Europaudvalget 2023-24
KOM (2024) 0800 Bilag 1
Offentligt
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EUROPEAN
COMMISSION
Brussels, 24.7.2024
COM(2024) 800 final
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
2024 Rule of Law Report
The rule of law situation in the European Union
{SWD(2024) 801 final} - {SWD(2024) 802 final} - {SWD(2024) 803 final} -
{SWD(2024) 804 final} - {SWD(2024) 805 final} - {SWD(2024) 806 final} -
{SWD(2024) 807 final} - {SWD(2024) 808 final} - {SWD(2024) 809 final} -
{SWD(2024) 810 final} - {SWD(2024) 811 final} - {SWD(2024) 812 final} -
{SWD(2024) 813 final} - {SWD(2024) 814 final} - {SWD(2024) 815 final} -
{SWD(2024) 816 final} - {SWD(2024) 817 final} - {SWD(2024) 818 final} -
{SWD(2024) 819 final} - {SWD(2024) 820 final} - {SWD(2024) 821 final} -
{SWD(2024) 822 final} - {SWD(2024) 823 final} - {SWD(2024) 824 final} -
{SWD(2024) 825 final} - {SWD(2024) 826 final} - {SWD(2024) 827 final} -
{SWD(2024) 828 final} - {SWD(2024) 829 final} - {SWD(2024) 830 final} -
{SWD(2024) 831 final}
EN
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1. INTRODUCTION
The rule of law is an essential safeguard for the well-functioning of our democracies, the
protection of individual rights, and hence for the vitality and prosperity of our societies and
economies. The rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights are the foundation for the
European Union’s work to foster peace, prosperity, competitiveness, social cohesion and
stability across the continent and around the world. These values, which are common to the
Member States
1
, often come under pressure, with the resilience of democratic societies and
institutions constantly put to the test. In the face of great change – whether the crises of
COVID-19 or the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, or the twin green and digital
transitions – the EU’s values are as central as ever to the confidence of citizens.
The EU has increasingly recognised that a proactive approach to promote and defend the rule
of law is at the heart of its success
2
. This is overall in line with EU citizens’ views and
expectations. In a recent Eurobarometer survey, 74% of respondents think that the EU plays
an important role in upholding the rule of law and 89% believe that it is important for all EU
Member States to respect the EU’s core values
3
.
Every year since 2020, the Rule of Law Report, by systematically and objectively examining
rule of law developments in all Member States, has shown that the rule of law matters to
citizens and businesses across the EU. Five years on, the preparedness of Member States, and
of the EU as a whole, to detect, prevent and address emerging challenges has greatly
improved. This benefits the resilience of our European democracies and mutual trust in the
EU, as well as the proper functioning of the EU’s single market, promoting a business
environment that fosters competitiveness and sustainable growth.
The EU is committed to promoting the rule of law as a cornerstone of human rights and
democracy globally and in its neighbourhood
4
. Beyond the clear economic and security
benefits of a larger Union a key goal of EU enlargement is to firmly anchor democracy, the
rule of law, respect of fundamental rights across our continent
5
. The inclusion of certain
enlargement countries
6
in the 2024 Rule of Law Report, alongside Member States, will
support these countries’ reform efforts to achieve irreversible progress on democracy and the
rule of law ahead of accession, and to guarantee that high standards will continue after
accession.
1
2
3
4
5
6
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union.
Rule of law toolbox at EU level.
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/rule_of_law_factsheet_1.pdf.
Special
Eurobarometer 553
on Rule of Law (2024).
See EU Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024 JOIN(2020) 5 final.
Commission Communication on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews, COM(2024) 146 final.
Albania, Montenegro, North-Macedonia and Serbia. The selection reflects the progress made in their
respective accession process or advancement as regards their level of preparedness on rule of law.
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2. UPHOLDING THE RULE OF LAW FOR THE BENEFIT OF CITIZENS AND
BUSINESSES
Over the past five years, the Commission has worked to build a rule of law architecture to
help counter the risk that falling short on the rule of law poses to individual Member States,
and to the EU as a whole
7
.
The goal of this work has been to
promote
a rule of law culture, to
prevent
rule of law
problems from emerging or deepening, and to
respond
effectively at EU level to serious and
persistent challenges. This called for a
diversification of the rule of law instruments
that
could be used at EU level, so that action can be calibrated to best effect
8
.
The rule of law architecture and improved knowledge that has emerged around the Rule of
Law Report, along with the reform momentum in Member States, has bolstered mutual trust
and shaped a better shared understanding of how to cultivate an environment in which the
rule of law can thrive.
In addition, since 2020, several new EU initiatives have raised common standards in areas
with direct relevance for the rule of law, drawing on the results of the monitoring in the
context of this report. These initiatives will boost
integrity
9
and step up the
fight against
corruption
10
, strengthen
transparency and accountability in decision-making processes
11
,
boost
capacity and the quality of public administrations
at all levels
12
, protect
media
freedom and media pluralism
13
both online and offline, strengthen
independent
authorities such as national equality bodies
14
, and
promote and protect an enabling civic
space
15
where citizens as well as an active and independent civil society benefit from the
right conditions and tools for meaningful participation and engagement.
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
The 2019 Communication from the Commission on Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union
set out how “if the rule of law is not properly protected in all Member States, the Union’s foundation stone
of solidarity, cohesion, and the trust necessary for mutual recognition of national decisions and the
functioning of the internal market as a whole, is damaged” (COM (2019) 164).
The European Court of Auditors called for a stronger overview of the different rule of law instruments (ECA
review on the rule of law reporting).
Agreement establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards for members of institutions and
advisory bodies.
A package on the fight against corruption (JOIN (2023) 12 final) included a proposal for a
new Directive on
combating corruption by criminal law
COM (2023) 234 and a proposal from the High Representative to
expand the CFSP sanctions toolbox to cover serious acts of corruption (HR(2023)108).
Proposal on Transparency of Interest Representation on behalf of Third Countries (COM(2023) 637).
The Communication on Enhancing the European Administrative Space (ComPAct) (COM(2023) 667) sets
out a framework for Member States to upskill public experts and leverage technology to tackle good
governance, justice efficiency and corruption challenges.
Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and
amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act) and Directive (EU) 2024/1069 on
protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court
proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’). Work continues on the 2021
Recommendation on the safety of journalists (C(2021)6650, 16 September 2021) and the proposals
protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly
unfounded or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’, C(2022)2428, 27
April 2022).
Directive (EU) 2024/1500 on standards for equality bodies and Council Directive (EU) 2024/1499 on
standards for equality bodies.
Commission Recommendation on promoting the engagement and effective participation of citizens and civil
society organisations in public policy-making processes (C(2023) 8627).
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The Rule of Law Report at the centre of the EU rule of law architecture
In 2019, when setting up the new College of Commissioners, President von der Leyen placed
the rule of law at the top of the political agenda and set the
Rule of Law Report
as one of the
core political guidelines for the current mandate, a commitment she has vowed to strengthen
further in the next five years.
Designed as a yearly cycle, the report focuses on prevention by improving awareness of key
rule of law developments. In identifying the challenges, it seeks to help Member States to
find solutions that protect the rule of law, working with the Commission, other Member
States, and key stakeholders such as the Venice Commission
16
. The report has become a
central instrument in the EU rule of law toolbox, and a key reference point at EU and national
level. Its dedicated monitoring has brought about a stronger common understanding of
developments in each Member State, helping to identify risks, develop possible solutions, and
target support early on.
Every year, the report
takes stock of the rule of law situation in every Member State
and
the EU as a whole,
assessing in a structured and rigorous way significant national
developments, both positive and negative, in four key areas:
justice, anti-corruption, media
pluralism and freedom; and institutional checks and balances.
With its transparent and
objective methodology, based on recognised rule of law standards, the report ensures fair and
equal treatment of all Member States while also taking specific national contexts and legal
traditions into account.
Since 2022, the report includes
specific recommendations
to Member States to better
support their efforts in taking forward reforms and to identify where improvements or follow-
up action may be needed. In 2023, almost 65% of the first set of specific recommendations,
issued in 2022, had been followed up, reflecting a positive reform dynamic across the EU. In
2024, this trend continued with 68% of the 2023 recommendations followed up
17
.
This shows that important efforts are being made by Member States to address the
recommendations made in the report. At the same time, depending on their nature and subject
matter, some recommendations can take longer to be addressed than the annual cycle of these
reports. For example, this could be due to the need for extensive political and stakeholder
consultations, or the fact that electoral cycles can interrupt the progress of legislation. The
report and its recommendations also provide a focus for monitoring the situation on the
ground, as well as the results of reforms.
Dialogue and follow-up to the Rule of Law Report at national and EU level
The report and its recommendations are the keystone for continuous
dialogue
with and
among Member States. This has included intensified contacts between the Commission and
Member States, including national parliaments whose role as lawmakers and in holding the
executive accountable is central to upholding the rule of law. Regular meetings of the
EU
16
17
COM (2020) 580 final.
There was found to be significant progress or full implementation on almost 20% of recommendations, and
some progress on 50% of the recommendations. No progress was noted on the remainder.
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Network of Rule of Law contact points
serve as a forum for sharing experience on issues of
common interest highlighted by the rule of law reports
18
.
The report has evolved into a centrepiece for EU institutions’ work on the rule of law. The
Annual Rule of Law dialogue
in the Council
19
draws on the Commission’s rule of law
report as its basis, recognised as creating a space for constructive political exchanges among
Member States and for sharing best practice and lessons learned. In 2023, the Council
positively evaluated its dialogue and looked to increasing its frequency
20
. In addition, the
Justice Council continued to discuss topical rule of law questions during each six-month
Council Presidency
21
. Rule of law issues are also relevant to the work of other Council
formations, as shown in the May 2024 discussion on the promotion of a rule of law culture
through education in the Education Council.
The
European Parliament’s
depth of interest has been shown not only in annual debates on
the Rule of Law Reports, but also in country-specific debates and dedicated public hearings
on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights
22
. A new Democracy, Rule of Law and
Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group offered an additional focus.
The report also helped to stimulate the wider debate on the rule of law. Examples include the
second High-level conference of the Presidents of the highest constitutional jurisdictions of
the EU in November 2023
23
. In January 2024, the 13th Direct Dialogue between EU Capital
Cities and the Commission was dedicated to the rule of law, with participating mayors
discussing the local dimension of the four pillars of the report
24
. The European Court of
Auditors has contributed to the further reflection on the report, publishing a review of the
Commission’s rule of law reporting in February 2024
25
.
The report has also acted as a catalyst for a stronger involvement of
civil society and
stakeholders
in rule of law matters. Civil society organisations and human rights’ defenders
play an important role in both stimulating and protecting the values and rights enshrined in
the EU treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, helping to foster the rule of law on the
ground. Civil society organisations and professional associations representing groups such as
judges, prosecutors or journalists submit significant contributions to the report each year.
Civil society organisations have also made valuable recommendations on how to improve the
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Network of national contact points on the rule of law (europa.eu).
Over the last year, exchanges on good
practices included on Ombudspersons and National Human Rights Institutions, case allocation systems and
technical support instruments for reforms in both the Member States and enlargement countries.
In this context, the General Affairs Council held a horizontal discussion on general rule of law developments
in September 2023, and country-specific discussions in October 2023 and January and May 2024.
Evaluation of the Council’s rule of law dialogue –
Presidency conclusions.
The evaluation formalised the
Rule of Law Report as the basis for the annual dialogue.
In March 2024, the Justice Council discussed the resilience of the justice system when dealing with criminal
organisations in a state governed by the rule of law. In October 2023, the discussion in the Justice Council
focused reinforcing the efficiency and quality of national justice system.
European Parliament resolution of 28 February 2024 report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report
(2023/2113(INI)), P9_TA(2024)0108, as well as dedicated plenary debates on Malta (19 October 2023),
Slovakia (17 January 2024), Greece (7 February 2024), and Hungary (24 April 2024).
Participants included the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights.
Following the Dialogue, the EU Capital Cities shared a position paper as a contribution to the 2024 Rule of
Law Report, including a call for more attention to be paid to the local dimension of the rule of law and for
additional EU funding to be made available for local educational initiatives in this area.
ECA 2024 review on the rule of law reporting.
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preparation process for the reports, leading to an extension of the stakeholder consultation
period and increased transparency
26
.
The Commission has continued to organise
national rule of law dialogues
together with the
Fundamental Rights Agency, bringing together different national stakeholders at national
level and seeking to include them more closely in the follow-up to the Rule of Law Reports.
They offer valuable opportunities for the Commission and national authorities to gather civil
society perspectives, convene diverse stakeholders, and explore collaborative approaches for
implementing the recommendations
27
.
Support for rule of law reforms
Effective justice systems, the fight against corruption, and good lawmaking all have direct
economic relevance, with a bearing on investment, growth and jobs, and therefore on the
well-functioning of the single market. The rule of law and good governance are cornerstones
for the proper functioning of the internal market, as well as for a healthy business
environment, for the sustainability of public finances, and for effective structural reforms. As
such, they are part of the
European Semester
and its country-specific recommendations.
Several Member States included specific rule of law measures and related milestones and
targets in their national
recovery and resilience plans (RRPs),
which aim to address
relevant country-specific recommendations. This has helped to galvanise important reforms
in justice systems, the fight against corruption and the overall transparency and inclusiveness
of the law-making process
28
. In particular, Member States have adopted measures to
strengthen judicial independence, such as by reforming the disciplinary regime for
magistrates, as well as improving the efficiency of judicial systems, for instance through
reforming the structure of courts. In line with commitments in their plans, some Member
States have also stepped up the fight against corruption, for example by strengthening the
institutions dedicated to combatting corruption. Member States have also been implementing
measures to improve the quality of the legislative process, for instance introducing a
mandatory use of public consultations and impact assessments. In certain cases, these RRP
commitments were deemed indispensable in protecting the EU’s financial interests, with their
satisfactory fulfilment conditioning access to any disbursement under the Recovery and
Resilience Facility.
Other
EU funding
has also helped to build the capacity of the judiciary, media and civil
society in upholding the rule of law, alongside technical support and expertise for targeted
reforms, notably through the Technical Support Instrument, focusing on improving the
efficiency and quality of public administration and justice and addressing anti-corruption and
media pluralism challenges
29
. This has also been supported in Member States through their
cooperation with
international expertise
through the Council of Europe and its different
bodies
30
, as well as through exchanges with practitioners from other Member States.
An increased capacity to respond to rule of law problems
26
27
28
29
30
Notably in advance of country visits
2024 Rule of Law Report - European Commission (europa.eu).
For further information see:
National rule of law dialogues - European Commission (europa.eu).
See the
Commission Report on the Implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility: Moving forward
(COM(2023) 545).
Other programmes offering important support include the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme,
and Creative Europe.
Notably the Venice Commission and the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO).
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As a complement to developing the rule of law toolbox on prevention and on creating rule of
law reform incentives, the EU has also increased its capacity to respond to rule of law
problems.
The Commission has continued to exercise its role as guardian of the EU treaties
31
. Where
necessary, it has launched
infringement procedures
to address specific breaches of the rule
of law. Judicial independence has been at the heart of an important body of case-law that the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has developed in cases initiated by the
Commission’s infringement procedures and by requests for preliminary rulings from national
courts.
The
general regime of conditionality
for the protection of the Union budget came into force
in 2021 to protect the sound financial management of the EU budget and the EU financial
interest from breaches of the principle of the rule of law
32
. The Commission closely monitors
the situation in all Member States and takes action where needed. In 2022, the Commission
initiated a procedure to protect the EU budget from breaches of the principles of the rule of
law in Hungary
33
. On a proposal by the Commission, the Council decided on budgetary
protective measures in December 2022
34
. While the implementation of some remedial
measures put forward in response to the conditionality procedure is ongoing, important
shortcomings remain and no new measures were adopted by Hungary to remedy the
outstanding concerns. Therefore, on 13 December 2023, the Commission concluded that the
measures adopted by the Council a year earlier should remain in place. The Commission is
ready to continue engaging with Hungary to resolve the remaining concerns
35
.
Another instrument that has encouraged reforms supporting Member States in the application
of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights
is the
horizontal enabling condition
under the
Common Provisions Regulation (Charter HEC). Member States are required to put in place
effective mechanisms to ensure compliance with the Charter at all stages when implementing
EU programmes
36
.
This includes compliance with the Charter right to an effective remedy
and fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal. This tool has demonstrated its
effectiveness in practice, as so far, there have been two cases where the Commission released
EU funding only after the Member States concerned had implemented the reforms considered
necessary to fulfil the horizontal enabling condition as regards judicial independence.
Finally, the
Article 7(1) TEU
procedure, which allows the Council to determine the
existence of a clear risk of a serious breach of the EU’s values and to follow up on such risks,
31
32
33
34
35
36
The 2022 Communication ‘Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers’ underlined that the EU is a
community of law, based on common values shared by Member States, with applying and enforcing EU law
and respect for the rule of law at its core (COM(2022) 518).
In January 2024, the Commission reported on the operation of the regulation establishing the general regime
of conditionality and concluded that the measures adopted until that moment had proved effective in
protecting the EU financial interests (COM (2024) 17 final/2).
On 27 April 2022, the Commission launched for the first time the step of the procedure established under
Article 6(1) of the Conditionality Regulation.
Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022.
Commission Decision C(2023)8999 final of 13 December 2023. Under the Conditionality Regulation,
Hungary may submit further remedial proposals and if the Commission considers that the issues have been
remedied partly or in full, it submits to the Council a proposal to adapt or lift the adopted measures.
The Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) governs three cohesion policy funds, one maritime, fisheries and
aquaculture fund, and three home affairs funds all under shared management. The Charter HEC also requires
that Member States have a strong complaints mechanism in place.
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has continued in the Council. Article 7 TEU
37
is an exceptional tool that the EU can use to
address the most serious rule of law failings in a Member State. So far, the procedure has
been triggered twice: first by the Commission in respect of Poland in December 2017
38
, and
then by the European Parliament in respect of Hungary in September 2018
39
. Under both
procedures, the Council held several formal hearings and state of play sessions, without
however taking a decision to take either procedure to the next stage
40
. Following a series of
positive developments in Poland, the Commission concluded in May 2024 that the conditions
for maintaining the procedure no longer existed. The Polish authorities adopted an Action
Plan to address the issues of judicial independence covered in the Commission’s reasoned
proposal of December 2017, and which the Commission will use in its monitoring
41
.
Considering that there is no longer a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law by
Poland, the Commission withdrew its reasoned proposal so that the procedure against Poland
is now closed. Monitoring of the rule of law developments will continue as part of the Rule of
Law Report.
Additional safeguards exist also in other instruments. Under the
Recovery and Resilience
Facility,
the Commission closely monitors compliance with the milestones, and it can
suspend part of future payments if a milestone or target that has been previously positively
assessed would be reversed
42
. If the reversed measure is relevant for the protection of the
EU’s financial interest, all future payments would be blocked, and could be unblocked only
upon re-fulfilment. Under the Common Provisions Regulation,
horizontal and thematic
enabling conditions
must be fulfilled throughout the entire programming period. If, at any
point, a Member State is no longer fulfilling an enabling condition that had been previously
positively assessed, a new assessment could result in a blocking of EU payments.
Rule of law at the core of the enlargement process and engagement with external partners
Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine and its people, now
in its third year, is also a direct attack on EU values. The EU’s resolve to uphold the rule of
law and the international rules-based order has only increased in the face of Russia’s war of
aggression. Safeguarding and upholding our democratic institutions and values is a shared
responsibility of Member States and EU institutions. This is all the more important now that
the EU and its Member States are threatened by hostile foreign actors using disinformation
and cyber-attacks trying to undermine our democracies and that there is increasing evidence
of direct foreign interference in our democratic structures
43
. Countries in the neighbourhood
and the Western Balkans are also targets of attempts at interference by Russia, with
disinformation and anti-democratic and anti-EU rhetoric being a particular concern.
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
Article 7 TEU sets out the conditions under which the Council may determine that there is a clear risk of a
serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2; the European Council may determine
the existence of such a serious and persistent breach; and the Council may then determine the action to be
taken in terms of suspension of the rights of a Member State under the Treaties.
Proposal for a Council Decision (COM(2017) 835, 20.12.2017).
European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 (2017/2131(INL)).
Seven formal hearings have taken place so far as regards Hungary. As regards Poland, six hearings took
place before the withdrawal of the Commission’s proposal.
See also country chapter on Poland (SWD (2024) 821).
Report from the Commission on the implementation of the Recovery and Resiliency Facility: Moving
forward (COM(2023) 545).
Cases include lawmakers hacked ahead of elections, covert lobbying via proxies, fake research issued to
whitewash human rights records, and websites purporting to be independent media platforms while covertly
facilitating political interference campaigns. See Communication from the Commission on Defence of
Democracy, COM(2023)630.
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Consolidating democratic structures, upholding the rule of law and protecting fundamental
rights is at the heart of the EU’s engagement with enlargement countries.
Credible and
sustainable reforms
in these areas are crucial for progressing towards accession. They are
defined as the “fundamentals” of EU enlargement policy
44
. The revised enlargement
methodology approved by the Council in 2020
45
reinforced the centrality of the
fundamentals, as the first matters to be addressed in the accession negotiations and the last to
be closed, with progress on the fundamentals key for overall progress in the negotiations.
This means they are monitored throughout the overall accession process and determine the
momentum of countries on their path towards accession.
The Commission’s
annual Enlargement package
takes stock of each country’s overall
progress on their path towards accession. Based on the principle of own merits, only with
tangible and continuous progress on the rule of law can the Commission recommend moving
forward in the negotiations with each country. The rule of law is also an essential element of
the new
Western Balkans Reform and Growth Facility
and the
Ukraine Facility.
To fully
benefit from these two unprecedented support mechanisms, countries need to prepare and
implement an agreed reform agenda, including concrete steps on the fundamentals.
As of 2024, as announced by President von der Leyen in the 2023 State of the Union address,
the Commission decided to extend
participation in the Rule of Law Report
to complement
the work under accession process, which remains the exclusive setting for enlargement
negotiations
46
.
Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia
now participate in the
Rule of Law Report and the EU Network of Rule of Law contact points, reflecting the
progress made in their respective accession process or advancement as regards their level of
preparedness on rule of law. This approach will enable an extension to other enlargement
countries in the future. The inclusion of these countries alongside Member States will
strengthen EU support for rule of law reforms, support their accession process and help
maintain a sustainable pattern of high standards after accession.
To ensure that reforms are implemented in practice, capacity building is crucial. The EU
provides
financial support and technical assistance
to ensure that reforms are aligned with
European standards. It encourages best practices, including consulting important legislation
with the Venice Commission. Peer reviews, training of justice professionals, and promoting
institutional cooperation with public administrations in Member States (twinning) have been
key forms of EU support in enlargement countries.
The EU is taking a strong and consistent approach in its entire external action, at bilateral,
regional and international level, in order to promote the rule of law around the world.
Upholding the rule of law is at the core of the EU’s external engagement and one of the
foundations of all EU agreements with international partners. An independent evaluation of
the EU’s support to the rule of law and anti-corruption in partner countries (2010-2021)
47
concluded that the EU had succeeded in advancing the rule of law agenda, including in
44
45
46
47
Together with economic criteria and public administration reform.
Communication from the Commission on ‘Enhancing the accession process - A credible EU perspective for
the Western Balkans’, COM(2020) 57.
Synergies between the enlargement process and the Rule of Law Report will be ensured and there are no
recommendations issued for Enlargement countries in the Rule of Law Report. Recommendations will
continue to be issued in the annual Enlargement Package, as well as in the context of the other engagement
foreseen under the Stabilisation and Association Agreements. The Rule of Law Report will support the
implementation of those recommendations.
The
evaluation
was published in December 2022. This strategic evaluation provides an independent and
evidence-based assessment of the performance of the EU support to the rule of law in Partner Countries.
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restrictive contexts and in fragile and conflict-affected states. Building on this evaluation, a
Global Team Europe Initiative on Democracy has been launched to work more effectively
and strategically on rule of law support and anti-corruption
48
. The EU also has a clear
commitment to tackle corruption at the global level, supporting legal and policy reforms to
build anti-corruption institutions and oversight bodies, and to strengthen civil society,
whistleblowers, human rights defenders and independent media as watchdogs against
corruption. Rule of law related issues, including the right to a fair trial and to due process, the
fight against corruption, and the independence of the judiciary are regularly raised in human
rights dialogues with partner countries, and the EU targets support towards key actors
advancing the rule of law.
3. KEY ASPECTS OF THE RULE OF LAW SITUATION AT NATIONAL LEVEL
As in previous years, this 2024 Rule of Law Report sets out significant common themes and
trends, specific challenges, and positive developments under the four pillars of justice
systems, anti-corruption frameworks, media freedom and pluralism, and other institutional
issues related to checks and balances. The examples given draw from the assessments to be
found in the 31 country chapters, which are an integral part of this report and provide the
detailed context for each Member State and participating enlargement country
49
. The report
also includes specific recommendations to Member States
50
and assesses progress in
implementing the specific recommendations issued last year
51
.
Methodology of the Rule of Law Report and its recommendations
The assessment in the country chapters for each Member State and enlargement country
covered has been prepared in line with an established methodology used for previous
editions of the report
52
. The country chapters rely on a qualitative assessment
autonomously carried out by the Commission, focusing on a synthesis of significant
developments since July 2023. In each country chapter, the analysis focuses in particular
on topics where there have been significant developments, or where significant challenges
have been identified in the previous report and persist during this reporting period. The
analysis contains a qualitative assessment of the progress made by Member States towards
implementing the 2023 recommendations
53
. The objective of the 2024 recommendations
48
49
50
51
52
53
The Team Europe Democracy (TED) is a global thematic Team Europe Initiative (TEI) involving 14 Member
States launched to promote democracy and human rights worldwide. Accountability and rule of law are key
priority themes.
The country chapters are available
here.
The recommendations are referenced in footnotes throughout this report, listed in the Annex by order of the
pillars in the country chapters and included in the individual country chapters.
The assessments included in the country chapters do not prejudge any future assessment under the Recovery
and Resilience Facility (Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of 12 February 2021), under the Common Provisions
Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of 24 June 2021) or under the general regime of conditionality for
the protection of the Union budget (Regulation 2020/2092 of 22 December 2020).
The methodology is available
here.
Depending on the progress made on the various subparts of each recommendation, and whether the
recommendations were carried through from the 2022 report, the Commission concluded in each case using
the following categories: no (further) progress, some (further) progress, significant progress, and full
implementation. Depending on the stage of progress and the results achieved, recommendations from the
2023 Report are carried into this year’s report, with adaptations as necessary.
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continues to be to support Member States in their efforts to take forward reforms
54
. There
are no recommendations for enlargement countries in this report; such recommendations
are issued in the context of the annual Enlargement Package.
The report is the result of close collaboration with national authorities and relies on a
variety of national, international and other sources
55
, as well as the Commission’s own data
gathering
56
. Member States and enlargement countries were invited to contribute, provide
written input
57
and participate in dedicated country visits
58
. A targeted stakeholder
consultation also provided valuable cross-cutting and country-specific contributions
59
. The
Council of Europe also provided an overview of its recent opinions and reports
60
. Prior to
the adoption of this report, national authorities have been given the opportunity to provide
factual updates to their country chapter. In addition, the Commission - at political and at
technical level - discusses the report, once published, with national authorities and
governments, as well as with national Parliaments.
3.1
Justice systems
Well-functioning, efficient and fully independent justice systems are crucial for the
application and enforcement of EU and national law and upholding the rule of law. Judicial
independence is integral to the task of judicial decision-making and stems from the principle
of effective judicial protection
61
. Independent judges and courts
guarantee the fairness of
judicial proceedings and the protection of
individual rights and are crucial for ensuring that
justice works to the benefit of citizens and of businesses. They are also essential for judicial
cooperation across the EU, which is a key objective in the area of freedom security and
justice
62
. Access to independent courts and judicial review are fundamental to the rule of
law
63
.
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
The principles on the basis of which the recommendations were prepared are the same as last year (see
COM(2022) 500, p.3-4). The recommendations are without prejudice to any action proceedings the
Commission may initiate under other legal instruments.
The sources used to prepare this report include written input received from Member States, contributions
received during the targeted stakeholder consultation, information produced by international organisations,
and the input provided during country visits. These sources inform the Commission’s assessment, but the
Commission’s conclusions remain its own responsibility.
In particular, the EU Justice Scoreboard provides comparative and reliable data on the efficiency, quality and
independence of justice systems in the EU Member States. Its aim is to assist the EU and Member States
improve the effectiveness of their national justice systems. The Scoreboard also includes indicators for the
judiciary’s independence relating to the effectiveness of investment protection. The Scoreboard is gradually
extending to present new data: in 2024, it included data on salaries of judicial and prosecutorial expert staff,
on the length of proceedings in bribery cases and asset declaration systems, and the appointment and
dismissal procedures for prosecutors. The Scoreboard is also an important source for European Semester
country reports.
Member States’ input can be found
here.
Information on the country visits can be found in the country chapters. During these country visits, held
online, the Commission spoke to Member States’ national authorities, including judicial and independent
authorities, law enforcement, and other stakeholders, such as journalists’ associations and civil society.
Stakeholder input can be found
here.
The Council of Europe input can be found
here.
See Article 19 of the Treaty on European Union, and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Article 3(2) of the Treaty on European Union.
On 18 June 2024, the EU announced its decision to adhere to the 2023 OECD Recommendation on Access
to Justice and people-centred justice systems. The Commission joined the 22 Member States that are
members of the OECD in drafting the Recommendation and continues to work to take it forward.
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Member States must fully respect the requirements set by EU law and the case-law of the
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and should also take European standards into account in
the design of their justice systems. European judicial networks and associations
64
also help
promote and uphold the rule of law, as they work on further developing European standards
and make important contributions to the preparation of the Rule of Law Report.
Perceptions of judicial independence
As set out in the 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard, Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 2024
show that the perception of independence among the general public and among companies,
when compared to 2023, improved or remained stable in most Member States, including
among countries which experienced systemic challenges
65
. Well-functioning and fully
independent justice systems can have a positive impact on investment and are key for
investment protection, and therefore contribute to growth and competitiveness. In
Denmark,
Finland, Austria, Sweden, Luxembourg
and
Ireland,
the level of perceived independence
continues to be particularly high among the general public or companies (above 75%), while
it remains very low in
Croatia, Poland
and
Bulgaria
(below 30%). As regards enlargement
countries, Eurobarometer results show relatively low levels of perceived independence.
Councils for the Judiciary and procedures for the appointment and dismissal of judges as key
safeguards for judicial independence
Procedures for the appointment and dismissal of judges and the powers and composition of
Councils for the Judiciary are important in safeguarding judicial independence, based on the
principles established by the CJEU.
Where established, Councils for the Judiciary are an important contributor to judicial
independence
66
and can act as a buffer between the judiciary and the other branches of power
in matters such as the appointment and career of judges or magistrates, as well as in the
management of the justice system
67
. European standards have been developed by the Council
of Europe on how the Councils for the Judiciary should be designed to best safeguard their
independence, including as regards their composition
68
. To function effectively, Councils for
the Judiciary need adequate resources and administrative independence.
Several Member States advanced legislative efforts to strengthen the independence and
effectiveness of Councils for the Judiciary, in some cases following the 2023
recommendations. In
Luxembourg,
the National Council for Justice was appointed and is
becoming fully operational. In
Bulgaria,
a constitutional reform changed the composition of
the Supreme Judicial Council to align it with the European standards. In
Hungary,
following
64
65
66
67
68
Such as the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary, the Network of the Presidents of the Supreme
Judicial Courts of the European Union, the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative
Jurisdictions of the European Union, the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe and Council of
Europe European Commission for the efficiency of justice (CEPEJ).
Figures 51 and 53, 2024 EU Justice Scoreboard.
The CJEU has recognised that where a Council for the Judiciary participates in an appointment process
involving political bodies, it can contribute to making that process more objective, by circumscribing the
discretion of political bodies, provided that it is sufficiently independent from the executive and legislative
powers and from the body to which it is submitting an opinion. See for example judgment of 2 March 2021,
AB and Others (Appointment of judges to the Supreme Court – Actions).
Key European standards have been developed by the Council of Europe on how the Councils for the
Judiciary should be established to best safeguard their independence, including on their composition, see in
particular Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Council of Europe.
See in particular Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 of the Council of Europe.
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legislative reform in 2023, the National Judicial Council’s new competences allow to
effectively counterbalance the powers of the President of the National Office for the
Judiciary, tasked with the central administration of courts. In other Member States, initiatives
are ongoing. In
Poland,
the Sejm adopted a law to address the concerns related to the
independence of the National Council for the Judiciary (NCJ). In the
Netherlands,
the
procedure for appointing members of the Council for the Judiciary and court management
boards is currently being reviewed. In
Estonia,
discussions are ongoing to reform the Council
for the Administration of Courts and transfer more powers from the executive to the
judiciary. In
Spain,
following a structured dialogue with the European Commission as
facilitator, an agreement was reached to renew the Council for the Judiciary and to initiate,
immediately after the renewal, a process in view of adapting the appointment of its judges-
members, taking into account European standards. On the other hand, concerns regarding the
Council for the Judiciary remain in
Slovakia,
where no progress has been made to introduce
safeguards for the dismissal of the members of the Judicial Council and three nominees were
dismissed before the end of their term.
As regards enlargement countries, following constitutional amendments in 2022 to strengthen
judicial independence in
Serbia,
the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial
Council were established in their new composition. In
Montenegro,
the legal framework
guaranteeing the independence and impartiality of the judicial system has been revised. In
Albania,
accountability has been strengthened thanks to vetting of all judges and prosecutors
but shortcomings remain on the appointments of non-magistrate members of the High
Judicial Council and the High Prosecutorial Council. In
North Macedonia
concerns remain
regarding the functioning and independence of the Judicial Council.
The method used for the appointment and dismissal of judges is important for judicial
independence and the public perception of it. To guarantee judicial independence, rules
governing judicial appointments need to prevent doubts as to the imperviousness of judges to
external factors, and as to their neutrality as judges
69
.
In several Member States, efforts to improve judicial appointment procedures are ongoing,
including as a follow up to the 2023 recommendations. In
Greece,
legislative steps were
taken to involve the judiciary in the appointments to the highest positions in the judiciary. In
Ireland,
the new Judicial Appointments Commission Act introduced a number of
improvements to reduce political influence in the appointment and promotion of judges. In
Finland,
a working group follows up on the report on the assessment and future development
trends of the court system, including the appointment process for judges. In
Austria,
recent
reforms of the appointment systems for the Supreme Court President and candidate judges
are being implemented. In
Poland,
some of the negative effects of the contested justice
reforms of 2017 regarding the functioning of the ordinary judiciary are being reversed. The
Government has set out its intention to involve the judiciary in all decisions related to
appointments to key positions within the ordinary judiciary and to organise transparent
appointment procedures based on open competitions: an approach already being implemented
for court presidents and vice-presidents. In
Germany,
discussions are ongoing about a
possible reform to enhance the resilience of the Constitutional Court. In
Malta,
steps have
been announced to involve the judiciary in the procedure for appointment of the Chief
Justice, as the Government has endorsed a constitutional reform stipulating consultations with
69
See judgments including those of 15 July 2021, C-791/19
Commission v Poland;
of 20 April 2021, C-896/19
Repubblika and Il-Prim Ministru;
and of 2 March 2021, C-824/18
AB and Others (Appointment of judges to
the Supreme Court).
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the incumbent Chief Justice prior to the appointment of a new Chief Justice. Some steps were
taken to ensure that the reform of judicial appointments in
Slovenia
contains adequate
safeguards for judicial independence, as the previously envisaged probationary period
without prescribed guarantees was abandoned. The 2022 constitutional reform to strengthen
judicial independence in
Serbia
is being followed up, including through the application of the
new appeal procedure to the Constitutional Court concerning judicial appointments.
Challenges remain in some Member States on appointments to high-level judicial positions
and for court president positions. In
Latvia,
a vacancy at the Supreme Court was filled, but no
steps were taken to introduce adequate safeguards against undue political influence
applicable to future appointments. Similarly, in
Austria,
no steps have been taken to ensure
judicial involvement in the appointments of administrative court (vice-) presidents. In
Lithuania,
there are calls to reinforce some more safeguards on the transparency of judicial
appointments. In
Sweden,
while initial steps have been taken in relation to the independence
of lay judges, no progress was made to ensure that their nomination system safeguards their
independence.
In
Montenegro,
significant delays in judicial appointments have had serious impacts on the
judicial system, though only the Supreme Court President now remains to be appointed. In
Serbia,
a considerable number of vacancies for judges and prosecutors remains to be filled. In
North Macedonia,
appointment decisions for public prosecutors and judges have been
criticised by civil society as lacking explanation and clear criteria.
Different aspects of independence of judges and courts are being addressed in a number of
Member States. In
Italy,
the Department of Tax Justice has been established in order to
increase the independence of the newly established tax courts from the Ministry of Economy
and Finance. In the
Netherlands,
strengthened security measures are being explored to
enhance the resilience of the justice system against organised crime. In
Malta,
work has
started to address persistent concerns regarding the independence of specialised tribunals.
The allocation of cases in courts also requires safeguards for judicial independence and
impartiality to prevent any undue interference, which can be ensured in different ways, such
as the random allocation of cases via a computer algorithm or a pre-defined order.
Portugal
has strengthened transparency in the allocation of cases, as a new electronic system is being
effectively implemented. In
Hungary,
the transparency of the case allocation at the Supreme
Court has improved, while concerns remain regarding the transparency of case allocation in
lower courts.
In a few Member States, concerns exist about undue pressure on the judiciary from
politicians or the executive level, and there is also evidence of pressure originating from third
countries. The risk that public statements from governments and politicians may affect public
trust in judicial independence has raised concerns in
Slovakia, Italy
and
Spain.
There are
particular concerns about intimidation of judges in
Lithuania,
originating from Russian
courts. As regards enlargement countries, concerns about attempted interference and pressure
on the judicial system by public officials or politicians remains high in
Albania, Serbia,
and
North Macedonia.
Autonomy and independence of the prosecution service as important topics of reform
The organisation of national prosecution services varies across the EU and there is no
uniform model for all Member States. However, institutional safeguards should guarantee the
autonomy of the prosecution service, ensuring that public prosecutors can fulfil their
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professional duties without interference
70
. This is essential for national and EU criminal law,
as well as for the protection of the financial interests of the EU.
Reforms to strengthen institutional safeguards for the prosecution service, some of them in
response to 2023 recommendations, have continued. In
Poland,
additional steps have been
taken to ensure the independence of the prosecution service from the Government and to
separate the office of the Minister of Justice from that of the Prosecutor General. In
Czechia,
a reform of the prosecution service included safeguards for the dismissal of the Prosecutor
General and other chief prosecutors. In
Denmark,
the Government submitted a proposal to
Parliament to strengthen the public perceptions of independence of the Director of Public
Prosecutions by limiting the maximum mandate for the position.
In
Malta,
the transfer of prosecutions from the Police to the Office of the Attorney General is
progressing
71
. In
Cyprus,
the Government is in the process of drafting legislation aiming to
separate the advisory and prosecutorial role of the Law Office, which is a positive step
towards strengthening the independence of the Prosecution Service; plans have also been
announced to introduce the possibility of review of the decisions of the Attorney General not
to prosecute or to discontinue proceedings. In
Spain,
a reform of the statute of the Prosecutor
General is foreseen, which will exclude persons having been in political office in recent years
from the office of Prosecutor General and prevent that the Prosecutor General acts in cases
that affect her or him personally. In
Serbia,
the laws on the Public Prosecution Office and the
High Prosecutorial Council allow prosecutors to file complaints against mandatory
instructions, thus aiming to strengthen prosecutorial autonomy.
The power of the executive to give instructions to prosecutors in individual cases has
continued being a subject of particular attention. In the
Netherlands
,
the debate continues on
the removal of the executive’s power to give instructions to prosecutors in individual cases.
In
Germany,
a proposal has been made to introduce further safeguards for the use of the
power of both Federal and Länder-level Ministers of Justice to issue instructions to
prosecutors in individual cases.
However, a number of challenges remain to be addressed, including those covered in 2023
recommendations. The planned reform of the prosecution service in
Austria
has not
advanced, with no political agreement to take forward the proposal by the expert group made
in 2022. In
Slovakia,
the power of the Prosecutor General to annul decisions of lower-ranking
prosecutors remains a concern. In 2024, despite strong concerns raised including by the
European Commission, the Slovak Government dissolved the Special Prosecutor’s Office,
raising concerns both about the immediate impact on cases and the long-term structural
impact, putting at risk the efficiency and autonomy of the prosecutions.
Ensuring accountability and safeguarding independence in disciplinary procedures for
judges and prosecutors
The CJEU has made clear that disciplinary procedures must not be used as a manner of
political control on the judiciary
72
. Safeguards include clear rules that define the conduct that
qualifies as a disciplinary offence, and the penalties to apply. Disciplinary proceedings need
70
71
72
See Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions and Reports concerning prosecutors (CDL-PI(2022)023).
This is also part of Malta’s RRP, milestone 6.3.
The Court has recalled this principle in cases referring to the disciplinary chamber of the Polish Supreme
Court (Judgment of 5 June 2023, C-204/21,
Commission v Poland)
and the Romanian Judicial Inspection
(Judgments of 11 May 2023, case 817/21
Inspecţia Judiciară,
and of 18 May 2021, C-83/19 etc
Asociaţia
'Forumul Judecătorilor din România' and Others v Inspecţia Judiciară and Others).
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to be carried out through an independent body, following procedures which fully safeguard
the rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular the rights of defence. Rules
must also ensure that disciplinary bodies’ decisions can be challenged in Court
73
.
The trend observed in past Rule of Law reports continued, with steps towards increased
safeguards for judicial independence and autonomy of prosecutors in disciplinary
proceedings in several Member States. In
Slovenia,
draft amendments to the Judicial Council
Act envisaging the overhaul the disciplinary framework for judges have been presented
.
In
Czechia,
a reform of the disciplinary proceedings is discussed in Parliament.
France
adopted
a new law reforming the status of magistrates, including the disciplinary regime. In
Malta,
a
discussion on the renewal of the disciplinary regime for prosecutors is expected in the second
half of 2024. In
Poland,
the disciplinary regime applicable to judges was reformed, in line
with the commitments under Poland’s Recovery and Resilience Plan.
The effective protection of judicial independence also requires a culture of integrity and
impartiality. Several Member States are implementing policies and practices to promote
integrity within the judiciary. Examples include steps in
Croatia
and
Sweden.
In
Belgium,
the
Government has decided not to table a proposal to introduce regular security checks by the
National Security Agency on all judges. In
North Macedonia,
Codes of ethics are in place for
both prosecutors and judges.
Efforts to improve the quality and efficiency of justice
The efficiency of justice systems is a necessary condition for the protection of rights, legal
certainty and public confidence in the rule of law. An efficient justice system manages its
caseload and delivers decisions without undue delay. Excessively long proceedings and
backlogs undermine the trust of citizens and businesses in national justice systems.
In several Member States, new measures are in place to improve efficiency.
Spain
has
adopted new measures to enhance the efficiency of the justice system. A trend in
France
to
decrease the length of court proceedings will be further supported by new legislation
promoting the amicable settlement of disputes. In
Czechia,
efficiency has continued to
improve, in particular regarding the length of administrative cases, while
Serbia
has seen a
positive trend as regards reducing the length of civil, commercial and criminal cases.
Despite some steps, some Member States still face long-standing challenges as regards the
efficiency of justice systems. Concerns remain in
Malta, Croatia
and
Greece,
though they all
took new measures in an attempt to reduce the length of proceedings. A similar pattern in
Portugal
is compounded by concerns that general criminal procedure legislation is not
tailored to efficiently deal with complex criminal proceedings In
Italy,
the length of judicial
proceedings is continuing its positive trend but remains a serious challenge. Regarding
enlargement countries, the length of proceedings for different kinds of cases remains a
challenge in
Albania
and
North Macedonia.
An effective justice system needs adequate resources, including the necessary investments in
infrastructure, and well qualified, trained and adequately paid staff. A number of Member
States have recognised this through additional resources to strengthen the resilience of justice
systems, including through their national Recovery and Resilience Plans. In
Denmark,
France, Sweden
and
Finland,
resources for the justice system have been increased. In
Croatia,
significant progress was achieved to step up remuneration and legislation to set objective
remuneration criteria is expected. In
Romania,
the High Court of Cassation and Justice took
73
Judgment of 25 July 2018,
LM,
C-216/18 PPU, para. 67.
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measures to address salary inequalities in the judiciary.
Latvia
saw substantial increases in
remuneration for judges and court employees, though turnover problems remain for judicial
assistants.
In other Member States, levels of remuneration continue to pose challenges, often leading to
shortages and vacancies which are difficult to fill. In
Slovenia,
some steps were made to
increase the level of remuneration of judges and state prosecutors, largely unchanged since
2012, for which the Government proposed a partial increase and the Constitutional Court
prescribed how its judgment should be implemented. In
Germany,
while some steps have
been taken to supplement the overall resources for the judiciary, the level of remuneration of
judges remains a challenge. In
Czechia,
the method for determining judges’ salaries was
modified to reduce salary increases, and salaries of court and prosecution assistant staff
remain an issue. In the
Netherlands,
specific recommendations to address staff shortages and
workload concerns among the judiciary are being discussed. In
Lithuania,
a reform of judicial
salaries is positively assessed by judges, while concerns remain as to the remuneration of
court staff and prosecutors.
Cyprus, Portugal
and
Romania
experience difficulties to recruit in
different areas of the judicial system. In
Hungary,
the level of remuneration of judges and
court staff has further deteriorated due to high inflation. The enlargement countries face
similar resources constraints.
Serbia
is implementing a Strategy on Human Resources in the
Judiciary 2022-2026, but the low attractiveness of judicial careers poses a challenge. The
same challenge has not been addressed by the amendments to the laws on salaries of judges
and prosecutors in
North Macedonia.
As regards staff levels, in
Spain,
new posts for judges have been established, while in
Italy
significant improvements were made in recruitment of magistrates and administrative staff. In
Belgium
providing adequate resources for the justice system has further progressed, as a tool
measuring workload confirms structural resource deficiencies. In
Albania,
overall shortages
of resources of the justice system risk negatively affecting the quality of justice.
Investing in the digitalisation can strengthen justice systems and make them more accessible,
resilient and ready to face current and future challenges. New digitalisation initiatives have
been put place in
Spain, Croatia, Italy, Ireland, France,
the
Netherlands, Malta
and
Romania.
In
Bulgaria,
a new draft law envisages changes to the Judicial System Act related to the
digitalisation of justice.
North Macedonia, Serbia
and
Albania
are taking steps in the
digitalisation of case management, although shortcomings remain.
Access to justice and the role of lawyers in the justice system
Lawyers and bar associations play a key role in guaranteeing access to justice, ensuring the
protection of fundamental rights, including the right to a fair trial. In several Member States,
steps are being taken to ensure reliable legal aid schemes and access to a lawyer. In
Luxembourg,
a reform to make legal aid more accessible was adopted. In
Czechia
and in
Spain,
provisions on legal aid have been amended to broaden access. In
Ireland,
there was
some progress on reducing the litigation costs and a general review of the Civil Legal Aid
scheme is underway. In
Lithuania,
the reform of the legal aid system is progressing, and the
conditions for the participation of legal aid providers have been improved. In
Slovakia,
amendments to increase the access to free legal aid are under preparation. In
Denmark,
a
review of the legal aid system has been ongoing. In
Finland,
a National Legal Services
Authority, which was established to provide more consistent and high-quality legal aid, will
be operational in 2025. Beyond the EU,
Albania
has a comprehensive legal framework in
place for legal aid and its number of beneficiaries has increased.
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Some Member States still see challenges. In
Bulgaria,
the Constitutional Court declared that
the law on mandatory judicial mediation, which was set to enter fully into force in July 2024,
was unconstitutional. In
Hungary,
concerns remain as regards the effectiveness of the legal
aid scheme in both civil and criminal cases. Certain challenges have also been identified in
Austria
linked to high court fees and access to legal advice in administrative cases, with some
steps taken to address the latter.
An effective justice system requires that lawyers be free to pursue their activities of advising
and representing their clients. In
Czechia,
an amendment enhancing the protection of attorney
confidentiality is in Parliament. On the other hand, challenges to the legal professional
privilege have been expressed from the legal profession in
Belgium
and respect for their
legally recognised rights and privileges in
Romania.
In
Lithuania,
lawyers continue to raise
concerns regarding the respect for professional secrecy.
3.2
Anti-corruption framework
Corruption damages the delivery of public services and, it corrodes citizens’ and businesses’
trust in public institutions, creating a sense of unfairness and injustice consequently damaging
the rule of law. A comprehensive approach to fighting corruption relies on a combination of
preventive and punitive measures. This requires a robust legal and institutional framework,
effective investigations, and prosecutions and a clear political will to enforce the anti-
corruption framework. It also needs comprehensive and effective measures to minimise the
space for corruption and foster integrity.
Corruption perceptions across the EU
The results of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
74
show that more than half of the 20
countries ranking best internationally are EU Member States
75
. However, differences remain
across Member States, also in terms of the trends in recent years
76
. Enlargement countries
score below the average
77
.
The 2024 Eurobarometer surveys on corruption
78
shows that corruption remains a serious
concern for citizens and businesses in the EU. About 7 in 10 Europeans (68%) believe that
corruption is widespread in their country and over 4 in 10 Europeans (41%) consider that the
level of corruption has increased in their country. 57% of citizens think that their
government’s efforts to combat corruption are not effective. In addition, most European
companies (65%) consider that the problem of corruption is widespread in their country and
half (51%) think that it is unlikely that corrupt people or businesses in their country would be
caught, or reported to the police or prosecutors.
National anti-corruption strategies and their implementation
74
75
76
77
78
Transparency International (2024)
https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022
11 Member States are in the top 20, two more than the previous year. Three Member States (Denmark,
Finland and Sweden) score 80/100 or above on the index, with others (the Netherlands, Germany,
Luxembourg, Ireland, Estonia, Belgium, Austria and France) score above 70/100. The EU average is (to be
calculated)/100.
Scores below 50 can be seen in Romania (46), Bulgaria (45), and Hungary (42).
Scores below 50 can be seen in Montenegro (45), North Macedonia (40), Albania (36), and Serbia (36)
Special
Eurobarometer 548
on Corruption (2024) & Flash
Eurobarometer 543
on Businesses’ attitudes
towards corruption in the EU (2024). The previous data sets are the Special Eurobarometer 534 (2023) and
the Flash Eurobarometer 524 (2023).
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The importance of maintaining effective anti-corruption policies is recognised in international
law
79
. National anti-corruption strategies can ensure that countries follow a comprehensive,
coherent and integrated approach, allowing action against corruption to be mainstreamed in
all relevant policy sectors. Almost all Member States currently have national anti-corruption
strategies in place, although with varying comprehensiveness. Since July 2023,
Hungary,
Greece, Italy, Sweden
and
Austria
have updated their national strategies and/or action plans
80
and
Portugal
adopted an anti-corruption agenda.
France, Finland
and
Bulgaria
have started
the process of revising their existing strategy, and preparatory revision processes are
advancing in
Slovenia,
while still pending in
Germany.
In
Estonia,
the implementation of the
anti-corruption action plan continues in an efficient and timely manner. In
Malta,
the
monitoring of the implementation of the national anti-fraud and corruption strategy
encountered some delays.
As regards enlargement countries,
Montenegro
has adopted and
Serbia
is currently finalising
their respective anti-corruption strategies. In
North Macedonia,
the slow implementation of
the measures committed to in its anti-corruption strategy points to a lack of political
commitment, while in
Albania,
implementation of the current strategy is on track but with
limited attention to high-risk sectors.
Strengthening the capacity of institutions and the legal framework to combat corruption
A robust legal and administrative anti-corruption framework
81
and strong and independent
institutions to enforce the rules are necessary to effectively combat corruption. In general, all
Member States and enlargement countries included in this report have strong legal
frameworks in place, although some specific gaps remain. In line with the 2023
recommendations, several Member States have taken forward criminal law reforms to
strengthen the fight against corruption.
Austria
extended bribery offences to cover candidates
for public office, and included additional sanctions for corruption offences, including the
prohibition to hold public office.
Greece
reinforced provisions on criminal liability for
bribery and
Croatia
strengthened the legislation on bribery of public officials, extending the
scope of liability of legal persons, and raising sanction levels for legal persons.
Germany
adopted a law strengthening provisions on trading in influence involving members of
Parliament. In other Member States some gaps remain, notably as regards foreign bribery. In
Sweden,
the legal definitions of foreign bribery, which remain limited, are being analysed by
a committee of inquiry, and revision of the foreign bribery offence is still pending in
Finland.
In some Member States, however, certain criminal law reforms risk undermining the fight
against corruption. In
Slovakia,
a recent criminal law reform raises a number of serious
concerns and has recently been subject to further amendment. Lowering the sanctions for
79
80
81
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) requires State Parties, in accordance with the
fundamental principles of their legal systems, to develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinated
anti-corruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of the rule of law,
proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability. All
Member States and the EU are parties to the Convention. See also The Kuala Lumpur
Statement on Anti-
Corruption Strategies.
Currently 20 Member States have dedicated anti-corruption strategies or programmes; almost all others have
anti-corruption components in other national strategies and action plans.
International standards are primarily the UNCAC; the Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption and its Civil Law Convention on Corruption; and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. At EU level, on 3 May 2023, the
Commission proposed a Directive on combating corruption, COM (2023) 234 final which aims to update
and strengthen the EU criminal justice framework.
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corruption and corruption-related crimes, shortening time limitation periods applying to
corruption crimes, and abolishing the Special Prosecution Office all risk to weaken the fight
against corruption. In
Italy,
a new law repealing the offence of abuse of office and limiting
the scope of the offence of trading in influence could have implications for the detection and
investigation of fraud and corruption. As regards the enlargement countries, in
North
Macedonia,
recent criminal code amendments weakened the legal framework, negatively
affecting the prosecution of corruption, especially in high-level corruption- cases.
Important developments took place to improve the anti-corruption institutional landscape in
some Member States. In
Bulgaria,
the Commission for Counteracting Corruption and Illegal
Assets Forfeiture was divided into two separate bodies (the Anti-Corruption Commission and
the Commission for Illegal Assets Forfeiture) in view of advancing anti-corruption
institutional framework, as envisaged in Bulgaria’s Recovery and Resilience Plan.
Poland
is
planning to dismantle its Central Anti-Corruption Bureau and transfer its resources and
competences to the Police’s Central Bureau of Investigation, with a view to addressing
previous concerns about interference.
The capacity of law enforcement services, prosecution authorities, and the judiciary more
generally, to enforce anti-corruption criminal law provisions is essential to effectively combat
corruption. Specialisation, expertise and adequate staffing all need to keep up with the
growing complexity of corruption crimes. In
Cyprus, Malta
and
Portugal,
steps have been
taken to increase resources of investigative authorities while
Luxembourg
is planning to do
so. On the other hand, concerns about both the overall level of resources, and the degree of
specialisation, have been voiced in respect of
Slovakia
and
Ireland.
Similar shortfalls for
specialised anti-corruption prosecution services have been highlighted in
Montenegro
and
Serbia.
Cooperation between law enforcement authorities and other agencies, such as financial
intelligence units and tax, audit, competition and other administrative authorities, as well as
access to information and the interconnection of databases and registries is key for fighting
corruption. Cooperation is being strengthened in
Spain,
with a dedicated agreement between
the prosecution anti-fraud agencies. In
Italy,
cooperation between the various national police
and prosecution services, the tax authorities and the national anti-corruption authority is
effective, and important investments in IT tools and interoperability benefit law enforcement
authorities. In
Ireland,
a forum of senior representatives meets regularly to facilitate inter-
agency coordination and information sharing among police and prosecution services, and
other national services active in preventing and fighting corruption. In other Member States,
challenges have been noted. The Audit Office in
Cyprus
reports that some public authorities
under audit (including the police in some cases) do not provide relevant information. In
Hungary,
the new Integrity Authority faces some obstacles in practice, particularly where it
needs to rely on cooperation with other public bodies.
The cooperation between national authorities and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office
(EPPO) is reported to be overall good in the participating Member States.
Poland
and
Sweden
joined the EPPO in 2024
82
. Preparations for the EPPO to become operational in both
countries will be concluded before the end of 2024. Beyond the EU,
Albania, Montenegro
and
North Macedonia
have concluded working arrangements with the EPPO, while working
arrangements with the EPPO are yet to be concluded with
Serbia.
82
Poland joined on 29 February and Sweden on 17 July.
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Removing obstacles to criminal investigations and prosecution and improving the track
record for high-level corruption
According to the Special Eurobarometer on citizens’ attitudes towards corruption, around two
thirds of Europeans (65%) think that high-level corruption cases are not pursued
sufficiently
83
. Effective investigation and prosecution of corruption cases can be obstructed
by shortcomings in law, such as excessively cumbersome or unclear procedures to lift
immunities or short time limitation periods. These obstacles can be particularly harmful for
complex corruption cases where time is often needed to build a case. In
Romania,
a delayed
legislative response on issues regarding the statute of limitations continued to result in the
closing of many corruption cases and the annulment of convictions. In
Italy,
the proposed
changes to the statute of limitations could reduce the time available to conduct judicial
proceedings for criminal offences, including in corruption cases. In
Slovenia,
recent
amendments to the Criminal Procedural Code limit the possibilities to use certain
investigative measures and could possibly make effective investigation and prosecution of
corruption more difficult.
The 2023 Rule of Law report noted that some Member States needed reforms to reduce the
length of criminal proceedings to improve the track record of final judgments, in particular
for high-level corruption cases. In
Croatia,
steps were taken to make the investigation and
prosecution of corruption offences more efficient, while a revision of the Criminal Procedure
Code and the Law on the specialised anti-corruption prosecution office remain outstanding.
In
Czechia,
high-level corruption cases also remain a point of attention due to delays in some
proceedings. In
Spain,
a reform of the Criminal Procedure Code, which could also increase
efficiency in handling high-level corruption cases, is still pending.
Some Member States continue to consolidate their track record of investigating, prosecuting
and sanctioning corruption, including in high-level cases
84
.
Austria, Latvia,
and
Romania,
saw continued effective investigation of high-level corruption. New impetus was given to
investigating high-level corruption cases in
Poland,
with several large-scale corruption cases
now open. Significant results continue to be achieved in prosecuting and adjudicating high-
level corruption offences in
France. Greece
made efforts to improve its track record, also by
addressing challenges identified in collecting corruption statistics, including on high-level
corruption. In
Slovenia,
first instance court judgments in corruption cases increased
considerably and the number of convictions almost doubled, while investigations into
possible high-level political influence in police decision-making are ongoing.
In other Member States, a robust track record in the investigation and prosecution of high-
level corruption cases, with dissuasive sanctions and final judgments, remains to be
established. This is the case, for example, in
Bulgaria
and
Malta.
In
Slovakia,
a robust track
record against high-level corruption is hampered by a continued lack of coordination among
corruption investigators and prosecutors as well as the Prosecutor General’s recourse to
powers to annul corruption investigations and prosecutions. In
Hungary,
some high-level
corruption cases have reached the indictment stage, but convictions remain rare in such cases
and the lack of a robust track record of investigations and prosecutions of corruption
allegations concerning high-level officials and their immediate circle remains a serious
concern.
83
84
Special
Eurobarometer 548
on Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2024).
As noted in the 2020 Rule of Law report, the lack of uniform, up to date and consolidated statistics across all
Member States makes it difficult to track the comparative success of the investigation and prosecution of
corruption offences. The assessment is based on the data provided by Member States.
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In
Montenegro,
the track record of investigations and prosecutions in cases of high-level
corruption is stable, but the lack of trials and final decisions contributes to a perception of
impunity. In
North Macedonia
resource constraints and a lack of cooperation between
national authorities hamper the effective prosecution of corruption and hinder the
establishment of a robust track-record of high-level corruption cases. In
Albania,
the number
of persons investigated, prosecuted, and convicted for corruption has been increasing, but a
recent amnesty law raises concerns. In
Serbia,
the number of final convictions in high-level
corruption cases increased in the past year, but further improvements are needed to establish
a solid track record on investigations, indictments and final convictions.
Fighting corruption as an enabler of organised crime
Corruption facilitates criminal activity and targets both the private and public sectors.
Addressing corruption risks related to infiltration and undue influence by organised crime
into the public service, law enforcement and the judiciary is an increasing priority for the
authorities in several Member States. In the
Netherlands,
preventing infiltration of organised
crime groups in the civil service and police through corruption is a strategic priority. A
programme is ongoing since 2020 on combating subversive organised crime, with risk
assessments initiated in several sectors (including ports and local authorities) and measures to
address vulnerabilities.
Sweden
is targeting work on the risk areas and enablers of organised
crime infiltration.
Belgium
is taking a variety of measures to address corruption linked to
drugs trafficking and organised crime groups, which is recognised as an important
phenomenon.
Fostering integrity in the public sector and preventing conflicts of interests
Transparent and accountable governance and integrity frameworks are the best protection
against corruption. This is why effective anti-corruption approaches often build on measures
to enhance transparency, ethics and integrity, as well as regulating areas such as conflict of
interest, lobbying and ‘revolving doors’
85
.
Conflicts of interest arise when a public official has a private or professional interest that
could interfere with the impartial and objective performance of their duties
86
. Some Member
States have taken further steps to regulate conflicts of interests, also following the 2023
recommendations. In
Czechia,
legislation was adopted to broaden the conflict of interest
system, including a total ban on media ownership for elected officials, though online media
remains outside the scope of this legislation. In
Slovenia,
legislation on supervision of
conflict of interest and incompatibility of office is being reviewed. Challenges remain in
other Member States. In
Italy,
comprehensive legislation on conflict of interest for political
office holders is still pending. In
Spain,
no further steps have been taken to improve rules on
conflicts of interest for civil servants, despite ongoing work since 2021. Regarding
enlargement countries, in
Albania
rules on conflict of interest for public officials are
incomplete and not aligned with European standards and
North Macedonia
would need to
strengthen the system for violations of the rules on conflicts of interest.
Senior government officials and Members of Parliament are often subject to specific integrity
rules and many Member States have codes of conduct in place. It is important that the
practical implementation of these rules is subject to regular verification and evaluation. In
Belgium,
the ministerial Code of Conduct for federal public office holders was extended to
85
86
JOIN (2023) 12 final, p. 4.
See Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec (2000)10 on codes of conduct for public officials.
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cover all members of ministerial private offices. In
Estonia,
digital tools are being developed
and deployed to ensure a better implementation of the existing rules on integrity. In
Greece,
work on developing codes of conduct for members of Parliament and members of
Government continued.
In
Portugal,
a new Code of Conduct applicable to the Government and high-level officials
was also adopted, which explicitly refers to the possibility of dismissal in case of violation of
the Code and foresees the creation of a corruption risk prevention plan. In other Member
States, gaps remain. In
Bulgaria,
a working group was established to draft a code of conduct
for top executive functions, given the serious gaps identified. In
Finland,
there is still no
dedicated Code of Conduct for Ministers. In
Montenegro,
while numerous institutions have
specific codes of conduct, the Government’s Code is ineffective, with the adoption of a law
with disciplinary penalties pending.
Ensuring transparent lobbying and regulating ‘revolving doors’
To be a legitimate act of political participation, lobbying needs to be accompanied by strong
requirements for transparency and integrity to support accountability and inclusiveness in
decision-making and restrict undue and covert influence
87
. Poorly regulated lobbying can also
open doors for foreign interference.
Some Member States have revised their lobbying transparency rules, also in line with 2023
recommendations. Stricter rules for
Germany’s
lobbying register came into force, with
extended transparency requirements and some steps were taken to introduce a legislative
footprint. In
Croatia,
a new law introduced an electronic lobby register, restrictions on
lobbying activities and a set of rules on the verification, enforcement and penalties. In
Finland,
new legal provisions require the registration of lobbying activities with a new
transparency register. In
Cyprus, Ireland, Lithuania
and
Latvia,
new lobbying provisions
entered into force or are being implemented, while discussions on new legislation continued
in
Belgium, Czechia
and
Portugal. Czechia
and
Portugal.
Further improvements are necessary in other Member States. In
France,
while guidelines on a
lobbyists’ register have entered into force and further drafts are before Parliament, concerns
remain on the disclosure of lobbying meetings by top-ranking officials.
Luxembourg
has
revised the code of conduct for parliamentarians to increase transparency, but the register still
provides limited details. Dedicated regulation on lobbying is still missing in
Slovakia
and
Italy,
and existing legislation could be improved in
Austria, Poland, Hungary
and the
Netherlands.
In
Romania,
rules on lobbying for members of Parliament are still missing,
while there have been some developments on the enforcement of lobbying rules for Members
of Government.
The regulation and enforcement on ‘revolving doors’ between public and private functions to
address potential conflicts of interest continues to be an area of attention. There are now
stricter post-employment rules for high-level officials and higher transparency standards in
place in
Germany.
In
Portugal,
new legislation on revolving doors introduced harsher
sanctions. In
Sweden,
the post-employment rules for top executive functions in the
government were evaluated, with suggested improvements. Discussions on introducing or
revising existing rules on revolving doors are progressing in
Finland
and the
Netherlands,
and
87
OECD (2021) Lobbying in the 21
st
century. OECD (2010), Recommendation of the Council on Principles
for Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying; Council of Europe standards on lobbying transparency,
Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)2, OECD (2024)
Recommendation on transparency and integrity in
lobbying and influence.
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guidelines are being developed in
Italy.
In other Member States, progress has been slower. In
Hungary,
post-employment restrictions and cooling-off periods are fragmented and limited in
scope, but there are plans to legislate in this area in 2025. In
Denmark,
no steps have been
taken to introduce rules on revolving doors for ministers. In
Estonia,
specific guidelines on
revolving doors together with possible instructions on how to mitigate the risks currently
being developed by the Public Ethical Council are expected in 2024.
In
North Macedonia,
while the legal framework and lobbying registers are in place, there are
no registered lobbyists yet. In
Montenegro,
new legislation on lobbying was recently adopted.
Asset and interest disclosure
Asset and interest declarations by public officials support public sector transparency and
accountability and are important tools to promote integrity and prevent corruption. Most
Member States have rules to ensure that such disclosures apply to those with political and
executive power. However, there are wide variations in the scope, transparency and
accessibility of disclosed information, as well as in the effectiveness of verification and
enforcement.
Positive developments are noted in some Member States, also addressing issues covered in
the 2023 recommendations. In
Greece,
implementation of the new law on asset declarations
is on track with a significant percentage of verifications completed, also thanks to an upgrade
of the dedicated electronic platform. In
Cyprus,
the judiciary introduced its own regulatory
framework on asset disclosure, and all judges now file their asset declarations with the
Constitutional Court. In
Portugal,
the reform to entrust monitoring and verification of asset
declarations of political and senior public officials to the Transparency Entity established in
2019 entered into force.
In other Member States, challenges remain. In
Belgium,
the system for asset declarations
does not ensure adequate verification and transparency, with checks only in the context of
criminal investigations. In
Denmark,
no progress has been made on asset declarations
submitted by those with top executive functions, and there is a lack of verification and
monitoring. In
Luxembourg,
there is still no formal verification system to check the accuracy
of asset declarations.
Hungary
has yet to take further steps to improve the asset declaration
system, including as regards oversight. In
Ireland,
the digitalisation of asset declarations has
not progressed. In the enlargement countries, while in
Albania
and
Serbia
asset declaration
rules cover a relatively broad range of officials, there are shortcomings in effective
verification and enforcement.
Whistleblower protection
The protection of whistleblowers plays an essential role in the detection and prevention of
corruption. The transposition of the EU Directive on whistleblower protection
88
has resulted
in revised or new legislation in many Member States, as noted in last year’s report. Since July
2023, progress on laws on the protection of whistleblowers has been made in several Member
States
89
.
However, there are still major obstacles to reporting corruption cases in practice with just
43% of Europeans knowing where to report a case of corruption and 28% of Europeans
88
89
Directive 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (OJ L 305, 26.11.2019).
A recent
report
on the implementation and application of the whistleblower Directive assesses the measures
notified by Member States declaring complete transposition by 17 December 2023 (COM(2024) 269 final).
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believing that cases of corruption are not reported because reporting would be pointless as
those responsible would not be punished
90
. To overcome reluctance, many Member States are
putting in place tools to provide guidance and raise awareness. For example, in the
Netherlands,
a campaign promotes awareness and encourages whistleblowers to use the new
reporting channels.
Italy
and
Cyprus
have developed new guidelines and information tools to
support whistleblowers. In
France,
a consortium of NGOs was created to advise potential
whistleblowers. In
Malta,
work is ongoing to develop a database and tools to process
whistleblowing reports.
Enlargement countries are working on aligning their laws with the EU acquis. In
Montenegro,
legal provisions on the protection of whistleblowers have been amended with
the aim to align with the EU acquis, and the government in
North Macedonia
is working on
updating the law on the protection of whistleblowers to the same end.
Addressing areas at high risk of corruption
No sector or area of activity is safe from corruption risks, but common high-risk areas
deserve particular attention – usually those involving management of significant public funds,
such as public procurement, or access to a critical service. Sectors such as healthcare, energy,
urban planning and regional and local government have been identified as vulnerable. Other
high-risk areas for corruption include focal points for organised crime, such as ports. Other
areas of risk relate to political party financing and investor citizenship
91
and residence
schemes
92
.
Risk assessment exercises are important tools for informing anti-corruption policy.
Czechia
developed a corruption risk assessment and risk measurement methodology to inform future
action. The
Netherlands
have launched a national risk assessment to identify the biggest
corruption threats at national, provincial and local level, with targeted awareness-raising
campaigns for high-risk sectors. In
Latvia,
authorities are planning to develop its
methodology for risk assessment. In
Estonia,
an electronic tool was developed to assess the
risks of corruption in the private sector.
Several Member States have adopted or are considering reforms to increase transparency and
oversight for political party financing, also with a view to support democratic accountability
and prevent undue foreign influence
93
. In the
Netherlands,
new draft legislation aims to
increase transparency and prohibit political parties when they pose a clear and real danger of
undermining or abolishing the democratic rule of law.
Germany
has adopted new political
party financing rules, regulating party sponsoring and hidden party campaign finance by
other persons. In
Denmark,
a new law on public financing of political parties has entered into
force, and a proposal for increased transparency for private financing of political parties is
still pending. In
Slovenia,
new rules should lead to more frequent audits of the largest
90
91
92
93
Special
Eurobarometer 548
on Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU (2024).
The Commission has taken steps against investor citizenship schemes in the EU, since the grant of EU
citizenship in return for pre-determined payments or investments, without any genuine link to the Member
State concerned, undermines the essence of EU citizenship and is in breach of EU law. This has included
referring one Member State to the Court of Justice.
Joint Communication on the fight against corruption on the fight against corruption, JOIN(2023)12, 3 May
2023.
In December 2023, the Commission presented a Recommendation on inclusive and resilient electoral
processes in the Union (C(2023) 8626). One of the points encouraged Member States to identify and address
possible gaps in their legislation relating to donations and other funding from third countries to national
political parties.
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political parties and of a larger proportion of state funding. In
Czechia,
a reform strengthened
the office supervising political parties financing.
Challenges continue to exist in other Member States. In
Belgium,
a long-awaited reform of
political party financing was stalled due to a lack of agreement between political parties. In
Cyprus,
the audits on funding of political candidates and parties pointed at flaws which have
not yet been followed up in legislation. In
Italy,
the practice of channelling donations through
political foundations and associations remains unchanged and there is no single register for
party and campaign information, with several draft laws still under discussion in Parliament.
Member States are taking different measures to mitigate corruption risks in other high-risk
areas. In
France,
following concerns raised on large public contracts, a draft law on the use of
consulting companies for public policies was presented in Parliament and the Government
established an agency to advise the public and tabled a law on the use of consulting
companies for public policies. In
Italy,
the digitalisation of the entire lifecycle of all
procurement or concession contracts will ensure more transparency of public contracts. In
Lithuania,
inspections targeted high-risk areas such as public procurement, supervision of
construction and territorial planning. Corruption prevention authorities in
Slovenia
concluded
a review of procurement procedures in the health care sector, making specific
recommendations to remedy weaknesses.
Such sectors also present intensified risks in enlargement countries. In
Albania
an overly
complex legal framework has also been identified as an obstacle to progress, and there are
several exemptions from the law on public procurement in
Serbia
which are not in line with
EU acquis and are widely used to circumvent the application of the existing procurement
rules.
3.3 Media pluralism and media freedom
A free and pluralistic media environment is essential for the rule of law, with free and
independent media playing an important role as watchdogs of democracy and holding power
to account. Pressure or control over the media from politicians or the state undermines media
freedom, as well as people’s freedom to seek, receive and impart information. Conflicts of
interest and a highly concentrated market dominated by only a few players can also
undermine media pluralism, in particular in the absence of strong safeguards for editorial
independence.
The EU has put in place rules and standards in several key areas covered by the rule of law
reports, starting with the safety and protection of journalists and measures to address the
phenomenon of strategic litigation against public participation (SLAPP). The European
Media Freedom Act (EMFA) introduces, among others, specific provisions on media
ownership transparency, the transparent and fair allocation of state advertising, and the
independent functioning of public service media and availability of financial resources for the
fulfilment of their public service remit
94
. Given the relevance of those provisions in fostering
media freedom and media pluralism, it is important that Member States start putting them
into practice as soon as possible, including by addressing the relevant rule of law reports’
recommendations, especially in cases where concerns on the matters covered by the EMFA
signalled in the rule of law reports have persisted for several years or where deterioration of
the situation has been reported.
94
The relevant provisions shall apply from 8 August 2025.
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The Media Pluralism Monitor assesses the risks to media freedom and pluralism in all
Member States and the majority of accession countries, focusing on four areas – fundamental
protection of media freedom, market plurality, political independence, and the social
inclusiveness of media. This year’s Monitor’s results (MPM 2024) show no major change
across these areas, though there has been some variance in specific indicators. The indicator
relating to the journalistic profession, standards and protection of journalists registers the
same medium risk score as the previous year with a higher risk score registered in terms of
journalists’ digital safety. Journalists’ working conditions and the lack of independence of
public service media governance in several countries remain issues of concern. This year’s
overall ranking divides countries into five risk bands with seven Member States registering in
the ‘high medium risk’ band while two Member States and three enlargement countries
covered by this report register in the ‘high risk’ band.
Strengthening the independent functioning of media regulators
National media regulators play an essential role in upholding media pluralism when they are
functionally and effectively independent and exercise their powers in an impartial and
transparent way, with sufficient resources. All Member States have legislation in place setting
out the competences and independence safeguards of media regulators. Both the Audiovisual
Media Services Directive (AVMSD) and the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) include
a set of requirements for media regulators: independence from government, impartiality,
transparency, accountability, adequate resources, appointment and dismissal procedures and
effective appeal mechanisms
95
.
Since the 2023 Rule of Law report, the tasks and competences of several national media
regulators have been expanded and extended, not least due to the adoption of the EU Digital
Services Act
96
. Positive developments are noted in
Spain,
with a strengthening of the
supervisory function of the audiovisual media regulatory authority. In
Sweden,
the national
regulatory authority was restructured, merging a range of tasks with the aim to provide more
effective services. As regards enlargement countries,
Montenegro
has put a legal framework
equipping the media regulator with comprehensive sanctioning instruments, including the
power to impose fines in case of violations of the law.
Continued concerns about the independence or impartiality of regulators exist in several
Member States, including insufficient safeguards against undue political influence over the
nomination process or in the functioning of regulators, as is the case in
Hungary, Slovenia,
Croatia, Bulgaria
and
Poland.
In
Greece,
additional measures were taken to strengthen
resources, however their adequacy for the authority to carry out its tasks remains to be fully
addressed. Enlargement countries also face challenges in ensuring the independence of media
regulators. In
Serbia,
the media regulator fails to fully exercise its mandate to safeguard
media pluralism and professional standards and there are serious concerns about its
independence, while in
Albania
questions arise due to the political affiliation and perceived
conflicts of interest of the regulator.
Increasing the transparency of media ownership
Transparency of media ownership is directly linked to media freedom and pluralism as it
allows users to make better informed judgements, as media owners can directly or indirectly
control or influence the editorial decisions and the news content provided. European
95
96
Directive 2018/1808 of 14 November 2018 and Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of 11 April 2024
Regulation 2022/2065 of 19 October 2022
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standards
97
define key measures, and there are specific requirements in EU law
98
. Since the
last report, there have been positive developments in
Ireland, Greece
and
Spain,
establishing
or extending online ownership registries. In
North Macedonia,
print and broadcast media
must disclose ownership information to the audiovisual media regulatory body, while self-
regulation governs the ownership registry for digital national media. In
Montenegro,
the new
Law on Audiovisual Media Services obliges providers of audiovisual services to provide
ownership information to the media regulator.
Previously highlighted challenges regarding transparency of media ownership persist in
Bulgaria, Czechia, France,
the
Netherlands
and
Cyprus.
In
Portugal,
a high-profile case
triggered discussions regarding the legislative framework. In
Albania,
the transparency of
ownership of media is limited, and in
Serbia,
measures aimed at increasing transparency of
media ownership are not yet fully implemented, and political and economic influence on the
media remains a source of concern. political and economic influence on the media remains a
source of concern.
Safeguarding media from political pressure and undue influence
Media independence can be undermined by political pressure and undue influence. This calls
in particular for strong safeguards against the politicisation of public service media and
transparent rules on fair allocation of state advertising. The European Media Freedom Act
(EMFA) includes provisions to ensure the independent functioning of public service media
and availability of financial resources for the fulfilment of their public service remit. It also
requires that Member States respect the effective editorial freedom and independence of
media service providers in the exercise of their professional activities and should not interfere
in or try to influence the editorial policies and decisions of media service providers.
State advertising includes all use of the budget, by public authorities or entities at all levels,
for the purposes of advertising and campaigns. If this is not allocated transparently and fairly,
it can be used as a means of political influence and to favour certain media outlets. In this
regard the EMFA sets out requirements in relation to allocation criteria and procedures as
well as annual publication of information by public authorities or entities on the amounts
spent with which Member States will need to comply with once the relevant provisions start
applying. In some Member States – namely
Austria, Bulgaria
and
Slovenia
– some positive
steps have been taken, also following the recommendations addressed in the 2023 and 2022
reports, though challenges remain. No steps have been taken to increase the transparency and
fairness in the allocation of state advertising in
Hungary, Croatia, Malta
and
Spain. Albania
lacks a transparent distribution system for state advertising. In
Montenegro,
information on
all public sector payments made to media outlets, including institutional advertising, is
limited. In
North Macedonia,
certain elements of a new law covering state-funded
advertising have raised concerns among stakeholders.
While the funding granted to public service media is the responsibility of each Member
State
99
, European standards and guiding principles exist on independence, the regulatory and
97
98
99
Recommendation CM/Rec(2018)11 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on media pluralism and
transparency of media ownership
EU legislation contains relevant provisions: Directive 2010/13/EU, as amended by Directive 2018/1808
(AVMSD); General (non-sectoral) obligations of transparency of beneficial ownership in the Anti-Money
Laundering Directives (Directives 2018/843 and 2015/849). The EMFA obliges all media service providers
to disclose their direct, indirect and beneficial owners.
As long as EU trade and competition rules are respected. See Protocol to the Treaties (No 29) on the system
of public broadcasting in the Member States.
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policy framework, funding, appointments, accountability, management, transparency, and
openness
100
. Provisions to ensure the independent functioning of public service media,
notably by requiring safeguards for adequate, sustainable and predictable financial resources
and fostering transparency in the appointments and dismissals of management will need to be
complied with once EMFA enters into application.
Reforms aimed at strengthening the independence of national public service broadcasters
have been agreed or are under way in several Member States. Legislation or other positive
steps have been applied in
Germany, Sweden
and
Czechia
while reform discussions are
ongoing or in preparation in
Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Denmark, Bulgaria,
the
Netherlands
and
Poland.
Previously voiced concerns with regard to the independent
governance and editorial independence of public service media have not yet been addressed
in
Romania, Malta,
and
Hungary.
In
Slovakia,
a law was adopted in July 2024 which
dissolves the current public broadcaster and establishes a new one, leading to concerns on the
future independence of the broadcaster. In
Italy,
though there are rules in place aimed at
ensuring that public service media provide independent and pluralistic information, there are
persisting challenges related to the effectiveness of its governance and funding system.
As regards enlargement countries, while the legal frameworks regulating the governance of
public service media are in place in
Albania
and
North Macedonia,
they have not shielded
public service media in practice against politicisation. Funding is unstable in
North
Macedonia.
In
Serbia,
while a revision is planned for the end of 2024 to ensure stable
funding, issues of editorial autonomy and pluralism of public service media need to be
addressed. A recent legal reform of public service media in
Montenegro
is expected to bring
positive developments both in terms of governance as well as funding.
Access to information
The right to access information held by public authorities is one of the main transparency and
accountability tools for civil society and citizens and it is fundamental for journalists to do
their work. Several Member States, such as
Estonia, Luxembourg, Austria, Bulgaria
and
Finland
have made further tangible progress in this respect. In
Austria,
for example, a
Freedom of Information Act was adopted and enshrined in the Constitution, which for the
first time provides a right to information from public authorities and state-owned enterprises.
However, limited progress has been seen in several other Member States where problems
were previously identified, such as
Spain, Poland, Germany, Greece, Romania
and
Malta.
In
Italy
the rules regulating the disclosure of judicial information in criminal proceedings raise
concerns, while in
Croatia
although journalists are exempt from the offence of disclosure of
such information, there is still strong criticism from stakeholders, and efforts continue to be
made to address it.
The right to access information is legally guaranteed in all the enlargement countries included
in this report, but journalists’ ability to exercise this right is often significantly limited in
practice. In
Serbia
and
Montenegro,
journalists face frequent refusals by public bodies to
release information.
Improving the safety and protection of journalists and addressing legal threats and abusive
court proceedings against public participation
100
Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2012)1 on public service media governance.
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Journalists continue to face physical and legal threats, with online smear campaigns and
censorship both also compromising their safety. Several measures recommended in the 2021
Commission Recommendation on the safety of journalists
101
are in need of improvement in
several Member States, as highlighted by an independent study published in May 2024
102
.
They include effective and impartial investigation and prosecution of crimes, dedicated
training, addressing online threats and attacks and ensuring the safety of female journalists,
journalists belonging to minority groups and those reporting on equality issues. Regarding
positive developments, several Member States (and enlargement countries)
103
have adopted
dedicated Action Plans, and taken steps to set up dedicated support structures promoting the
safety of journalists.
Strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) are a particular form of harassment
used against journalists and human rights defenders engaged with matters of public interest.
Defamation is one of the most common grounds on which SLAPPs are brought against
journalists. Such harassment usually aims at silencing journalists and creating a chilling
effect on media freedom and freedom of expression. New EU law provisions are in place
since May 2024 to curb SLAPPs
104
and Member States have been encouraged to take
additional action
105
. Moreover, the EMFA has put in place requirements for the effective
protection of journalistic sources and confidential communications and safeguards against the
deployment of intrusive surveillance software.
Following positive developments acknowledged in the 2023 report in some Member States,
others have also followed up on the recommendations issued in the 2023 and 2022 reports. In
Croatia,
awareness raising efforts continue on SLAPPs targeting journalists, though progress
is limited. In
Lithuania,
the Government adopted an action plan on the safety and protection
of journalists
and
continues to strengthen their protection against abusive lawsuits. In
Luxembourg,
the Government has committed to reinforce the safety of journalists and a new
draft law is expected to introduce safeguards for the protection of journalists in
Slovenia.
However, reform processes have stalled in
Cyprus
and
Malta.
In
Slovakia,
despite some
progress with regard to mechanisms aimed at improving the safety of journalists, there are
increasing concerns in relation to reported worsening of their working environment. In both
Montenegro
and
North Macedonia,
legislative amendments provide for harsher penalties in
case of violent acts or intimidation against journalists.
Specifically on the threat of SLAPPs and responding to 2023 and 2022 recommendations,
Greece
and
Ireland
have progressed with legislative work to introduce specific procedural
safeguards and/or revising their defamation laws, while reform of the defamation regime is
stalled in
Italy
and also in
Slovakia. North Macedonia
introduced legislative amendments
101
102
103
104
105
2021 Recommendation on the safety of journalists (C(2021) 6650, 16 September 2021)
European Commission, Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Study
on putting in practice by Member States of the recommendation on the protection, safety and empowerment
of journalists – Final report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.
While the Recommendation is addressed to EU Member States, it also encourages candidate countries to
follow its provisions.
Directive 2024/1069 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded
claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’).
The 2022 Commission Recommendation (C(2022) 2428, 27 April 2022) includes measures related covering
defamation, training, awareness raising, support mechanisms, data collection, reporting and monitoring. The
Commission is in contact with Member States to prepare a report on their follow-up to the Recommendation.
The Council of Europe also adopted a
Recommendation on countering the use of strategic lawsuits against
public participation (SLAPPs)
in April 2024.
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which restrict the margin to initiate SLAPP cases against media organisations and journalists
and decrease the fines applied in cases of defamation.
3.4 Other institutional issues linked to checks and balances
A well-functioning system of institutional checks and balances is central to the rule of law
and provides a system of mutual control, whereby the power exercised by one state authority
is subject to the scrutiny of others, even if how this is organised varies according to different
national legal and constitutional traditions. An open legislative process and attention to the
quality of lawmaking has a long-term effect on the ability to ensure the rule of law. The
stability and quality of the law-making process are also key indicators for confidence in
investment protection. Civil society organisations and independent authorities, such as
National Human Rights Institutions, equality bodies and Ombudspersons, are an
indispensable element in such checks and balances in a healthy democracy, so their freedom
to operate is directly relevant to rule of law.
The inclusiveness, quality and transparency of the law-making process
Efforts to improve the quality, inclusiveness and transparency of the legislative process have
continued, including on issues covered in the 2023 recommendations. In
Czechia,
the use of
accelerated legislative procedures decreased and a new public digital platform for accessing
legislation free of charge was launched. Similarly, in
Ireland,
the use of motions to shorten
the debate time for legislative proposals decreased considerably. In
France,
several tools have
been put in place to increase the participation of citizens in the law-making process. In
Portugal,
new measures were taken to improve the transparency of law-making, while the
regulation of impact assessment is still pending.
Some Member States have initiated efforts to improve the quality of the legislative process
that are still at an early stage. In
Croatia,
a new Law on Better Regulation introduced a
comprehensive overhaul of impact assessments and evaluations, and additional standards for
public consultations. In
Cyprus,
a new e-consultation platform is a step towards facilitating
stakeholder input in the legislative process, while further measures are needed for meaningful
public consultation. In
Luxembourg,
the legislative process is more inclusive, in particular as
regards Government-initiated legislation, while shortcomings remain concerning draft laws
tabled by members of Parliament. In
Poland,
the Government has started to involve civil
society more effectively in consultations on legislation, though this approach needs to be
consolidated. In
North Macedonia,
a national electronic consultation system allowing
stakeholders to participate in public consultations is in place, but not all draft laws are
published on the platform.
In a number of Member States, challenges persist in areas such as the excessive use of
accelerated procedures or the overall quality of law-making, as well as in consultation of
stakeholders. In
Spain,
the “Organic Law on Amnesty for the Institutional, Political and
Social Normalisation of Catalonia” sparked controversy and was subject to a Venice
Commission Opinion, which addressed a number of issues related to the rule of law. It was
taken forward under an urgent procedure, allowing only for a limited consultation of the
public. In
Bulgaria
challenges continue regarding the quality of the legislative process. In
Hungary,
the quality of law-making and the frequent changes in legislation remain a
significant cause for concern. Legal uncertainty adds to concerns about arbitrary decisions
from the government and public authorities seen as obstacles for the operation of businesses
in the single market. In
France, Estonia
and
Italy,
concerns have been raised about the
considerable use of accelerated legislative procedures or emergency decrees. In
Slovakia,
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major reforms have taken place without effective stakeholder involvement, frequently using
fast-track legislative procedures. In
Finland,
stakeholders have reported a change in the
practice of public consultations, reducing the opportunity to comment. In
Malta,
a formal
framework regarding public engagement in the drafting of legislation is still lacking. In
Romania,
efforts are still needed to ensure effective public consultations as shortcomings
persist.
In
Albania
and
North Macedonia,
deep political polarisation has a negative impact on the
legislative process, which in the latter case has caused delays in its work and led to the
excessive and sometimes inappropriate use of accelerated legislative procedures. In
Montenegro,
despite an establised framework for an inclusive legislative process, challenges
remain concerning inadquate public consultation. In
Serbia,
Parliament’s ability to provide
checks and balances is constrained by issues of effectiveness, autonomy and transparency,
and the process of public consultation needs further strengthening.
Constitutional reforms and debates impacting on institutional checks and balances
In several Member States, constitutional reform processes have been undertaken or are
subject of important public debates. In
Bulgaria,
the constitutional reform changed the
procedure for appointment of the interim government by limiting the powers of the President.
In
Sweden,
the Government is examining the follow up to an all-party committee report on a
possible amendment of the constitution to deal with serious peacetime crises. In the
Netherlands,
further steps have been taken by all state powers to strengthen the legal
protection of citizens and a State Commission on the Rule of Law issued recommendations.
In
Italy,
the Government has submitted to Parliament a draft constitutional reform, with the
objective of ensuring greater stability of government.
Significant developments on Supreme and Constitutional Courts in the checks and balances
Constitutional courts play a key role in the effective application of EU law and in ensuring
the integrity of the EU legal order and are key elements of checks and balances. While the
establishment, composition and functioning of constitutional jurisdictions are within the
competence of Member States, when exercising that competence, Member States are required
to comply with EU law and EU values
106
.
In some Member States, the scope of constitutional review is expanding. In
Bulgaria,
the
constitutional reform made constitutional checks more accessible by allowing all courts to
submit requests on constitutionality. In
Lithuania,
the Judicial Council is preparing a proposal
to amend the constitution in order to be granted the right of constitutional appeal regarding
legislation affecting the judiciary. Concerns persist regarding other aspects of the work of
Constitutional Courts in some Member States. In
Hungary,
the Constitutional Court still
reviews the merits of final rulings of ordinary courts, although as previously reported public
authorities can no longer challenge final judicial decisions before the Constitutional Court. In
Slovenia,
following concerns raised for years by the Constitutional Court regarding its
considerable workload, which prevents the Court from dedicating more attention to the
constitutionally most far-reaching cases, discussions have continued on constitutional
amendments to reduce the Constitutional Court’s caseload by transferring certain types of
cases to administrative courts.
106
CJEU, judgment of 22 February 2022, RS (Effect of the decisions of a constitutional court), C-430/21.
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As regards the enlargement countries, in
Albania
the Constitutional Court is effective in
upholding institutional checks and balances, though Parliament has failed to comply with
some of its rulings. In
Serbia,
several vacancies at the Constitutional Court need to be filled.
Ombudspersons, National Human Rights Institutions, equality bodies and other independent
authorities
National human rights institutions (NHRIs)
107
, Ombudspersons
108
, equality bodies and other
independent authorities have an important role in national checks and balances. In some
Member States, the status of these bodies has been further strengthened or reforms are under
way. In
Bulgaria
and
Cyprus,
the Ombudspersons have been given new tasks, and in
Lithuania
and
Poland
there was an increase of financial resources for Ombudspersons’
Offices. In
Sweden,
the National Human Rights Institution has secured funding for its
activities and continues working towards an A-status accreditation. In
Estonia, Luxembourg,
and
Finland
reforms are being discussed to strengthen the autonomy of independent
institutions.
However, in other Member States, NHRIs and Ombudsperson institutions continue to face
challenges. In
Hungary,
concerns remain regarding the independence and effective
functioning of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. In
Croatia,
some further steps were
made on the follow-up to the People’s Ombudsperson’s recommendations, but challenges on
access to information remain. The
Netherlands
Institute for Human Rights continues to face
governance issues. In
Slovenia,
the Human Rights Ombudsperson has raised concerns
regarding proposed amendments to the act on its functioning.
In
Montenegro,
the Ombudsperson’s Office has improved its capacity to handle complaints
and improve decision quality, but the absence of systematic follow-up to its
recommendations undermines the efficiency of its work. In
Serbia,
there is no systematic
follow-up on the recommendations of the independent bodies.
Procedures for the appointment of heads of independent authorities have emerged as offering
particular challenges. Delays in appointments have continued in
Bulgaria
and
Austria
while
in
Slovakia
legislative amendments have widened the power of the Government to appoint
and dismiss heads of certain independent bodies. In
Greece,
while measures were taken to
improve the salary regime, independent authorities face challenges that could undermine their
status and ability to carry out their tasks effectively. In contrast, in
Poland,
the
recommendation regarding the Supreme Audit Office has been fully implemented by
ensuring the appointment of its College members and an adequate follow-up to its findings.
As regards the four Member States who do not yet have established an NHRI in line with the
UN Paris Principles, in
Czechia,
an amendment to entrust the Ombudsperson with the
function of an NHRI, and there has been some progress on obtaining accreditation for the
Ombudsman and the NHRI in
Romania.
However,
Italy
and
Malta
have made no progress
towards establishing an NHRI.
107
108
The UN Paris Principles, endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 1993 (Resolution A/RES/48/134), set
out the main criteria that NHRIs are required to meet. NHRIs are periodically accredited before the
Subcommittee on Accreditation of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions.
See the Venice Commission Principles for Ombudspersons.
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Implementation of judgments by the European Court of Human Rights and national courts
Since 2022, the country chapters include figures on the implementation of leading judgments
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), an important indicator for the functioning
of the rule of law in a country. Results vary between Member States. Across the EU, around
44% of leading judgments of the ECtHR relating to the Member States from the last ten years
are yet to be implemented, a slight increase on last year
109
.
In
Belgium
non-compliance with European Court of Human Rights and domestic court
judgments, including a final judgment of a court of last instance, raises serious concerns.
Romania
remains under enhanced supervision from the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe for a long-standing structural problem of non-implementation or delayed
implementation of final domestic court decisions delivered against the State. In
Croatia,
a
new Law on Administrative Disputes includes measures to encourage the swift
implementation of administrative courts’ judgments.
Civil society organisations as essential actors for the rule of law
Civil society organisations (CSOs) and human rights’ defenders are key actors in the system
of checks and balances. They act as watchdogs against breaches of the rule of law and
actively contribute to promoting and protecting EU values and fundamental rights. This was
recognised in a Commission Recommendation on civic engagement in December 2023
110
,
calling on Member States to create and maintain a safe and enabling environment for CSOs
and human rights’ defenders, to enhance their opportunities for effective participation in
policy-making. In parallel, the Commission’ proposal on European cross-border associations
aims to remove regulatory and administrative barriers for non-profit associations in the single
market
111
.
In the majority of Member States, an enabling and supportive framework for civil society
exists, and the civil society space continues to be considered as ‘open’
112
. Initiatives to further
improve their operating space have continued, such as through a reform of the tax framework
in
Austria.
In
Sweden,
further steps were taken in the ongoing reforms of the legal framework
for the funding and operation of civil society. In
Ireland,
some further progress was made to
tackle legal obstacles to accessing funding, with an Electoral Commission review of the
current legislation. In
Croatia,
there has been a gradual shift towards multiannual funding for
civil society organisations, though a broader plan still remains outstanding. In
Poland,
creating the office of the Minister for the Civil Society is seen as a first step to new initiatives
to improve the legal framework for CSOs.
However, continuing the trend noted in previous Reports, CSOs and human rights defenders
have increasingly faced challenges, with new legal restrictions, lack of funding or physical
and verbal attacks. No concrete steps have been taken yet to address the uncertainty regarding
the tax-exempt status of non-profit organisations in
Germany.
In
Greece,
the ongoing
implementation of the interoperability of the existing registries for CSOs is a positive
109
110
111
112
Last year it was 40%. Contribution from the Contribution from the European Implementation Network for
the 2024 Rule of Law Report.
Recommendation on promoting the engagement and effective participation of citizens and civil society
organisation in public policy-making processes (C(2023) 8627, 12 December 2024).
COM/2023/516 final of 5 September 2023.
According to the rating given by CIVICUS (non-governmental organisation). Ratings use a five-category
scale: open, narrowed, obstructed, repressed and closed. Compared to 2023, one Member State has been
downgraded from ‘open’ to ‘narrowed’.
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development, while the registration framework still needs to be evaluated and concerns
remain about the space for civil society. In
Cyprus,
plans for regular dialogue between the
authorities and civil society are encouraging, but questions remain over the administrative
requirements imposed on CSOs. In
Italy,
challenges remain as regards the civic space, also in
light of reported verbal attacks on CSOs involved in humanitarian activities. In
Spain,
a
reform of the Citizen Security Law was announced in Parliament to address concerns about
its impact on the civic space is still pending.
In
North Macedonia,
CSOs operate in an overall enabling environment, but challenges
remain to ensure their sustainable engagement in policymaking. In
Serbia,
CSOs lack an
enabling environment for establishment, operations and financing, and smear campaigns are
conducted against several of them.
In certain Member States, civil society is faced with serious challenges or systemic undue
restrictions to their operations. In
Hungary,
there has been no progress in removing existing
obstacles for CSOs, with smear campaigns and the vilification of independent CSOs remain a
current practice. There are also concerns related to the State’s role in financing civil society.
In
Slovakia,
the environment for CSOs has deteriorated, particularly those with the role of
overseeing state activities, and in the area of human rights.
National checks and balances in the use of intrusive surveillance software (“spyware”)
Even where the use of spyware is linked to national security, and in instances where it falls
outside the scope of EU law, national checks and balances need to ensure that safeguards are
in place. Fundamental rights such as the protection of personal data, the freedom to receive
and impart information, the freedom of expression, as well as the right to an effective remedy
and a fair trial, need to be respected. EU data protection legislation offers a comprehensive
mechanism of oversight and safeguards and is applicable in situations where spyware is used
for law enforcement purposes. The Venice Commission is working on developing principles
and good practices applicable to targeted surveillance by means of spyware.
The 2024 Report follows up on developments concerning the alleged illegal use of spyware
(such as ‘Pegasus’ or equivalent intrusive surveillance software) referred to in previous
reports, in particular as regards the functioning of national checks and balances in response to
such allegations. In
Poland,
the Sejm established a parliamentary investigative committee to
assess the use of ‘Pegasus’ software by members of the Government, secret services, the
police, and other state bodies between 2015 and 2023. The new Prosecutor-General also
decided to formally notify persons targeted by Pegasus software and appointed a special team
to carry out investigations on the legality of its use. In other Member States, the situation
remains unchanged. In
Greece,
judicial investigations into the use of spyware are ongoing.
On the other hand, in
Hungary,
concerns persist due to the absence of effective judicial or
other oversight as regards the use of secret surveillance measures outside criminal
proceedings.
Safeguards in addressing foreign influence
Interference by foreign governments seeking to manipulate public opinion and distort the
democratic debate poses a threat to the EU’s democracies
113
. Efforts to preserve the public
interest and shed light on foreign influence on EU democracies must be proportionate and
fully respect fundamental rights and democratic values. Drawing on both the Court of
113
Communication on Defence of Democracy (C(2023)630).
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Justice
114
and the Venice Commission
115
, in December 2023 the Commission proposed to
regulate the transparency of interest representation from third countries in the EU, focusing
on transparency and democratic accountability, introducing targeted rules accompanied by
strong safeguards.
In some Member States, measures proposed or adopted and citing the need to address foreign
influence have raised serious concerns, notably because they stigmatise the organisations
concerned. Under a new law to protect national sovereignty,
Hungary
established a new
office with broadly defined competences tasked with reporting on any person or organisation
suspected of serving foreign interests and/or receiving foreign funding, which has launched
investigations
116
. This is currently subject to infringement proceedings launched by the
Commission. In
Slovakia,
draft amendments tabled in Parliament would introduce a
mandatory labelling of organisations receiving funding from abroad beyond a certain
threshold as ‘organisations with foreign support’.
Initiatives to foster a rule of law culture
Promoting a strong rule of law culture is essential for the long-term resilience of democratic
societies. A variety of actors actively contribute to this, for example by organising debates or
educational initiatives.
In
Czechia,
public authorities have launched initiatives to foster the rule of law culture, with
several events organised in both chambers of Parliament and high-level events organised by
the Government and the Public Defender of Rights. In
Spain,
several initiatives aimed at
fostering a rule of law culture have been taken. In
Slovakia,
the Slovak National Centre for
Human Rights, mandated as National Human Rights Institution and equality body,
contributes with projects to strengthen the rule of law culture.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS
The five successive years of Commission reporting on the rule of law have illustrated how
respect for the rule of law can never be taken for granted. Changing circumstances, whether
political change or societal and technological developments, can bring new challenges to the
rule of law. The nature and degree of challenges vary from one Member State to another, as
reflected in the recommendations addressed in the Rule of Law Report.
At the same time, the reports have also shown how dialogue can help to make progress. Over
the past five years, the EU has significantly enhanced its capacity to address rule of law
challenges and support reforms. Member States can increasingly draw upon a common
understanding of how policies, institutions and laws can best be shaped to protect the rule of
law. While rule of law-related problems still exist and will continue to emerge, the EU is now
better equipped to approach these in an objective and sound way, and to bring different
114
115
116
Judgment of 18 June 2020,
Commission v Hungary (Transparency of associations),
C-78/18,
EU:C:2020:476.
Venice Commission Report on Funding of Associations CDL-AD(2019)002. See also Venice Commission
Urgent Opinion on on the Law of Georgia on Transparency of Foreign Influence (CDL PI(2024)013) and
Opinion on Act LXXXVII of 2023 on the Protection of National Sovereignty (CDL(2024)001).
In June 2024, the Sovereignty Protection Office launched investigations into the activities and funding of
an anti-corruption CSO and an investigative media outlet.
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instruments to bear in finding solutions. Member States remain free to design solutions in line
with their specific national context, but such solutions should draw on a consolidating body
of rule of law standards and requirements.
The Political Guidelines for the Commission 2024-2029 cement the rule of law at the heart of
a successful EU. This is also underlined in the European Council Strategic Agenda adopted in
June 2024. This consensus shows the importance of continuing to deepen the EU’s work on
the rule of law, building common understanding, broadening the impact of the EU’s work,
and deepening the toolbox at our disposal to promote the rule of law.
The Rule of Law Report will continue to spearhead this work. This will include a broadening
of reporting to embrace key issues such as the Single Market dimension, looking at issues
affecting companies, especially SMEs, operating across borders. It will also include building
a closer link between the Rule of Law Report and its recommendations and funding under the
EU budget: this will be an important consideration as we seek to ensure that the next
Multiannual Financial Framework offers the maximum to European citizens. EU funding can
be further focused on helping national efforts to fight corruption and to protect the EU
financial interest, investing in upholding the rule of law. Further enlargement countries will
be included in the Rule of Law report as and when they are ready. Enforcement will be of
particular importance: tracking implementation of the Report’s recommendations will be
developed as a way to consolidate progress.
The core principles underlying the Rule of Law Report – equal treatment between Member
States, the rigorous application of EU standards, and a process embedded in dialogue and
mutual understanding – have stood the test of time. The Commission looks forward to
working with Member States, the European Parliament and the Council to ensure that the rule
of law can continue to provide the foundation stone for Europe’s democracies.
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ANNEX with recommendations
All the 2024 recommendations will be listed, in the protocol order of the Member States. For
each Member State the recommendations will be presented in the order in which the topics
appear in the respective country chapter and with a chapeau sentence where relevant (in an
identical way as in the country chapter).
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