns of transport

infrastructure investment in European regions (London

School of Economics – 2016)

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Assessing impact is nevertheless particularly useful

and important if and when it tackles the main

reason for the funding. For example, the Marco Polo

programme funding

was supposed to support

the EU transport policy goals of diminishing the

environmental side-effects of freight transport,

easing road congestion and improving road safety.

To do so, it had a budget of 552 million euro to fund

projects to counter the rise in international

See Special report N° 3/2013 “Have the Marco Polo

programmes been effective in shifting traffic off the road?”

road freight transport by shifting the expected

aggregate increase to railways, inland waterways

and short sea shipping, or a combination of those

transport modes.

When looking at the available data at Eurostat level

on the use of the transport modes over time, one

notices immediately that the programme funding

did not produce its intended effects (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Impact of Marco Polo Programmes on the use of road transport in Europe

(Source: ECA compilation of Eurostat data)

See Special report N° 3/2013 “Have the Marco Polo

programmes been effective in shifting traffic off the road?”

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Performance audit of large infrastructure investment

continued

In addition, even more worrying is the fact that

at project level,

there is hardly any information,

data or evidence available to audit, not even on

the direct jobs created, far from being able to

determine the indirect and induced employment

effects

. The only data available in some of the

audits were the “direct, temporary jobs during

construction”.

A good example

was the most recent (2016)

maritime transport performance audit which

assessed the impact of EU funding of the

infrastructure investment projects audited on job

creation in 19 port areas. The results showed that:

o most ports had some figures for job creation at

port level and project level, but there was no

common methodology for estimating these

job figures, and they were provided on an ad-

hoc rather than an annual basis. The reliability

of the figures could not be confirmed and the

methodological issue rendered the comparison

of the data with the other audited ports useless,

and

o there is little willingness or ability within the

Member States or port authorities to invest

substantial financial and human resources in

developing yearly, detailed and externally valid

data on these employment and added value

indicators.

The main lesson is that although the idea of

measuring the impact and outcomes of EU funding

for projects is a noble aim, in order to determine

whether EU support has really helped to create jobs,

the practical experience obtained through auditing

in the transport field (one of the major domains for

expenditure) has shown that despite the fact that it

might be very politically desirable to demonstrate

the added value and positive effects of EU support,

it is not easy to establish clear results because

the limited data available and the way the data is

gathered.

The main suggestion for auditors when setting

up a performance audit of transport in particular

would therefore be: if there is a need to include a

question on the job creation or higher level impact

of EU-funding in your questionnaire, limit yourself

to assessing the quality of any evidence made

available by the auditee and the methodology

applied to obtain it, in order to assess whether you

can safely report on it or not. If not, then only report

that there is no data available to avoid jeopardising

report quality.

Conclusions

This article reported on the lessons learned from

auditing the performance of significant investments

in various modes of the transport sector. It provided

important lessons which can be taken up in other

sectors as well, with respect to the methodology

for conducting your preliminary study, assessing

risks ahead and for tackling important topics such

as sustainability, deadweight and EU added value

which regularly arise when analysing much EU

expenditure.

In addition, it is important to measure and report

upon the actual results. No matter what the

spending rhythm and trend may be in a certain

field, the actual, visible results are important and

good and bad (and sometimes ugly) cases need

to be reported to improve future spending in the

given area.

Finally this article has also dealt with the link

between EU funding and more general impacts and

outcomes, including aspects such as the “leverage

effect”, using recent studies. The main issue here

is that there is usually little or no data available

ex post as evidence or support for the ambitious

declarations made to obtain the EU funding at

project application stage.

While getting EU money is one thing, obtaining

results are another, and they are (and should be)

connected.

Or, as Winston Churchill once said

“However beautiful the strategy, you should

occasionally look at the results.

Definitions used:

“direct

jobs”

is the creation of employment measured in

Full-time Equivalents (FTEs) directly related

to the port activity;

“indirect

jobs”

are those jobs generated in the national

economy as the result of local purchases by firms (not

individuals) directly dependent upon the port activity,

whereas

“induced

jobs”

are jobs created locally because of

purchases of goods and services by directly employed

individuals.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Quoted sources

CIPRIANI, GABRIELE (2013)

Final Report of the Working Party on “EU added value” (with

Annex)

12.7.2013.

CRESCENZI, RICCARDO; DI CATALDO, MARCO;

RODRÍGUEZ-POSE, ANDRÉS (2015)

Government quality and the economic returns of transport

infrastructure investment in European regions

London School of Economics, 52 p.

EUROPEAN COMMISSION - Directorate-General for

Regional and Urban Policy

Ex-post evaluation of Cohesion policy programmes: 2007-2013

- Work Package 4. KPMG/Prognos, 2016

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS (2012)

Special report N° 4/2012: “Using Structural and Cohesion Funds

to co finance transport infrastructures in seaports: an effective

investment?

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS (2013)

Special report N° 3/2013: “Have the Marco Polo programmes been

effective in shifting traffic off the road?”

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS (2014)

Annual Report 2013: “Chapter 10: getting results from the

budget”

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS (2014)

Special Report N° 6/2014: “Cohesion policy funds support to

renewable energy generation: has it achieved good results?”

EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS (2014)

Special Report N° 21/2014: “EU-funded airport infrastructures: poor

value for money”

Regulation 1083/2006

Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 of 11 July 2006

laying

down general provisions on the European Regional Development

Fund, the European Social Fund and the Cohesion Fund and

repealing Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999

Regulation 1303/2013

Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament

and of the Council of 17 December 2013

laying down common

provisions on the European Regional Development Fund,

the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European

Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European

Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions

on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social

Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries

Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006

Regulation 4253/1988

Council Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 of 19 December 1988,

laying down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No

2052/88 as regards coordination of the activities of the different

Structural Funds between themselves and with the operations of

the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial

instruments

The ECA has launched the

EKA (Enabling Knowledge for Audit) initiative

with the aim of promoting a corporate culture of knowledge-sharing and

collective learning. An important part of this initiative in the praparation of

Subject Briefs in which staff members set out and share their professional

knowledge on specific subjects.

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged/Reproduction autorisée

à condition de mentionner la source

EUU, Alm.del - 2016-17 - Bilag 3: Rapport fra Den Europæiske Revionsret oktober 2016

ISSN 1831-449X

Main Contents

INTERVIEW WITH VÍTOR MANUEL CALDEIRA, LEAVING ECA PRESIDENT

INTERVIEW

WITH KLAUS-HEINER LEHNE, THE NEWLY APPOINTED ECA PRESIDENT

REFLECTIONS BY LOUIS GALEA, LEAVING ECA MEMBER

THE ECA AND THE NAO: EXCHANGING KNOWLEDGE AND PEOPLE

44TH EUROSAI GOVERNING BOARD MEETING AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF AUDITORS

For more information

European Court of Auditors

12, rue Alcide De Gasperi

1615 Luxembourg

LUXEMBOURG

[email protected]

eca.europa.eu

@EUAuditorsECA

EUAuditorsECA

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