EUU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 56: Orienteringsbrev vedr. notifikation til Kommissionen om genindførsel af midlertidig grænsekontrol

Europaudvalget 2023-24
EUU Alm.del Bilag 56
Offentligt

Dear Commissioner Johansson,

1. Please be informed that the Danish Government, in accordance with the

provisions in Article 25 and 27 of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of 9 March

2016 (Schengen Borders Code), has decided to temporarily reintroduce bor

der controls at the internal borders for ix months as from 12 November

2023. The border controls may extend to all internal borders, including land,

sea and air borders, whereby the specific border sections and border crossing

points are determined by the Danish National Police. The border controls

will focus on the Danish-German land border and the Danish ports with

ferry connection to Germany. Such border control will thus not be carried

out at the Danish-Swedish border crossings.

This decision has been reached in order to be able to effectively counter the

significant threat to our public policy and internal security caused by terror-

ists and organized criminals who are able to exploit the free mobility within

the Schengen area and the threat from espionage from foreign state intelli

gence. This notification provides factual information and elaborates on the

circumstances and events which give rise to a new serious threat to our pub-

lic policy and internal security, while taking into account the free movement

of persons in the practical execution of the border controls.

2. First of all, the Centre for Terror Analysis (CTA), under the Danish Se-

curity and Intelligence Service, assess that the terrori t threat to Denmark

remains at the level of significant (level 4 of 5). Due to recent international

attention to events in Denmark and Sweden involving defamations of the

Quran the terror threat has been assessed to be heightened within the current

threat level.

Slotsholmsgade 10

DK - 1216 København K

Phone +45 7226 8400

www.justitsminsteriet dh

[email protected]

JUSTITS

Mnstry of Justice

Commissioner Johansson

MINISTERIET

1 3 October 2023

Europaudvalget 2023-24

EUU Alm.del - Bilag 56

Offentligt

EUU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 56: Orienteringsbrev vedr. notifikation til Kommissionen om genindførsel af midlertidig grænsekontrol

SApS

1he events have attracted substantial negative attention from various actors,

including militant Islamists groups, communities and individuals in foreign

countries. Due to the speed and unpredictability in which the defamations

of the Quran are shared via international media, social media and militant

Islamic propaganda, the threat picture is assessed to be volatile. The Danish

Security and Intelligence Service has concrete indications of a number of

threats targeted against both Denmark and Danish interests abroad follow

ing the defamations of the Quran.

Furthermore, the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (DDIS) assesses that

Islamic State (ISIS) and AI Qaida (AQ) wish to revenge the defamation of

the Quran in Sweden and Denmark.

Currently, the primary potential terrorist threat emerges from sympathizers

inspired by propaganda from the mentioned groups. Both groups have en-

couraged sympathizers to seek revenge against Denmark and Sweden for

defamations of the Quran. AQ and ISIS state in propaganda videos that it is

an Islamic duty to revenge the defamations.

AQ’s top management issued a declaration on 13 August 2023 which likens

Denmark and Sweden. In the declaration, AQ encourages attacks against

Danish and Swedish embassies and diplomats. Furthermore, the declaration

encourages Muslims to form attack cells.

In general, militant Islamism is estimated to be the primary terrorist threat

to Denmark. In this regard, it is further noted that CTA assess that since the

summer of 2012 a large number of individuals have travelled from Denmark

to the conflict zone in Syria/Iraq. Approximately one third of these individ

uals are presumed to have died in the conflict zone, and approximately half

of them have either returned to Denmark or taken up residence in other

countries outside of the conflict zone. According to information available,

approximately one fifth of these individuals from Denmark, including their

children, currently reside in the conflict zone or in neighboring countries.

Some of the individuals who have travelled from Denmark to the conflict

zone in Syria/Iraq may pose a threat towards Denmark or Danish interests

abroad. Likewise, it is possible that individuals having departed other coun

tries than Denmark including other European countries will pose a threat

towards Denmark and Danish interests abroad.

EUU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 56: Orienteringsbrev vedr. notifikation til Kommissionen om genindførsel af midlertidig grænsekontrol

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Exploitation of refugee and migrant routes has previously been included as

a central element in the planning of attacks by ISIS against targets in Europe,

and it is possible that militant Islamist groups still intend to exploit these

routes.

Secondly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine still constitutes an extraordinary

and uncertain situation in Europe.

DDIS states that Denmark and the West continue to be faced with the pro

spect of a long-term conflict with Russia that will use an array of different

means to create fear and uncertainty. The increased tension between Russia

and the West means that there is a high and persistent threat of espionage

from Russia.

In April 2022, Denmark expelled 15 Russian intelligence officers. However,

the Russian need for gathering information in Denmark has increased. It is

thus expected by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service that Russia

will look for new ways to receive information e.g. through the use of visiting

intelligence officers.

3. Against this backdrop and after careful consideration, the Danish Gov-

ernment considers temporary reintroduction of internal border controls as a

necessary and effective measure to address these real and current threats to

public policy and internal security.

This is also supported by the following facts:

- From 11 February 2023 until 18 August 2023 a total of 168 weapons

have been confiscated in relation to the border controls against Ger

many.

- From 11 February 2023 until 18 August 2023 the police have refused

entry to 801 persons on the Danish German border,

Finally, the recent migration developments within the Schengen area re

mains to be of great concern to Denmark. In 2022 approximately 330.000

incidents of irregular entries were recorded which in comparison to 2021 is

an increase of 64 percent. In the first 38 weeks of 2023 the number of reg

istered irregular entries is 22 percent higher than within the same period in

2022. The number of filed applications for asylum in EU+ EU, Norway and

Switzerland) in 2022 were one and a half times as many as in 2021 with a

total of 991.000. In 2023 as of 24 September 2023 774.000 applications of

EUU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 56: Orienteringsbrev vedr. notifikation til Kommissionen om genindførsel af midlertidig grænsekontrol

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asylum in EU+ have been filed which is 28 percent more than within the

same period of 2022.

4. The Danish Government remains committed to the principle of free

movement of persons. Please rest assured that the scope of the internal bor-

der checks will continue to be limited to what is deemed strictly necessary

to respond to the threat to our public policy and internal security. It thus

remains a matter of priority for the Danish Government that the practical

execution of the temporary border controls is carried out in a manner with

the least negative impact on persons crossing the border for legitimate rea-

sons and with careful considerations taken to the free movement of persons

within the EU.

The Danish police conduct the border controls in cooperation with German

law enforcement authorities where cooperation is also established regarding

exchange of information.

The border controls are carried out as spot-checks which in terms of quan-

tity, location and intensity are adapted to the expected number of travelers

as well as the current intelligence picture, the local conditions and the traffic

patterns at the individual border crossing points. The internal border con-

trols are thus substantially different from the systematic control of Den-

mark’s external borders. The Danish National Police have found that the

previous border controls have not had a distinctive negative impact on the

free movement of persons across the internal borders. This will continue to

be a priority for the Danish authorities in close cooperation with the German

authorities.

In continuation of letter of 14 April 2023 Denmark has decided to strengthen

the use of alternative measures in the border regions by increasing the use

of intelligent monitoring of the border areas as well as increasing the number

of police patrols and the crime-fighting efforts in the border area while at

the same time deescalating the intensity of the border control. This restruc

turing of the police efforts in the border areas is still being implemented.

However, it is the assessment of the Danish Government that alternative

measures at this point cannot fully remedy the need for reintroduction of

internal border controls. The reintroduction of internal border controls thus

remains a measure of last resort.

EUU, Alm.del - 2023-24 - Bilag 56: Orienteringsbrev vedr. notifikation til Kommissionen om genindførsel af midlertidig grænsekontrol

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1 he Danish Government will notify the other Member States about this de-

cision.

Yours sincerely,

fA Mahyar

Peter Hummelgaard