EUU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 387: Notifikation til Kommissionen om genindførsel af midlertidig grænsekontrol

Europaudvalget 2022-23 (2. samling)
EUU Alm.del Bilag 387
Offentligt

Dear Commissioner Johansson,

1. Please be informed that the Danish Government, in accordance with the

provisions in Article 25 and 27 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of 9 March

2016 (Schengen Borders Code), has decided to temporarily reintroduce bor-

der controls at the internal borders for 6 month as from 12 May 2023. The

border controls may extend to all internal border , including land, sea and

air borders, whereby the specific border section and border crossing points

are determined by the Danish National Police. The border controls will fo-

cus on the Danish-German land border, and the Danish ports with ferry con-

nection to Germany. Such border control will thus not be carried out on the

Danish-Swedish border crossings.

This decision has been reached in order to be able to effectively counter the

significant threat to our public policy and internal security caused by terror-

ists and organized criminals who are able to exploit the free mobility within

the Schengen area as well as the current migration situation within the

Schengen area and the threat from espionage from foreign tate intelligence.

This notification provides factual information and elaborate on the circum

stances and events which give rise to a new serious threat to our public pol-

icy and internal security, while taking into account the free movement of

persons in the practical execution of the border control .

2. First of all, the Russian invasion of Ukraine still con titutes an extraordi-

nary and uncertain situation in Europe. The war affect pa enger and mi-

gratory flows as well as contributes to higher levels of criminality (smug-

gling activities) on the EU’s external borders and also affects the internal

security of the EU.

Slotsholmsgade 10

DK - 1216 København K

Phone +45 7226 8400

Fax +45 3393 3510

www.justitsministeriet.dk

[email protected]

JUSTITS

Munstry of Justice

Commissioner Johansson

Date 14 April 2023

Europaudvalget 2022-23 (2. samling)

EUU Alm.del - Bilag 387

Offentligt

EUU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 387: Notifikation til Kommissionen om genindførsel af midlertidig grænsekontrol

1 he Center for Terror Analysis (CTA), under the Danish Security and Intel-

ligence Service, assesses that the war in Ukraine currently has no direct ef-

fect on the terrorist threat in Denmark, but it represents a destabilizing factor

which may affect the threat picture across Europe, for example in the form

of economic recession or issues related to shortages in the supply of energy

and other resources, disinformation and foreign fighters. Over time, it may

also affect the terrorist threat in Europe, including Denmark, if weapons

currently used in Ukraine fall into the hands of extremists who intend to

strike against targets in Europe.

This should be seen against a backdrop where CTA assesses that the terrorist

threat against Denmark is still considered to be significant (level 4 of 5).

Most recently, a number of Quran burnings in Sweden and Denmark, in

early 2023 have received considerable negative attention from militant Is-

lamists, reflected, for example, in targeted propaganda and a rise in the num-

ber of threats. CTA assesses that, just like the so-called cartoon case, the

recent events can become a reference point among militant Islamists, thus

impacting the threat to individuals or to Denmark in general.

Militant Islamism is estimated to be the primary terror threat towards Den-

mark. CTA assesses that, since the summer of 2012, a large number of in-

dividuals have travelled from Denmark to the conflict zone in Syria/Iraq.

Approximately one third of the travellers are presumed to have died in the

conflict zone, and approximately half of them have either returned to Den-

mark or taken up residence in other countries outside of the conflict zone.

According to information available, approximately one fifth of the travelers

from Denmark, including children of travelers, currently reside in the con-

flict zone or in neighbouring countries.

There is also a terrorist threat against Denmark from radicalized individuals

and smaller groups residing in other countries, primarily Denmark's neigh-

boring countries. The threat from militant Islamists living in other Western

countries may emanate from persons with connections to Denmark, but it

can also be people living abroad without any previous connection to Den-

mark.

Exploitation of refugee and migrant routes has previously been included as

a central element in the planning of attacks by Islamic State against targets

in Europe, and it is possible that militant Islamist groups still intend to ex-

ploit these routes.

EUU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 387: Notifikation til Kommissionen om genindførsel af midlertidig grænsekontrol

Furthermore, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) states that

Denmark and the West are faced with the prospect of a long-term conflict

with Russia that will use an array of different means to create fear and un-

certainty.

Apart from escalating rhetoric, threats and military provocations it is not

unlikely that Russia will resort to destructive cyberattacks and aggressive

intelligence operations. The increased tension between Russia and the West

constitutes an ongoing threat from espionage from Russia. DDIS assesses

that the security situation in Denmark, among others, must be seen in the

light of these developments.

This should be seen in conjunction with the fact that the Danish Security

and Intelligence Service assesses that intelligence activities in Denmark per-

formed by foreign states constitute a significant, multifaceted and persistent

threat to Denmark.In April 2022, Denmark expelled 15 Russian intelligence

officers however the Russian need for gathering information in Denmark

has increased. It is thus expected by the Danish Security and Intelligence

Service that Russia will look for new ways to receive information e.g.

through the use of visiting intelligence officers. According to the the Danish

Security and Intelligence Service, foreign intelligence services continuously

try to obtain information about e.g. critical infrastructure in Denmark. Such

espionage intends, among other things, to provide access to information that

may enable physical sabotage.

Finally, the recent migration developments within the Schengen area are of

great concern to Denmark. In 2022 approximately 330.000 incidents of ir-

regular entries were recorded which in comparison to 2021 is an increase of

64 percent. The number of filed applications for asylum in EU+ (EU, Nor-

way and Switzerland) in 2022 were one and a half times as many as in 2021

with a total of 991.000.

This year approximately 54.000 incidents of irregular entries were recorded

during the first three months and the trend continues in April, For the Central

Mediteranean route alone the increase amounts to 305 percent compared to

the same time last year. Secondary movements are significantly increasing

in several Member States.

EUU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 387: Notifikation til Kommissionen om genindførsel af midlertidig grænsekontrol

3. Against this backdrop and after careful consideration, the Danish Gov

ernment considers temporary reintroduction of internal border controls as a

necessary and effective measure to address these real and current threats to

public policy and internal security.

This is also supported by the following facts:

- From 1 august 2022 until 10 February 2023 a total of 340 weapons

have been confiscated in relation to the border controls against Ger-

many.

- In 2022 the police has refused entry to 3.370 persons on the Danish-

German border as well as 213 persons in the period from 1 January

2023 to 10 February 2023.

4. The Danish Government remains committed to the principle of free

movement of persons. Please rest assured that the scope of the internal bor-

der checks will continue to be limited to what is deemed strictly necessary

to respond to the threat to our public policy and internal security. It thus

remains a matter of priority for the Danish Government that the practical

execution of the temporary border controls are carried out in a manner with

the least negative impact on persons crossing the border for legitimate rea-

sons and with careful considerations taken to the free movement of persons

within the EU.

The Danish police conduct the border controls in cooperation with German

law enforcement authorities where cooperation is also established regarding

exchange of information.

The border controls are carried out as spot-checks which in terms of quan-

tity, location and intensity are adapted to the expected number of travelers

as well as the current intelligence picture, the local conditions and the traffic

patterns at the individual border crossing points. The internal border con-

trols are thus substantially different from the systematic control of Den-

marks external borders. The Danish National Police has found that the pre-

vious border controls have not had a distinctive negative impact on the free

movement of persons across the internal borders. This will continue to be a

priority for the Danish authorities in close cooperation with the German au-

thorities.

Furhtermore please note that in order to ensure as efficient and flexible a

control as possible the Danish Government has decided to reduce the

EUU, Alm.del - 2022-23 (2. samling) - Bilag 387: Notifikation til Kommissionen om genindførsel af midlertidig grænsekontrol

intensity by which the control s carried out, while at the same tme further

strengthening the efforts to combat cros border crime in the border areas.

Denmark i thu trengthening the u e of alternative measures in the border

region by increasing the use of intelligent monitoring of the border areas as

wella increasing the number of police patrols and the crime-fighting efforts

n the border area while at the same time deescalating the intensity of the

border control. However, it is the opinion of the Government that alternative

mea ures at thi point cannot fully remedy the need for internal border con

trols. The reintroduction of internal border controls thus remains a measure

of last resort.

The Danish Government will notify the other Member States about this de-

cision.

Yours sincerely,

Peter Hummelgaard