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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS

on the 8th Cohesion Report: Cohesion in Europe towards 2050

{COM(2022) 34 final}

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5.4 Non-EU migrants encounter more challenges on labour markets and face higher risks of poverty


Migrants are mainly concentrated in cities in the north-western EU

Within the EU, the share of non-EU migrants (defined as the population born outside the EU) is more than double the share of EU migrants (those born in a different EU country) (9% vs 4% in 2020). Accordingly, most Member States have more non-EU born migrants than EU-born migrants (Map 5.15 and Map 5.16). Luxembourg is a clear exception, with 40% of EU-born as against 13% born outside the EU. Overall, there are few non-EU migrants in the eastern EU, except in the Baltic States, where a significant share of the population was born in Russia.

Capital city regions and regions with a large city in the north-western and southern EU tend to have larger numbers of migrants, especially from outside the EU (Map 5.16). Regions, where non-EU migrants make up 20% or more of the population, include the outermost regions of Mayotte, Guyane, Canarias, the Illes Balears and the capital city regions of Brussels, Vienna, Paris and Stockholm. The share of EU migrants is over 10% in some regions of Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Austria, Ireland and Finland. There are few people from other EU countries that have moved to eastern regions (Map 5.15).

The share of migrants tends to be larger in regions with high levels of GDP, good job opportunities and a history of migration (OECD 2021). The correlation between GDP per head and the share of non-EU migrants is slightly stronger than for EU-born migrants. (Figure 5.14)

Figure 5.14: Share of migrants (2020) relative to GDP per head (2019) in NUTS2 regions in the EU



Note: BG and RO: no regional data, PL not all regional data available Source: Eurostat tables [lfst_r_lfsd2pwc] and [nama_10r_2gdp], DG REGIO calculations Non-EU migrants are concentrated in cities (OECD 2021), where they accounted, on average, for 13% of the population in 2020 against 8% in towns and suburbs and less than 4% in rural areas (Figure 5.15). The share also increased by more in cities between 2015 and 2020 (1.5 pp) than in towns and suburbs (0.8 pp), while it remained unchanged in rural areas.

EU migrants are far less concentrated in cities and account for approximately the same proportion of the population as in towns and suburbs (4% in 2020). They are less present in rural areas (accounting for only 2.5% of the population). Between 2015 and 2020, their share increased only in cities and then only slightly (by 0.2 pp).

12 ■ 2015 ■ Change 2015-2020 8 9 4.3 4.0 3.7 2.5 0 Cities Towns and Rural areas Cities Towns and Rural areas suburbs suburbs other EU-born non-EU born

Figure 5.15: EU and non-EU migrants (15-74) in the EU, by degree of urbanisation, 2015-2020 (% of the respective populations)

Note: The other-EU born and non-EU born population in Germany were estimated for 2015 based on a) the foreign population in 2015 b) the population by citizenship in Germany in 2015 and c) the population shares by country of birth in 2017 and 2018 Source: Eurostat table [lfst_r_pgauwsc], DG REGIO calculations

The employment rate of non-EU migrants increased, but more for men than for women

In the EU, the overall employment rate of people aged 20-64 increased by 3.3 pp to 72.5% from 2015 to 2020 (when because of COVID, it was slightly below the 2019 level). The rate for the native-born increased by 3.7 pp, more than for the two migrant groups (2.9 pp EU migrants and 1.6 pp for non-EU migrants). In particular, migrants living in rural areas secured a fundamental role in sustaining certain types of agricultural production in constant demand of temporary work, while in cities, they successfully fill the demand in certain services (Natale et al. 2019). The gap between the native-born and the non-EU born had been narrowing, supported by EU policies.

²⁶ It widened only in 2020, suggesting that the employment of the migrants was hit more by the pandemic and the measures put in place to control it (Figure 5.16).

EU migrants have a similar employment rate as native-born people (Figure 5.17). The majority of EU migrants hold EU citizenship, so have the same residency and labour market rights as native-born²⁷.

²⁶ The EU policies on legal migration include labour migration (with special directives for highly qualified workers subject to 'EU Blue Card Directive', seasonal workers and intercorporate transferees) as well as students and researchers, family reunification and long-term residents.

²⁷ Free movement of workers is one of the four freedoms enjoyed by EU citizens. It is guaranteed by the Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.


Accordingly, they are free to move to regions with higher wages and more employment opportunities and tend to face fewer obstacles to relocating than non-EU migrants if they lose their job. ²⁸

Non-EU migrants, despite progress, have a substantially lower employment rate than the native-born (62% as against 74%), mainly because of a low rate for women (53%). In Sweden and Belgium, the overall gap in the rate was 20 pp in 2020; for women, it was almost double the rate for men (28 pp as against 15 pp).

In most cases, the employment rate of non-EU migrants is higher in regions with a high native-born employment rate (OECD, 2021), but this is also where the gap with the native-born tends to be widest, especially for women (Map 5.17). The gap, therefore, averages 15 pp in north-western EU compared with only 5 pp in southern EU and 2 pp in the eastern EU (Figure 5.18). There is little difference in the employment rates of the three groups between cities and rural areas.

In the EU, the overall gender gap in the employment rate remained unchanged from 2015 to 2019 and narrowed slightly in 2020, when the rate for men was 78% and that for women 67% (see section 5.5). Conversely, the COVID-19 pandemic halted the increase in the employment rate for non-EU migrant women, and the gender gap for non-EU migrants widened by 3 pp to 20 pp as against 11 pp for native-born (Figure 5.17).


Figure 5.16: Employment rates (20-64) in the EU, for native-born and migrants, 2020 (% of the respective population, figure for change 2015-2020 in pp)



Source: Eurostat table [lfst_r_pgauwsc], DG REGIO calculations

²⁸ See EC (2021a) for annual information on intra-EU labour mobility.

Figure 5.17: Employment rates (20-64) and gender employment gaps (pp) in the EU, for native-born and migrants, 2015 and 2020 (% of the respective population)




Note: Grey bar parts are for employment rates for females, bar tops are for employment rates for males Source: Eurostat table [lfst_r_pgauwsc], DG REGIO calculations

Non-EU migrants with tertiary education have the widest employment gap, while the tertiary education attainment level is 4 pp lower

For people with basic education, the employment rate of non-EU migrants is just 2 pp lower than for the native-born. The gap between the two widens to 8 pp for those with upper secondary education and to 15 pp for those with tertiary education. This is primarily due to a substantial gap for women (19 pp), as well as more generally perhaps to difficulties in getting foreign qualifications recognised (Figure 5.18).

Map 5.15: People born in another EU country, Map 5.16: People born outside the EU, 2020 2020



Map 5.17: Difference between employment rates of non-EU born and native-born, 2020





Figure 5.18: Employment rates (20-64) for native-born, EU born migrants and non-EU born migrants in the EU, 2020 (% of the respective populations)




Source: Eurostat table [lfst_r_eredcobu], DG REGIO calculations

A third (33%) of native-born and EU migrants aged 25-64 have tertiary education compared with 29% of non-EU migrants. For all three groups, the tertiary-educated tend to be concentrated in cities. This is especially so for native-born, for whom the proportion of tertiary-educated is almost double in cities than in rural areas (44% against 23%). For EU migrants, the difference is smaller (42% against 27%), and for non-EU migrants smaller still (33% vs 24%) (Figure 5.19)

Migrants aged 15-24 are more likely to be neither in employment nor in education or training than native-born (20% as against 10%).

Figure 5.19: Native-born and migrants aged 25-64 with tertiary education by degree of urbanisation, 2020 (% of the respective populations)




Source: Eurostat table [edat lfs 9915], DG REGIO calculations

Non-EU migrants have double the risk of poverty and social exclusion

In 2019, around 10 million migrants aged 15 and over were at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE). This consists of 2 million EU migrants (22% of their total number) and 8.5 million non-EU migrants (38% of their number). The proportion is 3 pp smaller than in 2015 for both groups. Economic and labour market improvements led to a fall in the proportion of people living in very low work-intensity households, while there was an even larger reduction in those suffering severe material deprivation, especially among non-EU migrants. The fact that there was only a small reduction in those at risk of poverty, however, indicates that many non-EU migrants still have very low incomes.

Indeed, the AROPE rate for non-EU migrants is double that of native-born. The proportion of non-EU migrants at risk of poverty and simultaneously in a situation of severe material deprivation and in a household with very low work-intensity is almost three times that of the native-born (2.7% as against 1%) (Figure 5.20).


Figure 5.20: Intersection between sub-populations of AROPE in the EU for native-born and migrants, 2019 (% of the respective populations)



Source: Eurostat table [ilc_pees07], DG REGIO calculations

The AROPE rate for the population as a whole varies only slightly between cities (21.3% in 2019), towns and suburbs (19.2%) and rural areas (22.4%). However, the high concentration of migrants in cities – 45% of other-EU born and nearly 60% of non-EU born live in cities compared to less than 40% of the native born – means that the number of migrants at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion may be higher in cities than in rural areas. This is especially the case in Belgium and Austria (Figure 5.21).

Figure 5.21: Difference in shares of migrants and difference in the AROPE rate between cities and rural areas in the EU, 2019




Note: The horizontal axis show the percentage point difference in AROPE between cities and rural areas. The vertical axis shows the percentage point difference in the share of migrants in total population between cities and rural areas.

Source: Eurostat tables [ilc_peps13] and [lfst_r_pgauwsc], DG REGIO calculations

Material and social deprivation (see definition in the note to Figure 5.22) has fallen since 2015 across the EU. However, it is more prevalent among non-EU migrants than other groups, affecting roughly twice the share of these as native- and EU-born (Figure 5.22). This is especially the case in rural areas (26% in 2019) as compared with cities (24%) and towns and suburbs (22%).

Figure 5.22: Deprivation rates (18+) in the EU for native-born and migrants, 2015 and 2019 (% of the respective populations)

Severe material deprivation Material and social deprivation



Source: Eurostat tables [ilc mddd16] and [ilc mdsd05], DG REGIO calculations

Severe material deprivation: for at least four items out of the following, could not

- · to pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills;
- to keep their home adequately warm:
- to face unexpected expenses;
- to eat meat or proteins regularly:
- to go on holiday;
- a television set;
- a washing machine:
- a car;
- a telephone:

areas.

Material and social deprivation: for at least five items out of the following was unable for financial reasons to:

- face unexpected expenses;
- afford one week's annual holiday away from home;
- afford a meal with meat, chicken or fish or vegetarian equivalent every
- keep their home adequately warm:
- afford a car/van for personal use:
- replace worn-out furniture:
- replace worn-out clothes with some new ones:
- have two pairs of properly fitting shoes;
- spend a small amount of money each week on him/herself ("pocket morey")
- have regular leisure activities;
- get together with friends/family for a drink/meal at least once a month:
- have an internet connection:

Migration and regional economic development

A forthcoming OECD report (OECD 2022) assesses the uneven impact of migration on regions and cities. One of its chapters analyses the impact of migration on regional

development through innovation, international trade, labour markets and overall economic growth.

Migrants tend to increase regional GDP per head and contribute to regional economic convergence within and across countries in Europe. Migrants can increase regional GDP per head because they are younger and often bring complementary skills and fill shortages in critical positions. The study finds that, on average, a 10% increase in the migrant population share is associated with 0.15% higher GDP per head. This effect is stronger for less developed regions, especially in lower-income EU Member States. Overall, for the 25% poorest regions in a country. the positive effect of migration on per GDP per head is more than twice as high (0.36%). As a result, migration can help less developed regions catch up with the rest of the country and rest of the EU.

Migrants contribute to innovation by bringing new ideas to their host regions in OECD countries. Using detailed information on patents and the share of migrants in municipalities, the study shows that migrants raise the patenting activity in their local area and boost local innovation. However, these positive effects are limited to areas that were already innovative with high patenting levels, mainly located in urban

The presence of migrants influences regions' international trade. In Europe, migrants help their host regions establish new trade networks, reduce information • avoid arrears (in mortgage, rent, utility bills and/or hire purchase instalments)sts. create demand for goods from origin countries and boost regional exports and econd day. imports. On average, a 10% increase in the number of migrants in a given European region leads to 3.2% higher imports, including intermediates used in exports, and a 1.2% increase in exports. This impact is higher for regions with more high-skilled migrants, and most relevant for extra-EU trade.

> The labour market response to migrants varies across European regions and by type of worker. An increase in the share of migrants is linked to a short-term slowdown of growth in the native employment rate, especially among low-skilled workers. This effect weakens or disappears over time as regional labour markets adapt. In regions with higher levels of GDP per head, migrants are more easily absorbed in the labour force, resulting in little or no effect on the native workforce.

The report concludes that targeted policies could help to spread the benefits of migration for regional development. For instance, investing in the upskilling of native workers, especially those without a tertiary education, and less developed regions, could help address labour market challenges and strengthen regional development.

5.5 Where women thrive in the EU

Gender equality is one of the fundamental values of the EU and features prominently in the European Pillar of Social Rights. One of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) is to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls by 2030 (SDG5), while the recently adopted EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 is intended to ensure that all EU policy areas contribute to gender equality.

In some EU regions, women are able to improve their economic, social, and political positions, while in others they are held back. Despite the strong political commitment to achieving gender equality in the EU, large differences between women and men remain in various aspects of life, such as access to the labour market, pay and working conditions, and leadership in decision making.⁴

Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025

The Gender Equality Strategy covers the European Commission's work on gender equand sets out the policy objectives and main points of action for the 2020-2025 period.

The **key objectives** are ending gender-based violence; challenging gender stereoty closing gender gaps in the labour market; achieving equal participation across differences of the economy; addressing the gender pay and pension gaps; closing the gender gap and achieving gender balance in decision-making and in politics.

The **implementation** of this strategy is based on a **dual approach** of targeting meas to achieve gender equality, and strengthening gender mainstreaming. The latter will pursued by **systematically including a gender perspective at all stages of podesign in all EU policy areas, internal and external.**

For more details:


https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/gender-equality/gender-equality/strategy_en

In 2020, the employment rate of men (aged 20-64) in the EU was around 11 pp higher than for women (78% as against 67%) and the gap has remained unchanged over recent years (at least since the recovery started in 2013). The gender gap is particularly wide in less developed regions (17 pp in 2020) and in regions in southern and eastern EU (15 pp in both) (Table 5.4). Employment rates for men are higher than for women in all regions, except the capital city region in Lithuania, but with marked differences between them (Map 5.18). The gap was over 20 pp in 2020 in Malta, Corse, in several regions in Greece and Romania and in southern Italy. The gender gap in the employment rate is wider the lower the

⁴ The European Pillar of Social Rights calls, in principle 2, for equality of treatment and opportunity between women and men in the labour market, terms and conditions of employment, and career progression and for the right to equal pay.

level of education and is widest in less developed regions for all education levels (Figure 5.23).

Figure 5.23: Gender gap in employment rate, by level of education and group of regions 2020 (%-point difference between male and female rate)



Source: Eurostat table [lfst_r_lfe2emprc], DG REGIO calculations

Gender dimension in the Multiannaul Financial Framework 2021-27

The newly adopted Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) for the years 2021-27 incl a gender dimension throughout and more specifically in various EU funding and budge guarantee instruments, particularly **ESF Plus**, the **ERDF**, **Creative Europe**, the **Europe Maritime and Fisheries Fund**, the **Cohesion Fund** and the **InvestEU Program** Funding will support women's labour market participation and work-life balance, invecare facilities, support female entrepreneurship, combat gender segregation in ceprofessions and address the unbalanced representation of girls and boys in particularity and training.

For more details on the 2021-27 MFF: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/eu-budget/long-term-eu-budget_en

The far lower employment rates of women, however, do not translate into higher unemployment rates (Map 5.19), because many more women than men are not actively looking for a job⁵ "It is often missing care facilities for children and dependent elderly and gender stereotypes that hamper women's participation in the labour market and in entrepreneurship" (European Commission, 2021b, page 19). At the EU level, women's unemployment rates were only 0.5 pp higher than for men in 2020, though the gap was wider in less developed regions (1.5 pp) than in transition ones (0.5 pp), with the rate for women being higher than for men in southern EU regions especially (3 pp higher). Only in regions in north-western EU was the rate lower for women than for men (Table 5.4).

⁵ In 2020, in the EU, the activity rate for women - at 72% of the total population aged 20-64 - was around 12 pp lower than for men.

Table 5.4: Difference between female and male employment and unemployment rates in 2020 by group of regions

5.5). In Estonia, Latvia and Finland, the share of women with tertiary education was 16 pp - or more - larger than for men

	More developed regions	Transition regions	Less developed regions	Table 5.5: Gender gap in tertiary education by group of regions, average 2018-20
Gender gap (F-M) in employment rates (20-64), pp	-9.0	-9.1	-17.2	More developed regions Less developed regions
Gender gap (F-M) in unemployment rates (15-74), pp,	0.0	0.5	1.5	0. Difference in the share of women
	north- western	southern EU	eastern EU	education (percentage points)
	EU	Journal Lo	custem Eo	north- southern western EU EU eastern EU
Gender gap (F-M) in employment rates (20-64), pp	-7.0	-15.4	-14.6	10 ifference in the share of women and men aged 25-64 with tertiary 1.7 5.7 8.8
Gender gap (F-M) in unemployment rates (15-74), pp	-0.5	2.8	0.0	n.education (percentage points)

Source: Eurostat table [lfst_r_lfe2emprt] and [lfst_r_lfu3rt], DG REGIO calculations

Women in the EU have higher education levels than men

In the EU, more women aged 25-64 have tertiary education than men and this is the case in all regions, except in several regions in Germany, Austria, and southern regions in the Netherlands. On average, 35% of women in this age group were university graduates in 2018-2020, as opposed to 30% of men. The gap tends to be smaller in more developed regions and in regions in north-western EU (Table

: Eurostat table [edat_lfse_04], DG REGIO calculations

In 2003, the Council of the EU recommended balanced participation of women and men in all decision-making bodies in political and public life, with the proportion of women not falling below 40%.⁶ In addition, the UN Sustainable Development Agenda calls for full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership for women at all levels of political and economic

Women in political power

⁶ Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec(2003)3 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on balanced participation of women and men in political and public


decision making, 2003, available at: https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=09000016805e0848.

decision-making (SDG5). To date, progress is still slow and wide differences exist throughout the EU.

In 2020, only one in three members of national governments and parliaments, regional assemblies and executives and local councils were women (Figure 5.24). While the share of women was 8 pp higher than in 2011 in national governments and parliaments, the increase in share in regional executives (2 pp higher) and assemblies (3 pp higher), and local councils (just under 4 pp higher) was considerably less. At this rate, the share of women in national governments and parliaments would reach 50% by 2040, in local councils only in 2060, in regional assemblies in 2070 and in regional executives in 2090.

Part of the reason for the relatively slow progress at regional and local level may be that they started from a significantly larger share of women at the beginning of the period than in national governments and parliaments. Regions with small shares of women in regional assemblies in 2010⁷, therefore, experienced the largest increases in the subsequent 11 years (Map 5.21).

Figure 5.24 Women and political power in the EU, 2011-2020




Source: European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), DG REGIO calculations


In 2021, women made up at least half of regional assemblies in only 16 out of 285 cases. Two regional assemblies in Hungary have no women members at all, and in several regional assemblies in Hungary and Romania less than 10% of members are women. The share of women is largest (40% or more) in regional assemblies in Spain, France, Sweden and Finland (Map 5.20). Worryingly, in some EU regions, mainly located in eastern EU, not only was the share of women small in 2010, it also diminished further in the 11 years to 2021 (Map 5.21)

 $^{^{7}}$ Data for regional assemblies are available for the years 2010 to 2021.


Map 5.18: Difference between female and male employment rates (20-64), 2020



Map 5.19: Difference between female and male unemployment rates (15-74), 2020




Map 5.20: Women in regional assemblies, 2021





Map 5.21: Change in the share of women in regional assemblies, 2010-2021



Women's life satisfaction and views about job opportunities and their personal safety

48

When asked about whether they are satisfied with their life, around 33% of women in the EU in 2019 reported being satisfied, against 35% of men, though this small difference in the average hides large differences in many Member States and regions (Map 5.22). Less than 20% of women were satisfied with their life in all regions in Bulgaria and Croatia and a number of regions in Greece and Italy. Indeed, the figure was below 10% in Severoiztochen (6%) and Severen tsentralen (7%) in Bulgaria and Kontinentalna Hrvatska (9%) in Croatia (though in these regions, the figure was also below 10% for men). By contrast, the proportion was over 70% in all regions in Finland, where in Helsinki-Uusimaa and LänsiSuom, a much larger share of women than men (13 pp more) reported being satisfied with their life. On the other hand, the reverse is the case in Sachsen-Anhalt in Germany (the share being 25pp less for women than for men) and in north-east Italy (6pp less) (Map 5.23).

When asked about job opportunities, 51% of men across EU regions believed that, in 2019, it was a good time for finding a job in the area where they live - i.e. that there were significant job opportunities open to them – as against only 40% of women. There were, however, wide differences across regions (Map 5.24). While only 10% of women had a positive opinion on job opportunities in their area in the NUTS 1 region of Italy including Sicily and Sardinia, almost 90% of women had a positive opinion in Praha in Czechia. The gap between men and women was widest in the Região Autónoma da Madeira in Portugal (5% for men against 24% for women), followed by Saarland (67% for men, 44% for women), and Rheinland-Pfalz (78% for men, 55% for women) in Germany. By contrast, in Helsinki-Uusimaa in Finland and Bremen in Germany, more women than men had a positive opinion of job opportunities. More women than men also had a positive opinion in Lithuania, though here the overall satisfaction level was low (28% for women, 22% for men) (Map 5.25).

People who feel safe and trust others also tend to be more satisfied with their life. Those who have experienced crime, or have a fear of crime, tend to engage less in outdoor activities and to report higher levels of distress and lower levels of

well-being (Hanslmaier, 2013; Brereton et al., 2008; Denkers and Winkel, 1998). Safety is one of the aspects of life for which the place where a person lives matters, particularly for women. According to a recent survey conducted in European cities, around 80% of men feel safe walking alone at night, but only 64% of women (European Commission, 2020b). Across EU regions, less than 40% of women feel safe in Észak-Alföld in Hungary (35%), Nord-Est in Romania (38%), and Kentriki Ellada in Greece (39%). At the other extreme, over 80% of women feel safe in Luxembourg (81%), in the capital city region in Lithuania (82%), in a number of regions in southern Austria and Slovenia (around 83%), and Noreste in Spain (84%) (Map 5.26). Differences between women and men are particularly large (above 30pp) in Wallonia in Belgium, Voreia Ellada in Greece, central Italy, and Dél-Dunántúl and Észak-Alföld in Hungary (Map 5.27).