Summary of statement from the Committee on the Labour Market 2020/21:AU6
Subsidiarity check of the Commission’s proposal for a directive on
adequate minimum wages in the European Union, COM (2020) 682
Summary
The Committee on the Labour Market proposes that the Riksdag submit a reasoned opinion to the
Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in accordance with Chapter
10, Article 3 of the Riksdag Act. The Committee considers that the Commission’s proposal conflicts
with the principle of subsidiarity.
The Committee unanimously maintains that measures concerning wage formation are best regulated at
national level.
The position of the Committee
The Committee notes, firstly, that the Commission states that the proposed directive is based on
Article 153.1 (b) of the TFEU. According to this article, the EU shall support and complement
activities of member states in such areas as working conditions to achieve the objectives stated in
Article 151, which include improvements to living and working conditions. The provisions shall
however not be applied to wage conditions, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to
impose lock-outs (Article 153.5). The Committee further notes that the Commission takes the view
that the proposal respects the limits for EU competences as it does not contain a call for measures that
directly influence wage levels.
The Committee finds this interpretation remarkable. The Treaty is clear when it states that it is the
member states themselves that regulate matters in the area of wage conditions and that the EU lacks
the authority to legislate in this area. Since parts of the directive are proposed to be binding for all
member states, this is an encroachment on national models for wage formation. In the opinion of the
Committee, there is no doubt that minimum wages fall within the framework of what the Treaty
expresses as wage conditions.
For these reasons, in the opinion of the Committee, a measure at EU level already has limited
possibilities to help make wages reasonable and adequate in an efficient and accurate way at national
level.
The Committee will now move on to the question of the principle of subsidiarity in the proposal,
which is the object of the Committee’s examination. The Committee notes that the subsidiarity check
can only apply to existing proposals of the Commission that have been sent, which is something that
the Committee on the Constitution has clarified in other contexts (for example in an opinion on the
forms of reasoned opinions regarding subsidiarity checks, see Record of the Committee on the
Constitution 2011/12:27). According to the principle of subsidiarity, the EU shall take a measure only
in cases where the objectives of the measure cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states
themselves. In other words, taking the measure should entail added value at EU level.
In the opinion of the Committee, an important starting point in this context is that the member states of
the EU have different models for dealing with matters relating to wage formation. Whereas some
countries have collective agreement models, others have statutory minimum wages. There are also
differences between countries who have similar models. One precondition to ensure that the Swedish
labour market model should function is for example that the parties to the labour market are free to
negotiate without interference from the state. Wages in such a labour market model will be reasonable
since they are negotiated between two equally strong parties, the trade union and the employer. If the
EU interferes with these matters, there is a risk that models such as the Swedish model will be