Europaudvalget 2019-20, Retsudvalget 2019-20
EUU Alm.del Bilag 897, REU Alm.del Bilag 520
Offentligt
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Europol Public Information
The Hague, 15
th
July 2020
Replies to JPSG comments to Europol written
contributions (June 2020)
1.
Europol’s
replies to JPSG comments to “Europol’s activities
report from September 2019 to June 2020”
Requests for clarification by MEP Caterina CHINNICI
European Serious and Organised Crime Centre
In the Reporting on Europol Activities September 2019-June 2020 there is a
mention of the reorganization of the European Serious and Organized Crime
Centre, which will include, alongside the current European Migrant
Smuggling Centre (EMSC), a Unit specializing in drug trafficking and a Unit
for the fight against organized crime in order to respond to the needs of the
Member States to receive more specialized support in investigating high-risk
multi-criminals and organized crime groups.
Could Europol provide more information about this reorganization and
the reasons behind this decision?
Europol’s reply
The reorganisation of European Serious and Organized Crime Centre (ESOCC),
which was approved by Europol’s Management Board in May 2019, is closely
linked to the recent establishment of the new European Economic and Financial
Crimes Centre (EFECC) in June 2020. A number of areas, previously under the
umbrella of ESOCC (e.g. IP crime or different kind of frauds), are now part of
the EFECC. This will allow
to centralise and strengthen Europol’s operational
support provided to the EU MS and bodies in the fields of financial and economic
crime, promote the systematic use of financial investigations and forge alliances
with public and private entities in order to trace, seize and confiscate criminal
assets in the EU and beyond. The second major strand of ESOCC’s
reorganisation aims at promoting and enabling coordinated EU-wide
investigations targeting individuals posing the highest serious and organised
crime risk in the EU, in line with the High Value Target (HVT)
1
and Operational
Task Force (OTF)
2
approach applied by ESOCC since 2018. The establishment
of two separate, dedicated and reinforced Units
–
one for the fight against
organized crime and one for drug trafficking and drug-related crimes
–
are at
the heart of this effort.
1
Individuals whose criminal activity fulfils specified risk criteria and therefore constitutes a high risk of serious
and organised crime to two or more Member States
2
Temporary group of representatives of Member States (Third Parties) and Europol, forming a specific multi-
national/disciplinary (project) team targeting the selected HVT
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In particular, with regard to the Unit for the fight against organized crime,
does Europol believe that its work would be significantly facilitated if the
European Union were to bring all the measures adopted so far in the fight
against organized crime to a uniform and systematically coherent regulatory
framework, for example through the adoption of a European framework
directive against organized crime?
Europol’s reply
On the development of the legal framework: the prevention of organised crime in
the EU requires a holistic assessment of legislation considering the complexity and
evolving nature of the EU criminal landscape. While Europol regularly contributes
its expertise in preparatory phases, Agency does not have a role in legislative
process as such. However, the implementation and application of the existing
legislation would have a great impact in this area. This concerns especially the
Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA of 24 October 2008 on the fight against
organised crime. A number of workshops with EU Member States organised by the
Commission last year identified a diverse landscape
3
that poses a challenge for
international cooperation. Additionally, further legislative and policy developments
at EU level, under the auspices of the European Commission, could help stepping
up the response against organised crime. In this respect, beside the recast of
Europol’s legal mandate,
from an operational perspective, these measures could
concern areas such as the seizure and confiscation of proceeds of crime,
distribution of firearms, use of postal services for distribution of illicit commodities,
access to information and existence of administrative legislation enabling
prevention of organised crime
Child abuse material online
In the Reporting on Europol Activities September 2019-June 2020, the
important OPERATION GARGAMEL operation is illustrated, according to
which, on March 31st, the Belgian police with the support of Europol
dismantled a global network of child abuse with links in over 40 countries,
starting with a search during which over 9 million photos and videos of the
abuse of thousands of children from all over the world were found. Thanks
to the identification task force Europol has managed to identify 70 children
and 30 suspects. The Belgian federal judicial police managed to identify 60
suspects (including 24 in Belgium) and 40 victims, bringing the total to 90
suspects and 110 victims.
With regard to this investigation, which once again proves that such a
horrendous crime has, unfortunately, no hints to diminish, can Europol say
whether, to date, investigations continue to identify the other victims
involved, given the huge number of child pornographic material acquired?
Europol’s reply
3
For example the absence of unified legal framework related to access to the communication data by law
enforcement; EU legislation related to the distribution of firearms still contains loopholes that enable criminals
to purchase firearms legally in a limited number of countries inside the EU with very limited, sometimes
inexistent, control mechanisms.
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Investigations are continuing to identify victims from this data. It has proven
to be particularly useful in this regard and now forms part of a much larger data
set of 50 million images and videos of child sexual abuse that is present at
Europol for victim identification purposes. This is combined with the criminal
intelligence available here and other initiatives (like “Trace An Object”,
https://www.europol.europa.eu/stopchildabuse) to provide further information
to the Member States and Third Countries enabling the identification of victims
and the suspects that abuse them.
The global nature of this type of crime requires global intra-EU collaboration and
especially with third countries. Also taking into account that many of the minors
involved in these criminal networks often belong to vulnerable categories and,
therefore, their identification is more difficult (unaccompanied minors, minors
from families in extreme poverty).
For this reason, does Europol collaborate with the competent law
enforcement authorities of Third Countries and / or the various organizations
aimed at monitoring this phenomenon such as, for example, the National
Centre for Missing & Exploited Children - NCMEC? If so, is the degree of
collaboration with them considered sufficient?
Europol’s reply
Europol collaborates with Third Countries with which it has an operational
agreement, exchanging personal and operational information with them on a
regular basis. This cooperation has proven to be extremely effective in
combating online child sexual exploitation at a global level.
Collaboration with various organisations aimed at monitoring this phenomenon
is restricted by the Europol Regulation’s requirements on receipt of personal
data from private parties. The cooperation with NCMEC for receipt of personal
data is enabled through the cooperation of US law enforcement partners as the
channel for this information. This places an administrative and operational
burden on the US Liaison Officers at Europol and on Europol’s European
Cybercrime Centre (EC3) to enable the receipt of this data. Europol is part of
the law enforcement committee that advises the NCMEC Board of Directors since
2019 and cooperation with them is very strong. Europol also hosts the European
Financial Coalition aimed at combating the commercial sexual exploitation of
children and composed of representatives from Law Enforcement, NGOs,
Financial Sector and Payment Providers. Additionally Europol hosts several
Advisory Groups on Financial Services, Telecommunications Providers, Internet
Safety and also involving Academia through which issues surrounding Child
Sexual Exploitation are explored. Europol has worked closely with networks such
as Amber Alert (Police Expert Network on Missing Children), the Australian e-
Safety Commissioner’s Office and others during the COVID-19
period to amplify
their campaigns and products aimed at online safety.
2.
Europol’s
replies to JPSG comments on
Innovation
Request
for clarification by MEP Caterina CHINNICI
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In 2020, Europol set up the Innovation Lab, which aims to act as a monitoring
hub for new technological developments and promote innovation, also through
the development of common technological solutions for Member States in the
field of internal security.
One of the first projects undertaken within the Innovation Lab program concerns
a mechanism that allows greater speed for the recognition and reporting of child
pornography online. This is a very important project given the constantly
increasing volume of child pornography published online.
Could Europol give us clarifications on the collaboration with private online
platforms on this project?
We know, in fact, how important a close public-private cooperation on this issue
is and, therefore, I would like more details on the possible participation and
involvement of private stakeholders.
Again, with regard to the new Innovation Lab, I would like to ask if there is
also a revision of the technological tools for the exchange of information.
We know that law enforcement authorities and judicial authorities of the Member
States face difficulties in the exchange of big amount of data through safe
channels.
Is it possible to develop programs which overcome these difficulties and
which allow a fruitful and secure collaboration between Europol and the
Member States?
Europol’s reply
In the framework of the
Global Response Against Child Exploitation
(GRACE)
project, Europol is going to cooperate with a consortium of 22
partners, including private companies (and research institutes). The referrals
from Online Service Providers (OSPs) are crucial to fighting Child Sexual
Exploitation (CSE). However, Law enforcement agencies (LEAs) currently
receive significantly more referrals from OSPs than they can process, which
leads to backlogs. The
GRACE
project aims to build a system that will speed up
the processing by LEAs of referrals from OSPs of Child Sexual Abuse Material
(CSAM). The OSPs include social media platforms as well as electronic service
providers, such as hosting services. It is envisaged that this new system will
contribute to the analysis of the content and will help prioritising the work of
investigators to protect victims and apprehend offenders faster.
Regarding the exchange of information, law enforcement community is looking
into innovative analysis of high volume of data using machine learning with the
view to automating and standardising information analysis. Europol believes it
would be possible to develop programmes to enhance the exchange of large
sets of data through secure channels. However, currently, there are no plans
to revise the technological tools for LEAs information exchange.
Request for clarifications by MEP Patrick BREYER
The document stresses "currently the Europol Innovation Lab is supporting
EU Member States to implement
three
recently awarded H2020 funding
projects". However, the document only provides two examples. Could you
please provide a complete list of all the projects and more detailed
information on each of them?
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Europol Innovation Lab is supporting EU Member States to implement the
following three recently awarded H2020 funding projects:
Global Response
Against Child Exploitation; Artificial Intelligence and advanced Data
Analytics for Law Enforcement Agencies; Infiniti.
The
Global Response Against Child Exploitation
project aims to enhance
the fight against Child Sexual Exploitation. In particular, this project seeks to
improve EUROPOL and Member States LEAs’ capabilities to deal
with the
significant increase of Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) referred to LEA
around Europe. For that aim, the project will deliver a semi-automated CSEM
content analysis and prioritisation mechanism. The project will also improve law
enforcement agencies’
ability to track trends in the production, dissemination
and consumption of online CSEM.
The project on
Artificial Intelligence and advanced Data Analytics for Law
Enforcement Agencies
seeks to deliver a descriptive and predictive data
analytics platform and related tools using state-of-the-art machine learning and
artificial intelligence methods to prevent, detect, analyse, and combat criminal
activities. AIDA will focus on cybercrime and terrorism, by addressing specific
challenges related to law enforcement investigation and intelligence.
The project
Infinity
aims to become a flagship project against society’s most
pressing cybercriminal, terrorist and hybrid threats.
Infinity
will equip
investigators and analysts with cutting-edge tools to acquire, process, visualise
and act upon the enormous quantities of data they are faced with every day.
Infinity will be designed and developed to maximise the potential of individual
investigators. Furthermore, Infinity will offer a collaborative environment for
LEA cooperation.
Request for clarifications by the Cypriot delegation to the JPSG
‘On
8 October 2019, Ministers at the JHA Council expressed their support for
the creation of an innovation lab at Europol. The objectives given by the JHA
Ministers to the Europol Innovation Lab is to act as monitor of few
technological developments and drive innovation, including by developing
common technological solutions for Member States in the field of internal
security.’
Due to the rapid increase of cybercrime during the Covid-19 pandemic and
the development of various new online methods by criminals, this Laboratory
could be considered as a measure in the right direction, highlighting new
technologies to combat this phenomenon. However, as it is mentioned in the
relevant written contribution, additional resources are needed for its
structure and effective operation. Taking into account, that according to the
EU general budget for 2020, Europol was allocated with less funds than the
request endorsed by its Management Board in January 2019, what will be
the sources of its additional resources.
Do you estimate that for this
purpose
the
European
Commission
is
willing/ready
to
allocate/include additional funds in its revised proposal regarding
the new Multiannual Financial Framework (2021-2027) which is
under discussion at this stage?
Europol’s reply
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Europol did not receive additional funding for the Innovation Lab, which was set
up through the temporary re-allocation of resources from other areas.
Europol is not aware whether the Commission would include additional funds for
this specific purpose. However, it would be important for Europol to rely on
sufficient resources to carry out all its tasks, including the Innovation Lab.
Furthermore, the Innovation Lab was promoted by the JHA Council in October
2019 with the understanding that, being a multi-agency endeavour, other EU
JHA agencies would provide human resources to support the functioning of the
Lab and now the EU Innovation Hub. Discussions on this topic have been
ongoing since December 2019 with several relevant EU JHA agencies. The Lab
and the Commission have also invited EU MS to deploy SNEs to the Lab in
particular to work on specific projects.
3.
Europol’s replies to JPSG comments to
the
“reporting
on
Europol External Relations (September 2019-June 2020)
Request for clarifications by MEP Clare DALY
Paragraph:
‘Europol continued its cooperation with Israel established by a
Working Arrangement signed in 2018. Israel has its Liaison Bureau in Europol
Headquarters since September 2018 and cooperation has been assessed
very positively by both Europol operational units
and the Liaison Officers’
community. Israel is connected to SIENA. There has been active engagement
in a number of operations, for example focusing on CEO fraud, crypto
trading, investment scams and numerous contacts of a more strategic
nature’
Questions:
Could you please provide a full list of third-countries and authorities
connected to SIENA, particularly those with which Europol does not have
‘operational agreements’ but only ‘working arrangements’? (Europol website
only mentions Australia, Canada, Norway, Liechtenstein, Moldova,
Switzerland and the United States)
Could you please provide us with more information and some examples on
the type of ‘active engagement’ of Israel National Police in those operations?
Could you please clarify whether personal data has been transferred to Israel
(or to other third-countries with which there is no operational agreement in
place)? If that is the case, on which legal basis?
On which legal basis was the connection to SIENA granted? Is the
Memorandum of Understanding mentioned in Article 20 of the Working
Arrangement with Israel publicly available?
Could you please provide detailed information on the functioning of SIENA?
In particular, could you describe how it can prevent that personal data is
exchange in the absence of an adequate legal basis?
In line with the
Working Arrangement,
Europol only shares non-personal
information such as threat analyses. Europol does not transfer personal data to
Israeli law enforcement partners. The majority of EU MS investigations with links
to Israel, supported by Europol within the remit of its mandate, relate to
economic, financial and cyber-crimes such as CEO fraud, international
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investment fraud, money laundering and crypto trading. A common example
are large-scale CEO fraud cases where EU based companies are targeted by
OCGs operating from Israel that can only be tackled through an internationally
coordinated investigation in a meaningful way. The level of cooperation of the
Israel National Police is satisfactory and relies on the work of the Liaison Bureau.
Article 20 of the Working Arrangement establishing cooperative relations
between the law enforcement authorities of Israel and Europol foresees the
possibility for the establishment of a secure communication line. The
Memorandum of Understanding on the secure communication line between
Israel and Europol was signed on 17 July 2018. It is not a publicly available
document, neither are the MoUs with other third partners on the secure line or
the Liaison Officer Agreements. Europol has published on its website the
previously concluded Strategic and Operational Agreements, as well as the
Working Arrangements but not the implementing instruments. From a public
access point of view, releasing the MoU to the public could jeopardize the
interests protected in Article 4 of the MB Rules on Public Access. The MoU on
the secure line contains sensitive information on the obligations of the parties,
certain technical aspects and more importantly security and confidentiality
aspects. Releasing this information to the public could be detrimental to the
cooperation Europol has developed with third partners, which is essential to the
activities of Europol and the fulfilment of Europol’s tasks.
SIENA may be used by Member States and Third parties to exchange strategic
and operational information up to and including the level of EU CONFIDENTIAL
or its national equivalent for the objective of preventing and combating other
forms of crime falling outside of Europol’s mandate
where such exchanges
exclude Europol. It may be used by Member States and Third Parties for bi
–
and multilateral information exchange without the direct involvement of
Europol. SIENA also facilitates the exchange of so
–
called Swedish Initiative
requests (Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA). The SIENA users shall
take appropriate measures to protect information subject to the requirement of
confidentiality which is exchanged through SIENA. The general principles of
Confidentiality of Europol information includes: the obligation of discretion and
confidentiality, limiting access to information to authorised personnel, data
protection requirements as far as personal data are concerned and general
technical and procedural measures to safeguard the security of the system. Any
access to SIENA is fully traceable and logged for data protection auditing
purposes. Action performed in SIENA are logged as defined in the SIENA Data
Protection Requirements. Member States and Third Parties shall audit their own
users for the compliance of information exchange within their respective laws
and regulations, Third Parties in addition to any obligations arising from the
cooperation agreement with Europol. SIENA data protection log-files shall be
available at all times to the EDPS, the DPO at Europol and the national
supervisory authorities concerned. Third Parties with whom Europol has
concluded a strategic cooperation agreement under Council Decision
2009/371/JHA (prior to 1 May 2017) do not have access to the data stored by
Europol nor to reach the personal data exchange.
Third Parties in SIENA:
•
•
•
•
•
•
United Arab Emirates *
Brazil *
European Police College
China *
European Commission
European Central Bank
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
EMCDDA
Civilian European Security and Defence Policy Missions
EU Intelligence Analysis Centre
FRONTEX
Israel
Japan
New Zealand
European Anti-Fraud Office
Russian Federation (off-line)*
Turkey
UN Office on Drugs and Crime
World Customs Organisation
* Those entities are not yet active, as arrangements have not been finalized yet.
* Third Parties not having direct access to SIENA are so called offline Third Parties. All
SIENA transactions to and from offline Third Parties are operated by the Europol
Operational Centre.
Request for clarification by the Cypriot delegation to the JPSG
Taking into consideration Europol’s mandate to combat firearms smuggling
and its experience with supporting EU military operations, but also its activity
in combating human smuggling and trafficking, will
Europol have any
participation in operation EU NAVFORMED Irini?
As one of secondary tasks (also oil smuggling, training of Libyan coastguard) of
EUNAVFOR MED IRINI shall support the detection and monitoring of human
smuggling and trafficking networks through information gathering and patrolling
carried out by aerial assets above the high seas, in the agreed Area of Operation.
In carrying out this task, EUNAVFOR MED IRINI may collect and store, in
accordance with applicable law, data on human smuggling and trafficking,
including crimes relevant to the security of the operation, which it may transmit
to the relevant law enforcement authorities of Member States and to competent
Union bodies. Europol will continue cooperation with EUNAVFOR MED IRINI in
the same manner as with EUNAVFOR MED SOFIA, that is through Clearing House
operating as a part of European Migration Smuggling Centre.
In 2019, Cyprus requested Europol’s support to control the
increasing
irregular migrant flows into the country, which has proved to be very
important in efforts to identify persons with a terrorist background. We wish,
however, to reiterate, once again, that the overwhelming majority of
irregular migrants arrive in Cyprus from Turkey by sea or through the areas
of the Republic of Cyprus under Turkish military occupation and are victims
of smuggling
networks. In view of the Commission’s new proposals regarding
asylum and migration policy,
what further role could Europol assume,
in cooperation with FRONTEX or national law enforcement
authorities, to disrupt migrant smuggling networks?
Europol will continue supporting Cyprus through the deployment of Guest
Officers. At the time of the drafting, five
Europol’s Guest Officers were stationed
in Cyprus. In addition, the Joint Liaison Task Force Migrant Smuggling and
Tracking in Human Beings (JLT) will remain an important tool to respond to the
growing proliferation and sophistication of transnational criminal activities by
strengthening coordinated operations at working level. Through liaison officers
at the JLT, Member States are able to drive and stimulate intelligence-led
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Europol Public Information
coordinated action against OCGs active in migrant smuggling and human
trafficking. In order to facilitate cooperation with relevant Cyprus authorities, a
Seconded National Expert has been deployed to Joint Operational Team Mare,
which comprises specialists seconded from seven Member States to exchange
information in real time to disrupt smuggling networks operating from Turkey.
Cooperation with Turkey in the area of migrants smuggling remains limited due
to the absence of international agreement, which would allow exchange of
personal data between relevant Turkish authorities and Europol.
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